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Abstract
Modelling argumentation based on legal cases has been a central topic of AI and Law since its
very beginnings. The current established view is that facts must be determined on the basis of
evidence. Next, these facts must be used to ascribe legally significant predicates (factors and
issues) to the case, on the basis of which the outcome can be established.
This thesis aims to provide a method to encapsulate the knowledge of bodies of case law
from various legal domains using a recent development in AI knowledge representation, Ab-
stract Dialectical Frameworks (ADFs), as the central feature of the design method. Three legal
domains in the US Courts are used throughout the thesis: The domain of the Automobile Ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment, which has been freshly analysed in terms of factors in this
thesis; the US Trade Secrets domain analysed from well-known legal case-based reasoning sys-
tems (CATO and IBP); and the Wild Animals domain analysed extensively in AI and Law.
In this work, ADFs play a role akin to that of Entity-Relationship models in the design
of database systems to design and implement programs intended to decide cases, described as
sets of factors, according to a theory of a particular domain based on a set of precedent cases
relating to that domain. The ADFs in this thesis are instantiated from different starting points:
factor-based representation of oral dialogues and factor-based analysis of legal opinions.
A legal dialogue representation model is defined for the US Supreme Court Oral Hearing
dialogues. The role of these hearings is to identify the components that can form the basis of an
argument that will resolve the case. Dialogue moves used by participants have been identified as
the dialogue proceeds to assert and modify argument components in term of issues, factors and
facts, and to produce what are called Argument Component Trees (ACTs) for each participant
in the dialogue, showing how these components relate to one another. The resulting trees can
be then merged and used as input to decide the accepted components using an ADF. The model
is illustrated using two landmark case studies in the Automobile Exception domain: Carney v.
California and US v. Chadwick.
A legal justification model is defined to capture knowledge in a legal domain and to provide
justification and transparency of legal decisions. First, a legal domain ADF is instantiated from
the factor hierarchy of CATO and IBP, then the method is applied to the other two legal domains.
In each domain, the cases are expressed in terms of factors organised into an ADF, from which
an executable program can be implemented in a straightforward way by taking advantage of the
closeness of the acceptance conditions of the ADF to components of an executable program.
The proposed method is evaluated to test the ease of implementation, the efficacy of the re-
sulting program, the ease of refinement, transparency of the reasoning and transferability across
xv
legal domains. This evaluation suggests ways of improving the decision by incorporating the
case facts, and considering justification and reasoning using portions of precedents.
The final result is ANGELIC (ADF for kNowledGe Encapsulation of Legal Information
from Cases), a method for producing programs that decide the cases with a high degree of
accuracy in multiple domains.
KEY WORDS: Legal Reasoning, Legal Dialogue, ADF, Case-Based Reasoning, Factors,
Facts.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Justice? – You get justice in the next world. In this one you have the law.”
William Gaddis, A Frolic of His Own
——————————————–
1.1 Overview on Artificial Intelligence and Law
Understanding the human reasoning process used in conducting arguments, resolving conflicts,
and reaching a decision is an interdisciplinary study. Modelling argumentation has had a great
impact on the development of theories and applications in Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially
in critical domains that involve richness of reasoning such as Law. Law is at the heart of ev-
ery society, and is vitally important to people’s lives in all aspects, through applying justice,
addressing human rights, and promoting social values.
AI and Law have crossed paths [31, 110] for over 25 years. Creating and applying Law
involves information processing, reasoning, and decision making, which correspond to the tech-
niques of information retrieval and extraction, knowledge representation and reasoning, natural
language processing, machine learning and data mining. This makes Law a natural application
area and a rich test-bed for research in AI. In addition to these shared interests, AI and Law also
have a shared subject [31, p.307]: In law, rules have exceptions, reasons are weighed, and princi-
ples provide guidance. Similarly in AI, reasoning is uncertain, knowledge is context-dependent,
and behaviour is adaptive.
A particular concern of AI and Law is legal reasoning. Law often involves conflicting inter-
ests of opposite parties. The extensive documentation of disputes and the adversarial nature of
legal procedure makes AI and Law an excellent domain for providing methods to compare and
contrast between alternative opinions and for giving explanations and justifications for decisions.
Therefore, argumentation has been recognised as a core topic in AI and Law. Understanding of
the structure and acceptability of arguments is essential for a computer system to be able to
engage in exchanges of arguments. Legal systems have benefitted considerably from the devel-
opment of argumentation in AI, as in these domains there is a need for decision making based
1
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on incomplete or uncertain information. Incorporating elements from the theories of argumen-
tation into AI applications has the obvious advantage of allowing these systems to make use of
uncertain or incomplete knowledge available to them. In such situations argumentation can play
the important role of providing tentative conclusions for or against a claim in the absence of
further information to the contrary.
From the early 1990s several areas of computer science also became interested in the di-
alogical aspect of argumentation, including AI and Law. Dialogue systems were originally
introduced into AI and Law as a way of modelling legal procedures [70], and more recently
for legal reasoning [107] or for exploring particular legal phenomena such as burden of proof
[71, 109]. Dialogues in the legal domain combine arguments from different resources, i.e. ar-
gument about the case evidence and facts, argument from legal rules, argument from precedent
cases, argument from hypothetical tests and others that are required to resolve ambiguity and
conflicts. In general, in conflict resolution dialogues the outcome is not fully determined by the
participants. A typical example is legal procedure, where a third party, such as a judge or jury,
normally determines the outcome of the case.
At first sight, people might think that Law as a body of rules and legal reasoning is devel-
oped using techniques of knowledge representation and automated deduction [93], but it is not.
Legal reasoning goes beyond the literal meaning of the legal rules and requires consideration of
context. Further aspects of law, related to providing a test so that a landmark case can be applied
to future cases, applying the law to particulars of the case taking into consideration the social
effects and changes in social objectives, in addition to the adversarial nature of legal procedures,
may all require that a legal rule is overridden or changed.
A legal case starts with a story told by a client. The lawyer then interprets this story, accord-
ing to the case context, based on a set of facts so that it can be fitted to an applicable law. Once
the interpretation is determined an argument is constructed using some case precedents. Thus
a legal case passes through various modes of reasoning: determining facts, classifying the facts
under legal concepts of conditions, and deriving legal consequences from these facts. Therefore,
computational argumentation systems developed to simulate legal reasoning are used to target
different challenges [36, 110]. Systems can be used to store conflicting interpretations [98], pro-
vide reasoning with conflict rules [107, 108], propose alternative case decisions, use precedent
cases to generate arguments [10, 14], or as mediators between disputing parties by structuring
and recording their arguments and responses [34, 70, 92].
All this makes AI and Law a thoroughly interdisciplinary field, as it benefits from the syn-
ergy between the different kinds of systems investigated; theoretical systems (legal theory) are
used to learn about artificial systems while remaining grounded by the perspective on natural
systems (argumentation, practice of law) (see Figure 1.1) [31, p.308]. There is a synergy not
only between law and AI, but also between AI and AI and Law. Better understanding of AI
problems can benefit law, and applying law in AI can benefit AI. Applying argumentation the-
ories and techniques in real, documented examples in Law instead of hypothetical ones has
contributed significantly to the improvement of AI applications from which society as a whole
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can benefit. It also provides insights about the limitations of existing techniques, suggesting
refinements and extensions of the models, or developing new approaches.
FIGURE 1.1: The Interdisciplinary Nature of AI and Law Systems
1.1.1 Legal Reasoning Model
Modelling reasoning in legal cases has been a central topic of AI and Law from the beginning,
and there is now a good degree of consensus, especially with regard to the main elements in-
volved. This consensus can be expressed as a tree of inference, with a legal decision as the root
and evidence as the leaves. Between the two there are a number of distinct layers. Immediately
below the decision there is the issues level [55], or values [38], which provide the reasons why
the decision is made.
The idea here is that laws are made (and applied) so as to promote social values. Whether
a value is promoted or not by a particular decision is an issue. Where more than one value is
involved and they point to different decisions, the conflict needs to be resolved. Sometimes it is
appropriate to give priority to one value over another (as in [38]); sometimes a balance needs to
be struck (as in [87]).
At the next level down there are a number of factors [10]. Factors are stereotypical fact
patterns which, if present in a case, favour one side or the other by promoting a value if that
side wins, and so are used to resolve the issues. Factors are required to enable generalisation
across the infinitely varied fact situations that can arise, and so permit the comparison of cases.
Sometimes (as in [10]) it may be convenient to group several factors together under more ab-
stract factors, so that there may be two or three layers of factors, moving from base level factors
through more abstract factors, before reaching the issues. Below the factors there are the fact
patterns used to determine their presence. These may offer necessary and sufficient conditions,
but more often they offer either a set of sufficient conditions, or in less clear-cut cases, a number
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FIGURE 1.2: Legal Case-Based Reasoning Systems Time Line
of facts supplying reasons for and against the presence of the factor, which need to be consid-
ered and weighed to make a judgment [20]. At the lowest level there is the evidence. Facts
are determined by particular items of evidence, and where evidence conflicts, a judgment will
need to be made: often this judgment is made by a jury of lay people rather than lawyers. In
the lower courts there will be real items of evidence, particular witness testimonies and the like.
But by the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, the facts are usually considered established
and beyond challenge. The Supreme Court does, however, need to consider what is admissible
and what should count as evidence, and whether this will generally be available, so that the rule
governing their decisions can be applied in future cases.
Thus a complete argument for a case will comprise a view on what can be considered as
evidence for relevant facts: what facts are required to establish the presence of various factors,
and how they relate; how the factors can be used to determine the issues; and, where issues and
values conflict, how these conflicts should be resolved.
Several systems have contributed to this understanding in legal reasoning in the domain of
AI in law. HYPO [14], the parent, is a case-based reasoning system that supports the selection of
similarity between cases based on factors treated as dimension points. The main goal of HYPO
is to create arguments for a legal case using precedent cases, without making decisions on the
current case. CATO (HYPOs child) [10] was primarily directed at law school students, and was
intended to help them form better case-based arguments, in particular to improve their skills in
distinguishing cases by grouping these factors into a factor hierarchy. IBP (HYPOs grandchild)
[17] partitions the factors into case issues and uses case-based techniques to resolve the conflicts
within issues and predict the outcomes of cases.
HYPO, CATO and IBP all operates on the domain of US Trade Secret Law, which concerns
the protection of technological and commercial information not generally known in the trade
against unauthorised commercial use (this legal domain is explained in Chapter 3). AGATHA
system [57, 58] has also used cases from the domain of US Trade Secret Law, however, the main
purpose of AGATHA is to construct a case law theory of the domain, starting from factors rather
than the domain itself, which explains as many of the existing cases as possible while giving the
desired outcome for the current case.
Figure 1.2 shows a time line for some of the landmark legal reasoning systems; all these
systems are based on an analysis of the case opinion argument and finding the similarities be-
tween cases in a specific case domain. The systems above the line are those directly relevant to
this thesis, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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1.1.2 Motivation
Although AI and Law has been around for more than three decades, and there has been much in-
teresting research [31], there has been disappointingly little penetration into legal practice. One
important exception is the approach to moving from written regulations to an executable expert
system based on [85], which has been developed through a series of ever larger companies:
Softlaw, Ruleburst and, currently, Oracle.
In the past few years or so, however, there is an unprecedented degree of interest in AI
and its potential for supporting legal practice. This is evidenced by articles in the legal trade
press such as Legal Business1 and Legal Practice Management2; national radio programmes
such as Law in Action3 and Analysis4 and Professional Society events, such as panels run by
the Law Society of England and Wales5. The legal profession has never been so interested in,
and receptive to, the possibilities of AI for application to their commercial activities. There are,
therefore opportunities which need to be taken.
One of the major lessons that can be drawn from Softlaw and its successors is the need for
a methodology. A methodology gives some assurance to clients that their engagement with AI
has some prospects of success: they are not so interested in furthering research activities as
in increasing profits and the use of an established methodology can allow them to know how
their particular problem will be addressed and what will be produced at the end of the process.
Equally important, as the Softlaw experience also showed, is the existence of tools to support the
methodology. Such tools reinforce the methodology, make it more teachable and reproducible
and shorten the development time.
This thesis targets this need by presenting a knowledge engineering methodology to fa-
cilitate analysis and provide a way for recording the fruits of this analysis by encapsulating
the knowledge of different legal domains, rather than just one domain as in the previous legal
case-based reasoning systems, using Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADF) [53, 54], a recent
development in abstract argumentation (see Chapter 2 for argumentation frameworks) and a
generalisation of Dungs Abstract Argumentation Framework (AF) [61]. The final result is AN-
GELIC (ADF for kNowledGe Encapsulation of Legal Information from Cases) methodology.
Note that ADFs are primarily used to record knowledge, not to execute it.
As mentioned above, work in AI and Law has established a fairly clear model of legal
reasoning in which cases are described in terms of legally significant factors, and these sets of
factors provide reasons to decide cases in a particular way, determined by precedent cases. AI
and Law has not, however, provided a methodology to extract the relevant factors in the domain,
show the factors presented in a case and find the relationship between these factors and other
components of the reasoning, such as facts and issues in a more comprehensive way.
1AI and the law tools of tomorrow: A special report. www.legalbusiness.co.ukindex.phpanalysis4874-ai-and-the-
law-tools-of-tomorrow-a-special-report. All websites accessed in January 2017.
2The Future has Landed. www.legalsupportnetwork.co.uk. The article appeared in the March 2015 edition.
3Artificial Intelligence and the Law. www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b07dlxmj.
4When Robots Steal Our Jobs. www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0540h85.
5The full event of one such panel can be seen on youtube at www.youtube.com/watch?v=8jPB-4Y3jLg.
Other youtube videos include Richard Susskind at www.youtube.com/watch?v=xs0iQSyBoDE and Karen Jacks at
www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0B5UNWN-eY.
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HYPO, CATO and IBP systems focus on the reasoning involved and provide a program to
model this reasoning. In contrast, ANGELIC provides a method for performing the domain
analysis required for such systems. Moreover, unlike AGATHA, the theory in AGATHA is
constructed from factors rather than the domain itself.
The legal case analyses provided in ANGELIC show
• how argument components, not the argument, tend to be proposed and refined in oral ar-
gumentation dialogues, in (i) a dialogue representation model that produces a visual rep-
resentation of the argument components exchanged by the dialogue parties in a graphical
form, taking as input the dialogue speech acts and showing how the accepted components
can be formed, the conditions under which they apply,
• and how relationships between them can be related to the decision in a (ii) a decision
justification model. The legal reasoning methodology is then applied over various legal
domains, using analyses produced by different people for use by different programs for
different tasks to show that it is able to documenting knowledge derived by cases in a
variety of domains.
The remainder of this chapter outlines an introduction to the research described in this thesis.
The next section (Section 1.2) presents the research questions and the associated research issues
that the work is directed towards. Section 1.3 describes how the research issues are addressed
(the research methodology) while Section 1.4 describes the contributions of the work presented
in this thesis. Section 1.5 presents the published work to date resulting from the content of
the thesis and Section 1.6 describes how the rest of this thesis is structured. This chapter is
concluded with a brief summary in Section 1.7.
1.2 Research Issues and Questions
Given the overview from the introduction above, the aim of the research presented in this thesis
is:
To provide a methodology to encapsulate analyses of a variety of case law domains,
potentially performed by different people, for different purposes, using different
techniques, in a common format that can be readily realised in a computational
form.
To address this aim, the research is directed to answer the following research questions:
RQ1 Does abstract argumentation provide a format capable of capturing a variety of case law
domains?
RQ2 How can computational dialogue be used to identify relevant components to instantiate
the abstract argumentation format used?
RQ3 How can we produce an executable program from this argumentation format in a standard
manner such that cases are decided by the program to an acceptable degree of accuracy?
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RQ4 How can this executable representation be used to evaluate and refine the analysis?
RQ5 What additional information needs to be provided to support the particular aspects of
applications such as explanation?
The first part of this research aims to address RQ1 and RQ2 by modelling a representation for
the factor-based argumentation through which Supreme Court Oral Hearings (in which counsels
for the parties present and clarify their arguments), can be analysed in order to identify the com-
ponents from which arguments are constructed for delivering the opinion (in which the justices
supply a reasoned judgment). The second part concerns providing analysis and justifications
for legal decisions through a representation using Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADFs) to
explore RQ3, RQ4, and RQ5 in addition to RQ1. This ensures the following research objectives
are fulfilled:
Objective 1 Provide an approach to analyse and represent a legal procedure dialogue in a real
context to provide an argument structure from the argument components.
Objective 2 Employ a knowledge engineering approach to capture knowledge in a legal do-
main, and to reason with this representation, to provide justification and transparency of
legal decisions.
Objective 3 Develop a justification model that can be applied over different legal case domains
using abstract argumentation, and compare the outcome to the actual legal decisions.
Objective 4 Conduct a comparative evaluation to compare the performance of the defined ap-
proach between the different domains, and other legal reasoning systems.
Objective 5 Discover various methods to improve the explanation of legal decisions in the pro-
gram output.
In the conclusions in Chapter 8, these research questions and objectives will be re-visited to
discuss how well they have been met using the methodology presented in the next section.
1.3 Research Methodology
Five research phases are followed in the order below to fulfill the aims of the research conducted
in this thesis, and to address the research questions identified in the previous section. Figure 1.3
illustrates the research framework, showing the relationships between these phases. Note that
all the selected legal domains in the research are related to the US Courts, where all the case
briefs, Oral Hearings and Opinions are readily and freely available to the public and have been
previously examined in the AI and Law literature.
Phase 1: Analysis and Representation of Dialogue This phase presents a model that provides
a structured analysis of the dialogues conducted within the US Supreme Court Oral Hear-
ings to enable the construction of what has been called argument component trees (ACTs)
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FIGURE 1.3: Research Framework
in which the issues, facts and factors are proposed and refined through the use of a set of
defined speech acts. Following on from the analysis, a dialogue representation model is
defined to identify the moves made during the hearings. The model is validated through
application to a selected case domain, the Automobile Exception to the US Fourth amend-
ment. The oral hearing dialogues of two landmark cases, US v. Chadwick and California
v. Carney, related to this domain are analysed and their ACTs are constructed to show
the relevant components. The following steps show the methodology applied to fulfill the
aims of this phase:
1. Locate the Oral Hearing dialogues in the overall Supreme Court process; identify
that the dialogue consists of three distinct sub-dialogues; and characterise the three
sub-dialogues in terms of their initial state, and individual and collective goals fol-
lowing Walton and Krabbe’s dialogue typology in [133].
2. Define a set of speech acts to enable the goals of the dialogues to be achieved in
the form of assertions and associated questions, and determine the pre- and post-
conditions of the moves to define a protocol for the dialogue.
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3. Define a visual representation as an inference ACT to show how the components of
the arguments are asserted, and related to each other, updated after each move in the
dialogue.
4. For each case study, analyse the transcript of the Oral Hearing, mark each utterance
with the appropriate speech act and construct the ACTs by executing the dialogue.
5. Update a legal ontology that serves as a repository for the argument components in
the domain.
6. Establish a legal case analysis work flow to clarify the stages of the analysis and
how they are related to the legal ontology used, the implemented program and to the
legal opinion.
Phase 2: Semi-automated Dialogue Representation Model Having established the model for
conducting the analysis task, the next step was to move towards automation, as follows:
1. Define a precise grammar setting out the rules for how the components of the ACTs
can be combined to construct the trees.
2. Implement a program to provide a visual representation of the dialogue by producing
ACTs of the relevant components for each party in the dialogue and provide input to
the decision making process. The program will focus only on validating the analysis
of the Oral Hearing dialogues and organising the ACT components.
3. Test the program over scenarios from the two analysed case studies.
Phase 3: Abstract Dialectical Framework to Justify Legal Decisions To find the relationship
between the opinion argument and the represented issues, factors and facts, the factor-
based reasoning [10] has been expressed in terms of ADFs [54]. Further clarification is
provided to show how the constructed ADF can be used to give justifications for case de-
cisions in the domain by implementing a Prolog program that ascends through this ADF,
identifying the factors present in the case and resolving the issues to predict the outcome.
The program thus takes as input the case representation and produces the accepted com-
ponents that determine the case decision. Following the analysis of CATO [10], IBP [17]
and AGATHA [57], the US Trade Secrets domain is selected to provide a comparative
evaluation with IBP (Issue-Based Prediction) and AGATHA (Argument Agent for The-
ory Automation), through the following method:
1. Study the analysis of CATO [10] and IBP [17] and map the factor hierarchy tree into
an ADF.
2. Construct the ADF that expresses the theory of knowledge of the analysed domain.
3. Define the ADF’s acceptance conditions for the different components using the
cases’ representation and decision.
4. Implement a Prolog program by rewriting the acceptance conditions as groups of
Prolog clauses to determine the acceptability of each node in terms of its children
and adding some reporting to indicate whether the node is satisfied.
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5. Apply the program to the 32 cases used in AGATHA and record the results (the
accepted components).
6. Compare the achieved results with the CATO, IBP and AGATHA programs reported
in [38] and [57], and analyse the findings.
Phase 4: Justification using the Representation The previous phase described how the ADF
and factor-based reasoning can be related. This stage shows how this finding can be used
to provide justification for the decision based on the ACTs constructed from the Oral
Hearing dialogues. This will involve:
1. Using the ACTs constructed from the case studies to provide an approach for merg-
ing the ACTs into one case ADF.
2. Defining the acceptance conditions for the different ACT components according to
the factor acceptance conditions defined above.
3. Constructing the final case ADF that represents the decision justification from the
accepted components.
4. Providing steps for the decision explanation and justification model that generates
the ADF from ACTs.
Phase 5: Generalisation and Evaluation Following the methodology presented above, a fur-
ther evaluation is conducted by applying the justification model over different legal case
domains, examining the results and comparing the outcome with the actual case decisions.
This involves:
1. Capturing and representing the knowledge of two more domains: The Wild Animals
(5 cases) [30], and Automobile Exception to The Fourth Amendment (10 cases) [29].
The analysis of the Wild Animals domain is based on [30]; while the analysis of the
Automobile Exception domain, although starting from [115] and [29] was produced
specifically for this thesis.
2. Conduct a comparative evaluation between the domains that tests the ease of im-
plementation, the performance and efficacy of the resulting program, the ease of
refinement and the transparency of the reasoning.
3. Investigate further improvements to the program output by incorporating the case
facts to improve the decision justification and reasoning using portions of prece-
dents.
4. Amend the program rules to produce another opinion, the dissenting (minority) opin-
ion.
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1.4 Research Contributions
The work described in this thesis makes a number of contributions, as follows:
1. Examination of the legal procedure in the US Supreme court and characterisation of the
three sub-dialogues of the Oral Hearing in terms of their initial state, and individual and
collective goals as required by Walton and Krabbe in [133].
2. A dialogue representation model, which provides a structured analysis of US Supreme
Court Oral Hearings that enable the construction of argument component trees in which
the issues, facts and factors are proposed and refined through the use of a set of defined
speech acts. This involves a manual mark-up for the argument components of the Oral
Hearing transcripts of two legal cases and a workflow for analysing the legal cases and
relate the produced argument components to the legal opinion. This mark-up can then be
input to the oral hearing dialogues program to provide a visual representation by executing
the dialogue.
3. A correspondence between the components of the arguments in the dialogue representa-
tion and the legal opinion.
4. The application of ADFs as powerful, general, abstract frameworks for argumentation to
drive and record the design of a knowledge base to encapsulate a body of case law.
5. A solid formal basis for factor-based reasoning using ADFs that was lacking from previ-
ous systems used for reasoning about cases.
6. ANGELIC, a methodology for developing a decision justification model using Abstract
Dialectical Frameworks that is able to encapsulate and apply theories of case law repre-
sented as ADFs. The method has been tested by producing programs for three domains:
US Trade Secrets from the factor hierarchy of CATO [10] and IBP [55] (ANGELIC Trade
Secrets), the Wild Animals domain from [30] (ANGELIC Animals), and a set of cases in
the Automobile Exception to The Fourth Amendment domain (ANGELIC Automobile).
7. A comparative evaluation between the domains that tests the ease of implementation,
the performance and efficacy of the resulting program, the ease of refinement and the
transparency of the reasoning.
8. A comparative evaluation between ANGELIC, the methodology applied in this thesis, and
previous legal case-based reasoning systems.
9. A means of improving the justification of the ANGELIC program by incorporating the
case facts, to provide closeness to the reported opinion.
10. Identification of ways to improve the explanation of the output from the decision justifi-
cation model using portion of precedents and the generation of multiple opinions.
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1.5 Publications
Much of the work included in this thesis has been reported in various articles, refereed con-
ference proceedings, workshops and seminars. Segments of work presented in this thesis have
been published in papers along with the author’s supervisors, Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-
Capon, as shown below:
Journal Paper
1. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2016): A methodology for
designing systems to reason with legal cases using abstract dialectical frameworks.
Artificial Intelligence and Law. Vol 24(1), pp. 1-49.
Paper Abstract [8]: This paper presents a methodology to design and implement
programs intended to decide cases, described as sets of factors, according to a theory
of a particular domain based on a set of precedent cases relating to that domain. We
use Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADFs), a recent development in AI knowl-
edge representation, as the central feature of our design method. ADFs will play a
role akin to that played by Entity-Relationship models in the design of database sys-
tems. First, we explain how the factor hierarchy of the well-known legal reasoning
system CATO can be used to instantiate an ADF for the domain of US Trade Secrets.
This is intended to demonstrate the suitability of ADFs for expressing the design of
legal cased based systems. The method is then applied to two other legal domains
often used in the literature of AI and Law. In each domain, the design is provided by
the domain analyst expressing the cases in terms of factors organised into an ADF
from which an executable program can be implemented in a straightforward way
by taking advantage of the closeness of the acceptance conditions of the ADF to
components of an executable program. We evaluate the ease of implementation, the
performance and efficacy of the resulting program, ease of refinement of the pro-
gram and the transparency of the reasoning. This evaluation suggests ways in which
factor-based systems, which are limited by taking as their starting point the repre-
sentation of cases as sets of factors and so abstracting away the particular facts, can
be extended to address open issues in AI and Law by incorporating the case facts to
improve the decision, and by considering justification and reasoning using portion
of precedents.
This paper is an extension of ICAIL 2015 [5] conference paper. Much of the content
of this paper provided the basis of the work presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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Conference Proceedings Contributions
1. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2016): ANGELIC Secrets:
Bridging from Factors to Facts in US Trade Secrets - JURIX 2016: The Twenty-
Ninth Annual Conference, Nice, France, pp.113-118. Frontiers in Artificial Intelli-
gence and Applications, Vol. 294. IOS Press, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Paper Abstract [9]: The ANGELIC (ADF for kNowledGe Encapsulation of Legal
Information from Cases) project provided a methodology for implementing a sys-
tem to predict the outcome of legal cases based on a theory of the relevant domain
constructed from precedent cases and other sources. The method has been evaluated
in several domains, including US Trade Secrets Law. Previous systems in this do-
main were based on factors, which are either present or absent in a case, and favour
one of the parties with the same force for every factor. Evaluations have, however,
suggested that the ability to represent different degrees of presence and absence, and
different strengths, could improve performance. Here we extend the methodology to
allow for different degrees of presence and support, by using dimensions as a bridge
between facts and factors. This new program is evaluated using a standard set of test
cases.
The work presented in this paper acted as a foundation for part of future work (dis-
cussed briefly in Chapter 8) related to this thesis.
2. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2015): Evaluating an ap-
proach to reasoning with cases using abstract dialectical frameworks. In: Proceed-
ings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law
(ICAIL 2015), San Diego, USA, pp. 156 - 160. ACM Press.
Paper Abstract [5]: Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADFs) are a recent devel-
opment in computational argumentation which are, it has been suggested, a fruitful
way of implementing factor-based reasoning with legal cases. In this paper we eval-
uate this proposal, by reconstructing CATO using ADFs. We evaluate the ease of
implementation, the efficacy of the resulting program, ease of refinement of the pro-
gram, transparency of the reasoning, relation to formal argumentation techniques,
and transferability across domains.
The content of this paper summarises the material presented in Chapters 5 and 6
and part of the evaluation in Chapter 7.
3. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2015): Factors, issues and
values: revisiting reasoning with cases. In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Inter-
national Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL 2015), San Diego,
USA, pp. 3-12. ACM Press.
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Paper Abstract [6]: In this paper we revisit reasoning with legal cases, with a
view to articulating the relationships between issues, factors, facts and values, and
to identifying areas for future work. We start from the different ways in which
attempts have been made to go beyond a fortori reasoning from the precedent base,
so that conclusions not fully justified by the precedents can be drawn. We then
use a particular example domain taken from the literature to illustrate our preferred
approach and to relate factors and values. From this we observe that much current
work depends critically on the ascription of factors to cases in a Boolean manner,
while in practice there are compelling reasons to see the presence of factors as a
matter of degree. On the basis of our observations we make suggestions for the
directions of future work on this topic.
The work presented in this paper acted as a foundation for part of the future work
related to this thesis, discussed briefly in Chapter 7.
4. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2015): Using abstract dialec-
tical frameworks to argue about legal cases In: Proceedings of the First European
Conference on Argumentation (ECA 2015), Lisbon, Portugal, pp.163-180.
Paper Abstract [7]: Recent work has shown how to map factor hierarchies for le-
gal reasoning into Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADFs), by defining acceptance
conditions for each node. In this paper we model as ADFs bodies of case law from
various legal domains, rewrite them as logic programs, compare the results with pre-
vious legal reasoning systems and propose improvements by increasing the scope of
reasoning downwards to facts.
The content of this paper is an extended version of ICAIL conference paper no.1.
The aim of this paper is to present the application of abstract argumentation in
the legal domain, to a different audience, concerned with argumentation in general
rather than law in particular.
5. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2014): Abstract dialecti-
cal frameworks for legal reasoning. In R. Hoekstra (editor): Legal Knowledge
and Information Systems - JURIX 2014: The Twenty Seventh Annual Conference,
Krakow, Poland, pp.61-70. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Vol.
271. IOS Press, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Paper Abstract [3]: In recent years a powerful generalisation of Dung’s abstract ar-
gumentation frameworks, Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADF), has been devel-
oped. ADFs generalise the abstract argumentation frameworks introduced by Dung
by replacing Dung’s single acceptance condition (that all attackers be defeated) with
acceptance conditions local to each particular node. Such local acceptance condi-
tions allow structured argumentation to be straightforwardly incorporated. Related
to ADFs are prioritised ADFs, which allow for reasons pro and con a node. In this
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paper we show how these structures provide an excellent framework for representing
a leading approach to reasoning with legal cases.
The work presented in this paper acted as the foundation for the work presented in
Chapters 5 and 6.
6. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2014): Support for factor-
based argumentation. In S. Parsons, N. Oren, C. Reed and F. Cerutti (editors):
Computational Models of Argument, Proceedings of COMMA 2014, The Scottish
Highlands, UK, pp. 447-448. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications,
Vol. 266. IOS Press, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Paper Abstract [4]: In this paper we describe the analysis of arguments for the pur-
pose of building computational models which use factor based reasoning. As such
our emphasis is on the identification of the components of arguments and their rela-
tionships, rather than the structure of particular arguments. Factor-based reasoning
is characterised by its use of concepts which are resistant to definition in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Such concepts instead require classification on
the basis of “family resemblance”, whereby a number of features must be consid-
ered. None of these factors, individually or collectively, can be seen as necessary
or sufficient and so a judgment must be made by balancing the reasons in favour
and the reasons against. We also describe a program which will provide support for
some of the stages central to the analysis process.
This is a short paper accompanying the demonstration of the program and case
studies presented in Chapter 4.
7. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2013): From Oral Hearing
to Opinion in the US Supreme Court. In K.D. Ashley (editor): Legal Knowledge
and Information Systems. JURIX 2013: The Twenty Sixth Annual Conference,
Bologna, Italy, pp.1-10. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Vol.
259. IOS Press, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Paper Abstract [2]: In this paper we provide a structured analysis of US Supreme
Court Oral Hearings to enable identification of the relevant issues, factors and facts
that can be used to construct a test to resolve a case. Our analysis involves the pro-
duction of what we term “argument component trees”(ACTs) in which the issues,
facts and factors, and the relationships between these, are made explicit. We show
how such ACTs can be constructed by identifying the speech acts that are used by
the counsel and Justices within their dialogue. We illustrate the application of our
analysis by applying it to the Oral Hearing that took place for the case of Carney v.
California, and we relate the majority and minority opinions delivered in that case
to our ACTs. The aim of the work is to provide a formal framework that addresses
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a particular aspect of case-based reasoning: enabling the identification and repre-
sentation of the components that are used to form a test to resolve a case and guide
future behaviour.
This paper extends the CMNA workshop paper mentioned below. Part of the mate-
rial presented in this paper set the basis of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Workshop Contributions
1. L. Al-Abdulkarim, K. Atkinson and T. Bench-Capon (2013): Dialogues in US Supreme
Court Oral Hearings. In: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Workshop on Computa-
tional Models of Natural Argument (CMNA 2013).
Paper Abstract [1]: Dialogue protocols in Artificial Intelligence and Law have
become increasingly stylised, intended to examine the logic of particular legal phe-
nomena such as burden of proof, rather than the procedures within which these phe-
nomena occur. While such work has provided some valuable insights, the original
motivation still matters, and so in this paper we will return to the original idea of
using dialogue moves to model particular procedures by examining some very par-
ticular dialogues - those found in Oral Hearings of the US Supreme Court. We will
characterise these dialogues, and illustrate the paper with examples taken from a
close analysis of a case often modelled in AI and Law, California v Carney (1985).
This paper presents the preliminary investigation required to identify tools to provide
computational support for the analysis of Oral Hearings.
The work presented in this paper acted as the foundation for the dialogue represen-
tation model. Part of the paper’s material is presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
Doctoral Consortium Reports
1. L. Al-Abdulkarim (2013): Dialogue Interactions in Oral Hearings. In: CEUR Pro-
ceedings, The Doctoral Consortium of the Twenty Sixth International Conference
on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems (JURIX 2013), Bologna, Italy.
The work presented in this report is related to phase 1 and phase 2 (Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4) of the research methodology. This paper and accompanying presentation
won the prize for the best Doctoral Consortium contribution.
1.6 Thesis Structure
This section outlines the structure of this thesis, indicating the related appendices for each chap-
ter.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the research literature that is relevant to the issues addressed
in this thesis. The chapter is divided into three separate parts: Argumentation in AI and
Law, dialogues, and frameworks for argumentation. Each section explains the topics re-
lated to this research, with an emphasis on how it has been used in this thesis.
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Chapter 3 provides some necessary legal background for this thesis. Firstly, it explains the
procedures of the US Courts, with a focus on the US Supreme Court to show the role
played by the Oral Hearings and Legal Opinion stages, the main procedures on which
this research is based. Secondly, the chapter gives an overview of the legal cases domains
that have been used as case studies in the thesis.
Chapter 4 provides a structured analysis of US Supreme Court Oral Hearings. The chapter
proposes a legal dialogue representation model to enable the identification and represen-
tation of the argument components (issues, factors, and facts) that are used to form the
tests proposed to resolve a case and so establish a knowledge base for a legal domain that
can guide the design of the legal decision justification model. The analysis involves the
production of argument component trees by identifying speech acts to mark the counsels’
and Justices’ utterances within their dialogues. A legal decision workflow is presented
to show how the Oral Hearing analysis leads to the case decision, taking the role of an
ontology that serves as a repository for the argument components of a legal domain. The
specification and implementation of the representation model are briefly discussed, and
the design details are provided in Appendix A. The model is illustrated by analysing the
Oral Hearings of two case studies US v. Chadwick and Carney v. California. The full
analyses of these cases are provided in Appendix B and Appendix C respectively.
Chapter 5 presents ANGELIC, a knowledge engineering methodology for encapsulating legal
information from cases, and shows how it is used for expressing the design of legal case-
based reasoning systems. The factor hierarchy of CATO [10] is used to instantiate an ADF
for the domain of US Trade Secrets considering the similarity in the structure between the
factor hierarchy in (CATO, IBP) and ADF. The factor definitions of the US Trade Secrets
domain are given in Appendix D. Moreover, the chapter investigates the relationship
between the opinion arguments and the represented issues, factors, and facts in the ACTs
produced in Chapter 4, showing how these ACTs can be merged and expressed in terms
of ADFs.
Chapter 6 explores the application of ANGELIC to a range of legal domains to construct sys-
tems that predict the outcome of legal cases described as sets of factors, according to a
theory of a particular domain, based on a set of precedent cases relating to that domain.
The design is provided by the domain analyst, with each domain expressing the cases in
terms of factors organised into an ADF from which an executable program can be im-
plemented. A number of evaluations are conducted to test the ease of implementation,
the performance and efficacy of the resulting program and the ease of refinement of the
program. The chapter is extended for the Automobile Exception domain (the factors defi-
nitions are explained in Appendix E) to explore the relationship between the Oral Hearing
and the Opinion. Furthermore, the domain program applies reasoning using the fact layer,
and includes new rules to consider dissenting opinions.
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The Prolog program and the results for each legal domain are included in the appendices:
US Trade Secrets domain in Appendix F, Wild Animals in Appendix G, and Automobile
Exception domain in Appendix H.
Chapter 7 After applying the methodology to several legal domains, this chapter provides a
number of comparative evaluations: an evaluation to compare the performance of AN-
GELIC on the three legal domains; and a comparative evaluation to compare ANGELIC
with other legal reasoning systems. Further suggestions are discussed to compare the
transparency in reasoning at different reasoning levels, and to set the foundations for fu-
ture work.
Chapter 8 This chapter concludes the thesis by reviewing the contributions and main findings
in terms of the identified research questions and issues. The chapter also revisits the
research objectives and presents some ideas for future work.
1.7 Summary
The main aim of this research is to provide a method to encapsulate analyses of a variety of case
law domains, performed by different people, for different purposes, using different techniques,
in a common format that can be readily realised in a computational form. This introductory
chapter has presented a general overview of AI and Law, the main research domain in this
thesis. In particular, this chapter explained the research questions together with the associated
research objectives to be addressed, the adopted research methodology, and the contributions
and publications that have been produced in the course of the research. Finally, the chapter
provides the thesis road map, starting from Chapter 2, which provides the literature review
aimed to establish the necessary background to the work presented in this thesis.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
“Student: Dr. Einstein, aren’t these the same questions as last year’s final exam?
Dr. Einstein: Yes; But this year the answers are different.” Albert Einstein
——————————————–
This chapter presents an overview of the existing research literature that is relevant to the issues
addressed in this thesis. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the main concern of this thesis
is to provide a method to encapsulate analyses of a variety of case law domains in a common
format. This involves extracting the relevant argument components from dialogues and legal
decisions, then representing this knowledge in a suitable format and realising it in executable
form, so that it can be tested, evaluated and refined. In order to fulfill this research aim in
the appropriate broader context, this chapter is divided into three separate sections, covering
relevant literature:
1. Argumentation in AI and Law: The chapter starts with an overview of the AI and Law
domain in Section 2.1, describing the leading legal case-based reasoning systems, and
discussing the current consensus in legal reasoning models, which has moved from case
evidence to legal consequences.
2. Dialogues: Dialogue typologies and the structure of the dialogue models will be discussed
in Section 2.2 with a focus on examples of legal dialogue systems, which relates to the
material that will be presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
3. Frameworks for Argumentation: Section 2.3 presents an overview of argumentation frame-
works, starting with abstract argumentation frameworks, Dung’s frameworks [61] and re-
finements of these, giving more emphasis to Abstract Dialectical Frameworks [53, 54],
and ending with structured argumentation: Argumentation Schemes [132], ASPIC+ [105]
and Carneades [71].
The chapter concludes with a summary of the key points addressed, and their relationship to
the research contribution of this thesis. Figure 2.1 provides a diagram showing the scope of the
literature that addresses the issues of this thesis.
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FIGURE 2.1: Main Topics in The Literature Review
2.1 Argumentation in AI and Law
The overview of AI and Law provided in the introductory chapter shows that a central theme in
modelling legal reasoning is argument. Arguments can be reconstructed from legal documents
(natural language texts) or generated from sources such as legislation rules, evidence, precedent
cases and other sources.
Basically four main approaches are considered in modelling legal argument: logical mod-
els of legal argument, as recently presented by Prakken and Sartor in [110]; legal reasoning
with argumentation schemes [73] (see sub-section 2.3.3 for argumentation schemes); arguments
generated from legal procedures (e.g. [64, 70, 71, 109]); and arguments produced from legal
case-based approaches (e.g. [10, 14, 55]).
Originally legal practices were interpreted as a set of rules that could produce and explain
legislation and expert knowledge; however, these rules are defeasible and subject to interpreta-
tion and exceptions. Therefore, gaps and conflict between rules need to be resolved, and excep-
tions to these rules have to be considered. In case-based reasoning, the case is decided based
on knowledge of law and precedent cases. Prakken and Sartor in [108] represent a precedent
as two conflicting rules; pro-plaintiff factors and pro-defendant factors, plus a priority between
them: if the plaintiff won then the first rule has priority over the second, if the defendant won
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then the second rule has priority over the first. This provides the bridge between case- and rules-
based representation, allowing for the logical representation of case-based reasoning, enabling
a theory-based reasoning approach [38] where precedent cases are used to explain the new case
and conflicts are resolved by using rules from expert knowledge.
As stated in Chapter 1, every case starts with evidence and ends with a legal consequence.
Modelling legal reasoning can be seen as a series of steps; on the basis of this evidence, a set of
facts is established. After that, intermediate predicates [89], which relate strongly to the notion
of factors as found in CATO [10] and IBP [55], are used to bridge from factors to normative
consequences.
This section addresses the issues required to provide the knowledge representation used in
this thesis. The first sub-section (Sub-section 2.1.1) describes the landmark case-based reason-
ing systems in the legal domain, the sub-section 2.1.2 shows where these systems are located in
the models of legal reasoning. In addition to the legal case-based reasoning, this section pro-
vides a brief overview of another two branches of research in AI and Law: legal text processing
and legal ontologies.
2.1.1 Legal Reasoning Systems
This sub-section explores a number of landmark case-based reasoning systems in the legal do-
main, which are foundational for discussion of reasoning with legal cases in AI and Law as
illustrated in Figure 2.2. HYPO [14], one of the foundational systems, is a case-based reasoning
system that supports the similarity between cases based on factors treated as dimension points.
CATO [10] is used to explain how to distinguish cases by grouping these factors into a factor
hierarchy. IBP [17] partitions the factors into case issues and uses case-based techniques to
resolve the conflict within issues.
These systems are explained in more detail in the following sub-sections: an overview of
each system is provided showing the purpose of the system, the legal case domain(s) used,
and the case representation and reasoning approach with examples where appropriate. Some
additional legal reasoning systems will be discussed briefly in the last sub-section.
HYPO
HYPO (1990) ( [14, 116]) is a seminal system that introduced a new approach in legal reason-
ing using case-based reasoning. Background about the system showing the main features and
functionality is presented here.
Purpose: The main goal of HYPO is to create arguments for a legal case using precedent cases,
without making decisions on the current case.
Domain: HYPO operates on the domain of US Trade Secret Law, which concerns the protection
of technological and commercial information not generally known in the trade against
unauthorised commercial use. This domain is described in more detail in the next chapter.
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FIGURE 2.2: Landmark Case-Based Reasoning Systems.
Case Representation: Cases in HYPO are represented by Dimensions. These dimensions are
invoked on the basis of the facts of the cases, and range from an extreme pro-plaintiff po-
sition to an extreme pro-defendant position. HYPO uses a Case Knowledge Base (CKB)
which is a structured database consisting of a small number of both actual and hypothet-
ical legal cases (30 cases) and a set of thirteen dimensions used as an index to retrieve
these cases.
Reasoning process: HYPO was the first system to reason about precedent cases by using ad-
versarial case-based reasoning, that is, by drawing an analogy to similar past cases in order
to provide a justified conclusion that the new case should be decided in a similar manner
to specific past cases. To fulfill this requirement HYPO’s reasoning process consists of
the following steps:
1. Analysing the fact situation for the case under consideration dimensionally using the
dimensions prerequisites. HYPO then assigns both the applicable dimensions and
near-miss dimensions.
2. Drawing factual analogies to past cases, by finding the similarities between the di-
mensions of the case under consideration and the precedent cases in the CKB. HYPO
retrieves all the cases that have one or more dimensions in common with the new
case. These cases may have been decided for the plaintiff or defendant.
3. Positioning the new case with respect to the retrieved precedent cases using claim
lattices. HYPO creates two claim lattices: a regular claim lattice for applicable
dimensions and an extended claim lattice for near-miss dimensions. The branches
in these lattices represent different ways of arguing about the new case. The new
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FIGURE 2.3: Example of Claim Lattice in HYPO
case is matched to the precedent cases with more on-point dimensions. Figure 2.3
shows an example of these lattices.
4. Select the best precedent cases. HYPO compares the most on-point precedent cases
and selects the best cases that have at least one dimension that favours the party who
won the case. The more on-point the cases are, the less opportunity there is for the
opponent to distinguish the case.
5. Generate 3-ply argument for the current fact situation citing precedents. The first
side applies analogies, from the best case that supports his side, to the new case. The
opponent then responds by distinguishing the cited precedent or providing counter-
examples. The first side responds again to create a 3-ply argument. The argumenta-
tion moves in HYPO are:
• Analogising a problem to a past case with a favourable outcome.
• Distinguishing a case with an unfavourable outcome.
• Citing a more on-point counter-example to a case cited by an opponent.
• Citing an as-on-point counter-example.
6. Modify the current fact situation hypothetically to strengthen or weaken a specific
dimension, and generate a 3-ply argument for the selected hypothetical. This in-
volves: moving a case along a related dimension; making a case into a near-miss
of that dimension; making the case extreme along a dimension; making a near-miss
dimension apply; or strengthening or weakening a case along an applicable dimen-
sion.
7. Explain by illustrating arguments and comparing arguments for the new case and
selected hypothetical cases.
Chapter 2. Literature Review 24
Example: In HYPO there are a number of dimensions associated with the Trade Secrets do-
main. For example, HYPO has a dimension Security-Measures that has none as the ex-
treme pro-defendant position and then steps through a series of more rigorous measures
until the extreme pro-plaintiff position is reached. Another dimension is Disclosures-to-
Outsiders, which ranges from the extreme pro-plaintiff position of none through increas-
ing numbers of disclosures to the extreme pro-defendant point, where the information is
in the public domain.
In addition to the development of the first case-based reasoning system in the legal domain,
a significant contribution by HYPO concerns the form of the three-ply argument structure; as
will be seen in the dialogues discussion in section 2, this is similar to the moves by the parties
in the legal dialogues examined in this research in Chapter 4.
CATO
This sub-section provides an overview of CATO [10, 11], which was developed from Rissland
and Ashley’s HYPO. More detailed discussion will be provided in Chapter 5.
Purpose: CATO was not intended to predict or recommend decisions. It was primarily directed
at law school students, and was intended to help them form better case-based arguments,
in particular to improve their skills in distinguishing cases [10]. As in the second ply of
HYPO, a precedent cited for the plaintiff can be distinguished from the current case by
drawing attention to pro-plaintiff factors in the precedent missing from the current case
or pro-defendant factors in the current case absent from the precedent. Similar considera-
tions are used in the third ply to distinguish precedents cited for the defendant.
Domain: CATO also functions in the domain of US Trade Secret Law, using 148 cases indexed
by 26 factors. Each factor favours either the plaintiff or the defendant. Each case in the
database contains a list of factors and a squib (a short explanation of the case).
Case Representation: A core idea in CATO was to describe cases in terms of factors, which are
legally significant abstractions of patterns of facts found in the cases, and to build these
base-level factors into a hierarchy of increasing abstraction, moving upwards through
intermediate concerns (abstract factors) to issues. Each factor is a specific feature that
is either present or not present, in contrast to a dimension, which refers to a range of
points. CATO’s factor hierarchy consists of 26 base factors, 11 intermediate factors, 5
high level factors (issues) and 50 links. The definition of these factors is given in [10] and
is presented in this thesis in Appendix D.
Reasoning process: The base level factors in the factor hierarchy are arranged as leaves, con-
tributing to the presence or absence of their parents (abstract factors). A child is seen as
a reason for the presence or absence of its parent, and the abstract factors are also taken
as present or absent. Their role in CATO is that children of the same parent may be sub-
stituted for or used to cancel one another when emphasising or downplaying distinctions
between cases with different base level factors.
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FIGURE 2.4: CATO Abstract Factor Hierarchy From [10]
• Emphasise strengths related to the issue: CATO reasons why such issues matter in
terms of abstract factors and cites cases that led to favourable outcomes.
• Downplay weaknesses: points to factors that are closely related in the factor hierar-
chy and therefore compensate for the weakness.
At the root of the hierarchy is an issue. There may be several layers of abstract factors
before the issue is reached. An extract from the factor hierarchy, showing details of the
support and attack relationships between the factors, is shown in Figure 2.4. The full
factor hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5.
The CATO program matches precedent cases with a current case to produce arguments in
three plies; this is very similar to HYPO:
• First a precedent with factors in common with the case under consideration is cited,
suggesting a finding for one side.
• Then the other side cites precedents with factors in common with the current case
but a decision for the other side as counter-examples, and distinguishes the cited
precedent by pointing to factors not shared by the precedent and current case.
• Finally the original side rebuts by downplaying distinctions, citing cases to prove
that weaknesses are not fatal and distinguishing counter examples.
CATO and HYPO: The factors in CATO can be related to the dimensions of HYPO. For ex-
ample in CATO there are factors No-Security-Measures and Security-Measures. These
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factors divide the SecurityMeasures dimension of HYPO into the extreme pro-defendant
point of No-Security-Measures and all points beyond this (Security-Measures), which sug-
gests that any security measures at all are a point in favour of the plaintiff. Corresponding
to Disclosures-to-Outsiders there are factors Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders and Disclosure-
In-Public-Forum. Here the pro-plaintiff factor is not explicit: the advantage to the plaintiff
of no disclosures is represented by the absence of the other two factors, which represent
factors favourable to the defendant (one stronger than the other, although it is unclear in
[10] if this strength manifests itself in resolving issues or is used only in emphasising
distinctions).
HYPO and CATO identify but do not resolve conflicts between arguments. The next system,
IBP, provides a means of adjudicating between conflicting arguments.
IBP: Issue Based Prediction
Bru¨ninghaus and Ashley have adapted CATO for prediction in IBP [55], [17] and [18]. IBP used
a logical domain model that relates the various elements of the CATO factor hierarchy.
Purpose: IBP is firmly based on CATO, though the aim is not simply to discover and present
arguments, but to predict the outcomes of cases. To enable this, the issues of CATO’s
hierarchy are tied together using a logical model derived from the Uniform Trade Secret
Act, which has been adopted by the majority of States in the US, and the Restatement of
Torts. In the Restatement of Torts:
One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so,
is liable to the other if:
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means,
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by
the other in disclosing the secret to him,
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was
a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the
third person’s disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other,
or (d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that
its disclosure was made to him by mistake”
Domain: IBP uses 186 cases from US Trade Secret Law, including the 148 cases analysed by
CATO. The additional cases are used as a test set to evaluate predictions.
Case Representation: IBP employs CATO factors in the case representations, and groups these
in an abstract factor hierarchy rooted in issues. It also separates factors into 3 groups:
• Knockout (KO) Factors: when present in a case, the case is won by the side it
favours.
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• Weak Factors: IBP does not allow the issue to be discussed if it is represented only
by a weak factor.
• Normal Factors: all the rest.
Reasoning process: IBP identifies the issues raised in a case and determines which party is
favoured for each issue. It is an algorithm that combines reasoning with an abstract do-
main and case-based reasoning techniques to predict the outcome and provide an explana-
tion in an argument-like outline of its reasoning. IBP translates the Uniform Trade Secret
ACT and the Restatement of Torts into a high level logical structure of the domain; see
Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5. The domain model captures logical relationships between 5 ma-
jor issues, each of which is associated with 5 to 7 abstract-level factors from the factor
hierarchy.
To predict the outcome of a case, IBP does the following:
• If all the issues favour one party, the issue is decided for that party.
• Otherwise, if there are conflicting factors, IBP uses three case-based reasoning tech-
niques (Theory-Testing, Explain-Away and Broaden-Query) to resolve the conflict.
As part of the evaluation in [55], nine other systems were also considered to provide a
comparison. Most of these were different forms of machine learning systems, but programs
representing CATO and HYPO were also included. IBP performed successfully among these
systems.
The factor hierarchy and analysis in CATO, along with the IBP logical model, have been
used in the research in this thesis to instantiate an Abstract Dialectical Framework for the US
Trade Secret Law domain as will be shown in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, and the results obtained
are compared with these systems in Chapter 7.
AGATHA
Legal reasoning can be either rule-based, where cases are used as a knowledge source, or case-
based, as in the previous systems, where cases are explicitly represented and precedent cases are
explicitly deployed to form an argument in the context of a particular legal case. A middle way
is where a body of knowledge can be seen as a form of theory, as in [38]. In this approach, cases
are pairs of sets of factors and an outcome, and factors are triples of a factor, the value promoted
by finding for a particular party when that factor is present, and the party is favoured by that
factor. The motivation behind this approach was to ground the rule priorities in preferences for
the social values promoted [28]. The idea is that following the various rules promotes the values
associated with the factors in their antecedents, and that a preference for rules can be justified in
terms of a preference for the values promoted by following them. The precedents thus enable the
value preferences to be identified and these preferences can then be applied to new cases, with a
different set of factors relating to the same values. Theories in [38] are five-tuples comprising:
• the set of precedent cases on which the theory is based,
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FIGURE 2.5: Construction and Use of Theories From [28]
• the set of factors present in those cases,
• a set of rules linking sets of factors and outcomes,
• a set of preferences over these rules,
• and a set of value preferences.
A set of constructors is also provided so that theories can be constructed on the basis of the
available cases. Figure 2.5 illustrates the construction of these theories, the idea being that the
disputants would each construct a theory giving the decision to their side, and the best theory
(judged using criteria such as explanatory power and simplicity) would win. This approach was
embodied and empirically evaluated in the AGATHA (Argument Agent for Theory Automation)
system of [57, 58] as seen below:
Purpose: The main objective of the reasoning applied in AGATHA is to construct a case law
theory of the domain which explains as many of the existing cases as possible while giving
the desired outcome for the current case.
Domain: AGATHA has been tested over the 32 analysed cases available to the public from the
US Trade Secrets law. These cases consist of 26 factors and 5 values. It also uses three
simple cases from the Wild Animals legal domain, much used in the AI and Law literature
[40].
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Case Representation: Cases are represented as sets of factors and an outcome, which is either
find for the plaintiff or the defendant. Factors are represented by a factor name, an out-
come favoured by the presence of that factor, and a value which is the reason why the
factor favours that outcome.
Reasoning process: Prior to AGATHA, a Case Theory Editor (CATE) [58] was implemented
to facilitate the manual construction of theories and translate them into executable code.
From CATE, AGATHA was implemented to explore the automation of theory construc-
tion. AGATHA, like HYPO and CATO, simulates case-based dialogue using a set of
argument moves, each associated with theory constructors taken from [38]. Plaintiff and
defendant play these moves in turn, and each move has the effect of modifying the devel-
oping theory. The five moves used in AGATHA are the following:
1. Analogise Case. This is the first move in the dialogue and is used to cite a precedent
case which has the outcome desired by the party making the move. The factors
in both cases (the cited case and the problem case) are sorted into factors which
support that outcome and those factors which support the opposite outcome. A rule
preference is made with the supporting factors preferred over the contrary factors.
2. Distinguish with Case, by citing a new case to distinguish the case that has been
already cited.
3. Distinguish with Arbitrary Preference. This is similar to the previous move, except
that it distinguishes the cited cases with factor preferences for the party making the
move.
4. Distinguish Problem. This move distinguishes the current case instead of the pre-
viously cited case. If, for example, AGATHA is making a plaintiff move, it creates
two rules using the plaintiff and defendant factors. AGATHA takes all the plaintiff
(defendant) factors from the problem case and conjoins them as the antecedent into
a single rule with plaintiff (defendant) as consequent. The values associated with
the factors in these two rules create a value set and a value preference corresponding
to the plaintiff factors being preferred over the value set from the defendant factors.
Finally a rule preference is created using this value preference.
5. Counter with Case. This move counters the previously cited move with another case
that is as-on-point as or more-on-point than that for the other side. The original rule
and value preferences supported by the previously cited case are replaced by new
preferences which are supported by the new case.
AGATHA uses a variety of heuristic search algorithms (for example A* search) to allow a
reasonable number of precedent cases to be available in order to produce effective theories
that ensure good precedent cases are chosen. Theories are evaluated according to their
simplicity and explanatory power and their value in terms of the theory position in the
game tree as shown in the example in Figure 2.6.
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FIGURE 2.6: Example of Produced Theories (reproduced from [57])
Legal Systems Purpose Case Representation CBR Reasoning
HYPO Create arguments Dimensions
(range of points)
Using dimensions
CATO Generate issue-based
arguments
Factors
(one boolean point)
Using factors
IBP Predict case decision
and resolve conflicts
Factors and Issues Logical model
AGATHA Generate case law theory
(theory refinements)
Factors and Values Theory comparison
TABLE 2.1: A Summary of Landmark Legal CBR Systems
AGATHA is different from IBP in that it can be used even if there is no accepted structural
model, whereas IBP relies on using the structure provided by the Restatements of Torts. Direct
comparison between AGATHA and the previous systems is hampered by the fact that evaluation
in AGATHA is directed towards evaluating the different heuristics and search algorithms used
in that system, and so no version can be considered “definitive”, and, of course, many fewer
cases were used in the experiments. However, typically 27-30 of the 32 (≈ 84− 93%) cases
were correctly decided by the theories produced by AGATHA [57].
HYPO, CATO, IBP and AGATHA are summarised in Table 2.1 to distinguish between the
systems’ goals and the reasoning approach used over the representation of the cases. In terms
of encapsulating the analyses of the case law domain, HYPO used dimension points to analyse
the cases in order to find the similarity between the current case and precedent cases, CATO
introduces a factor hierarchy for the legal domain in which the cases are represented in terms
of domain factors. Domain issues are determined in IBP as a logical model that links the top
abstract factors of CATO to the leaf issues of the logical model. Figure 2.7 illustrates the legal
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reasoning stage corresponds to each legal CBR system. As indicated by the figure, HYPO and
CATO are not aimed to decide a case but to create arguments about precedent cases. None of the
programs represented the domain independently of the program code they embody rather than
encapsulated their domain theory.
These systems are considered the foundation of the work presented in this thesis. However,
the methodology presented here provides an implementation independent record of the domain
knowledge, forming a tree that runs from base level factors at the bottom (the leaf nodes) to a
verdict at the top (the root node) passing through issues using an Abstract dialectical framework
which can also provide a formal basis for factor-based reasoning that was lacking in previous
legal CBR systems.
Unlike previous systems, all of which used a single domain, to ensure the applicability of the
presented methodology, several legal domains from the US Courts, often used in the literature
of AI and Law, have been used throughout the thesis.
Other Notable Systems
In addition to the four CBR systems discussed previously, there are other landmark legal CBR
systems that took a different direction in their development. The discussion in this section ends
with a brief overview of these systems.
TAXMAN: The TAXMAN project of McCarty and Sridharan [98] had as its goal providing
a computational means of generating the majority and minority opinions in a landmark
Supreme Court Case in US tax law case, Eisner vs Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) to
gain insights into legal reasoning approaches. The main contribution from TAXMAN is
the recognition that legal argument involves theory construction from a knowledge base.
McCarty summarises his position in [97]:
“The task for a lawyer or a judge in a “hard case” is to construct a theory of
the disputed rules that produces the desired legal result, and then to persuade
the relevant audience that this theory is preferable to any theories offered by
an opponent” (p. 285).
GREBE: This program was introduced by Branting in [47]. GREBE represents cases as a
semantic network, giving a very fine grained representation of cases and their facts. The
reasoning process in GREBE requires finding a pattern of relationships in the new case
that corresponds to facts in the past cases. Later in [48] Branting found that matching in
case-based reasoning can be improved by comparing new cases to portions of precedents.
A new case may match the facts of some of the precedent case more strongly than the
entire set of each precedent case. The use of portions of precedents is discussed further in
evaluating the ADF approach in Chapter 7.
CABARET: Skalak and Rissland describe CABARET [121] as a development of HYPO. It
models the Home Office Deduction in US Tax Law, as derived from statute. CABARET
generates skeletal arguments using a control strategy, incorporating a top-down process
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(like CATO) that specifies the ideal case independent of the case present in the case base,
and a bottom-up process (like HYPO) that generates the arguments based on the cases in
the case base.
BankXX: BankXX [117] was developed by Rissland, Skalak and Friedman and evaluated in
[118]. It combines both heuristics and argumentation. BankXX creates arguments using
the knowledge base, which is a semantic network of argument components of legal cases
and legal theories represented by nodes and links between them, and uses a heuristic best
first search to build the arguments. This process involves analysing the new case and
creating a claim lattice, as in HYPO [14]. BankXX chooses one of the on-point cases
randomly as a starting point and places it onto an open list. This open list contains all the
nodes that have been harvested during the search.
The summaries of the legal reasoning systems discussed so far are concerned with repre-
senting cases as factors, combined sometimes with issues or values. This is related to a stage
in legal reasoning known as intermediate concepts; various models of reasoning are applied to
determine the legal consequence from these intermediate concepts. These can be seen as layers
in legal reasoning as proposed in the next sub-section.
2.1.2 Models for Legal Reasoning
Modelling reasoning in the legal domain has been the central question for many researchers
in the domain of AI and Law since [98] and [68]. Over the years a picture of reasoning has
evolved, which can be seen as a series of reasoning steps. The current consensus in AI and Law
(expressed in several contributions to the overview of the field provided in [31]) is that reasoning
about legal cases passes through four stages, as in Figure 2.7:
1. from evidence to agreed facts,
2. from agreed facts to base factors; intermediate concepts of legal significance which ab-
stract from the case facts to facilitate comparison of cases,
3. from base factors to higher level factors and issues, and
4. from issues to legal consequences.
Evidence
Every case begins with evidence. Evidence may be in conflict, contain gaps or lack plausibility.
Moreover, it may be unclear which inferences should properly be drawn from the evidence, and
how it should be interpreted in terms of the governing legislation. The evidence itself may take
many forms, including the testimony of eyewitnesses, expert testimony, physical evidence and
perhaps even video evidence (as in Popov v Hayashi [30]). The evidence itself is certain: in
Pierson v. Post, that Post testified that he was within 100 yards of the fox is a matter of record
and a transcript of the testimony is available in case of doubt. Whether Post is believed or not
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FIGURE 2.7: Legal Reasoning Stages
is a different matter, especially if other witnesses testify that he was a good furlong behind the
fox. The methods used to draw inferences from the evidence to beliefs as to what was the case
are as many and various as the evidence presented. Witnesses may be more or less personally
credible and may have been better or worse placed to view the events. Expert witnesses will
disagree. Statistics must be interpreted. In principle any form of standard reasoning might be
called into play here. It is, of course, not specifically legal reasoning and very often the evidence
is not assessed by judges but by juries composed of lay people who are supposed to be as good
as anyone in deciding what is true on the basis of testimony.
Evidence forms the leaves of the tree of reasoning. On the basis of this evidence, a set of
facts is established. The process may appear to be akin to forward chaining: a lot of testimony is
presented and the facts of the case are deduced from this body of information. In fact, however,
the process is far more structured and more akin to backward chaining. Evidence is not random,
but elicited by the counsels for the plaintiff and the defendant in order to resolve the issues in
favour of their clients. The move from evidence to an accepted body of facts is discussed next.
Fact
Next, facts must be determined on the basis of evidence. Facts are descriptions of states or
events, the truth of which is currently unknown and has to be proven. Facts and evidence should
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not be confused [42]: if evidential data exists it does not guarantee the truth of the fact evidenced
(e.g. the witness might lie).
Therefore, the first stage - the move from evidence to facts -requires a rather different style
of reasoning (as is evidenced in that facts are often determined by lay people (juries) and are
typically not capable of challenge at the appeal stage). This is the topic of [44], and this stage
has been explored using argumentation that focuses on arguments based on evidence, stories or
narratives that use hypothetical stories or scenarios to explain the evidence, and hybrids of the
two [42]. The idea behind the hybrid argumentative-narrative theory is to decide which fact to
accept from both arguments and stories. Stories explain “what happened” by organising a set
of case facts into one or more hypotheses, while arguments support or attack the facts in these
hypothetical stories according to the defeasible inferences based on evidence. The accepted
facts are determined from the acceptability of the stories in light of the evidential arguments in
the case. The hybrid argumentative-narrative theory has been extended in [46] to show the role
of legal stories in finding the interaction between factual reasoning ( a proof for what happened
in a case) and legal reasoning (making a decision based on the proof). Moreover, a development
of the hybrid theory is the integrated theory [43] which employs stories (causal arguments) and
evidential arguments in one reasoning account, and [32] which consider the role of dimension
at this stage of reasoning.
In addition to the hybrid approach, reasoning with evidence has been considered by several
projects in AI and Law, including the use of probability and Bayesian reasoning (e.g. [86]) and
combinations of these by using a support graph as an intermediate structure between Bayesian
networks and argumentation models to reconstruct different argumentative results about the case
(e.g. [123]).
From another perspective, each dimension in HYPO represents the stereotypical facts of
legal cases, whilst the facts of a particular case represented on particular points on these dimen-
sions. Thus dimensions provide a way of determining what are the relevant features of the case.
Other work concerned with this stage includes Gordon’s Pleadings Game [70], which identifies
the facts that are agreed by the parties and those that will require resolution in the trial itself.
The second stage, the move from accepted facts to factors, was recently explored in [24],
reusing the notion of dimensions. In that paper facts are written as dimension points, and the
dimension points are used to drive the factor-based reasoning, seen as a set of argumentation
schemes.
Intermediate Concepts
Now these facts must be used to ascribe legally significant predicates to the case. These predi-
cates, which serve as intermediaries between the world of fact and the world of law (as discussed
in e.g. [50]), have been termed intermediate concepts [89], [17], but are more often called fac-
tors, following the highly influential systems HYPO [14] and CATO [10], and the high level
factors and issues in IBP [18, 55].
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Factors
The notion of factors was established in Ashley and Aleven’s CATO. Factors are stereotypical
patterns of fact, present or absent in a case, and favour one or other of the parties in the case.
CATO did not consider the role of facts and dimensions, instead representing cases as bundles
of factors from the outset. The factors are then used to establish the legal conclusions (see e.g.
[89], [83]). The use of factors effectively addresses the third stage of the legal reasoning process
enumerated above, by using the base level factors to infer more abstract high level factors, which
are then used to establish the legal conclusions (fourth stage) (see e.g. [83, 89]).
Factors provide a level of abstraction that allows the particular facts of a case to be viewed in
terms of precedent cases. The level of abstraction also enables the case to be used as a precedent
for future cases. Factors are therefore very important for precedential reasoning [83, 108]. Since
there are factors which favour the plaintiff and factors which favour the defendant, typically
there will be factors favouring both parties in the case. A further development can be found in
[114] which identifies a different kind of precedent - the framework precedent - which requires
a different treatment, since it establishes a number of issues, which will be discussed further
below.
To this end CATO organises the factors (base level factors) into an abstract factor hierarchy.
This hierarchy has abstract factors as its non-leaf nodes: the children of these nodes are reasons
to consider them present or absent, depending on whether they favour the same party or the
other side. There are potentially several layers of abstract factors before reaching the leaf nodes
(the original base-level factors). This hierarchy is used to play down distinctions by substituting
factors with the same parent favouring the same side, and canceling factors with the same parent
favouring different sides. At the root of the hierarchy is an issue. There may be several layers
of abstract factors, before the issue is reached.
Since CATO, factors have received much more attention than dimensions: the fact that they
are either present or absent, and always favour the same side, greatly facilitates their use in
investigating the logic of factor-based reasoning. The investigation of the logic of factor-based
reasoning was significantly advanced by [108], which demonstrated how factor-based reasoning
with precedents could be represented as rules. Essentially each precedent gives rise to three
rules. Suppose that the precedent can be described as P ∩ D where P is the set of pro-plaintiff
factors and D is the set of pro-defendant factors. The three rules are :
R1: P→ plaintiff.
R2: D→ defendant.
R3: a priority rule R1  R2 or R2  R1 depending on the outcome of the precedent.
This approach was further developed in [83], in which R1 is allowed to use a subset of P, so
that it is possible to go beyond simple a fortiori reasoning.
The work described so far in the intermediate concepts takes cases represented as bundles
of factors and considers how they can be used to determine legal consequences. Further devel-
opments consider the legal issues stage before deciding the case, as presented next.
Chapter 2. Literature Review 36
Issue
An issue is a point of contention. In CATO there are five root nodes, corresponding to the leaf
issues of the logical model of IBP. Since CATO is not predicting a verdict but teaching students
how to distinguish cases, and since distinctions are made within issues, there is no need to tie
these issues together with the logical model used in IBP. Issues and abstract factors could be
eliminated by unfolding into the base level factors, but they are both useful for the purposes of
exposition and presentation of the argument.
In IBP the precedents are organised into a set of issues, which are then related logically
through the logical model. Thus the leaves of the logical model are resolved using CATO-
style case-based reasoning, but the outcome is then deduced on the basis of these values. The
relationship between the logical model at the high level and cases used to resolve the leaves of
the logical model is similar to the use of statutes and cases in CABARET, well described in
Loui’s description of CABARET in section 3.4 of [31].
The logical model may come from several sources: from statute, as in [120] and CABARET
[121], from a commentary or other summary of the common law as in [55], or where some
precedent case explicitly sets out such a model, i.e. as a framework precedent [114].
It might at first sight seem that the logical model takes us little further forward: the model
in IBP begins by telling us only that the court can find that a trade secret was misappropriated if
and only if there was a trade secret and it was misappropriated. However, going down a level,
there is more detail of how to establish the existence of a trade secret (it must be of value, and
efforts must have been taken to maintain secrecy), and how to establish misappropriation (either
by showing that the information was obtained improperly, or that a confidential relationship
was breached by the use of the information). Thus the logical model tells us precisely what
arguments can be presented, what issues are relevant, how a case should be presented in terms
of these issues, and the consequences of resolving these issues in particular ways. Issues are
thus addressed in the last stage identified at the beginning of this section.
The verdict is logically entailed by the resolution of the issues forming the logical model.
As such, from a logical viewpoint, the question can be unfolded into the leaves of the logical
model of issues. Thus, in the IBP model of US Trade Secrets Law, the question of whether a
Trade Secret was misappropriated unfolds into
(IV ∧MS) ∧ ((IU ∧ CR) ∨ QM)
where IV is Information-Valuable, MS is Maintain-Secrecy, IU is Information-Used, CR is
Confidential-Relationship and QM is Questionable-Means.
Although logically unnecessary, the intermediate issues above the layer of leaf issues are
useful for exposition and work in the same ways as the brackets in the logical expression, to pro-
vide a decomposition into subtasks which show how to tackle the problem, and how to present
the solution.
Rigoni’s example of a framework precedent in [114], Lemon v. Kurtzman1 states
1403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and finally, the statute must not foster “an
excessive government entanglement with religion.” Walz v Tax Commission at 397
U. S. 674.
This explicitly sets out three issues, all of which must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff
if the case is to be found for the plaintiff. Once the issues have been resolved, the verdict can be
justified in purely deductive terms: it is in the resolution of the issues that the distinctively legal
argumentation is encountered.
Although the preceding stages may suffice to decide a particular case, some work moves a
step further and reasons about what the decisions tell us about the purposes of the law [40], or
the social values promoted by the law [38]. This results in a theory of the relevant case law,
intended to generalise the previous decisions, and in some especially difficult cases to justify
the decision. These are the landmark cases which represent a shift in the law, as discussed
with regard to AGATHA in the previous section, where values were attached to every factor to
provide reasons for factor preferences. Whether or not the factors sufficiently favour the plaintiff
can be decided by looking at precedent cases, or in the absence of suitable precedents, values
(cf [106]: any value preferences may themselves be justified by precedents, as in [28]) or by
commentaries.
Verdict, Decision, Opinion
At the top level there is the verdict of the court. The verdict can be regarded as a performative
utterance in the sense of [26]. It is not true or false: a pronouncement by the appropriate per-
son that he or she finds for the plaintiff is simply how a case is decided for the plaintiff: the
pronouncement of the verdict makes it so. As such, these statements have assertability (some-
times called felicity) conditions rather than acceptance conditions. Of course, coming from an
AI system, the verdict cannot be performative, and rather corresponds to a recommendation to
the court or a prediction of what the court will do. This latter, which follows the IBP system
[55], is perhaps the best way to categorise the aims of such systems. As explained in the previ-
ous section, not all AI and Law systems have sought to make recommendations or predictions:
HYPO [14], the system from which so much work in AI and Law on arguing with cases stems,
was designed to find, but not to evaluate, arguments and its child CATO [10] was specifically
designed to instruct law students in a particular kind of argument, namely distinguishing cases,
and emphasising or downplaying these distinctions.
The verdict is binary: the verdict must be “yea or nay”: the judge cannot refuse to answer
the question, nor express uncertainty or doubt as to the verdict. Leave to appeal may be given,
but the verdict remains in force until it is overturned or quashed on appeal. The court is required
to justify the verdict. Justification is in terms of issues. The relationship between issues and
verdict, is, as agreed by all of [121], [55] and [114], deductive: the verdict is expected to follow
logically once the issues have been resolved.
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Perhaps the purest treatment of the deductive relationship between verdict and issues is
found in the so-called logical models of legislation systems, most sharply presented in [120]. In
those systems there is only the logical model: everything below what is explicit in legislation is
left to the user for resolution. An example of a logical model is shown in Figure 5.4, taken from
[55], based on the Restatement of Torts.
The Court Opinion is more than a case verdict. In addition to the legal decision, the court
opinion provides an explanation for the justification that yields this decision showing the major-
ity, minority (dissenting) and concurring opinions. In some opinions the justification involves
providing a test to resolve a new factual justification arising from the case (landmark case) and
provides a means of deciding for future cases; this is an essential part of what the court is trying
to achieve.
Thus a complete argument for a case will comprise a view on what can be considered as
evidence for relevant facts: what facts are required to establish the presence of various factors,
and how they relate; how the factors can be used to determine the issues; and, where issues and
values conflict, how these conflicts should be resolved.
In the lower courts there will be real items of evidence, particular witness testimonies and
the like. But by the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, the facts are usually considered
established and beyond challenge. The Supreme Court does, however, need to consider what
should count as evidence, and whether this will generally be available, so that the rule can be
applied in future cases. This research work investigates the Oral Hearings stage (Chapter 4) and
legal decisions (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7) in the context of the Supreme Court process,
to provide a basis for the representation of the relevant argument components (facts, factors and
conflict issues).
This concludes the discussion of legal reasoning models that have been constructed from
the previous work in the domain of AI and law. This discussion has highlighted the particular
aspects of the reasoning layers that are applicable to the ideas presented in this thesis. More
detailed accounts of argumentation in legal systems can be found in the surveys conducted by
Bench-capon et.al. [31] and Prakken and Sartor [110]. The next section investigates the role of
dialogues, in particular argumentation-based dialogue models in the legal domain. Prior to this,
it is useful to briefly present another important research area in the AI and Law that concerns
processing of legal texts and defining legal ontologies.
2.1.3 Legal Text Processing
The analysis of the text in legal case decisions and factor extractions in previous legal reasoning
systems, such as HYPO and CATO, have all been conducted manually; see for example the
factor extractions in CATO by students from a Law school (Figure 2.8). In general this is an
intensive, time consuming and error-prone task. For this reason, providing automated support
tools to annotate the unstructured linguistic information has become an important research topic
to address the knowledge acquisition bottleneck with textual analysis, which is the problem of
getting the textual data into mark-up form for conceptual retrieval.
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FIGURE 2.8: Factor Extraction in CATO [10]
Several methods and mediated systems have been developed to address these difficulties,
starting with automated marking-up tools and progressing to the use of more powerful text an-
alytic tools as in Flexlaw Legal Text Management System [122] and SALOMON [125]. In the
argumentation domain, the Araucaria system [113] supports manual argument analysis by or-
ganising text taken from a complex argument into an inference tree, using the argument markup
language (AML). AML is defined in XML (eXtensible Markup Language). To describe argu-
ment structure, it uses the original text tags to indicate the evolving structure and to establish
a relationship between the text and the inference tree. Araucaria has been tested on an excerpt
from an extended argument taken from a US Supreme Court case. The tool follows the assump-
tion that any text excerpt can be analysed in different ways depending on a variety of analytical
options, which lead in turn to alternative proposals.
SMILE (SMart Index Learner) is a computer program developed by Ashley and Bru¨ninghaus
in [18] to bridge case-based reasoning and extract information from texts. SMILE + IBP repre-
sents case text for the purpose of automated text classification. SMILE applies natural language
processing (NLP) techniques to a squib, which is a manually constructed summary of the case
decisions that represents the factors of the case along with factor indices. From a set of squibs,
a learning set is constructed from a list of statements of each factor, and machine learning tech-
niques are applied to acquire a classifier (a pattern) for each factor. The classifiers are applied
to the (test set) of squibs, and each text is classified as to the factors contained within it. A
nearest-neighbour machine learning algorithm is applied to a learning set of squibs, where the
classifying pattern is compared to sentences in the test set to find sentences most similar to the
classifying pattern. The success of the classification is measured against a gold standard of
squibs, which have been manually classified. Squibs are further preprocessed using a range of
NLP techniques. The three representations used for each sentence are:
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• Bag of words (BOW) - the degree to which one squib is similar to another squib in terms
of the lexical items in each.
• Role replaced (RP) - the name of an individual is replaced by their role in the case, e.g.
IBM for plaintiff.
• Propositional patterns (Prop) - part of speech patterns.
The results in Ashley and Bru¨ninghaus [18] report that the accuracy and completeness of
SMILE’s classification tasks was insufficient (F measure around 0.70) in terms of realising
the goal of identifying factors automatically from a legal text. Note also that SMILE does not
address the knowledge bottleneck at the point of identifying and annotating the factors from
unstructured text.
In contrast, Wyner and Peters [140, 141] presented another approach for text annotation
to support the identification and extraction of legal case factors that is rule-based, following a
bottom-up, knowledge-heavy strategy and using the General Architecture for Text Engineering
system (GATE)2, which is an open-source framework for language engineering applications.
The approach uses original, unstructured text to annotate factors, rather than structured text in
squibs which classify cases with respect factors. It involves selecting salient lexical items and
identifying and extracting high-level components of rules from regulations using NLP tools.
Some of the results are promising, while others are less so.
Their approach applied a case study in [142] to produce a gold standard corpus of annotated
texts in collaboration with law school students, using an online tool to annotate a corpus of legal
cases for a variety of annotation types, e.g. citation indices, legal facts, rationale, judgment,
cause of action, and others.
In addition to the use of Semantic Web technologies such as XML, a number of interesting
contributions have used the power of ontologies extensively in the domain of AI and Law to
analyse legal texts and provide support for legal reasoning, as well as making the law available
to the public. Legal ontologies are discussed further in the next sub-section.
2.1.4 Legal Ontology
An ontology as defined by [143] as “an explicit, formal, and general specification of a conceptu-
alisation of the properties of and relations between objects in a given domain”. Ontologies were
introduced by Gruber in [77] and have long been a feature of AI and law (see e.g. [126, 129]
and [128]).
The role of an ontology cannot be neglected in the current development of legal case-based
reasoning systems. Ashley considers its importance in [16] and distills the ontological require-
ments for modelling case-based arguments. General and specific roles of ontologies have been
determined in [16] based on the purposes of the CBR system.
1. Exchange and re-use of knowledge and information among knowledge bases and other
resources on the Internet.
2URL: https://gate.ac.uk/
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2. Make assumptions about concepts explicit so that the program can reason with them and
manage relations and distinctions among concept types.
3. Generate natural language explanations to help in drawing inferences and provide com-
parisons to relevant cases.
Moreover, three more specific roles for the ontology have also been defined: (i) to provide
support for case comparison by drawing inferences to find relevant cases and generate arguments
about how to decide a problem; (ii) to distinguish deep and shallow analogies to allow more
abstract matching between the cases; and (iii) to induce defensible hypotheses from a database
about how to decide a problem using hypothetical reasoning.
A legal CBR ontology is used for representing the case, i.e. in addition to the case name,
parties, and decision, the case facts can be used as concepts to determine the factors and enable
case comparisons by finding the similarities and differences between cases. Using such repre-
sentation, ontology can provide explanations for the decisions of cases and the inferences drawn
from the comparisons. Finally, ontologies can be used to represent case-based argument by cap-
turing typical, schematic, domain-specific inferences. For example, Wyner and Hoekstra [139]
proposed a legal ontology that is relevant to annotating texts in legal cases to extract the main
ontological elements. These elements are related to abstract concepts in the domain, which can
be added to the structure of an argumentation scheme, factor hierarchy, legal theories and rules.
One of the most important legal ontologies, which addresses the role of exchanging knowl-
edge bases, is the Legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF) which is an OWL ontology of
legal concepts, allowing legal knowledge bases to be represented in OWL. The main roles of
LKIF as given in [82] are to translate legal knowledge bases written in different representation
formats and to provide a knowledge representation formalism. In [82] a legal core ontology is
defined to play a role in the translation of existing legal knowledge bases to other representation
formats, in particular into LKIF as the basis for articulate knowledge serving.
To this end, there are a number of other alternative approaches and developments that target
automatic text annotation in general and factor annotation in particular for unstructured linguis-
tic information. However, this is not the main focus of the research presented in this thesis. For
this reason, a manual analysis was applied in this research to mark-up the dialogues in the US
Supreme Court Oral Hearings and use the elements to feed a legal ontology which serves as a
repository for the argument components of a legal domain as shown in Chapter 4. Dialogues
and dialogues models are explained in the next section.
2.2 Dialogues
A dialogue is an exchange of speech acts among a number of participants, in some sequence,
aimed at achieving a collective goal. Austin [26] defines a speech act as a performative utterance
with a variety of forces: locution, illocution and perlocution. Searle [119] focuses on the illocu-
tionary force of speech acts and clarifies them as: representatives (e.g. reciting a creed), direc-
tives (e.g. requests, commands and advice), commissives (e.g. promises and oaths), expressives
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(e.g. congratulations, excuses and thanks) and declarations (e.g. pronouncing someone guilty).
Not all the speech acts are explicit. Searle introduced the notion of “indirect” speech acts, when
the participants can employ implicit inferences based on sharing background information. The
terminology of speech acts was used to define the semantics of utterances in KQML [65] and
FIPA [66].
This section explores the different types of dialogues and shows why it is important to distin-
guish between these types to define the required components of a dialogue model that fulfills the
goals of the dialogue. The following sub-sections examine these topics and provide examples
of various legal dialogue systems.
2.2.1 Dialogue Typology
A number of distinct dialogue types used in human communication have been identified by
Walton and Krabbe [133] as follows: Persuasion, Negotiation, Inquiry, Information-Seeking,
Deliberation, and Eristic Dialogues3. Table 2.2 explains each dialogue based on the following
characteristics:
• The dialogue initial situation, which identifies the initial conditions that give rise to the
dialogue.
• The overall collective goal, shared by all participants, which defines the characteristics of
a successful dialogue outcome.
• The individual goals of the participants, which help to determine the reasons for particular
utterances by the participants, which should lead towards the main goal, while at the same
time respecting their own best interests.
The dialogue descriptions are summarised according to [133] as follows:
• A Persuasion dialogue occurs when one participant endorses some proposition or state-
ment to persuade another participant to accept his statement. If the participants are guided
only by the force of argument, then whichever participant has the more convincing ar-
gument, taking into account the burden of proof, should be able to persuade the other to
endorse the statement at issue, within finite time.
• A Negotiation dialogue happens when two or more parties attempt to jointly divide some
resource, where the competing claims to this resource cannot all be satisfied simultane-
ously. Negotiations require some level of cooperation between the involved parties, but,
at the same time, each participant is assumed to be seeking to achieve the best possible
deal for him or herself. If a negotiation dialogue terminates with an agreement, then the
resource has been divided in a manner acceptable to all participants.
• An Inquiry dialogue involves two or more participants, each being ignorant of the an-
swer to some question, and each believing the others to be ignorant also, jointly seek to
3This list is not exhaustive e.g. consider the examination of dialogue [62].
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Type Initial Situation Main Goal Participants Aims
Persuasion Conflicting view
points
Resolution of conflicts
by verbal means
Persuade the other(s)
Negotiation
Conflict of interest
and need for
cooperation
Making a deal
Get the best out of it
for oneself
Inquiry General ignorance Growth of knowledge
and agreement
Find a proof or
destroy one
Info-seeking Personal ignorance Spreading knowledge
and revealing positions
Gain, pass on,
show or hide
personal knowledge
Deliberation Need for action Reach a decision Influence the outcome
Eristic Conflict and
antagonism
Reaching and
accommodation
in a relationship
Strike the other
party and win
in the eyes of
onlookers
TABLE 2.2: The Six Types of Dialogues (reproduced from Walton and Krabbe [133])
determine the answer. Inquiry dialogue does not start from a position of conflict, since
the participants have not taken a particular position on the issue at question; but they are
trying to find out some knowledge.
• An Information-Seeking dialogue occurs when one participant does not know the answer
to some question, and believes (perhaps erroneously) that another party does so. The first
party seeks to obtain the answer from the second by means of the dialogue.
• A Deliberation dialogue involves two or more parties attempt to agree on an action, or
a course of action, in some situation. The action may be performed by one or more the
parties in the dialogue or by others not present. When the participants are deliberating,
they share a responsibility to decide the action(s) to be undertaken in the circumstances, or,
at least, they share a willingness to discuss whether they have such a shared responsibility.
As with negotiation dialogues, if a deliberation dialogue terminates with an agreement,
then the participants have decided on an acceptable course of action.
• An Eristic dialogue occurs when the participants quarrel verbally aiming to vent grievances,
the dialogue may act as a substitute for physical fighting.
Most human dialogues are in fact combinations of these ideal types embedded in a larger
interaction. Often, however, a dialogue will contain nested dialogues, of the same or different
types, and dialogues may shift, licitly or illicitly, between types as the dialogue proceeds. For
example, a legal dispute may contain both persuasion, when each party is trying to provide
an argument to persuade the Justices, and deliberation between Justices in a court to decide a
case. The most usual type of dialogue to be embedded within persuasion and deliberation is
information-seeking. In both persuasion and deliberation, facts need to be established, and if
these are unknown to the participants, the information may need to be sought elsewhere. More
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recently, Atkinson et.al. [25] studied the differences between deliberation and persuasion as
shown in the following summary:
1. Deliberation starts from a desire to cooperate, whereas persuasion starts with a conflict.
2. In a deliberation, none of the participants has a commitment, but all seek to find an accept-
able course of action. There is, therefore, no burden of proof in a deliberation dialogue,
whereas in persuasion, a proponent is committed to a particular statement and required to
satisfy the criteria to which the opponents are committed.
3. In deliberation, the roles of all participants are initially the same. In persuasion, the roles
are asymmetric: there is a proponent and opponents.
4. In deliberation, the aim is to satisfy some public decision rule constructed and committed
to in the course of the dialogue. In persuasion, the participants have a private decision
rule, which they are entitled to see satisfied before being persuaded.
5. In deliberation, all parties supply and request information. In persuasion, one party is
expected to supply information which the other one request it.
In this sense, dialogue typologies have proved to be of importance in argumentation theory
and are applied in computational argumentation in AI for a number of reasons, including:
• By identifying a dialogue as falling under one of the particular types, the participants are
aware of the goal they are trying to achieve by engaging in the dialogue interaction.
• The pragmatic meaning of speech acts, e.g., “assert” or “inform”, is determined based on
the type of the dialogue.
• The dialogue shifts are considered to avoid fallacies (if the shift is illicit) and misunder-
standings (if the shift goes unnoticed).
It is important to note that not all the dialogues are primarily argument-based. The main aim
of some dialogues is, for example, giving and receiving explanations but not proving something.
In these kind of dialogues, such as Information-seeking, there is no burden of proof; when a
questioner asks for an explanation, there is an obligation on the part of the other party to provide
one. More about dialogues and burden of proof can be found in [131].
The work presented in the next chapter focuses on analysing the Oral Hearing Dialogues
according to the features of the dialogue types stated by Walton and Krabbe: this is important
to define the representation model required for these dialogues. The next sub-section explores
what is needed to define a dialogue model.
2.2.2 Legal Dialogue Models
In each dialogue, participants are involved in a rule-governed interaction known as the dialogue
protocol. At each point in the dialogue, the participants exchange utterances (or speech acts)
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known as dialogue moves according to a specific dialogue protocol until the dialogue terminates
when reaching certain conditions. Each move is described by a name with a set of components
that fulfill the goal of the move. The protocol rules specify the turn-taking between the dialogue
participants, and the effect of the dialogue move on participants’ commitment in a fair and
effective way. Together the moves and protocol form the structure of what is called a Dialogue
model. Gordon and Walton in [74] defined a dialogue formally as an ordered 3-tuple O,A,C
where:
• O is the opening stage,
• A is the argumentation stage,
• and C is the closing stage.
At the opening stage the dialogue type is defined according to the initial situation, and the
dialogue participants are determined. Each participant has an individual goal, and the dialogue
itself has a collective goal. The dialogue moves through the opening stage toward the clos-
ing stage where the dialogue is terminated. During the argumentation stage, the participants
exchange a number of dialogue moves according to the applicable protocol.
Each dialogue move is associated with pre- and post-conditions that are important to avoid
misunderstandings and breakdown of the dialogue. Pre-conditions are constraints that must be
met in order for the speech act to be made; post-conditions are brought about by the speech
act being made. These conditions in turn construct a structure for the overall protocol of the
dialogue. Prakken classifies dialogue protocols in [104] as: unique- or multiple-move protocol;
unique- or multiple-reply protocol; or immediate- or non-immediate-response protocol, depend-
ing on the dialogue context and dialogue type that is in progress. For example, arguments in nat-
ural language dialogues may leave elements implicit. Participants may postpone their replies, or
return to earlier choices, and move to alternatives.
The formal study of dialogue systems for argumentation was initiated by Hamblin [79].
Hamblin built a very simple system for argumentation in dialogue called the WhyBecause Sys-
tem with Questions. At each move in a dialogue, a participant is allowed to say various things
(called locutions by Hamblin, but nowadays they are called speech acts) used in a dialogue.
An example of a persuasion dialogue is the well-known game “DC” first described in Macken-
zie [95]. DC is a symmetric two-person dialogue game, where each player is committed to
various propositions which they either assert or accept to be true or they abandon these commit-
ments. These propositions are stored in, and removed from, a commitment store for each player.
Changes to these commitment stores result from the application of post-conditions of certain
moves. The goal is to derive a contradiction in the opponent’s commitments, forcing retraction.
Many dialogue systems do not have much in common. For this reason, several proposals for
formal dialogue games have been presented for most of the atomic dialogue types in the dialogue
typology. Prakken, for example, has proposed a number of formal dialogue game protocols to
model persuasion dialogues (see [104] for an extensive survey). In [104] Prakken identifies the
speech acts typically used in such dialogues as:
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• Claim P (assert, statement ...). The speaker asserts that P is the case.
• Why P (challenge, deny, question ...). The speaker challenges that P is the case and asks
for reasons why it would be the case.
• Concede P (accept, admit ...). The speaker admits that P is the case.
• Retract P (withdraw, no commitment...). The speaker declares that they are not committed
(anymore) to P. Retractions are real retractions if the speaker is committed to the retracted
proposition, otherwise it is a mere declaration of non-commitment (e.g. in reply to a
question).
• P since S (argue, argument ...). The speaker provides reasons why P is the case. Some
protocols do not have this move but require instead that reasons be provided by a claim P
or claim S move in reply to a why move (where S is a set of propositions). Also, in some
systems the reasons provided for P can have structure (e.g. a proof tree or a deduction).
• Question P (...). The speaker asks another participant’s opinion on whether P is the case.
Very similar speech acts are used in deliberation dialogues. Atkinson et.al. [25] have re-
cently defined the pre-and post-conditions of these speech acts for both the deliberation and
persuasion dialogues in order to distinguish between the two dialogues, finding the differences
largely in the pragmatics of the utterance.
Prakken considers only persuasion dialogues; further research efforts introduce dialogue
templates [45] that are equally suited for other types of dialogues. Dialogue templates are
schemas that encode the generic structure of utterances and replies in dialogue, where dialogue
protocols can be mixed and matched to form different types of protocols. Dialogue templates
also lay down the basics for automatically executing dialogue protocols, as they provide the pos-
sible moves at each point in a dialogue, and determine whether the player of a move is winning.
Dialogue systems were originally introduced into AI and Law as a way of modelling legal
procedures [70], but more recently they have been used to capture the logic of aspects of legal
reasoning, such as reasoning with cases (e.g. [107]) or particular legal phenomena such as bur-
den of proof (e.g. [71, 109]), and in consequence have become somewhat stylised and removed
from any particular legal dialogue. In general, in conflict resolution dialogues the outcome is
not fully determined by the participants’ points of view and commitments. A typical example
is in legal procedures, where a third party determines the outcome of the case. The following
sub-sections give an overview of some examples of dialogues in the legal domain.
Pleadings Game (1994)
Gordon formalised the procedural context of legal argument in The Pleadings Game [70]. The
Pleadings Game sets the formal foundations for a type of mediation system that can be used
by lawyers to support discussions about alternative theories by making sure that the rules of
procedure are obeyed and by keeping track of the arguments exchanged and theories constructed.
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The specification of the Pleadings Game is given below, following Prakken’s [104] models of
persuasion dialogues.
Context Legal procedure as persuasion dialogue. This was intended as a normative model
of civil pleading in Anglo-American legal systems. The purpose of civil pleading is to
identify the conflicting issues that need to be resolved in order to decide the case.
Participants Plaintiff and defendant
Initial State Each game starts with an initial background theory shared by the parties. During
the game it is continuously updated with each claim or premise of a party that is conceded
by the other party.
Moves The game contains speech acts for conceding and challenging a claim, for stating and
conceding arguments, and for challenging challenges of a claim. Three kinds of moves
can be made during a dialogue: open moves, which have not yet been replied to; conceded
moves, which are the arguments and claims that have been conceded; and denied moves,
which are the claims and challenges that have been challenged and the arguments that
have been attacked with counterarguments. Move legality is further defined by specific
rules for the various speech acts, which are mostly standard.
Commitment The game does not have an explicit notion of commitments, but special protocol
conditions enforce the participants’ dialogical consistency.
Protocol The protocol is multi-move but unique-reply. At each turn a player must respond in
some allowed way to every open move of the other player that is still “relevant” and may
reply to any other open move.
Termination and Winning Rules The result of a terminated game is twofold: a list of issues
identified during the game (i.e., the claims on which the players disagree), and a winner,
if there is one. Winning is defined relative to the background theory constructed during
a game. If issues remain, there is no winner and the case must be decided by the court.
If no issues remain, then the plaintiff wins if his main claim is defeasibly implied by the
final background theory, while the defendant wins otherwise.
More recently, Gordon et.al. have developed Carneades [71], which has also been designed
to be embedded in a procedural context. Unlike the Pleadings Game, Carneades does not itself
define a dialogue protocol. No roles, speech acts, termination criteria, or procedural rules are
defined. Instead Carneades is intended to be a reusable component providing services generally
needed when specifying such argumentation protocols. Carneades is explored further in sub-
section 2.3.3.
DiaLaw (1995)
DiaLaw [90, 92] is a dialogical framework for modelling legal reasoning; it incorporates the no-
tion of propositional commitment. The dialogue model formalises a legal procedure using both
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rule-based and case-based reasoning. Further discussion, in the same format as the Pleadings
Game above, about the persuasion dialogue game in DiaLaw (following [104]) is shown below:
Context DiaLaw is applied to legal disputes, and has since been developed for on-line dispute
resolution [91].
Participants Two participants with symmetric dialectical roles are involved in the dialogue
game.
initial State The dialogue begins with a claim from one of the players.
Moves The game contains detailed protocol rules for each specific type of move. They can
use locutions for claiming a proposition and for questioning, accepting and withdrawing
a claimed proposition. A claim can also be attacked by claiming its negation. Arguments
are constructed implicitly, by making a new claim in reply to a challenge. More arguments
are related to the procedural correctness of dialogue moves. A supporting claim is not
required to logically imply the supported claim. However, the game does not provide
means to attack arguments on their invalidity.
Commitment DiaLaw contains the usual commitment rules for claims, concessions and retrac-
tions. The commitments are not logically closed, but several rules render the making,
conceding or retraction of claims obligatory depending on what logically follows from
one’s commitments.
Protocol DiaLaw is for pure persuasion. As for turn taking, each dialogue begins with a claim
by one player, and then the turn switches after each move, except in a few cases where
surrenders are moved.
Termination and Winning Rules A dialogue terminates if no disagreement remains, i.e., if no
commitment from one player is not a commitment by the other. The first player wins if at
termination he is still committed to his initial claim; otherwise the second player wins.
Toulmin Dialogue Game (TDG) (1998)
The specification and implementation of this dialogue game is based on the argument schema
of Toulmin [124] (See Argumentation scheme in sub-section 3.3.1). This schema has been
found effective for the presentation of legal argument [94, 96], as an argument is seen as a set
of premises which entail a particular conclusion rather than a formal logic representation as in
previous dialogue systems.
The Toulmin scheme presented in Figure 2.9 shows different roles for premises, which give
arguments a richer structure, and corresponds to real arguments. Thus the structure proposed
by Toulmin incorporates three elements important in legal arguments: their defeasibility, via the
rebuttal; their need to appeal to extra logical justifications, through the backing; and the degree
of proof required, through the qualifier. The dialogue game based on the toulmin scheme was
used for the British Nationality Act in [39].
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TDG [34] is a persuasion dialogue game with a set of moves rich enough to model rea-
sonably realistic dialogues. A State Transition Diagram is used to show what moves, and se-
quences of moves, are possible in TDG. Each move is illustrated by a description, pre- and post-
conditions and completion conditions. The richness achieved by distinguishing the premises is
essential to capture elements of organisation and context integral to real arguments.
FIGURE 2.9: Toulmin Argumentation Scheme (reproduced from [34])
Context The scheme is applied to give more flexible legal dialogues. The idea is to generate
better dialogues by defining the communication language in terms of the argumentation
scheme defined by Toulmin.
Participants The game is symmetric for proponent and opponent, in that all the moves can be
made by either of these participants, at any given time. One of three roles is undertaken by
the participants: proponent of the claim, opponent of the claim, or referee, which enforces
implicit commitments.
initial State In TDG there is a claim stack that stores claims on the top of the stack, either
explicitly as claims, or implicitly when data or warrant s are supplied. Initially, this claim
stack is empty, and dialogue begins when a claim is made by one of the players.
Moves Speech acts are based on an adapted version of Toulmin’s argument scheme (Figure
2.9). A Claim (C) move is supported by data (Supply Data(C)), which can be sought if
not provided using (Why(C)). The data support is warranted by an inference licence using
(Supply Warrant(C) or So(C) to request a warrant) which possibly has presuppositions,
and which is backed by grounds for its acceptance. Finally, a claim can be attacked
with a rebuttal, which itself is a claim and thus the starting point of a counterargument.
Arguments can be chained by also regarding data as claims, for which further data can be
provided. The proponent can also withdraw his commitment to C using (Withdraw(C)).
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Commitment Each player is committed to the truth of certain propositions as the result of
moves. The commitment stores, maintained for each player other than the referee, record
these commitments.
Protocol The protocol is multi-move and multi-reply. The proponent starts with a claim and
then the parties can reply to each other’s moves according to a communication language.
To handle this, propositions are added to a “claim stack” when stated and removed from
it when retracted or conceded; each move replies to the top claim in the stack, but with
(Switch Focus(C)) control move, a player can move an earlier claim to the top of the stack
and so reply to it. After a surrendering move, or when an argument structure has been
completed, the turn switches to the referee. The referee assigns the turn to the opponent
of the top of the claim stack using (Current Claim(C)) or invites the opponent to make a
rebuttal move (Rebuttal (C)) .
Termination and Winning Rules The referee terminates the game when all claims have been
either conceded or retracted (claim stack is empty). The game has no explicit definition
of a winner.
PADUA (2009)
PADUA [135] is a Protocol for Argumentation Dialogue Using Association Rules, designed
to support two agents debating a classification in a persuasion dialogue by offering arguments
based on association rules mined from individual datasets. The participants have debate on the
basis of their experience of particular cases stored in a database. Arguing from experience is
akin to case-based argument where arguments about a case are typically backed by precedents,
therefore the best examples of legal PADUA are in legal domains where simple facts are used, as
transcribed from claim form to database, to find factors or similar intermediate predicates. The
purpose of PADUA dialogues is the resolution of conflicting opinions about the classification
of an instance. This purpose is met when the dialogue is terminated, and is identified with
the classification proposed by the winner of the dialogue game. PADUA specification is given
below:
Context PADUA is applied in a legal domain that addresses the classification of routine claims
for a hypothetical welfare benefit system in the UK.
Participants PADUA has two agents, each with distinct datasets of records relating to a classi-
fication problem. These agents produce reasons for and against classifications by mining
association rules from their datasets using standard data mining techniques “association
rule” which means that the antecedent is a set of reasons for believing the consequent.
initial State PADUA models argument from experience: that is, the agents will have con-
siderable experience of classifying examples in the particular domain and will draw on
this experience to offer reasons for classifying the new example. A topic language is
defined in PADUA that consists of set of items where each item is a set of value re-
lated to the database attributes, a set of database records, and association rules in the
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form (premises → conclusion,con f idence) according to a specific threshold of confi-
dence (Conf) that represents the lowest acceptable confidence, where rules with confi-
dence lower than this threshold are considered invalid arguments.
Moves The dialogue moves in PADUA are related to the three main argument moves used in
the legal CBP systems which involve: citing a case, distinguishing a case and providing
counter example. One represents citing a generalization of experience, by proposing a new
rule with a confidence higher than the threshold (Conf) (Propose rule), three pose the dif-
ferent types of distinction each with different force: either adding some new premise(s) to
the proposed rule, such that the confidence of the rule is lower than the confidence thresh-
old (Distinguish), or arguing that certain consequences (conclusions) of the proposed rule
do not match the studied case (Unwanted consequences), or that the confidence in the
classification would be increased if some additional features (premises) were present (In-
crease confidence). The (Counter rule) move is different in that it poses that there are
reasons to think the case untypical by proposing a new rule. Finally, (Withdraw unwanted
consequences) excludes the unwanted consequences of the rule it previously proposed,
while maintaining a certain level of confidence.
Commitment PADUA defines four effect rules that change the commitment store of the player
after a dialogue move.
Protocol A protocol that specifies the legal moves at each stage of a dialogue is defined [135].
PADUA protocol applies a simple turn taking policy, in which each player is allowed to
play exactly one move in its turn, and the turn shifts to the other agent in the dialogue.
Termination and Winning Rules The dialogue purpose is met when the dialogue is termi-
nated, and is identified with the classification proposed by the winner of the dialogue
game i.e. the dialogue ends when a player fails to play a legal move in its turn. In this
case, this particular player loses the game while the other player wins it. The winner of a
PADUA is the participant whose goal matches the output of the dialogue.
The dialogue moves presented above are defined within a dialogue structure in an argumentation-
based dialogue system. These moves are different from the argument moves presented in HYPO,
CATO and AGATHA in sub-section 2.1; the goal of the moves in these systems was to provide
an approach to a case-based reasoning, but they are not embedded within a dialogue.
In summary, the review of the several works presented in this section shows that dialogue
models are helpful in reasoning about exchanges of information by participants in different
contexts, including law. The work on this topic has produced some valuable insights. This
thesis will return to the original motivation of representing a specific legal procedure, running in
a real context, by considering some particular natural dialogues that form a clearly defined stage
of the US Supreme Court process, namely the Oral Hearings stage.
The three-ply approach of HYPO is similar to that used in the Oral Hearings of the US
Supreme Court. First, the plaintiff cites some cases supporting his side. In the second ply, the
defendant can distinguish the cases cited by the plaintiff and cite cases supporting the defendant:
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these are counter-examples to those cited in the first ply. In the third ply, the plaintiff is allowed
a rebuttal: the counter-examples can be distinguished and further cases advanced to show that
weaknesses in the original argument are not fatal, and to emphasise any strengths in the case.
Chapter 4 presents the structure of the dialogue representation model, defining the speech
acts and the rules that form the protocol of these Oral Hearing dialogues. The model presented
is not a dialogue game; also, there is no argument in these dialogues, no winners or losers, and
no burden of proof. However, the key idea of the dialogue is to extract the relevant argument
components, not to make a decision. To investigate how these argument components can be
represented, the next section discusses various frameworks for abstract and structured argumen-
tation.
2.3 Frameworks For Argumentation
Argumentation Theory is the study of the process of making a decision through logical reason-
ing, which itself involves different types of reasoning [33]. Contributions in argumentation the-
ory provide a number of mechanisms which are useful in their application to AI. One particularly
important contribution is Dung’s notion of an “argumentation framework” for the evaluation of
the acceptability status of arguments.
This section first gives an overview of Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks, and the
various refinements of Dung’s frameworks. More detail is given regarding the most recent gen-
eralisation of Dung’s framework, Abstract Dialectical Frameworks which are the core of the
work presented in this thesis. Afterwards, the discussion moves from the abstract nature of
argument to examine structured argument.
2.3.1 Dung Abstract Argumentation Frameworks and Dung’s Refinements
Dung developed a formal abstract theory of argument. A Dung argumentation framework (AF)
[61] consists of a set of arguments related by a binary conflict-based attack relationship (Figure
2.10 (a)).
Definition 1: An Argumentation Framework AF is a pair AF = < A,De f >4 where
– A is a set of arguments.
– De f is a binary relation of A. De f ⊂ A× A is the attack relationship for AF. A
comprises a set of ordered pairs of distinct arguments in De f .
The argumentation process moves through a number of steps: first, identify the arguments
and the attack relationship between them; then, evaluate the arguments and their interactions
according to one of the several available semantics; and finally, select the most acceptable ar-
guments (or sets of arguments) and draw a conclusion or choose a decision from the accepted
4Dung called the relationship “defeat”. Subsequent work has led to “attack” being more representative.
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arguments. The sets of acceptable arguments are determined under different extensional se-
mantics. For R, S, subsets of A, Dung defines several types of extensions as explained below
(reproduced from [21]).
• s ∈ S is attacked by R if there is some r ∈ R such that < r,s >∈ A.
• x ∈ X is acceptable with respect to S if for every y ∈ X that attacks x, there is some z ∈ S
that attacks y (i.e. z, and hence S, defends x against y).
• S is conflict free if no argument in S is attacked by any other argument in S.
• A conflict free set is admissible if every argument in S is acceptable with respect to S.
• S is a preferred extension if it is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) admissible
subset of X .
• S is a stable extension if S is conflict free and every argument y, ¬(y ∈ S), is attacked by
S.
• S is a complete extension if S is a subset of A, S is admissible, and each argument which
is defended by S is in S.
• S is a grounded extension if it is the least (with respect to set inclusion) complete exten-
sion.
• An argument x is credulously accepted if there is some preferred extension containing it.
• An argument x is sceptically accepted if it is a member of every preferred extension.
Each AF has a grounded extension (which may be the empty set) that is contained in all
other extensions, and at least one preferred extension.
The framework abstracts from the underlying logic in which the arguments and attack re-
lation are generated. The abstract nature of Dung’s theory of argumentation accounts for its
widespread application as a general framework for various species of non-monotonic reasoning,
and, more generally, reasoning in the presence of conflict, whether such conflict arises from
uncertain or incomplete information or as a result of differing opinions or preferences.
Dung’s theory has been developed in a number of directions. One is to provide some means
for preferring one argument to another as in [12], so that an argument a successfully attacks
b if and only if a is not preferred to b according to some given preference relationship defined
within the framework. Another form of preference is in Value Based Argumentation Frameworks
(VAFs) [28] where each argument is associated with a social value that is promoted according
to a value preference ordering which may vary from one audience to another. Depending on this
process, the argument will be accepted or defeated by other attacks. That is, a is defeated if and
only if a value v1 promoted by an argument a is ranked higher than the value v2 promoted by
b as in Figure 2.10 (b). This social value determines the strength of an argument according to a
certain preference ordering by an audience.
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Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks (EAFs) [100] refine Dung’s framework in
a different way. Modgil allows attacks on attacks in addition to attacks on arguments, assum-
ing that the defeat relationship in AF is a basic attack relationship. EAF arguments express
preferences between other arguments using attacks on attacks. Intuitively, if argument c claims
that argument b is preferred to argument a, and a attacks b, then c undermines the success of
a’s attack on b by pref-attacking a’s attack on b (Figure 2.10 (c)). This idea has been further
generalised by Baroni et al. [27] so that not only can arguments attack attacks, but these attacks
on attacks can themselves be attacked in Argumentation Frameworks with Recursive Attacks
(AFRA). Furthermore, Dung AFs have been used to reason about other arguments rather than
about the domain, by using preference ordering and attacks on attacks to determine a unique set
of justified arguments; this results in Meta-argumentation Frameworks [99] (Figure 2.10 (d)).
The arguments defined in all these frameworks can be evaluated under the full range of Dung’s
extensional semantics.
Further work has applied formal argumentation models to legal argumentation. For example,
the abstract argumentation framework of Dung [61] has been applied to law in [103] and many
subsequent papers, and an extension to accommodate values [28] was applied to legal argument
in [38] and elsewhere. The computational and theoretical strands of factor-based reasoning have,
however, by no means remained separate, and there have been a number of attempts to express
the factor-based reasoning embodied in systems such as CATO in a rule-based format suitable
for representation in a more formal framework (e.g. [108]).
Finally, a number of works augment Dung’s framework to include a support relationship, in
addition to an attack relationship, in arguments such as Bipolar Abstract Argumentation Frame-
works [56]. BAFs present two independent kinds of information: arguments supporting other
arguments, and arguments attacking arguments. In Dung’s framework, if an argument a attacks
argument b and argument c attacks argument a, then c supports b. This is different from the
support relationship in a BAF, which is assumed to be totally independent of the attack relation
and thus is not defined using the attack relation. The links in BAFs have been generalised to
include any interpretation in Abstract Dialectical Frameworks, with acceptance conditions local
to each particular node as shown in the next sub-section. Figure 2.10 (E,F) illustrates BAFs and
ADFs respectively.
2.3.2 Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADFs) were introduced in [54] and revisited in [53]. ADFs
provide a generalisation of Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) [61]. ADFs, like
AFs, consist of a set of nodes and directed links between them, but whereas the links in an
AF have a uniform interpretation, namely defeat, the links in an ADF can be given a variety of
interpretations including the second relationship (support) in bipolar argumentation frameworks
[56]. In addition, ADFs generalise the single acceptance condition introduced by Dung’s AF
(that all attackers be defeated) with acceptance conditions local to each particular node. The
nodes in ADF are statements, not necessarily arguments, that are related by a variety of types of
links.
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FIGURE 2.10: Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
Although the acceptance conditions are often expressed as propositional functions, this need
not be the case: all that is required is the specification of conditions for the acceptance or re-
jection of a node in terms of the acceptance or rejection of its children. Table 2.3 shows the
differences between AFs, bipolar AFs and ADFs.
ADFs are defined in [53] as follows:
Definition 2: An ADF is a tuple ADF = < S,L,C > where
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– S is the set of statements (positions, nodes).
– L is a subset of S×S, a set of links.
– C = {Cs∈S} is a set of total functions Cs : 2par(s)→ {t, f}, one for each statement s.
Cs is called the acceptance condition of s.
In a Prioritised ADF, L is partitioned into L+ and L−, supporting and attacking links, re-
spectively.
Definition 3: A prioritised ADF (PADF) is a tuple A = (S,L+,L−,>) where
– S is the set of statements (positions, nodes).
– L+ and L− are subsets of S×S the supporting and attacking links.
– > is a strict partial order (irreflexive, transitive, antisymmetric) on S representing
preferences among the nodes.
FIGURE 2.11: ADF and PADF
Prioritised ADFs (PADFs), illustrated in Figure 2.11, were designed specifically to reflect
Preference-Based Frameworks [12]. This partitioning is used to separate links into supporting
and attacking links, but continues to see the acceptance conditions as specifying preferences
locally rather than adopting a global ordering of nodes as will be used in Chapters 5 and 6.
Brewka and Woltran have also introduced weighted ADFs where a weight is added to the links
using a weight function; i.e. by assigning qualitative or numerical weights to the links in the
ADF; the acceptance conditions will then be defined based on the weights of links rather than
on the involved positions.
Different semantics, including Dung’s semantics, have been defined for ADFs to evaluate
the arguments and determine the acceptable arguments in ADFs [51]. The notion of a model
in ADF means that all acceptance conditions are satisfied. The Diamond system [63] is a tool
for computing various interpretations with respect to the semantics for a given ADF. It takes an
ADF as an input and produces different models for different ADF semantics.
The advanced features of ADFs motivate the core work in this thesis. ADFs have taken
the design role to drive and record the knowledge base for a system to apply a body of case
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AF BAF ADF PADF
Nodes Abstract argument Abstract argument Any statement Any statement
Links Attacks Supports and
attacks
Any type of
links
Supports and
attacks (L+,L-)
Accepted
nodes
A node that
defeats
all attacks
A node that
defeats all
attacks
The node’s
acceptance
condition is true
The node’s
acceptance
condition is true
according to
a particular order
TABLE 2.3: AF, BiPolar and ADF
law taking advantage of the knowledge features embedded in the ADF, as is fully discussed in
Chapter 5. Legal decisions are typically not truth functional: they require both a context (e.g.
a set of cases) and a procedure (e.g. stare decisis). Both of these can be represented in the
“acceptance conditions” of ADFs, as in Chapter 5, applied in different legal domains in Chapter
6 and finally evaluated in Chapter 7.
2.3.3 Structured Argumentation
Dung’s arguments are entirely abstract, mainly exploring how acceptability of arguments fol-
lows from a defeat relationship according to a number of different semantics. However, the
structure of the arguments in Dung’s frameworks is unknown. How can an argument be con-
structed from a set of premises by performing consecutive reasoning steps? What are the dif-
ferent ways in which an argument can be attacked? For this internal structure many different
formalisms have been proposed. This sub-section discusses such structured approaches, specif-
ically examining the argumentation schemes, ASPIC+ and Carneades.
Argumentation Schemes
Argumentation schemes [132] are stereotypical patterns of human reasoning used in conversa-
tional argumentation, and in other contexts as well, including legal and scientific argumentation.
They are forms of inference from premises to a conclusion in which one party is trying to get
another to come to accept a conclusion that is at issue. They represent deductive and induc-
tive reasoning in some instances but typically they represent defeasible inference rules. These
schemes are defined by studying many examples of arguments and finding patterns and struc-
tures common to these arguments. They are a powerful tool as a bridge between human and
computational models of argument; they are useful in understanding the structure of the argu-
ments and making significant improvements in reasoning systems in AI.
Schemes are useful for identifying arguments by finding missing premises, analysing argu-
ments and finally evaluating them. In addition to the premises and conclusion, a key feature
of any argumentation scheme [132] is a set of characteristic Critical Questions (CQs). A set
of appropriate CQs is associated with each scheme. These questions represent attacks, chal-
lenges or criticisms that, if not answered adequately, make the argument fitting the scheme fail
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to hold since argumentation schemes establish their conclusions only presumptively; the CQs
are needed to test these presumptions. Some critical questions ask whether a premise of the
argument is stated to identify a hidden premise, or whether a premise is true. Such questions
create a burden on the other side to back the premise with further grounds.
Argumentation schemes are a tool for constructing arguments to put forward in a dialogue.
A typical method is to instantiate a scheme from an underlying knowledge base (e.g. Carneades
[71]) or modelling logic as in the Action-based Alternating Transition System (ATAS) used in
[22]. The relationship of a set of critical questions to a scheme brings in the notion of a dialogue
sequence between a questioner and an answerer. An argument is a move in a dialogue, and the
scheme that it instantiates determines the allowed and required responses to the move by the
other side. For an argument to be justified it is not sufficient for it to fit a recognised argument
scheme: it should also survive a dialogical testing process with critical questions.
Legal arguments can be raised from different sources: from evidence, precedent cases, social
values, rules, policy goals and jurisprudence doctrine. Two functions of argumentation schemes
can be distinguished: argument patterns useful for reconstructing arguments from natural lan-
guage texts; and methods for generating arguments from argument sources such as legislation
or precedent cases. Legal reasoning typically requires a variety of argumentation schemes to be
used together. In addition to Toulmin’s argumentation scheme [124] (discussed previously in the
Toulmin Dialogue Game in section 2.2.2), a leading example of a presumptive argumentation
scheme is the one representing argument from expert opinion as formulated in [132]: A is a
proposition; E is an Expert; D is a domain of knowledge.
Argument From Expert Opinion
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in the subject domain S containing proposition
A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A in domain S is true.
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken as true.
The standard six critical questions, given in [132], matching the expert opinion argumenta-
tion scheme are:
CQ1: How credible is E as an expert source?
CQ2: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
CQ3: Does E ′s testimony imply A?
CQ4: Is E reliable?
CQ5: Is A consistent with the testimony of other experts?
CQ6: Is A supported by evidence?
Another form of argumentation scheme that is used frequently in legal reasoning is witness
testimony, which is considered as a basic source of evidence about a fact in a case in trial courts.
Witnesses are not always reliable; that is what needs to be clarified through the following scheme
taken from [134, p. 310]:
Argument from Witness Testimony
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Position to Know Premise: Witness W is in a position to know whether A is true or
not.
Truth Telling Premise: Witness W is telling the truth (as W knows it).
Statement Premise: Witness W states that A is true (false).
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
Five critical questions are used with this witness testimony argumentation scheme:
CQ1: Is what the witness said internally consistent?
CQ2: Is what the witness said consistent with the known facts of the case (based on
evidence apart from what the witness testified to)?
CQ3: Is what the witness said consistent with what other witness have (indepen-
dently) testified to?
CQ4: Is there some kind of bias that can be attributed to the account given by the
witness?
CQ5: How plausible is the statement A asserted by the witness?
Practical reasoning is reasoning about what to do. An argumentation scheme for practical
reasoning is introduced in Walton’s [132] and elaborated by Atkinson et.al. in [23] by redefining
the notion of goal intro three distinct elements: states, goals, and values. This results in the
construction of sixteen critical questions presented in [23].
Practical Reasoning (PRAS)
Circumstance premise In the circumstances R
Consequent premise to achieve new circumstances S
Goal premise which will realise some goal G
Value premise which will promote some value V .
Conclusion we should perform action A
Legal reasoning can also be seen as practical reasoning as in [20] by instantiating the argu-
mentation scheme so that the action (A) is to decide for, say, the plaintiff, given the facts (R) and
a decision to resolve the case (G) which will promote value (V). This justification has been ap-
plied to reconstruct the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions of several legal cases,
for example Pierson v. Post.
Modelling the legal dialogues discussed in Chapter 4 in this thesis uses a set of critical ques-
tions that are akin to the CQs attached to an argumentation scheme. However, the conclusions of
these dialogues are not arguments but argument components in the form of issues, factors, facts
and relationships between them. Argumentation schemes are intended to supply reasons why
these components should be considered and tested for their presence in a case. In this sense,
the role of these critical questions is to provide moves in the dialogues by providing challenging
questions about the argument components, or seeking additional components to be proposed.
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ASPIC+
Another refinement of Dung’s abstract approach is the ASPIC+ framework for structured argu-
mentation [105]. The framework enables some content to be given to the arguments assuming
an unspecified logical language and knowledge base. This may include facts, strict rules, and
defeasible rules. The arguments are defined as inference trees, formed by applying inference
rules (which may be either strict or defeasible) to a knowledge base.
The root node of the tree is the argument claim, and the leaf nodes are the argument premises.
Premises are facts in the knowledge base; they are either assumptions (ordinary premises), which
are initially unjustified and are defeated if challenged and cannot be argued for, or axioms, which
cannot be questioned [101].
In ASPIC+ an argumentation theory is AT = (AS,K) where
• The argumentation system AS consists of an argumentation language L and a set of strict
rules Rs and defeasible rules Rd and a partial function n that corresponds defeasible rules
to the language such that Rd→ L.
• Knowledge base K consists of two disjoint subsets Kn (the axioms) and K p (the ordinary
premises).
Arguments in ASPIC+ relative to AT are defined as chain applications of the inference rules
from AS into inference trees, starting with elements from the knowledge base K. For a given
argument,
• the function Prem returns all the formulas of K (called premises) used to build the argu-
ment,
• Conc returns its conclusion, Sub returns all its sub-arguments,
• De f Rules returns all the defeasible rules of the argument and
• TopRule returns the last inference rule used in the argument.
The notion of an argument as an inference tree leads to three ways of attacking an argument
(Figure 2.12):
• Rebuttal (a conclusion attack): A rebuts an argument B (on B′) iff Conc(A) =¬ϕ for some
B′ ⊂ Sub(B) of the form B1′′,,,,Bn′′⇒ ϕ .
• Undermining (a premise attack): A undermines an argument B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = ¬ϕ
for some B′= ϕ,ϕ /∈ Kn
• Undercutting (an inference attack): A undercuts an argument B (on B′) iff Conc(A) =
−n(r) for some B′ ⊂ Sub(B) so that B′’s top rule r is defeasible.
Rebutting and undermining attacks succeed only if the attacked argument is not stronger than
the attacking argument, while undercutting attacks express exceptions to defeasible inference
rules and thus succeed as defeats independently of preferences over arguments.
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FIGURE 2.12: Formalising a Legal Opinion in ASPIC+ From [106]
The framework has a number of applications in the legal domain. Wyner et.al. [145] provide
argumentation schemes for CATO-style case-based reasoning, which have been reanalysed and
formalised in ASPIC+ in [111] where defeasible legal case-based reasoning is represented, for-
malised in argumentation schemes and evaluated in ASPIC+. In [106] ASPIC+ has been used
as a tool for reconstructing natural legal argument about legislative proposals in order to present
some of the main ASPIC+ features, the distinction between deductive and defeasible inference
rules and the explicit preference ordering on arguments.
The analysis of legal cases produced by the ADF representation in Chapters 5 and 6 in this
thesis bears a strong resemblance to the kind of structured argumentation found in ASPIC+.
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This topic is explored further in Chapter 7.
Carneades
The Carneades system [71] is software developed for constructing, evaluating and visualising
arguments from formal models of legal concepts, rules, and cases. Carneades is useful for mod-
elling procedural context as in legal dialogues. It shows how proof standards make it possible to
shift the burden of proof during a dialogue from one side to the other as it progresses from stage
to stage when a critical question matching an argumentation scheme is asked by one party.
Critical questions are then modelled as additional premises of different types to capture
the varying effects on the burden of proof of different kinds of questions. Burden of proof
is distributed by distinguishing between three types of premises: those that must always be
supported with further grounds (ordinary premises); those that can be assumed until they have
been questioned (assumptions); and those that do not hold in the absence of evidence to the
contrary (exceptions).
The originality of Carneades lies in its method for allocating the burden of proof to the pro-
ponent or respondent, for each premise separately, using premise types, proof standards and the
dialectical status of statements (stated, questioned, accepted or rejected). The notion of burden
of proof in Carneades[71] refers to: burden of production, which means the amount of evidence
required to produce the legal facts for the plaintiff’s main claim, or producing the exceptions for
the defendant, and burden of persuasion, which defines the degree to which the fact-finder must
be persuaded in order for the ultimate claim to be proved, i.e. if the party having that burden has
failed to satisfy it, the issue is to be decided against that party. The initial allocation of the bur-
den of production is regulated by the premise types of the argumentation scheme applied. The
burden of persuasion is allocated by assigning the appropriate proof standard. As the dialogue
progresses, subject to the argumentation protocol, the burdens may be reallocated by changing
the assignment of premise types and proof standards via speech acts designed for this purpose.
Multiple forms of reasoning can be integrated in Carneades architecture, which allows a
number of computational models of argumentation to be used together to search and construct
argument as in [73]. Unlike Dung’s framework, Carneades is a formal model of argument struc-
ture. Arguments are designed to model instantiations of argumentation schemes linking a set of
premises to a conclusion, where the premises and the conclusion of arguments are statements
about the world, which may be accepted or rejected. However, Carneades does not depend on a
particular logical language for expressing statements, inference rules or argumentation schemes.
Carneades constructs an argument graph, which is a kind of proof tree that provides a basis
for explanations and justifications. Argument graphs have two kinds of nodes; statement nodes
and argument nodes. The evaluation of arguments in Carneades depends on whether statements
have been questioned or decided, the allocation of the burden of proof, and the proof standard
applicable to questioned statements.
Carneades has been reconstructed as an ADF in [52]. This translation yields acyclic Carneades
structures; however, this property has been generalised using the resulting ADF to produce
cyclic argument structures. Further benefits from this Carneades-ADF translation allows the
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generalisation of argument evaluation structures on ADF nodes, and helps put Carneades on a
solid formal foundation by clarifying the relationship between Carneades and Dung AFs (both
are instances of ADFs). Another recent translation considers finding the relationship between
Carneades, AF, and ASPIC+ [127] producing a cycle-free argumentation framework, thus al-
ways inducing a unique Dung extension which is the same in all Dung’s semantics. Carneades
has also been used to reconstruct legal cases decisions (Pierson v. Post [72] and Popov v.
Hayashi in [75]).
2.4 Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of a number of areas this research has drawn upon in
proposing the work in the forthcoming chapters. The main background setting for this research is
the area of Argumentation in AI and Law. Three main topics have been discussed, starting with
the core topic of AI and Law and covering legal reasoning models and legal CBR systems, legal
text processing and legal ontologies. Then, dialogue typologies and the components of dialogue
models were presented, showing examples of legal dialogue models. Finally, an overview of
argumentation frameworks was provided, showing abstract and structured argumentation. A
summary of the key points from each topic is briefly presented below:
Legal CBR Systems The chapter began by exploring a number of landmark legal case-based
reasoning systems in the domain of AI and Law, mainly HYPO and HYPO’s descendants
(CATO, IBP and AGATHA). All four systems have used cases from the US Trade Se-
crets domain, varying in their knowledge base size, to identify arguments. However, the
systems are distinct in their case representation and reasoning: HYPO uses dimensions,
CATO uses factors organised in a factor hierarchy, IBP groups CATO factors into an
abstract factor hierarchy rooted in issues, and AGATHA uses factors and values to empir-
ically evaluate the theory-based reasoning of [38]. Three key moves have emerged from
these systems: (i) citing a case, (ii) distinguishing a case, and (iii) providing a counter-
example. In contrast to the other systems, IBP resolves the conflict between the arguments
and predicts the outcomes of cases. AGATHA produces a theory of the domain, while
HYPO and CATO present the arguments without resolving the conflict between them.
The research undertaken in this thesis has reused the factor hierarchy of CATO, and
mapped it to the logical model of IBP to instantiate an Abstract Dialectical Framework for
32 cases of US Trade Secrets domain used in AGATHA. Chapter 5 defines the acceptance
conditions for all the base factors and abstract factors of CATO and IBP and translates
it into an executable form to evaluate the approach. Possible refinements are suggested
in Chapter 6. The findings are compared with other domains and different legal CBR
systems in Chapter 7.
Models for Legal Reasoning Next, this chapter investigated various approaches in the domain
of AI and Law applied at different layers in modelling legal reasoning: (i) from evidence
to agreed facts; (ii) from agreed facts to intermediate concepts (factors, and issues); and
Chapter 2. Literature Review 64
(iii) from intermediate concepts to legal consequences, which is the stage concerning legal
CBR systems discussed previously. The legal case representation applied in this thesis
considers the second and third layers, showing an inference tree (ACT) with facts, factors
and issues in Chapter 4, and considering the case facts layer in reasoning with ADF in
Chapter 6.
Legal Ontologies and Legal Text Processing The knowledge representation encapsulated in
this research was all done manually, as in the case-based reasoning discussed previously.
This chapter considers research efforts in the AI and Law domain that pertain to process-
ing legal texts by providing examples of the use of NLP techniques for ontology construc-
tion and factor annotation, specifically of unstructured linguistic information, to address
the knowledge acquisition bottleneck.
Research in this thesis considers the role of legal ontology in the development of legal
representation models to provide explanations for the components extracted from natural
language, but not NLP techniques. In Chapter 4, a manual analysis is applied to mark-up
the dialogues in the US Supreme Court Oral Hearings. The elements are used to feed
a legal ontology which serves as a repository for the argument components of a legal
domain.
Legal Dialogue Models Another aspect of concern in this research is modelling legal dia-
logues. Dialogue systems were originally introduced into AI and Law as a way of mod-
elling legal procedures. The outcome in most of these dialogues is not fully determined
by the participants but by a referee (a judge or jury). This chapter has discussed a num-
ber of legal dialogue games including Pleadings Games, DiaLaw, TDG and PADUA. All
these systems examine persuasion dialogues in different legal contexts. The protocol and
moves of these dialogue games work together to fulfill the goals of the dialogue.
One of the key aims of this thesis is to provide a computational model for a legal proce-
dure, running in a real context, by considering some particular natural dialogues that form
a clearly defined stage of the US Supreme Court process, namely the Oral Hearings stage.
In comparison to other contexts, dialogues in the legal domain combine arguments from
different sources, i.e. argument about the case evidence and facts, argument from legal
rules, argument from precedent cases, argument from hypothetical tests and others which
are required to resolve the ambiguity of the conflict issues. However, the structure of ex-
changing arguments in legal dialogues is not clear: the argument types are interleaved and
there is no particular order for the parties to pose arguments, which makes the analysis
of oral hearings more complicated. Chapter 3 first examines the goal of the Oral Hearing
dialogues in order to define the structure of the dialogue representation model, including
the speech acts and the rules that form the protocol of these Oral Hearing dialogues in
Chapter 4. However, the main goal of the dialogue is to extract the relevant argument
components, i.e. there is no outcome or winner.
The dialogue moves defined in these dialogues are different from the argument moves
presented in HYPO, CATO and AGATHA since these systems do not embed their moves
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within a dialogue. However, the three ply approach of HYPO is similar to that used in the
Oral Hearings of the US Supreme Court. First, the plaintiff cites some cases supporting
his side. The defendant cites cases supporting his side in the second ply (counter-examples
to those cited in the first ply). In the third ply, the plaintiff is allowed a rebuttal.
Frameworks For Argumentation Argumentation Theory is the study of the process of mak-
ing a decision through logical reasoning, which itself involves different types of reason-
ing [33]. Argumentation theory provides a number of mechanisms which are useful in
their application to AI. The final topic discussed in this chapter is the various frameworks
for abstract and structured argumentation, starting from Dung’s abstract argumentation
frameworks, and explaining the distinction between the various refinements of Dung’s
frameworks, including ADFs. The advanced features of ADFs motivated the core work in
this thesis: the nodes in ADFs are statements rather than specifically abstract arguments,
and the links can be a variety of interpretations that define acceptance conditions local to
each particular node.
In particular, ADFs can take a design role to drive and record the knowledge base in order
to apply a body of case law, taking advantage of the knowledge features embedded in the
ADF, as is fully discussed in Chapter 5. Legal decisions are typically not truth functional:
they require both a context (e.g. a set of cases) and a procedure (e.g. stare decisis). Both
of these can be represented in the “acceptance conditions” of an ADF. The method is
applied in different legal domains in Chapter 6 and evaluated in Chapter 7.
Several formalisms for structured arguments have also been presented, showing how an
argument can be constructed from a set of premises by performing consecutive reasoning
steps through argumentation schemes. The various types of argument attacks in structured
argumentation in ASPIC+ have a strong resemblance to legal cases represented in ADFs
(discussed in Chapter 7). This chapter finally described Carneades and how it has been
reconstructed as ADF.
Each of these areas plays an important part in the research presented in the following chap-
ters for the computational representation of legal domains. The next chapter will provide the
necessary background about the legal procedures and the legal domains relevant to this thesis.

Chapter 3
Legal Case Decision Process and Legal
Domains
“To succeed, planning alone is insufficient. One must improvise as well.” Isaac
Asimov, Foundation
——————————————–
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some necessary background about the procedures of
the US Courts, with a focus on the US Supreme Court since this is the main legal procedure
body examined in this research. Furthermore, an overview of the legal case domains that have
been used as case studies in the thesis is provided. All the selected legal domains are related
to the US Courts where all the case briefs, Oral Hearings and Opinions are available to the
public and many have been previously analysed in the AI and Law literature. This chapter gives
an overview on courts procedures in Section 3.1. Then, briefly describes the Supreme Court
processes in Section 3.2 and the role played by the Oral Hearings and Legal Opinion stages in
Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 respectively. The chapter also provides an overview of the particular
legal case domains that have been used as examples in this thesis in Section 3.5 and concludes
with a Summary in Section 3.6.
3.1 Overview on Court Procedures
Following the legal reasoning model described in the previous chapter (Section 2.1.2), every
legal case starts from evidence and ends with a legal decision. This decision-making process
may require the involvement of several courts, starting from the Lower Courts and moving
up to the Appellate and Supreme Courts. Every Court requires the investigation of specific
stages in the legal reasoning model: Figure 3.1 illustrates the stages of reasoning in combination
with the relevant Courts. This diagram illustrates the idea that the lower courts determine the
facts and apply the law as established, whereas the higher courts take the facts as given and
interpret the law. The US legal system is derived from the English Common Law system that
uses the principle of stare decisis (“let the decision stand”), where cases are decided according
to consistent principled rules as established in precedent cases, so that similar facts yield similar
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results. Decisions in Common Law jurisdictions (rather than civil law as in the continental
European usage), are heavily influenced by precedent cases. Case law, in common law, is the
set of decisions that can be cited as precedents. If the current case is distinct from precedents,
judges have the authority to make law by providing tests and creating precedents for future
cases. The focus in this research is on civil cases (in the Anglo-American usage, where it refers
to non-criminal cases), such as those applicable to Trade Secrets and Property Law. In criminal
law cases the emphasis is much more strongly on what the evidence establishes, rather than
distinctively legal reasoning. New cases, whether they are Civil or Criminal, are presented first
to Trial Courts, where evidence and testimonies are discussed and examined. This evidence
is used as a basis to determine facts by following the procedure of law in order to resolve the
dispute between the conflict parties1. Typically, there will be standards of proof that must be
met, and often the responsibility of deciding facts will be given to a jury. Once the facts have
been established, determining the outcome should typically be a straightforward application of
existing law. In many legal processes, including UK and US Appeals, the facts are decided by
the court of first instance, and cannot be revisited at the appeal and subsequent stages. Thus, for
example, in US Supreme Court cases, which are the subject of much study in AI and Law, the
facts are never in dispute. In some scenarios, decisions made by Lower Courts are reviewed in
Appellate Courts, and Supreme Courts. The role of these courts is to affirm, reverse or quash the
decision made by Lower Courts. The facts decided by the Lower Court are used to determine
the presence or absence of base factors. The Courts’ decision shows what are the factors that
require consideration, how the conflicts between these factors are resolved, and what are the
issues served by this decision. All the examples in this research are in the higher courts. The
next section explains in more detail the processes of the US Supreme Court, the highest court
in the United States, with further investigations of the Oral Hearing dialogues and the opinions
produced by this Court.
3.2 Supreme Court Process
Typically the Supreme Court reviews cases that have been decided in lower courts, affirming,
quashing or reversing the lower court decision. The Supreme Court receives a number of certio-
rari requests from parties (petitioners) who are not satisfied with lower court decisions, asking
for a review of their cases. Normally, when a case for consideration of certiorari is accepted,
the petitioner and respondent write briefs setting out their positions and recommendations to
prepare the Justices for the oral argumentation. Briefs may also be supplied by other interested
parties, such as the Solicitor General. These are the so-called amicus curiae (friend of the court)
briefs. When the Justices have considered all the briefs, the Oral Hearings take place. The
total time for the oral argumentation is just one hour; thirty minutes for each party. Normally
the petitioner will begin, reserving some of his thirty minutes for rebuttal. The respondent will
follow for thirty minutes, and the petitioner will finish, taking the remaining time for a rebuttal.
Following the Oral Hearing, the Justices meet in a Justice conference to discuss and vote on the
1US Courts URL: http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure.
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FIGURE 3.1: Legal Reasoning Stages in Different Courts
case. Following this the opinions are prepared: one Justice will be chosen to write the opinion
of the Court, and the other Justices may, if they wish, write their own concurring or dissenting
opinions. Figure 3.2 illustrates the procedure of the Supreme Court from the time of receiving
the certiorari until the court opinion. The top level illustrates the main processes in the pro-
cedure, while more detailed sub-processes are presented in lower levels. The Supreme Court
is expected to give a decision in the case under review, but it needs to look to the past and the
future as well. The decision is often expressed as a rule which will be applicable to future cases,
and which will, as far as possible, be consistent with previous decisions of the Court: see e.g.
[83].
3.2.1 Oral Hearing Dialogues
This section describes the initial situation, the individual goals and the collective goals for Oral
Hearings of the US Supreme Court as required to characterise dialogues in Walton and Krabbe
[133], which will help to drive the analysis of the Oral Hearing dialogues in terms of the com-
putational perspective. Within the Supreme Court procedure, there are three nested dialogues
in the main oral argumentation dialogue (Figure 3.3). The overall aim is to establish the var-
ious elements, and the connections between them, expressed as clearly and unambiguously as
possible, which can be used by the Justices to construct the arguments they will use in their
opinions. Tests for the elements may also be proposed and refined. Each of the three dialogues
will involve a counsel and up to nine Justices. No distinction between the Justices is presented
in the analysis.
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Essentially they will all ask questions to clarify and challenge the argument components
proposed by counsel, although the particular questions they pose may well be motivated by their
own views of the case, and their developing ideas of the argument they will use to decide the
case. The arguments produced in the opinion will essentially introduce and use a test [19], which
will be binding on future cases satisfying the test, and which will allow a decision to be made by
using the facts of the current case to establish the presence of a set of factors which will resolve
the issues in favour of one of the parties.
FIGURE 3.3: Oral Hearing Nested Dialogues
In the initial state of the petitioner presentation, briefs from the petitioner, respondent and
any “friends of the court” are available. These will set out (and justify) a set of tests which
would provide candidate arguments: counsels will in turn present the elements of a test which,
if accepted, will ground an argument for their clients. The briefs will also state the accepted facts
of the case, and draw attention to relevant precedent cases. The collective goal is to obtain a clear
statement of a set of elements that can be used to form an argument which will resolve the case.
Individually the counsel will wish to present an acceptable test which will lead to a decision for
the petitioner and to answer any critical questions satisfactorily: modifying his tests if necessary.
The Justices will wish to clarify any points that have not been made clear in the original brief, and
to pose challenges arising from the other briefs. The collective goal of the second dialogue, the
respondent presentation, is to obtain a clear statement of the test advocated for the respondent.
The respondent dialogue differs in its initial state because the petitioner has already presented.
Thus as well as presenting his own test, counsel for the respondent may find some difficulties
with the test proposed by his adversary. The Justices remain interested in clarification and
eliciting answers to questions arising from the other briefs. While the collective goal of the
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Initial State Individual Goal Collective Goal
Petitioner OH Briefs
Petitioner: Proposing tests
and answering Justice
questions that would
decide the case for the
petitioner.
Justice: Clarify ambiguous
points and pose questions
form other briefs.
Clear statements
of set of elements
which can be used
as an argument that
resolves the case
Respondent OH
Briefs +
Petitioner’s tests
and elements
Respondent: Proposing tests,
rebutting petitioner’s tests,
answering Justice questions
that would decide the case
for the respondent.
Justice: Clarify ambiguous
points and pose questions
form other briefs.
Clear statements
of set of elements
which can be used
as an argument that
resolves the case
Petitioner
Rebuttal
Respondent’s tests
and elements
Petitioner: Rebutting
respondent’s tests, propose
elements and tests that
would decide the case
for the petitioner.
Justice: Clarify points
if required.
Clear statements
of set of elements
which can be used
as an argument that
resolves the case
TABLE 3.1: Characteristics of Oral Hearing Dialogues
rebuttal dialogue is again a clear statement of the tests and the elements composing them,
and the choices that must be made when deciding between the tests, the initial state now also
contains the respondent’s test and its elements, and the individual goal of the petitioner’s counsel
is to pose questions against this test. Justices usually say very little during this stage, but they
may wish to seek clarification of some points. The summary of this characterisation of the three
dialogues is shown in Table 3.1. The goal of the three dialogues as a whole is to provide a clear
statement of possible tests and the elements used in them, which the Justices will employ to
decide the case and construct the arguments in their opinions.
3.2.2 Legal Arguments in the Court Opinion
After the Oral Hearings, there will be a set of available argument components, in the form of
facts, factors and issues, and possible linkages between them. The task now is to analyse these
alternatives to produce an answer for the case, and a test applicable to future cases. This is the
role of the Justices’ conference stage. Different Justices may make different choices, which may
lead Justices to write individual opinions either dissenting from the majority, or concurring by
expressing a different justification of the majority or minority decision. These different Justices’
opinions are explained below:
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Majority Opinion Is the opinion that prevails, when the majority (five or more out of the nine
Justices) provide an opinion on an issue and that opinion is the one that prevails.
Dissenting Opinion The other Justices, who disagreed with the majority opinion, sometimes
provide one or more dissenting opinions to express their disagreements.
Concurrence Sometimes, one or more Justices who agree with the ultimate decision made
by the majority or minority, but disagree on the decision justification, wish to provide
comments in a concurring opinion.
The Court Opinion is more than a case verdict. The opinion provides an explanation for the
justification that leads to this verdict, showing the majority, minority (dissenting) and concurring
opinions. In some opinions the justification involves providing a test to resolve a new case
(landmark case) and provides a means of deciding for future cases: this is an essential part of
what the court is trying to achieve. A typical case Opinion document in the US Supreme Court
is structured in the following parts:
Syllabus Every opinion starts with a syllabus which is a summary of the case, outlining the
case facts and the decisions of the previous courts. The last portion of the syllabus states
the Justices supporting the majority (Main) opinion, and which Justices have issued con-
curring or dissenting opinions.
Main Opinion This is the official opinion of the case, written by one of the Justices. The main
opinion involves the case decision and an explanation for the decision, stating the issues
that the Justices relied upon in their justification. The majority opinion shows that all
the Justices (unanimous opinion), or at least more than half of the Justices agree to one
decision and one Justice is chosen to write the majority opinion.
Dissenting and Concurring Opinions Often, the opinion document involves multiple opin-
ions; Justices rarely agree to one main opinion. They might agree with the decision but
have different justifications, presented as concurring opinions. Likewise, Justices might
disagree with the decision and thus have dissenting opinions.
Disposition At the end of the main opinion, the document clarifies the court action, which
might be affirming, reversing the lower court decision, or returning the case to the lower
court (remanding).
3.3 Legal Case Domains
Now that a general review of the US Courts, and specifically the US Supreme Court process,
has been presented, it is time to provide a brief introduction to the legal case domains from
these Courts, which are used as examples in this research. Civil case domains are selected from
the Common Law. Concentrating on these areas follows the majority of work in AI and Law,
recognising that the case law of a legal domain goes through a life cycle of three stages as stated
by Levi in [88]. The selected cases are related to the second stage where there is a period of
stability and the theory is settled.
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But it is not simply deductive. In the long run a circular motion can be seen. The
first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases are com-
pared. The period is one in which the court fumbles for a phrase. Several phrases
may be tried out; the misuse or misunderstanding of words itself may have an effect.
The concept sounds like another, and the jump to the second is made. The second
stage is the period when the concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by
example continues to classify items inside and out of the concept. The third stage
is the breakdown of the concept, as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead
as to make it clear that the suggestive influence of the word is no longer desired.
Each of the following sub-sections gives an overview of what the domain is, the specification
of the cases used in that domain, and the role this domain plays in the thesis.
3.3.1 Automobile Exception to The Fourth Amendment Domain
The U.S. Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures2.” A search is consid-
ered reasonable if a warrant has been obtained. However, when there is a high probability of
losing the evidence so that there is an urgent reason to search, obtaining a warrant may become
impossible. One such situation is a moving automobile. This domain thus considers the interac-
tion of two competing considerations: the enforceability of the law, which makes the exigency
issue important, and citizens’ rights, which include the right to privacy [29].
This exception was first established by the United States Supreme Court in 1925, in the
Carroll v. US.3 decision which states:
Various acts of Congress are cited to show that, practically since the beginning
of the Government, the Fourth Amendment has been construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search for contraband in a store, dwelling-house,
or other structure for the search of which a warrant may readily be obtained, and a
search of a ship, wagon, automobile, or other vehicle which may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
The Automobile Exception is developed further as more cases are decided with new condi-
tions needing to be taken into consideration, such as the type of vehicle or movable container
and the status of the vehicle, which influences whether there was an urgent need to search it. For
example, was the vehicle traveling on the highway (as in Carroll) or it was parked in a parking
lot but capable of moving? (as in California v. Carney4). Was it parked in a private place that is
used for accommodation (Coolidge v. New Hampshire5) and so not subject to inspection with-
out warrant or was it in a public location? Whatever the conditions, there must be a probable
cause to search, but is it legal to search the whole vehicle if the probable cause applies only to
2Fourth Amendment - U.S. Constitution URL: http://constitution.findlaw.com/amendment4.html.
3Carroll v United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
4 California v. Carney, 471 US 386 (1985).
5Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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a container inside the vehicle? What if an authorized warrant is easy to obtain?. The aim of the
court opinions in this domain is to determine whether there is enough exigency with respect to
a possibly lowered expectation of privacy given the particular case facts.
Two case studies from the Automobile Exception domain, US v. Chadwick6 and California
v. Carney, have been used to address the research question of providing a computational dialogue
to identify relevant components and instantiate the abstract argumentation format used as shown
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. These two case studies are briefly explained below:
US v. Chadwick (1977)
The test in this case was to consider whether a footlocker search was justified under either the
“automobile exception” or “search incident to a lawful arrest”, another possible exception to the
fourth amendment. The agent officers arrested respondents (one of whom was Chadwick7), who
were transporting a double-locked footlocker on the train and then loaded it in a car trunk outside
the station. The agents had probable cause to believe that the footlocker contained narcotics
due to information received. The respondents, together with the automobile and footlocker,
were admittedly under the agents’ control. Later, at the police station, the agents opened the
footlocker in the automobile trunk without warrant, and found large amounts of marijuana.
California v. Carney (1985)
California v Carney8 concerns the applicability of the automobile exception to motor homes.
It arose when drug agent officers arrested Carney, who was distributing marijuana from inside
a motor home parked in a public parking lot in the downtown of San Diego for an unknown
period of time. After entering the motor home, without first obtaining a warrant, the police
officer observed marijuana. This motor home was an integral vehicle with wheels, engine, back
portion and was registered as a house car, which requires a special license in California. On the
other hand, it did have some interior home attributes such as refrigerator, cupboard, table and
curtains covering all the windows. The question was whether the automobile exception applied
in this case, or whether such vehicles have too much in common with dwellings and so come
with expectations of privacy too great to satisfy this exception.
Most of the examples given in the thesis are from the case of Carney v. California, which
has been the subject of several papers in AI and Law, especially those which consider the Oral
Hearing stage [29, 76, 115]. The opinions of ten US Supreme Court cases from the same domain
are newly analysed and applied in Chapter 6 to form a knowledge base to instantiate an Abstract
Dialectical Framework for legal reasoning.
3.3.2 Wild Animals Domain
The Wild Animals cases were introduced into AI and Law in [40] and extended to the base-
ball case of Popov v Hayashi in [144] [30]. Briefly, the Wild Animals cases concern plaintiffs
6United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
7US v. Chadwick Opinion: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/433/1/case.html.
8California v. Carney Opinion: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/386/case.html.
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Wild Animal Case Plaintiff Factors Defendant Factors Decision
Pierson v. Post
HotPursuit, Impolite,
PSport,Vermin
NotCaught D
Keeble v. Hickergill
OwnsLand,Malice,
Nuisance, Pliving
NotCaught, DSport P
Young v. Hitchens
HotPursuit,
Impolite, Pliving
NotCaught, DLiving D
Ghen v. Rich
Convention,
NoBlame, Pliving
NotCaught, DLiving P
Popov v. Hayashi
HotPursuit, Assulate,
NoBlame, PGain
NotCaught, DGain
not P
not D
TABLE 3.2: Factor-Based Cases in Wild Animals Domain, where P=Plaintiff, D=Defendant.
chasing Wild Animals when their pursuit was interrupted by the defendant. The Court decision
is to determine whether the plaintiff has the right to make a claim against the defendant. Five
Wild Animal cases including Popov v. Hayashi9 have been used in this research to provide a
simple illustration and clarification for the construction of ADFs for legal reasoning from a fac-
tor hierarchy (Chapter 6). In Pierson v. Post10, Post was chasing a fox for sport, Keeble11 was
hunting ducks, Young12 was pursuing fish and Ghen13 a whale, all in pursuit of their livelihoods.
Popov v Hayashi concerned disputed ownership of a baseball (valuable because it had been hit
by Barry Bonds to break a home run record). Popov had almost completed his catch when he
was assaulted by a mob of fellow spectators and Hayashi (who had not taken part in the assault)
ended up with the baseball when it came free. The Wild Animals cases were cited when con-
sidering whether Popov’s efforts had given him possession of the ball. The domain factors, and
case representations are presented in Table 3.2 and described further in Chapter 6.
3.3.3 U.S. Trade Secrets Domain
HYPO [14], CATO [10] and IBP [55] are all legal case-based reasoning systems designed in the
US Trade Secrets domain. Trade Secret law is concerned with the protection of technological
and commercial information not generally known in the trade against unauthorized commercial
use by others. This involves considering the efforts to maintain secrecy through, for example, a
confidentiality agreement and various protection measures to prevent information being obtained
through legitimate means, such as reverse engineering or other questionable means. The trade
secrets might be disputed when the Plaintiff disclosed the information to defendant in the context
of negotiations about a joint venture or sale of a business or disclosed its information in a public
forum without obtaining any security measures.
9Popov v. Hayashi: WL 31833731 Ca. Sup. Ct. 2002.
10Pierson v. Post: 3 CM. R 175,2 Am. Dec. 264 (Supreme Court of N.Y, 1805).
11Keeble v. Hickerimzill: 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Queen’S Bencch 1707).
12Young v. Hitchens: 1 Dav. & Mer. 592, 6Q.B. 606 (1844).
13Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (1881).
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Case Plaintiff Factors Defendant Factors Outcome
Arco F10,F16,F20 D
Boeying F4,F6,F12,F14,F21 F1,F10 P
Bryce F4,F6,F18,F21 F1 P
CollegeWatercolour F15,F26 F1 P
Den-Tal-Ez F4,F6,F21,F26 F1 P
Ecologix F21 F1,F19,F23 D
Emery F18,F21 F10 P
Ferranti F2 F17,F19,F20,F27 D
Robinson F18,F26 F1,F10,F19 D
Sandlin F1,F10,F16,F19,F27 D
Sheets F18 F19,F27 D
SpaceAero F8,F15,F18 F1,F19 P
Televation F6,F12,F15,F18,F21 F10,F16 P
Yokana F7 F10,F16,F27 D
CMI F4,F6 F10,F16,F17,F20,F27 D
DigitalDevelopment F6,F8,F15,F18,F21 F1 P
FMC F4,F6,F7,F12 F10,F11 P
Forrest F6,F15,F21 F1 P
Goldberg F21 F1,F10,F27 P
KG F6,F14,F15,F18,F21 F16,F25 P
Laser F6,F12,F21 F1,F10 P
Lewis F8,F21 F1 P
MBL F4,F6,F13 F5,F10,F20 D
Mason F6,F15,F21 F1,F16 P
MineralDeposits F18 F1,F16,F25 P
NationalInstrument F18,F21 F1 P
NationalRejectors F7,F15,F18 F10,F16,F19,F27 D
Reinforced F4,F6,F8,F15,F21 F1 P
Scientology F4,F6,F12 F10,F11,F20 D
Technicon F6,F12,F14,F21 F10,F16,F25 P
Trandes F4,F6,F12 F1,F10 P
Valco-Cincinnati F6,F12,F15,F21 F1,F10 P
TABLE 3.3: Factor-Based Cases in US Trade Secret Domain
For example, in Televation14 copies of the plaintiff’s drawings had been used by the defen-
dant which called into question whether the secret counted as reverse-engineerable:
The mere fact, however, that a competitor could, through reverse engineering, du-
plicate plaintiff’s product does not preclude a finding that plaintiff’s techniques or
schematics were trade secrets, particularly where, as here, the evidence demon-
strated that the reverse engineering process would be time-consuming.
In Boeing Company v. Sierracin Corporation15, Sierracin argues that if Boeing had secrets,
they were lost by passage into the public domain:
14Televation Telecommunication Systems, Inc. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1988).
15The Boeing Company v. Sierracin Corporation, 108 Wash.2d 38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987).
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Engineering drawings are prima facie trade secrets. If Boeing automatically lost
trade secrets upon submission to the FAA, it could never have them, because FAA
submission is required before manufacture of a single airplane. Submission of con-
fidential data to the FAA does not mean that the information is available to the
public upon demand. On the contrary, such information is exempt from public dis-
closure because it could substantially harm the competitive position of the entity
which was required to submit the information.
IBP used 186 cases in its very thorough empirical evaluation to predict the outcome of cases;
148 cases were analysed for CATO; and 38 were analysed specifically for IBP. Unfortunately,
the analyses of these cases are not all publicly available; therefore this thesis uses the 32 cases
harvested from public sources by Alison Chorley and used to evaluate her AGATHA system
[58], [57]. All these cases belong to higher courts; either Appellate Courts or Supreme Courts.
This research extends the use of the US Trade Secrets domain further in constructing legal
reasoning using an Abstract Dialectical Framework from the factor hierarchy of CATO and the
logical model of IBP as discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The factor background of the
CATO system is described in [10], and the factor definitions are explained in Appendix D in this
thesis. CATO uses 26 factors, each identified as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant. Table 3.3 gives
the factor representation of the 32 cases from the AGATHA system [57, 58].
3.4 Summary
This chapter has laid the essential legal foundation for the work presented in this thesis. First,
the legal procedure of the US Supreme Court was explained, showing the legal reasoning types
involved at this level of the Justice system. In particular, the chapter has characterised the Oral
Hearing dialogues taking place at the Supreme Court, as a preparation for constructing the dia-
logue representation model in the next chapter. The chapter also explained the structure of the
legal Opinion document, showing the different opinion types. Furthermore, a brief overview
was given for the three legal domains used as test cases in this thesis. All the legal cases pre-
sented in these domains operate under the Common Law system where the decisions are heavily
influenced by precedent cases.
Chapter 4
Legal Dialogue Representation
“When people talk to each other, they never say what they mean.
They say something else and you’re expected to just know what they mean.” Alan
Turing, The Imitation Game
——————————————–
This chapter provides a structured analysis of US Supreme Court Oral Hearings to enable iden-
tification of the relevant issues, factors and facts that can be used to construct a test to resolve
a case. The analysis involves the production of what are called ‘argument component trees’
(ACTs) in which the issues, facts and factors, and the relationships between these, are made
explicit. The aim of the work proposed in this chapter is to provide a model to enable the
identification and representation of the components that are used to form a test and establish a
knowledge base for a legal domain that can guide the design of the legal decision model, i.e. to
address the second research question in this thesis. The model has been implemented to develop
an oral hearing dialogue program to produce a visual representation of the ACTs for each player
in the dialogue in graphical form, taking as input the components from the dialogue speech acts.
The first section of this chapter shows how such ACTs can be constructed by identifying
the speech acts that are used by the counsel and Justices within their dialogues (Section 4.1 and
Section 4.2 ) and illustrating the model of the analysis by applying it in Section 4.6 to the Oral
Hearings that took place in two case studies, US v. Chadwick and Carney v. California. The
work also involves building an ontology that serves as a repository for the argument components
of a legal domain in Section 4.3 and shows how the dialogue representation and ontology work
together in a legal decision workflow in Section 4.4. Details of the specification and imple-
mentation of the representation model are discussed in Section 4.5. Finally, a summary of the
chapter is provided in Section 4.7.
4.1 Oral Hearings Speech acts
The Oral Hearings stage, as explained in the previous chapter, is conducted between the Justices
and the counsels of the conflict participants in three recorded oral dialogues. The Oral Hear-
ings are also available in a transcript form, the example below shows an excerpt from the Oral
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Hearing transcript of California v. Carney1.
Unidentified Justice: How long was this vehicle on the parking lot?
Louis R. Hanoian: The record does not show how long it was there, Your Honor.
There was... Mr. Agent Williams witnessed the vehicle in the parking lot for a
period of an hour and a quarter, and it had been there prior at various times.
Unidentified Justice: Does the record tell us the character of the parking lot?
Louis R. Hanoian: The record doesn’t specifically say that.
To enable the proposal and critique of the Oral Hearing components required to construct
the arguments of the opinion and resolve the case, a number of dialogue moves are articulated,
which are inspired by argumentation schemes and critical questions [132]. The moves challenge
the ACT components, or seek additional components to be proposed. Thus, although there are
no conclusions, and hence no arguments as such, in the Oral Hearings, the moves have many
similarities to those arising from argumentation schemes. Moves can be made either explicitly
by one party, or implicitly, triggered by another move which is tacitly presupposed by the move.
This is because, as in any natural language interaction, participants make presumptions about
what their hearers already understand and infer and so the Oral Hearings will contain ellipses.
Note that the evidence level is not considered here: the facts to be used have already been
determined by the lower court, although, as in Q10 below, the answers may provide further
considerations are required to show how the facts will be related to factors, and how they can be
determined, since some facts may be difficult or costly to obtain, and so may not be appropriate
in a given situation. For example, a police officer will be unable to determine how long a vehicle
has been parked.
Now consider the questions that can be posed against the assertions. The structure as a
whole is meant to provide a test. The questions relate to the test too broad and test too narrow
arguments of [15], but the articulated moves below offer a finer granularity since they iden-
tify various different aspects with respect to which the test may be deficient. In the following
questions, relevant means relevant to deciding the case.
Q1: Are all the issues relevant?
Q2: Are there other issues that are relevant?
Q3: Are the issues linked correctly?
Q4: Are all the factors really relevant to this issue?
Q5: Is there an additional factor relevant to this issue?
Q6: Is the relationship between factors correct?
Q7: Are all the facts relevant to determining the presence of this factor?
Q8: Is there an additional fact relevant to the presence of this factor?
1California v. Carney, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-859.
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Q9: Is the relationship between facts correct?
Q10: Can these facts be readily observed by the appropriate person?
These questions permit a test to be challenged as too broad or too narrow at all three levels,
and in two ways. As well as challenging the breadth and narrowness in terms of the elements
used (e.g. Q1 and Q2), the test can also be challenged in terms of the way the elements are
combined, as in Q3. It should also be noted that it is quite common to combine questions: for
example Q1 and Q2 can be combined, effectively suggesting the substitution of one element for
another. These could be expressed as additional questions, but here combinations of questions
are used. Note also that Q10 relates to whether the tests can be applied by the person responsible
for applying them in the operational situation: a test that cannot be applied in the actual situation
is not acceptable, because providing a test that is applicable in future cases is an essential part
of what the court is trying to achieve.
In [14] the response to such questions is said to be one of:
Save the test: Effectively deny that the question is pertinent to the test; for example, if
Q8 is posed suggesting that an additional fact would change the position with respect to
some factor, it can be maintained that the same position continues to hold.
Modify the test: Exclude an item (e.g. Q1), add an item (e.g. Q2) or change the linkage
(e.g. Q3);
Abandon the test: This means withdrawing the current proposal and proffering a new
one.
A definition of the dialogue moves is provided below. There are four moves that control
the beginning and end of each dialogue and the Oral Hearing of the legal case, while the rest
of the moves mainly enforce the result of posing the questions mentioned above by adding new
components, combining components or emphasising certain components, similar to the three
ply HYPO [14].
For each move a description of the pre-condition(s) and post-condition(s) is clarified accord-
ing to the protocol of the Oral Hearing dialogues shown in the transition diagram in Figure 4.1.
Moves might be specified explicitly from the party’s utterance, or in some moves, a component
might be within the party’s knowledge and thus asserted implicitly as illustrated by the dotted
lines in Figure 4.1.
Note that “P” is used to represent the party who plays the move, “N” is the party’s counsel
name in the dialogue, “C” is the running case and “D” is the running dialogue. Note also that,
in the Oral Hearing transcripts, there is no prescribed turn-taking rule (in the sense of Prakken
[104]); counsel makes multiple moves and continues until interrupted by a Justice.
Open Case Is an implicit move to open the Oral Hearings of a new case.
Format OpenCase (P, C)
Pre-condition No other case is open.
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Post-condition The case is open.
Example To open the Oral Hearings of “California v Carney”:
OpenCase (ChiefJustice, CvC)
Open Dialogue Every dialogue in the case Oral Hearing is explicitly opened by the Chief Jus-
tice.
Format OpenDialogue (P, D, N, C)
Pre-condition The Oral Hearings of the case is open and no other dialogue is open.
Post-condition The dialogue D is open.
Example To open the petitioner’s dialogue:
OpenDialogue(ChiefJustice, PD, Louis Hanoian, CvC)
End Dialogue The dialogue ends implicitly when the dialogue end time is reached or when the
petitioner explicitly asks to end the first dialogue to save time for rebuttal.
Format EndDialogue (P, D, N, C)
Pre-condition The dialogue D is open.
Post-condition The dialogue D is closed.
Example To close the the petitioner’s dialogue:
EndDialogue(ChiefJustice, PD, Louis Hanoian, CvC)
Close Case is the final move that is stated explicitly to close the case after listening to all the
dialogues in the Oral Hearings.
Format CloseCase (P, C)
Pre-condition Case C is open, and no other dialogue is open.
Post-condition Case C is closed.
Example To end the Oral Hearings:
CloseCase(ChiefJustice, CvC)
Assert Component Asserts an argument component (issue, factor or fact) explicitly or implic-
itly.
Format 1 AssertIssue (C, D, P, Issue)
Format 2 AssertFactor (C, D, P, Factor,Factor′sparent)
Format 3 AssertFact (C, D, P, Fact, Fact ′sparent)
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Pre-condition The dialogue D is open and the parent of the component is asserted. Is-
sues are the root of the ACT; the parent of a factor is either an issue (or combination
of issues) or an abstract factor (or combination of abstract factors); and the parent of
a fact is a base factor (or combination of base factors).
Post-condition The component is asserted and the child relationship between the com-
ponent and its parent is asserted, and the ACT is modified accordingly.
Issues Example AssertIssue (CvC, PD, Petitioner, Exigency)
Factors Example AssertFactor (CvC, PD, Petitioner, automobile, Exigency)
Facts Example AssertFactor (CvC, PD, Petitioner, car, automobile)
Combine Components This move is asserted when a relationship between two components,
or more, has been stated implicitly or explicitly. The relationship could be a conjunction,
a disjunction or (+) which means that both components are considered but neither are
necessary or sufficient as explained in the following section (Section 4.2).
Format 1 AssertCombIssues (C, D, P, RelationType, Issue1, Issue2... )
Format 2 AssertCombFactors (C, D, P, RelationType, Factor1,Factor2..., parent)
Format 3 AssertCombFacts (C, D, P, RelationType, Fact1,Fact2..., parent )
Pre-condition All the components have been initially asserted.
Post-condition The new relationship between the components is asserted, and the ACT
is updated.
Issues Example AssertCombIssues (CvC, PD, Petitioner, or, {Exigency, Privacy})
Factors Example AssertCombFactors (CvC, PD, Justice, and, {homeProperties, mo-
bile}, Exigency+Privacy)
Facts Example AssertCombFacts (CvC, PD, Petitioner, or, {car, mobileHome}, automo-
bile)
Emphasise Component This move is used to stress the importance of a specific base factor
or fact. Components are emphasised when they have been repeated several times or pro-
ceeded with another word that indicates their importance.
Format 1 Emphasise Factor (C, D, P, Base Factor)
Format 2 Emphasise Fact (C, D, P, Fact)
Pre-condition The component has been asserted.
Post-condition The new component is emphasised in the player’s ACT.
Base factor Example Emphasise Factor (CvC, PD, Petitioner, automobile)
Fact Example Emphasise Fact (CvC, PD, Petitioner, wheels)
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Note that the dialogues of the actual hearings are often not well structured: the questions are
not posed in any particular order, and may be interleaved with the presentation of the proposal,
so that the proposal is modified as it is presented. Moreover, different moves or components
can be chosen for an utterance, following the assumption that text in the Oral Hearing transcript
can be analysed in different ways, even by legal experts, depending on a variety of analytical
options, which lead in turn to alternative moves. Nonetheless, the aim of each counsel is to
present and defend the components required for a test which will be favourable to their client,
and the Justices aim to get a clear statement of the various components which they can use to
build the arguments in their opinions.
4.2 Argument Component Trees
The goal of the Oral Hearing dialogues involves identifying the components that can be used
to construct tests that will provide arguments to resolve the case, and the relationships between
these components. To reach this goal, the representation model of these dialogues organises the
argument components identified above as an Argument Component Tree (ACT), so that for each
dialogue in the Oral Hearing one ACT is formed for the counsel (petitioner or respondent) and
one for the Justice.
• Each ACT is constructed starting from the issues. Issues (e.g. the issues in California
v. Carney are Exigency and Privacy) may be conjunctive so that all issues must be con-
sidered, or they may be disjunctive so that the issues are independent, and one positive
will suffice. These are shown in the ACT using “and (∧)” and “or (∨)” respectively.
Sometimes, however, the relationship is not truth functional: like factors, all must be con-
sidered, but none is necessary or sufficient, e.g. when Case law is elaborating conditions
to meet circumstances not foreseen in the original drafting. The issues are then defined by
conditions which must be considered, although never individually necessary or sufficient
(see [20] for a fuller discussion of these relationships). The non-truth functional relation
is shown in the ACT using “+”.
• Throughout the dialogue, the participants’ ACTs are updated by the assertion of new
factors (e.g. Mobility to the issue Exigency) to resolve issues, or facts that indicate the
presence of factors (e.g. Wheels indicates Mobility factor) or the linkage between them
in order to construct a test. These links may also be truth functional (conjunction or
disjunction), or reasons that must be considered, essentially the usual relations between
factors of [10].
• The base factors and facts which emerge as the most important in the dialogue are indi-
cated with“R” at the end of the component name in the ACT.
By the end of the dialogue, each ACT shows a complete representation of a perspective
on the components exchanged in the course of the dialogue and possible linkages between them
(see Figure 4.2). The next stage is to merge the alternatives from the ACTs to produce an answer
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FIGURE 4.1: Oral Hearing Dialogues Protocol
Chapter 4. Legal Dialogue Representation 86
FIGURE 4.2: Argument Component Tree (ACT)
for the case, justifiable by a test applicable to future cases as shown in Chapter 5. These ACTs
work as a knowledge base for constructing the Abstract Dialectical Framework for the legal
domain. The case studies (Section 4.6) show the ACT construction in a number of scenarios
from different cases in the Automobile Exception domain.
4.3 An Ontology For Oral Hearing Dialogues
The above model requires a source of domain knowledge, which has been supplied in the form
of an ontology. The ontology is constructed from a manual analysis of the statutes governing
the case, the factors identified in precedent decisions, the various facts in previous cases, and
from the previous trials of the current case, contained in the briefs. Similar analyses, although
not presented explicitly as ontologies, have been performed by Rissland [115], Grabmair and
Ashley [76] and Bench-Capon [29], as well as by lawyers writing briefs for related cases. As
with these predecessors, all the natural language processing is performed by the analyst and not
the program. The references cited above have all included an analysis of Carney.
The ontology is incrementally constructed using Prote´ge´2, an open source visual ontology
editor. The structure of the ontology consists of classes that represent sets of individuals (object
2Prote´ge´ URL: http://protege.stanford.edu/
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instances); data properties, which are the attributes of the classes; object properties, which
represent the relationship between the objects (individuals) in the domain; and individuals,
which are the actual objects for the class. The work of [139] presents a legal case ontology
that shows the main elements needed to describe case law domains and the number of argu-
mentation schemes that can be used to determine the decision. Although there are a number of
common classes between [139] and the ontology presented here, the main focus in this ontology
is to provide a basis of legal knowledge of the argument components in the Oral Hearing.
The next section presents the specification of the legal domain ontology, showing the classes
required in the domain of Oral Hearings, their class properties and examples of individuals as
shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
FIGURE 4.3: Screenshot From the Legal Domain Ontology
4.3.1 Entities: Classes and Properties
Class: Participant is a super-class that represents the participants in every case. This class
consists of sub-classes for each participant role; i.e. Justice (which includes a Chair sub-
class), Party (which consists of Petitioner and Respondent sub-classes) and Solicitor.
Data Properties Every participant has a “name”. Moreover, the petitioner and respon-
dent sub-classes in particular have the “Counsel name” that represents each party.
Object Properties Every participant is involved in one or more dialogues.
Individuals e.g. State of California:Petitioner; Carney:Respondent
Class: Court which represents the Court where the Oral Hearing is conducted.
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FIGURE 4.4: Legal Ontology Diagram
Data Properties “Court name”, “Court place”
Object Properties Every court “has Justice” (Different instances of the Supreme Court
are often referred to by the name of the Chief Justice: e.g. the Warren Court.)
Individual e.g. US Supreme Court:Court
Class: Case Domain Legal cases are classified according to specific categories. In the ontology
the cases are classified according to common domains.
Data Properties “domain name”
Object Properties A case domain consists of a number of cases related to that domain.
Individual e.g. Searches and Seizures:Case Domain
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Classes: Issue, Factor, Fact These are the classes that represent the argument components in
the Oral Hearing.
Data Properties “Issue name”, “Factor name”, “Fact name” represent the name of
each class respectively. The main source of a factor (“Factor Source”) in the factor
class, i.e. whether the factor is from the constitutional law, new in the case, hypo-
thetical or it has been retrieved from precedent cases. The “Fact Type” that also
shows if the fact is truly related to the case, hypothetically mentioned or retrieved
from precedent cases.
Object Properties The object properties “has parent issue”, “has abstract factor”
are used to represent that a factor has either been connected to an issue or has an
abstract factor, and “has parent factor” indicates that every fact has a parent fac-
tor. Moreover, there are object properties that reflect the relationship between the
components.
Individuals e.g. Privacy:Issue; Mobility:Factor; Car:Fact
Class: OH Dialogue The Oral Hearing dialogue is the super-class for the three nested dia-
logues: petitioner dialogue; respondent dialogue and petitioner rebuttal dialogue sub-
classes.
Data Properties “OH Date” to represent the arguing date.
Object Properties The property “has Justice” shows the Justices that attend the Oral
Hearing dialogue, while “has petitioner” and “has respondent” show the party
of the petitioner (and the petitioner rebuttal) dialogues, and the respondent dialogue
respectively. Moreover, “include issue”, “include factor”,“include fact”, are the
object properties that represent the relationship between each sub-dialogue and the
component classes (Issue, Factor and Fact).
Individuals e.g. CvC OH:OH Dialogue; CvC PD:PDialogue
Class: Opinion The opinion super-class represents the case decision and consists of a num-
ber of sub-classes: Majority; Majority concurring; Dissent and Dissent concurring sub-
classes.
Data Properties “Decision date” which reflects the opinion date and “Decision no”
which represents the number of the opinion in the case report.
Object Properties The Object properties “favour maj”, “favour dis” show the parties
favoured by the majority and dissenting. The majority and dissent opinion are “sup-
portedBy maj”, “supportedBy dis” one or more Justices and “writtenBy maj”,
“writtenBy dis” a specific Justice. However, there are some cases where some
Justices have a concurring opinion “has concurring maj”, “has concurring dis”
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shows the relationship between the majority and each majority concurring and the
dissent and each dissent concurring respectively.
Individuals e.g. CvC Maj:Majority
Class: Case is the main class that represents the legal case in the ontology.
Data Properties “case name”, “case num”, “case year” which refer to the case name,
number in the report and the case year respectively.
Object Properties Each case “belongs to” a Court and is “classified as” one or more
domains. Each case has an object property “hear” with OH dialogue class and
another property “decide” with the Opinion class. Each case “has petitioner” and
“has respondent” for the petitioner and respondent individuals.
Individual e.g. California v Carney:Case
Now that the ontology entities have been described, the next step is to show how to retrieve the
individuals from the ontology to create dialogue moves and construct the dialogue ACTs. The
workflow in the next section provides a description for this process.
4.4 Legal Case Analysis Workflow
Given the information available to the analyst, the following method is identified for the analysis
of cases relating to the domain of law, for which a factor-based analysis is well suited as shown
in Figure 4.5.
To begin, a suitable set of cases are identified to represent a domain. These can be obtained
by finding a recent case from the desired area and then tracing back through the citations to
earlier cases. Several such sets of cases can be found in AI and Law: the US Trade Secrets cases
of [10], the Home Deduction cases of [117], the Wild Animals cases of [40] and [37] and the
Fourth Amendment cases of [29]. From the available cases, the landmark decisions that shaped
the development of the law are selected: these can usually be identified from commentaries on
the law concerned, or simply from the number of times they are cited in subsequent cases. A
number of researchers have built networks of precedents e.g. Foweler et.al. [67] and Bommarito
et.al. in [84].
1. The first step is to process the cases in chronological order. Initially there are no compo-
nents, but as the knowledge of the domain is built, each new case will, as well as making
use of components from previous cases, introduce new components and relate them to
existing components. These new cases will most often have new sets of facts, which lead
to the ascription of existing factors: cases will typically have quite different concrete facts
and so will rarely match exactly on facts. Quite often, however, a case will also introduce
one or two new factors, required to resolve the questions raised for the first time by that
particular case, and in virtue of which the case is considered a landmark case. For example
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FIGURE 4.5: Legal Case Analysis Method
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California v Carney concerned a vehicle that could also be used as a dwelling: this was
novel and needed the factors available to be extended in order to represent this question.
It is also possible, although rare in a mature domain of law, for issues to be introduced.
In regard to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment, expectations of privacy
were not considered to be an issue in the first case (Carrol, decided in 1925) but had been
recognised as a key issue and a central part of the discussion by 1985, when Carney was
decided.
2. Next, for each leading case, the transcript of the Oral Hearing is analysed and each ut-
terance is marked with the appropriate speech act, identifying the content of the speech
act either from the existing components recorded in the ontology or introducing a new
component from the current case. This provides a method for analysing the transcript:
• Proceeding utterance by utterance, ensures that all significant elements in the tran-
script are systematically addressed
• By classifying the utterances in terms of a limited set of speech acts, making the
process more objective.
• Existing components in the ontology guide the decision of when to introduce a new
component.
• New relationships between existing components and relationships between new and
existing components are identified.
• Alternative perspectives can be shown and used to guide the analysis of the opinion.
• The need for further components is identified. For example, if a new factor is in-
troduced but it is not applicable in terms of existing facts, additional facts become
relevant and need to be included as argument components.
3. Once the transcript has been marked up, using the speech acts, the sequence of speech
acts and their contents can be input to a program, to effectively reproduce the dialogues
using the restricted vocabulary. The oral hearing dialogue program will process the se-
quence of speech acts to build the various component trees corresponding to petitioner’s,
respondent’s and Justices’ perspectives. The role of the oral hearing dialogue program is:
• To verify the coherence of the mark-up. If speech acts have been used that fail to
satisfy their preconditions, this will be identified by the program so that the mark-up
of the transcript can be revised (for example, when a factor for a newly asserted fact
has not been previously annotated in the transcript, or is implicitly asserted).
• To handle implicit assertions. Speakers in dialogues, and the participants in the Oral
Hearings are no exception, often presuppose that the hearers will have, and make
use of certain background knowledge. If the presuppositions are not obvious or are
ambiguous, the utterances may be challenged in the hearing and the party forced to
make the presuppositions explicit. Very often, however, they really are obvious to
the hearer, and so no challenge appears in the dialogue. In such cases the dialogue
Chapter 4. Legal Dialogue Representation 93
needs to be completed by implicit moves, since the party is tacitly committing to
these unstated presuppositions.
• To enable the visualisation of the components and their relationships and the differ-
ent perspectives of petitioner, respondent and Justices. In this way the choices that
need to be made to reconstruct the opinions in the next stage are much more readily
identified.
Now the various perspectives on the argument components are established, the nest step
is to turn to the opinions. Note, however, the labels of the nodes are not from free text of
the decisions, but components taken from the ACTs of the Oral Hearing. Also the relationship
between children and their parent may not be the propositional functions usual in such diagrams:
rather the diagrams will be ADFs [54], where the acceptance conditions of a node in terms of
its children need not be propositional (i.e. may be in terms of factor-based reasoning).
4.5 Specification and Implementation
4.5.1 BNF Grammar
To enable precise specification and implementation of the Oral Hearing dialogues representation
model, a Backus-Naur Form grammar is provided to define the syntax of the objects in the
model, as shown below. The grammar shows that case law consists of one or more cases where
each case is specified by a name, the Oral Hearing (OH) and the case decision. The Oral Hearing
is defined by a number of nested dialogues where the outcome of each dialogue is a set of ACTs,
one ACT for each participant (Petitioner, Respondent or Justice). The ACT is constructed from
components (issues, factors and facts) and the relations between these components. The factor
belongs to an issue or another abstract factor, and consists of a number of facts. The factors and
facts may or may not be emphasised.
〈CaseLaw〉 ::= 〈Case〉〈Case〉*
〈Case〉::= 〈name〉〈OH〉〈Decision〉
〈OH〉::= 〈Dialogue〉3
〈Dialogue〉::=〈PACT〉*
〈PACT〉::=〈Player〉〈ACT〉
〈Player〉::=Petitioner | Respondent | Justice
〈ACT〉::= 〈Issues〉 〈Factors〉〈Facts〉
〈Issues〉:=〈Issue〉〈Issue〉*
〈Issue〉::=〈IssueName〉|〈IssueRelation〉
〈IssueRelation〉::= 〈Issue〉〈rel〉〈IssueRelation〉|〈Issue〉
〈rel〉::= and | or | +
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〈Factors〉::= 〈Factor〉〈Factor〉*
〈Factor〉::=〈FactorParent〉〈FactorName〉〈Emph〉|〈FactorRelation〉
〈FactorParent〉::=〈Issue〉|〈AbstractFactor〉
〈AbstractFactor〉::=〈Factor〉
〈Emph〉::=Y|N
〈FactorRelation〉::=〈Factor〉〈rel〉〈FactorRelation〉|〈Factor〉
〈Fact〉::=〈Factor〉〈FactName〉〈Emph〉|〈FactRelation〉
〈FactRelation〉::=〈Fact〉〈rel〉〈FactRelation〉|〈Fact〉
4.5.2 Implementation
The role of the oral hearing dialogue program has been explained in the workflow presented in
Section 4.4: the aim is to implement the representation model using the analysis of the Oral
Hearing dialogues. The input to the program is the components identified from the ontology.
Then, the output is a visual representation of the ACTs for each player in the dialogue in graphi-
cal form. The oral hearing dialogue program was developed in Java, using the support of the Jena
library from Jena API, an open source API for ontology management. The design specification
of the program is given in Appendix A.
Based on the analysis of Oral Hearing transcripts, the Oral Hearing in the program starts
from an open case move and terminates with a close case move. In between there are two or
three nested dialogues according to the Oral Hearing of the case, where each dialogue starts from
an open dialogue move and ends through an end dialogue move. For the main two dialogues
(petitioner and respondent dialogues), the program instantiates two new ACTs for the counsel
and the Justice directly after the open dialogue move. Following the order of the moves in the
transcript analysis, the program retrieves the individual component required for the move. The
retrieved component is used to update the ACT instance of the player and display the changes
in the trees after each move.
4.6 Case Study: Automobile Exception to The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A search is considered reasonable
if a warrant has been obtained. There are several possible exceptions; one is for automobiles,
since their mobility can make it impossible to obtain a warrant, but the exception does not apply
to all vehicles in all circumstances. Using the Oral Hearing transcripts of two landmark cases
in this domain, US v. Chadwick and California v. Carney, a manual analysis was performed for
the three nested Oral Hearing dialogues using the mark-up scheme shown in Table 4.1.
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Tag Attributes Appropriate Move(s) ACT Status
<CASE>
Speaker
Name
Date
Conflict Parties
OpenCase None
<Dialogue>
Speaker
DialogueID
Parties
OpenDialogue
If (D1or D2) Initiate a
new ACT for each party
If (D3) update D1 ACTs
<Issue>
Speaker
Name
Synonym
AssertIssue
Update speaker’s ACT
by a new issue
<Factor>
Speaker
Name
Parent
Source
Synonym
AssertFactor
Update speaker’s ACT
by a new factor and
a new link to the
parent of the factor
<Fact>
Speaker
Name
Parent
Type
Synonym
AssertFact
Update speaker’s ACT
by a new fact and
a new link to the
parent of the fact
<CombIssue>
<CombFactor>
<CombFact>
Speaker
Relation type
Components
AssertCombIssues
AssertCombFactors
AssertCombFacts
Update speaker’s ACT
by a new relation
<Emphasise> Speaker
Component
EmphasiseFactor
EmphasiseFact
Emphasise component in
the speaker’s ACT
<EndDialogue>
Speaker
DialogueID
Parties
EndDialogue Complete ACTs
<CloseCase>
Speaker
Name
Date
Conflict Parties
CloseCase None
TABLE 4.1: Mark-up Scheme for the Oral Hearings Transcript
This mark-up describes the main annotated tags, and their attributes in the transcripts, which
are equivalent to the ontology classes and attributes discussed previously. Each tag is related to
a particular dialogue move, where the tag attributes construct the move components.
In this section two short scenarios are explained for each case study, demonstrating the
dialogue moves according to the dialogue protocol conditions and the tree construction after
each move for each party’s ACT in the dialogue. Every mark-up tag is related to one explicit
move, whether it is for a component itself or the parent of the component. Each component in
the dialogue move has either the name of the mark-up text in the transcript or an alternative name
that has been used previously in the dialogue, or the legal ontology. Although multiple dialogue
moves are captured for an utterance, the dialogue moves may not presented in the same order
as they appear in the utterance: the component’s parent move is added, explicitly or implicitly,
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prior to its children.
Note that for each scenario there are:
Case: US v. Chadwick “USvCh”, or California v. Carney “CvC”.
Parties: Petitioner (“P”), Respondent (“R”), Justice (“J”).
Dialogue: Petitioner Dialogue (“PD”), Respondent Dialogue (“RD”), Petitioner Rebuttal Di-
alogue (“PRD”).
Fact Type: True in current case (“T”), hypothetical (“H”), precedent case(s) (“case name”
or “PC” if case name is not mentioned).
Factor Source: New from the current case (“N”), precedent case(s) (“case name” or “PC” if
case name is not mentioned), constitutional Law (“L”), hypothetical (“H”).
Parent Type: Issue (“I”), Factor (“F”), Issue Relation (“IR”), Factor Relation (“FR”)
Move Status: Explicit moves are shown according to the mark-up tags, while implicit moves
are illustrated in italic.
Appendix E presents the definitions of the Automobile Exception components, while the
full analysis and the complete Oral Hearing ACTs for US v. Chadwick and California v. Carney
can be found in Appendix B and Appendix C respectively.
4.6.1 US v. Chadwick Scenario A
Context: This transcript shows how the footlocker has been compared to an automobile in order
to use the automobile exception from precedent cases.
Dialogue: Petitioner Dialogue.
Participants: Petitioner and unidentified Justice.
ACTs: Show the construction of the petitioner and Justices’ ACTs according to the speech acts
(Figure 4.6).
Petitioner: we think that the <Issue> reason a search warrant <CombIssues> is not re-
quired is the same reason a search warrant was not required in the automobile cases.
There is, we submit, no rational distinction between the <Fact> footlocker involved in
this case <CombFactor> and the <Fact> glove compartment of an <Factor> automo-
bile<CombFact> or <Fact>the trunk of an <Factor> automobile, which can be opened
<Issue> without a warrant. (See Figure 4.6 (a))
Assert Issue (USvCh, PD, P, Exigency)
Assert Issue (USvCh, PD, P, Privacy)
Assert CombIssues (USvCh PD, P, or, {Exigency, Privacy})
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Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, P, automobile, Exigency, I, L)
Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, P, container, Exigency, I, PC)
Assert CombFactors (USvCh, PD, P, and, {container,automobile}, Exigency, I, PC)
Assert Fact (USvCh, PD, P, glove compartment, container, F, PC)
Assert Fact (USvCh, PD, P, trunk, container, F, PC)
Assert Fact (USvCh, PD, P, footlocker, container, F, T)
Assert CombFacts (USvCh, PD, P, or, {glove compartment, trunk,footlocker}, con-
tainer, F, H )
• The issue tag for reason a search warrant is not required is renamed to “Exi-
gency to reflect the meaning in the automobile exception.
• the CombIssues tag for is not required is used to show that the “Exigency”
issue is treated independently from the privacy requirement in warrant search.
• the fact tag on footlocker is combined using CombFact tag with the glove com-
partment and the trunk facts of an automobile factor. Since that the footlocker
is not part of an automobile a CombFactor tag is added to compare between
large containers and automobile containers.
• the issue tag, for searching without warrant, is repeated here again to show the
parent of the automobile factor.
Unidentified Justice: Well that supports the original seizure of the <Fact> footlocker.
There was an <Factor> automobile and that the seizure of the footlocker took place <Issue>
without a warrant<Factor>because it was an automobile<CombFactor> and because<Factor>
it was incident to a lawful arrest.
So that supports the seizure, but as I understand it the issue is not the seizure of the footlocker,
but the <Factor> opening and the search of it?. (See Figure 4.6 (b) )
Assert Issue (USvCh, PD, J, WarrantlessSearch)
Assert Issue (USvCh, PD, J, WarrantSearch)
Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, J, automobileExigency, WarantlessSearch, I, L)
Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, J, automobile, automobileExigency, F, L)
Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, J, IncidentLawfulArrest, WarantlessSearch, I, L)
Assert ComFactors (USvCh, PD, J,and,{automobileExigency,IncidentLawfulArrest}, Warant-
lessSearch, I, L)
Assert CombIssues (USvCh, PD, J, +, {WarrantSearch,WarrantlessSearch})
Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, J, container, {WarrantlessSearch+WarrantSearch}, IR, N)
Assert Fact (USvCh, PD, J, footlocker, container, F, T)
Assert CombFactors (USvCh, PD, J,and,{container,automobile}, automobileExigency, F,
PC)
Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, J, search location, {WarrantlessSearch+WarrantSearch}, IR,
N)
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Assert CombFactors (USvCh, PD, J,and,{container, automobile, search location}, {War-
rant Search + WarrantlessSearch }, IR, N)
Petitioner: We think that <Fact> could be opened back <CombFactors> at the <Fact>
agents’ office<Issue>for the same reason that the<Fact>trunk<CombFactors>of an<Factor>
automobile can be opened back in the <Fact>police impoundment lot.
The <Fact> glove compartment as in Cooper v. California opened back at the <Fact> police
station. We do see a distinction between what happened here and the search of, for example,
<Fact> a person’s bedroom. (See Figure 4.6 (c))
Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, P, Search location, Exigency, I, PC)
Assert Fact (USvCh, PD, P, Police office, Search location, F, PC)
Assert CombFactors (USvCh, PD, P, and, {search location, automobile}, Exigency, I, L)
Assert CombFactors (USvCh, PD, P, and, {search location, automobile, container}, Exi-
gency, I, Cooper v. California)
Assert Factor (USvCh, PD, P, PrivateRoom, Privacy, I, L)
Assert Fact (USvCh, PD, P, bedroom, PrivateRoom, F, H)
4.6.2 US v. Chadwick Scenario B
Context: The respondent in this extract is trying to clarify why the footlocker is not like an
automobile using precedent cases. This scenario assumes that the conflict issues have been as-
serted in previous contexts.
Dialogue: Respondent Dialogue
Participants: Respondents and unidentified Justice
ACTs: Show the construction of the respondent and Justices’ ACTs according to the speech
acts as in Figure 4.7.
Unidentified Justice: What justified the search of the <Factor> automobile in Cooper?
That was not the <Factor> automobile theory? It was based on the idea that the <Fact>
car <CombFactor> had been used to <Fact> transport contraband. (See Figure 4.7 (a))
Assert Factor (USvCh, RD, J, automobileTheory, Exigency, I, L)
Assert Factor (USvCh, RD, J, automobile, automobileTheory, F, L)
Assert Fact (USvCh, RD, J, car, automobile, F, Cooper)
Assert Factor (USvCh, RD, J, probableCause, Exigency, I, L)
Assert Fact (USvCh, RD, J, transportContraband, probableCause, F, Cooper)
Assert CombFactor (USvCh, RD, J, and, {probableCause and autombile}, Exi-
gency, I, Cooper)
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FIGURE 4.6: ACTs Construction US v. Chadwick, Scenario A
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Respondent: It is only in terms of there is a <Factor> forfeiture statute governing the
<Fact> containers of contraband. However, that statute only goes for <Issue> seizure,
it does not go to search and the justification for the search in Cooper. (See Figure 4.7(b))
Assert Factor (USvCh, RD, R, forfeitureStatute, Exigency, I, Cooper)
Assert Factor (USvCh, RD, R, probableCause, Exigency, I, Cooper)
Assert Fact (USvCh, RD, R, containers of contraband, probableCause, F, Cooper)
Assert CombFactors (USvCh, RD, R, and, {probableCause, automobile, forfei-
tureStatute}, Exigency, I, Cooper)
Unidentified Justice: I know and then I am just asking why would Cooper not pick
up, if the United States has the right of <CombFactor> probable cause to <Fact> seize
the footlocker and hold it pending <Factor> forfeiture proceedings? (See Figure 4.7 (c) )
Assert Factor (USvCh, RD, J, forfeitureStatute, Exigency, I, Cooper)
Assert CombFactor (USvCh, RD, J, and, {probableCause, automobile, forfeitureStatute},
Exigency, I, Cooper)
Assert Factor (USvCh, RD, J, container, {Exigency+Privacy}, IR, N)
Assert Fact (USvCh, RD, J, footlocker, container, F, N)
Assert CombFactor (USvCh, RD, J, and, {probableCause, container, forfeitureStatute},
{Exigency+Privacy}, IR, Cooper)
Respondent: Because, Cooper is an <Fact> automobile and automobiles have <Issue>
less of an expectation of privacy than <Fact> luggage <CombFacts> and footlocker.
(See Figure 4.7 (d))
Assert Factor (USvCh, RD, R, luggage, container, F, H)
Assert CombFact (USvCh, RD, R, or, {luggage, footlocker}, container, F, H)
Assert CombFactor (USvCh, RD, R, and,{probableCause, container, forfeitureStatute},
Privacy, I, Cooper)
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FIGURE 4.7: ACTs Construction US v. Chadwick, Scenario B
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4.6.3 California v. Carney Scenario A
Context: Here the Justice is asking questions to clarify the privacy properties of the motor home
used in California v. Carney and emphasising the requirements of a bright line facts. The con-
flict issues are previously asserted in this scenario.
Dialogue: Petitioner Dialogue.
Participants: Petitioner and unidentified Justice.
ACTs: Figure 4.8 shows the ACT construction for both the petitioner and the Justices after each
move.
Unidentified Justice: And this <Fact> mobile home was <Fact> not a tractor-drawn
(sic), was it? (See Figure 4.8 (a))
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, J, mobileConfiguration, Exigency+Privacy, IR, N)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, J, tractorDrawn, mobileConfiguration, F, H)
Petitioner: <Fact> No it was not. It was an <Factor> integral vehicle with <Fact>
an engine <CombFact>, <Fact> wheels <CombFact> and <Fact> backportion. (See
Figure 4.8 (b))
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, P, mobileConfiguration, mobile, F, N)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, notTractorDrawn, mobileConfiguration, F, H)
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, P, integral vehicle, mobileConfiguration, F, T)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, wheels, integral vehicle, F, T)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, engine, integral vehicle, F, T)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, backPortion, integral vehicle, F, T)
Assert CombFacts (CvC, PD, P, and, {wheels, engine, backPortion}, F, T)
Assert CombFactors (CvC, PD, P, or, {notTractorDrawn, integral vehicle}, mo-
bileConfiguration, F, H)
Unidentified Justice: <CombFactor>And not tied up to<Fact>water, electric<Factor>
facilities, or anything like that? (See Figure 4.8 (c))
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, J, homeFacilities, Privacy, I, H)
Assert CombFactor (CvC, PD, J, and, {homeFacilities, mobileConfiguration},
{Exigency+Privacy}, IR, H)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, J, WaterElect, homeFacilities, F, H)
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Petitioner: <Fact> That’s correct, in this particular instance [presents additional facts of
the case]. So it is essential that the officers be provided with <CombIssue> bright line
guidance, guidance by which they know the limits of their power, and so that the people
know the limits of their protection. (See Figure 4.8 (d))
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, P, homeFacilities, Privacy, I, N)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, no WaterElect, no homeFacilities, F, H)
Assert CombIssues (CvC, PD, P, or, {Exigency, Privacy})
Unidentified Justice: Would you buy the <EmphasiseFact> guideline of wheels? That
if the vehicle has wheels on it, it’s not a home. (See Figure 4.8 (c))
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, P, integral vehicle, mobileConfiguration, F, T)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, J, wheels, IntegralVehicle, F, T)
Emphasise Fact (CvC, PD, J, wheels)
Petitioner: If the <Fact> vehicle has wheels on it, I think that that makes it mobile and
it would be subject to the exception. <EmphasiseFact> That would provide a bright line.
(See Figure 4.8 (d))
Emphasise Fact (CvC, PD, P, wheels)
4.6.4 California v. Carney Scenario B
Context: This is where the motor home is compared to hypothetical facts (camper tent) and
(movable suitcase) from a precedent case US v. Chadwick.
Dialogue: Petitioner Dialogue.
Participants: Petitioner and unidentified Justice.
ACTs: Petitioner and Justices’ ACTs as in Figure 4.9.
Unidentified Justice: What about a <Fact> camper’s tent, if the camper takes his things
out of the <Fact>motor home and pitches a tent next to it? (See Figure 4.9 (a))
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, J, mobility, {Exigency+privacy}, I, L)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, J, camperTent, mobility, F, H )
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, J, motor home, mobility, F, T )
Assert CombFact (CvC, PD, P, and, {camperTent, motor home}, mobility, H )
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FIGURE 4.8: ACTs Construction California v. Carney, Scenario A
Chapter 4. Legal Dialogue Representation 105
Petitioner: The <Fact> motor home would be subject to search <CombFact>, but
<Fact> not the tent, not under this particular exception. (See Figure 4.9 (b))
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, mobileHome, mobile, F, T )
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, notTent, mobile, F, H )
Assert CombFact (CvC, PD, P, and, {notTent, mobileHome}, mobile, H )
Unidentified Justice: <Factor> But it is movable. And I should think your reasoning
would apply. I’m not saying you are right or wrong. (See Figure 4.9 (c))
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, J, movable, mobility, F, H )
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, J, camperTent, movable, F, H )
Petitioner: <Fact> It is <Factor> movable. Well, I think the reasoning does apply.
<CombFact> But again, this Court has been very careful in drawing the lines to vehicles.
For example, the <Fact> suitcase in the Chadwick case. That’s capable of movement,
but the Court was reluctant to apply the analysis of allowing <Issue>a warrantless search
of the suitcase.
However, when the <CombFact> suitcase is placed into the <Fact> trunk of a car,
<CombFactor>and the <Factor> probable cause arises afterwards, the suitcase is sub-
ject to search. (See Figure 4.9 (d))
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, P, movable, Exigency, I, H)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, tent, movable, F, H)
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, P, movable, Privacy, I, Chadwick)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, suitcase, movable, F, Chadwick)
Assert CombFact (CvC, PD, P, or, {tent, suitcase}, movable, F, H)
Assert Fact (CvC, PD, P, cartrunk, mobileConfiguration, F, PC)
Assert Factor (CvC, PD, P, probableCause, Exigency, I, H)
Assert CombFactor (CvC, PD, P, and, {mobile and movable,probableCause}, Ex-
igency, I, PC)
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FIGURE 4.9: ACTs Construction California v. Carney, Scenario B
4.7 Summary
This chapter has presented a dialogue representation model for the US Supreme Court Oral
Hearings whereby the issues, factors and facts of concern to a case can be identified. Argument
component trees have been constructed to provide visualisation for the components and their
relationships for the various legal parties. Moving from the Oral Hearing transcripts to ACTs,
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through the use of a set of defined speech acts identified in a legal ontology, has defined in a
legal analysis workflow. This workflow shows how the sequence of speech acts is input to a
program to effectively produce the ACTs corresponding to petitioner’s, respondent’s and Jus-
tices’ perspectives. The oral hearing dialogue program was then applied to scenarios from case
studies showing the dialogue moves and the constructed ACTs. The next chapter explores the
role of these ACTs in encapsulating the knowledge of the domain and providing the decision for
the case.

Chapter 5
System Design for Reasoning with
Legal Cases Using Abstract Dialectical
Frameworks
“First comes thought; then organization of that thought, into ideas and plans;
then transformation of those plans into reality. The beginning, as you will observe,
is in your imagination.” Napoleon Hill
——————————————–
This chapter presents ANGELIC, a knowledge engineering method for encapsulating legal
information from cases using Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADFs) [54], and demonstrates
the suitability of ADFs for expressing the design of legal case-based reasoning systems. ADFs
will play a role in the system design akin to that played by Entity-Relationship models in the
design of database systems. The factor hierarchy of CATO is used to instantiate an ADF for
the domain of US Trade Secrets, taking into consideration the similarities between the factor
hierarchies in CATO and IBP and ADF.
To find the relationship between the opinion arguments and the represented issues, factors,
and facts in ACTs, this chapterl investigates how these ACTs can be merged and expressed in
terms of ADFs, where the nodes represent factors, the edges reflect the support between the
factors and the acceptance conditions are defined to determine the accepted nodes (argument
components).
The outline for this chapter is as follows. A general overview of ADFs and their role in
designing knowledge-based legal systems is discussed in Section 5.1. ANGELIC is presented
in Section 5.2 explaining the approach followed in using ADFs for legal reasoning. Section 5.3
provides an overview of the factors and the factor hierarchies in CATO and IBP in order to ex-
plain how ADFs encapsulate the factor hierarchy of CATO, showing the natural mapping of the
statements and links from the factor hierarchy to the ADF in Section 4. Next, a methodology for
mapping from Oral Hearings ACTs to ADF is provided in Section 5.5 and the chapter concludes
with a summary in Section 5.6.
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5.1 Abstract Dialectical Frameworks Role in AI and Law
As discussed in Chapter 2, Abstract Dialectical Frameworks were introduced in [54] and revis-
ited in [53]. ADFs provide a generalisation of Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs)
[61]. ADFs, like AFs, consist of a set of nodes and directed links between them, but whereas the
links in an AF have a uniform interpretation, namely defeat, the links in an ADF can be given
a variety of interpretations. Moreover, in ADFs the nodes are statements in general, rather than
specifically abstract arguments. ADFs also generalise bipolar argumentation frameworks [56]
which introduce a second relationship (support) in addition to the attack relationship of AFs.
However, the ADF goes further and allows any type of link to be used. Although the acceptance
conditions are often expressed as propositional functions, this need not be the case: all that is
required is the specification of conditions for the acceptance or rejection of a node in terms of
the acceptance or rejection of its children.
Partitioning will be used to divide the links into supporting and attacking links, but will
continue to see the acceptance conditions as specifying preferences locally rather than adopting
a global ordering of nodes1.
ADFs can both drive and record the design of the knowledge base for a system to apply
a body of case law. In particular the otherwise monolithic rule base is modularised by being
distributed as the acceptance conditions of nodes. Good modularisation - tightly coherent and
loosely coupled - is an essential feature of good program design (see e.g. [112]). The modular-
isation of the knowledge base achieved by using an ADF is indeed tightly coherent, since each
set of rules is concerned only with the acceptance of a single statement, and contains all the
rules needed to decide the acceptance of that statement. Loose coupling is achieved by limiting
the components required to determine the acceptability of a node to the children of that node.
Knowledge engineering advantages of ADFs include, in addition to the effective modulari-
sation of the system:
• Effective partitioning of the problem space, which limits the number of precedents re-
quired to determine the outcome of cases.
• Ready visualisation of the possible paths through a Prolog program: the connection be-
tween sets of rules is readily visible from the structure, whereas tracing which rules are
invoked when a given rule is executed from a monolitic rule base of any reasonable size
can often be difficult and error-prone.
• Assurance of completeness of the rule base, since it can readily be seen that each non-leaf
node has its own acceptance condition.
• Straightforward inclusion of additional nodes. Addition of nodes can be performed with-
out fear that there will be unanticipated ramifications in the knowledge base.
• Awareness of what nodes will be affected by the removal (or modification) of a node.
1Whereas PADFs were designed specifically to reflect Preference-Based Frameworks [12], the approach taken
here reflects Value-Based Frameworks [28], which are more commonly used in AI and Law. The relationship between
Preference- and Value-Based Frameworks is formally characterised in [99]
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• Support for verification: each node can be considered, either by reference to precedents
or otherwise, in isolation, on its own merits.
• Neutrality and integration between frame-based and rule representations. The node struc-
ture provides the former and the acceptance conditions the latter.
• Division of labour across a team of implementors: realisation of the part of the program
which decides one node can be done independently of the realisation of other nodes; how
the fragments will link together is explicitly specified. The children determine the inputs
required by each module (node): that is, how the modules interface with each other.
All of these things are highly desirable when designing and developing a system of any real
size and substance to reason with legal cases. The lack of such support has been a significant
barrier to the uptake of such systems in practice (see, e.g., [48] for the difficulties in developing
a sizable knowledge base to represent case law without effective design support).
5.2 The ANGELIC Methodology
From the ADF definition, it is clear that there is similarity in structure between the ADF, the
factor hierarchy in CATO and Argument Component Trees (ACTs). Moreover, the additional
flexibility that ADFs provide over AFs allows a more natural representation than has been pos-
sible in AFs, especially since there are both pro and con reasons.
This section presents ANGELIC, an ADF knoweldge encapsulation approach for legal infor-
mation from cases. Instantiations of ADFs both for factor hierarchies and ACTs will be created
in order to encapsulate and apply the theories that the hierarchies represent in a formal represen-
tation of knowledge in the legal domain. The methodology described here goes through three
iterated phases:
Domain analysis and representation: The ANGELIC methodology is applied to three do-
mains. Recognising that the case law of a legal domain goes through a life cycle of three
stages as stated by Levi [88], this methodology is intended to be applied to the domains
during the second stage where there is a period of stability and the theory is settled.
The first starts with the use of the existing knowledge of US Trade Secrets in CATO and
IBP as shown in Section 5.4. Second, in Chapter 6, ADFs in the domain of the Wild
Animals cases will be constructed (Popov v Hayashi and related cases as modelled in
[30]), for which several different representations exist. Finally, a set of cases are used
from the Automobile Exception to The Fourth Amendment, which has been discussed in
the literature in [115], [76] and [29], but has only been partially represented to illustrate
particular points in these papers. Therefore, there will be examples of several variant
analyses and a new analysis specifically produced for this thesis. Figure 5.1 shows the
two approaches used in analysing and representing these domains by instantiating ADFs
from different sources.
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FIGURE 5.1: Domain analysis and representation Phase: Different Starting Points for ADF
instantiation.
Implementation: Next, a move from analysis to an executable program is done in a direct
and immediate way using Prolog, by translating the acceptance conditions into Prolog
procedures, adding some control and reporting information, and then executing the result-
ing program. Comparison of the program outcomes with the actual outcomes of the cases
allows the theory to be refined, exploiting the software engineering benefits afforded by
the formal representation.
Testing and Refinements: For each domain, an evaluation is conducted to test the ease of
implementation, the performance and efficacy of the resulting program, the ease of refine-
ment of the program and the transparency of the reasoning. This yields further insights as
to how the case facts can be incorporated and how the justification and reasoning can be
improved using portions of precedents [48]. The implementation and testing phases are
discussed in the next chapter.
5.3 Factor-Based Reasoning Using ADFs
A number of landmark case-based legal reasoning systems were discussed in Chapter 2, includ-
ing CATO and IBP. This section proposes how the factor hierarchy of CATO and the logical
model of IBP can be used to instantiate an ADF for the domain of US Trade Secrets.
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FIGURE 5.2: CATO Abstract Factor Hierarchy (reproduced from [10])
5.3.1 CATO
CATO [10], which was based on Rissland and Ashley’s HYPO, most fully described in [14],
takes as its domain US Trade Secrets Law. CATO was primarily directed at law school students,
and was intended to help them form better case-based arguments, in particular to improve their
skills in distinguishing cases, and emphasising and downplaying distinctions. A core idea was
to describe cases in terms of factors, legally significant abstractions of patterns of facts found in
the cases, and to build these base-level factors into a hierarchy of increasing abstraction, moving
upwards through intermediate concerns (abstract factors) to issues. An extract from the factor
hierarchy, showing details of the support and attack relationships between the factors, is shown
in Figure 5.2 and the complete hierarchy is shown Figure 5.3. The Figures have been reproduced
directly from [10]. Each factor favours either the plaintiff or the defendant2. The CATO program
matches precedent cases with a current case to produce arguments in three plies:
• First a precedent with factors in common with the case under consideration is cited, sug-
gesting a finding for one side.
• Then the other side cites precedents with factors in common with the current case but a
decision for the other side as counter-examples, and distinguishes the cited precedent by
pointing to factors not shared by the precedent and current case.
• Finally, the original side rebuts by downplaying distinctions, citing cases to prove that
weaknesses are not fatal and distinguishing counter-examples.
2Note that the domain analysis in Chapter 5 and the forthcoming chapters refer to the parties as plaintiff and
defendant (rather than, for example, petitioner and respondent) following the longstanding practice in AI and law.
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FIGURE 5.3: CATO Abstract Factor Hierarchy (reproduced from [10])
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CATO uses twenty-six base level factors (there is no F9), as shown in Table 5.1.
ID Factor
F1 DisclosureInNegotiations (d)
F2 BribeEmployee (p)
F3 EmployeeSoleDeveloper (d)
F4 AgreedNotToDisclose (p)
F5 AgreementNotSpecific (d)
F6 SecurityMeasures (p)
F7 BroughtTools (p)
F8 CompetitiveAdvantage (p)
F10 SecretsDisclosedOutsiders (d)
F11 VerticalKnowledge (d)
F12 OutsiderDisclosuresRestricted (p)
F13 NoncompetitionAgreement (p)
F14 RestrictedMaterialsUsed (p)
F15 UniqueProduct (p)
F16 InfoReverseEngineerable (d)
F17 InfoIndependentlyGenerated (d)
F18 IdenticalProducts (p)
F19 NoSecurityMeasures (d)
F20 InfoKnownToCompetitors (d)
F21 KnewInfoConfidential (p)
F22 InvasiveTechniques (p)
F23 WaiverOfConfidentiality (d)
F24 InfoObtainableElsewhere (d)
F25 InfoReverseEngineered (d)
F26 Deception (p)
F27 DisclosureInPublicForum (d)
TABLE 5.1: Base Level Factors in CATO
There is, however, no single root for the factor hierarchy as presented in [10]: rather there
is a collection of hierarchies, each relating to a specific issue. To tie them together, the Issue
Based Prediction (IBP) system of Bruninghaus and Ashley [55], which is also based on the US
Tade Secrets domain, has been used as shown in the next sub-section.
5.3.2 IBP
In IBP, which is firmly based on CATO, the aim is not simply to discover and present arguments,
but to predict the outcomes of cases. To enable this, the issues of CATO’s hierarchy are tied
together using a logical model derived from the Uniform Trade Secret Act, which has been
adopted by the majority of States in the US, and the Restatement of Torts. The model is shown
in Figure 5.4.
IBP used 186 cases in its very thorough empirical evaluation [55]; 148 cases were analysed
for CATO and 38 were analysed specifically for IBP. Unfortunately, the analyses of these cases
are not all publicly available and so 32 cases have been used in this thesis. These cases were
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FIGURE 5.4: IBP Logical Model From [55]
harvested from public sources by Alison Chorley and used to evaluate her AGATHA system
[57, 58]. As part of the evaluation in [55], nine other systems were also considered to provide
a comparison. Most of these were different forms of machine learning systems, but programs
representing CATO and HYPO were also included. IBP was the best performer: results are
reported in [55] for IBP, Naive Bayes (the best performer of the ML systems), CATO, HYPO
and a version of IBP which uses only the model, with no CBR component. This comparison
will be revisited in Chapter 7.
5.4 Abstract Dialectical Frameworks For Factor Hierarchy
Now, consider the CATO and IBP factor hierarchies, as shown in Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. An
ADF for capturing the legal knowledge can now be instantiated as represented by these factor
hierarchies as follows:
Statements The statements S are the set of all the issues, intermediate concerns and base-level
factors.
Links is a subset of S×S, a set of links where L+ form the supporting links labelled “+” and
L− form the attacking links labelled “−”
Acceptance Conditions For each abstract factor (non-leaf node), a number of acceptance con-
ditions are defined in terms of their supporting and attacking children. Each acceptance
condition is constructed from the factors in the legal domain potentially based on the de-
cisions in precedent cases. Often, however, the nature of the relationship is clear; that
precedents would not always be required to resolve the comparisons was recognised in
[10].
“for certain conflicts, it is self-evident how they should be resolved. ... It is not
necessary to look to past cases to support that point.” (p47).
Chapter 5. System Design for Reasoning with Legal Cases Using Abstract Dialectical
Frameworks 117
The acceptance conditions are expressed as a set of tests. The order of the tests expresses
preferences. If none are satisfied, the node (abstract factor) is assigned to a default value.
Although [54], [51] and [53] have shown ADFs to be formally sound and their formal prop-
erties have been investigated, the ADFs explained here have not explicitly used these properties.
They are rather straightforward, since for these domains the ADFs are cycle-free. As such, the
grounded, preferred and stable semantics coincide. Moreover, since the input cases will deter-
mine the labelling of base-level factors (the leaf nodes), the nodes of the ADFs can be completely
and unambiguously labelled within the Prolog program to find the grounded extension. This is
important since it means that programs based on a design in the form of a cycle-free ADF are
themselves tractably computable.
5.4.1 US Trade Secrets Domain
Using the complete factor hierarchy of [10] given in Figure 5.3, an ADF has been produced
having as its leaf nodes the base-level factors of CATO. This is described in tabular form in
Table 5.2.
ID S L+ L−
F102 EffortstoMaintainSecrecy F6, F122, F123 F19,
F23, F27
F104 InfoValuable F8, F15 F105
F105 InfoKnownOrAvailable F106, F108
F106 InfoKnown F20, F27 F15, F123
F108 InfoAvailableElsewhere F16, F24
F110 ImproperMeans F111 F120
F111 QuestionableMeans F2, F14, F22, F26 F1, F17, F25
F112 InfoUsed F7, F8, F18 F17
F114 ConfidentialRelationship F115, F121
F115 NoticeOfConfidentiality F4, F13, F14, F21 F5, F23
F120 LegitimatelyObtainable F105 F111
F121 ConfidentialityAgreement F4 F23
F122 MaintainSecrecyDefendant F4 F1
F123 MaintainSecrecyOutsiders F12 F10
F124 DefendantOwnershipRights F3
TABLE 5.2: CATO as ADF
The roots of CATO’s hierarchies correspond to the leaves of the IBP logical model: these factors
can be therefore formed into a single ADF by using this structure. The relevant additions to the
ADF needed to integrate the IBP model are shown in Table 5.3 (note that F124 is not discussed
in [55]).
In Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 there are eighteen nodes to provide with acceptance conditions.
One (F124) has only a single supporting child: thus the acceptance condition will be Parent←→
Child. This is written (as are the other acceptance conditions) as a set of tests for acceptance
and rejection, to be applied in the order given, which allows expression of the priority between
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ID S L+ L−
F200 TradeSecretMisappropriation F201,F203 F124
F201 Info-Miasappropriated F110,F112,F114
F203 Info-Trade-Secret F102,F104
TABLE 5.3: IBP Logical Model as an ADF
them. This form of expression is easier to read in many cases, because it corresponds directly to
the defeasible rules with priorities used in formalisms such as ASPIC+ [105], and because it is
directly usable as Prolog code. The last test will always be a default. Thus Parent←→Child is
written as
Accept Parent if Child.
Reject Parent.
Where NOT is required negation as failure is used. The tests are individually sufficient
and collectively necessary, so that the closed world assumption can be applied and ensuring
equivalence with the logical expression (corresponding with [59]). Six nodes (F201, F203, F105,
F108, F114 and F124) have only supporting links: these can be straightforwardly represented
using AND and OR. AND is used for two nodes (F201 and F203), as in the IBP model, and OR
for the other four. The most complicated is InfoMisappropriated (F201):
Accept InfoMisappropriated if F114 AND F112.
Accept InfoMisappropriated if F110.
Reject InfoMisappropriated.
Five nodes have one supporting and one attacking link. These are best seen as forming an
exception structure: accept (reject) the parent if and only if supporting (attacking) child unless
attacking (supporting) child. Note that the exception may be the supporting or the attacking
child: in the former case the default will be reject, and in the latter the default will be accept.
Thus:
Accept Parent if Supporter AND (NOT Attacker).
Reject Parent.
OR
Reject Parent if Attacker AND (NOT Supporter).
Accept Parent.
For F110, F120 and F121 the attacking child is the exception, while for F122 and F123 the
supporting children are the exceptions. This leaves seven nodes. For F200 the attacking link is
regarded as an exception to the case where the conjunction of the supporting links holds:
Accept Trade Secret Misappropriation if
Info Trade Secret AND
Info Misappropriated AND
(NOT Defendant Ownership Rights).
Reject Trade Secret Misappropriation.
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For F104 and F112 the supporting links offer disjoint ways of accepting the parent, and the
attacking child is a way of establishing that the factor is not present. The default is defined to be
accept because in many of the cases there are no factors for either side present relating to this
point, and yet the abstract factor is required to be present. This factor was often simply accepted
on the facts and uncontested, and so there was no discussion of the point, therefore no factors
were mentioned in the decision. Thus for F112:
Accept F112 if F18.
Accept F112 if F8.
Accept F112 if F7
Reject F112 if F17.
Accept F112.
The remaining four are more complicated because they involve more factors. This might
be where some reasoning with precedents is required, but here (because a very limited number
of precedents are available) the approach is to make an initial attempt to supply tests, and re-
main prepared to adjust these in the light of particular precedents where testing show this to be
necessary. For F106 (InfoKnown):
Accept F106 if F20.
Accept F106 if F27 AND (NOT F15).
Accept F106 if F27 AND (NOT F123).
Reject F106.
The rationale is that if the information is known to competitors, it is known, but even if it is
disclosed in a public forum, the uniqueness of the product can suggest that the disclosure had
no impact (i.e. it was not sufficiently widely known), and so the secret remained effectively
unknown (and so F24 (InformationObtainableElsewhere) is more appropriate). The third clause
suggests that the public disclosure might be restricted (e.g. if the secret was disclosed in a court
of law during a trade secrets hearing), so that the information may be known, but embargoed.
For F115, each of the four supporting links (F4, F13, F14 and F21) is regarded as a distinct way
of establishing notice of confidentiality. F23 (WaiverOfConfidentiality) is an exception to each
of them whereas F5 (AgreementNotSpecific) is an exception only to F4 and F13, since the other
two do not relate to agreements.
Reject F115 if F23,
Accept F115 if F21.
Accept F115 if F14.
Reject F115 if F5.
Accept F115 if F4.
Accept F115 if F13.
Reject F115.
Similarly for F111 (QuestionableMeans), the supporting links can be seen as four differ-
ent ways in which questionable means can be established. The attacking links here seem like
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counter-claims rather than exceptions, and suggest that this node requires exploring precedents
to identify preferences. However, as a first attempt they are regarded as three distinct ways of re-
jecting the claim. Thus seven clauses are defined, one for each factor, which are initially ordered
as F25, F17, F22, F26, F14, F2, F1, to reflect the strong and weak links shown in CATO.
Reject F111 if F25.
Reject F111 if F17.
Accept F111 if F22.
Accept F111 if F26.
Accept F111 if F14.
Accept F111 if F2.
Reject F111 if F1.
Reject F111.
This leaves F102, EffortstoMaintainSecrecy, which has three supporting and three attacking
links. F19 is applicable only if no security measures at all are taken, which suggests that it has
priority. Similarly a waiver of confidentiality (F23) or disclosure in a public forum (F27) could
be seen as negating any efforts to maintain secrecy, although F123 provides a possible exception
to the latter. The remaining two supporting links are regarded as independent. Thus six clauses
are defined, offering reasons to reject or accept, ordered F19, F23 (F27 and NOT F123), F6,
F122, F123 with reject as the default.
Reject F102 if F19.
Reject F102 if F23.
Reject F102 if F27 AND (NOT F123).
Accept F102 if F6.
Accept F102 if F122.
Accept F102 if F123.
Reject F102.
5.5 Abstract Dialectical Frameworks from Oral Hearing ACTs
The previous section described how the ADF and factor-based reasoning can be related. This
finding influences the investigation of providing a justification for the legal decision based on
the ACTs constructed from the Oral Hearing dialogues. Recalling the outcome from the Oral
Hearing dialogues analysis and representation, there are four ACTs produced for each legal case:
Petitioner’s and Justices’ ACTs from the petitioner and rebuttal dialogues and respondent’s and
Justices’ ACTs from the respondent’s dialogue. These will set out the available facts, factors
and issues, and possible linkages between them.
Based on the individual and collective goals of these dialogues, the petitioner and respondent
ACTs reflect each party’s goals to assert all the argument components that would persuade the
Justices to provide arguments supporting their side. The Justices’ ACTs, on the other hand,
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illustrate the assertions of nine Justices and aim to clarify all the conflicting components in the
case.
The task now is to merge these alternatives to produce an answer for the current case as
defined in the process below. In the US Supreme Court procedure, this is the role of the Jus-
tices’ conference stage. Given the Justices’ ACTs, the goal of mapping the Oral Hearing ACTs
is to instantiate a Case ADF from the merged Justices’ ACTs and integrate the Case ADF to
the domain ADF. The domain ADF is first generated in chronological order starting from the
Case ADF of a landmark case in that domain (in the Automobile Exception domain, the first
ADF is created after Carroll and updated from every new Case ADF). For every new Case ADF,
the domain is modified by the components and acceptance conditions introduced by the case:
this will help in tracking the definition and modifications of the acceptance conditions. Further-
more, the source of every component and acceptance condition in the Case ADF is determined.
Sources could be new law, Oral Hearings, a precedent case or hypothetical, so that the generated
domain ADF provides comprehensive details about the components that construct the opinion
arguments and their provenance.
1. Merge the Justices’ petitioner ACT (PJACT) and Justices’ respondent ACT (RJACT) into
one ACT by mapping the components and relationships as shown below in the Carney
case study.
2. Instantiate a Case ADF from the merged Justices’ ACTs.
3. Ensure that the produced Case ADF shows all the possible acceptance conditions.
5.5.1 Merging Justices Oral Hearing ACTs
Before instantiating a Case ADF, a merge is conducted between the Justices’ ACTs, as shown
in the steps below, to encapsulate all the components and relationships that have been discussed
by the Justices during the Oral Hearing dialogues. Using California v. Carney’s Justices’ ACTs
from the petitioner and respondent dialogues (Appendix C: Figures C.2 and C.4), Table 5.4
and Figure 5.5 illustrate the merging approach, showing all the components from both Justices’
ACTs (PJACT and RJACT). Each component is followed by the component’s parent in paren-
theses. The merging process is performed by applying the following steps:
1. Mapping the similar components from the two petitioner and respondent Justices’ ACTs
directly into the new merged ACT.
2. Adding directly into the merged ACT any component found in only one of the Justices’
ACTs.
3. Defining new components when required; for example, defining a new base factor when
facts or a combination of facts are directly mapped to an abstract factor e.g. vehicle status.
4. Combining all the relationships from both Justices’ ACTs into the merged ACT as shown
in Figure 5.5.
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FIGURE 5.5: Merged Justices’ ACT
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Component PJACTs RJACTs Merged Justices’ ACT
Issue Exigency Exigency Exigency
Issue Privacy Privacy Privacy
Issue Relation Exigency + Privacy Exigency + Privacy Exigency + Privacy
Abstract Factor Mobile (Exigency) Mobile (Exigency) Mobile (Exigency)
Base Factor VehicleRegistration (Exigency) VehicleRegistration (Exigency)
Base Factor MobileConfiguration (Mobile) VehicleConfiguration (Mobile) VehicleConfiguration (Mobile)
Base Factor ParkingPeriod (Exigency + Privacy) ParkingPeriod (Exigency + Privacy)
Base Factor ParkingLocation (Exigency) ParkingLocation (Exigency)
Base Factor ParkingType (Exigency + Privacy) ParkingType (Exigency + Privacy)
Base Factor HomeFacilities (Exigency + Privacy) HomeFacilities (Exigency + Privacy)
Base Factor HomeConfiguration(Exigency + Privacy) HomeConfiguration (Exigency + Privacy)
Base Factor HomeFeatures(Exigency +Privacy) HomeFeatures(Exigency +Privacy)
Base Factor ResidentialUse (Privacy) ResidentialUse (Privacy)
Base Factor FactsRelation:TransportedVehicle VehicleStatus(Mobile)
OR CrashedCar OR ParkedVehicle(Mobile)
Base Factor FactsRelation:HouseBoat OR HighspeedObject (Mobile) MobileType(Mobile)
OR Suitcase OR Tent (Mobile)
Facts TransportedVehicle,CrashedCar, TransportedVehicle,CrashedCar,
ParkedVehicle(VehicleStatus) ParkedVehicle(VehicleStatus)
Facts HouseBoat, Suitcase, Tent (MobileType) HighspeedObject (MobileType) HouseBoat, Suitcase,
Tent, HighSpeedObject (MobileType)
Facts TrailernoTractor,TractorDrawn, Wheels(VehicleConfiguration) TrailernoTractor, TractorDrawn,
SelfPropelled, Wheels (MobileConfiguration) SelfPropelled, Wheels (VehicleConfiguration)
Facts Public, MobileHomePark (ParkingType) Public, MobileHomePark (ParkingType)
Facts LongTime, ShortTime (ParkingPeriod) LongTime, ShortTime (ParkingPeriod)
Facts Downtown (ParkingLocation) Downtown (ParkingLocation)
Facts WaterElectricity (HomeFacilities) WaterElectricity (HomeFacilities)
Facts Cab,SelfContainedUnit(Home Configuration) Cab,SelfContainedUnit(HomeConfiguration)
Facts HasCurtains, WindshieldCurtainsDown, HasCurtains, WindshieldCurtainsDown,
Bed, SleepingBag, Furniture, Bed, SleepingBag, Furniture,
PersonalEffects (HomeFeatures) PersonalEffects (HomeFeatures)
TABLE 5.4: Merged Justices’ Components
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5.5.2 From Oral Hearing ACTs to Case ADF
The Case ADF, as shown in Table 5.5, is instantiated first from the merged Justices’ ACTs in
the Oral Hearing, then modified in order to select the acceptance conditions during the Justices’
conference stage and finally represent the case opinion as shown in the next chapter. The Case
ADF can be defined as follows:
Statements The statements S are the set of all the components: issues, factors and facts. These
statements are subsets of the domain ADF.
Links is a subset of S× S, a set of supporting links L+ and attacking links L−, which are
determined based on the relationships between parent and children.
Acceptance Conditions For each issue, abstract factor and base factor, a number of accep-
tance conditions are defined from the component relationships in the merged ACT. All
the relationships and components related to the undetermined relationships between the
conflict issues (+) are captured in acceptance conditions related to each conflict issue.
These acceptance conditions are used to determine all the possible opinions in deciding
the case.
Merged Justices ACT S L+ L-
Exigency Exigency Mobile,VehicleRegistration HomeFeatures,
PublicParkingLocation, HomeFacilities,
PublicParkingType ParkingLong
Period
Privacy Privacy HomeConfiguration, ResidentialUse PublicParking
HomeFeatures, HomeFacilities, Location, Public
ParkingLongPeriod ParkingType
Mobile Mobile VehicleConfiguration, MobileType,
VehicleStatus
HomeConfiguration HomeConfiguration Cab,SelfContainedUnit
ResidentialUse ResidentialUse PeopleLivingIn
VehicleRegistration VehicleRegistration SpecialLicence
VehicleConfiguration VehicleConfiguration TractorDrawn, TrailernoTractor
SelfPropelled,HighSpeedObject
ParkingPeriod ParkingLongPeriod LongTime ShortTime
ParkingLocation PublicParkingLocation Downtown
ParkingType PublicParkingType PublicParking MobileHomePark
HomeFacilities HomeFacilities Water, WaterElectricity
HomeFeatures HomeFeatures Bed, SleepingBag,
Furniture, PersonalEffects
VehicleStatus VehicleStatus TransportedVehicle, ParkedVehicle CrashedCar
MobileType MobileType HouseBoat Tent,Suitcase
TABLE 5.5: California v. Carney Oral Hearing Case ADF
The acceptance conditions from all the possible relationships are shown below:
Exigency IF (Mobile AND (VehicleRegistration
OR PublicLocation).
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Exigency IF (Mobile AND ShortParkingTime AND
PublicParking AND (NO) HomeFacilities).
Exigency IF (Mobile AND HomeConfiguration AND
(NO) StorageCompartment).
Privacy IF (MobileHome AND ResidentialUse
AND (NOT) PublicParking).
Privacy IF (MobileHome AND Parked
AND HomeFeatures).
Privacy IF (Mobile AND LongParkingTime AND
MobileHomeParking AND HomeFacilities).
Privacy IF (Mobile AND HomeConfiguration AND
StorageCompartment).
Mobile IF MobileType AND VehicleConfiguration
OR VehicleReadyStatus
MobileType IF Automobile OR Houseboat OR Tent
OR Suitcase OR HighSpeedObject
VehicleConfiguration IF TractorDrawn OR TrailerOnly OR
SelfPropelled OR AutomobilewithWheels
VehicleStatus IF Transported_Highway OR Crashed OR Parked
VehicleRegistration IF Licence
ParkingPeriod IF LongTime OR ShortTime
ParkingType IF PublicParking OR MobileHomeParking
HomeFacilities IF Water AND Electricity
HomeConfiguration IF Cab AND Trailer
HomeFeatures IF Curtains OR CurtainsDown OR PersonalEffects
OR Bed OR SleepingBag
ResidentialUse IF PeopleLivingin
PublicParkingLocation IF DownTown
This Case ADF will be compared in Chapter 6 with the ADF instantiated from the case opinion
in order to determine the role of the Oral Hearing analysis in deciding the case. The comparison
will help in:
• Determining the argument components that have been derived from the Oral Hearing
analysis and used to define the opinion argument.
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• Specifying the precedent cases that have been cited in both the Oral Hearing and the
Opinion.
• Understanding who proposed the components used for constructing the argument opinion
using the petitioner and respondent ACTs.
• Tracking how all the acceptance conditions are initiated and modified.
• Providing further details about the sources of all the argument components, whether they
were proposed as a fact in the case, a hypothetical component or a precedent case compo-
nent.
5.6 Summary
ANGELIC, a knowledge engineering methodology for encapsulating knowledge from legal
cases using ADFs has been proposed in this chapter. The first stage in the approach (domain
analysis and representation) has been presented. First, a domain ADF was instantiated for the
US Trade Secrets domain using CATO and IBP factor hierarchy, which in turn provided a solid
formal basis for factor-based reasoning. Second, the ACTs constructed from the legal cases in
Chapter 4 were merged to generate a Case ADF. Next, Chapter 6 will consider the remaining
stages, the executable form of applying ADF to the various domains, including the results, and
possible refinements.
Chapter 6
Applying ADFs to Predict the Outcome
of Legal Cases
“His machine was never perfected, though it generated a whole field of research
into what became known as “Turing Machines”. Today we call them “computers.”
Alan Turing, The Imitation Game
——————————————–
Following the design methodology introduced in the previous chapter, this chapter shows how
ANGELIC has been applied in different legal domains to predict the outcome of legal cases
described as sets of factors, according to a theory of a particular domain, based on a set of
precedent cases relating to that domain. In Chapter 5, an ADF for the domain of US Trade
Secrets was instantiated from the factor hierarchy of the well-known legal reasoning system
CATO. The method is now applied to two other legal domains often used in the literature of AI
and Law. In each domain, Wild Animals and Automobile Exception, the design is provided by
the domain analyst expressing the cases in terms of factors organised into an ADF, from which
an executable program can be implemented in a straightforward way by taking advantage of the
closeness of the acceptance conditions of the ADF to components of an executable program.
A number of evaluations are conducted to test the ease of implementation, performance and
efficacy of the resulting program and the ease of refinement of the program. This chapter is
structured as follows: Section 6.1 shows how an ADF is implemented and applied in different
legal domains, presenting the results from the program and analysing the output from each
domain. Next, a modification to the program in the Automobile Exception domain is applied,
first by reasoning using the fact layer as proposed in Section 6.2, and then including new rules
to consider the dissenting opinion in Section 6.3. After that, the relationship between the Oral
Hearings and the Opinion is given in Section 6.4. Finally a summary of the chapter is provided
in Section 6.5.
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6.1 ADF Applications to Legal Domains
This section illustrates how the approach has been applied to several different domains that have
often been used in AI and Law. First, US Trade Secrets is considered, using the 32 cases from
[58]. Next, the work is extended to further domains: starting with a small-scale domain con-
cerning Wild Animals (5 cases) before proceeding to the Automobile Exception to The Fourth
Amendment (10 cases). Note that the aim is only to encapsulate (rather than learn) the theory of
the applicable law. For this purpose, a limited number of case suffices (cf. HYPO, which used
fewer than 25 cases [14]).
The program is implemented using Prolog, taking advantage of its closeness to the expres-
sion of the acceptance conditions, which makes the implementation quick, easy and transparent.
The Prolog program was created by ascending the ADF, rewriting the acceptance conditions as
groups of Prolog clauses to determine the acceptability of each node in terms of its children.
This required restating the tests using the appropriate syntax, adding some reporting to indi-
cate whether the node is satisfied (defaults are indicated by the use of “accepted that”), and
some control to call the procedure to determine the next node, and to maintain a list of accepted
factors.
6.1.1 US Trade Secrets Domain
Using the ADF instantiated from the factor hierarchy of [10] ( Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 ) in the
previous chapter, this section provides some examples from the implemented ADF as shown
below.
ANGELIC Secrets Program
The program is executed by posing a query, which enables the first factor to be decided in the
case and its base-level factors as arguments. Each factor is called in turn, with the factors present
passed up as FactorsSoFar. The Prolog for F112 (for which the acceptance conditions are given
below, and which will call the procedure to get F111) is:
Accept F112 if F18.
Accept F112 if F8.
Accept F112 if F7
Reject F112 if F17.
Accept F112.
getf112(Case,FactorsSoFar):-
member(f18,FactorsSoFar),
write([the,information,was,used]),
nl, getf111(Case,[f112|FactorsSoFar]).
getf112(Case,FactorsSoFar):-
member(f8,FactorsSoFar),
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write([the,information,was,used]),
nl, getf111(Case,[f112|FactorsSoFar]).
getf112(Case,FactorsSoFar):-
member(f7,FactorsSoFar),
write([the,information,was,used]),
nl, getf111(Case,[f112|FactorsSoFar]).
getf112(Case,FactorsSoFar):-
member(f17,FactorsSoFar),
write([the,information,was,not,used]),
nl, getf111(Case,FactorsSoFar).
getf112(Case,FactorsSoFar):-
write([accepted,that,the,information,was,used]),
nl, getf111(Case,[f112|FactorsSoFar]).
Each of the four tests in the acceptance condition is applied in a separate clause, using the
set of factors currently identified as present in the case, before proceeding to the next factor
(F111), with F112 added to the applicable factors if it is accepted. To allow completion of the
database [59], a final clause is added to catch any case not covered by any of the preceding
clauses. Although the default is normally reject, as discussed above, these defaults may favour
either side. In some cases the default should be accept, such as F112 and F104, because in
most cases there are no factors in the case descriptions relating to these abstract factors, and
yet they are a sine qua non for any claim. These aspects were uncontested and so the factors
were not explicitly discussed in the trial, and so do not appear in the CATO analysis. Where it
was clear that the factor needed to be explicitly established (e.g. F106 (InformationKnown) and
F111(QuestionableMeans)) the default was reject. The code for F111 is:
getf111(C,Factors):-
member(f25,Factors),
write([questionable,means,were,not,used]),
nl,getf123(C,Factors).
getf111(C,Factors):-
member(f17,Factors),
write([questionable,means,were,not,used]),
nl, getf123(C,Factors).
getf111(C,Factors):-
member(f22,Factors),
write([questionable,means,were,used]),
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nl, getf123(C,[f111|Factors]).
getf111(C,Factors):-
member(f26,Factors),
write([questionable,means,were,used]),
nl, getf123(C,[f111|Factors]).
getf111(C,Factors):-
member(f14,Factors),
write([questionable,means,were,used]),
nl, getf123(C,[f111|Factors]).
getf111(C,Factors):-
member(f2,Factors),
write([questionable,means,were,used]),
nl, getf123(C,[f111|Factors]).
getf111(C,Factors):-
member(f1,Factors),
write([questionable,means,were,not,used]),
nl,getf123(C,Factors).
getf111(C,Factors):-
write([accepted,that,questionable,means,were,not,used]),
nl, getf123(C,Factors).
The above demonstrates that it is a straightforward and reasonably objective process to trans-
form a factor-based analysis such as is found in [10] to an executable program via an ADF. Al-
though judgment is sometimes required to form the acceptance conditions, such judgments are
not difficult to make. Moreover if there are difficult choices, the effect of the alternatives can
be compared using a set of test cases. Overall, the relatively small number of factors relevant to
particular nodes greatly simplifies the task.
Results
The program was run on the domain cases as shown in Appendix F. The cases are represented
as a list of base-level factors. For example, the Boeing case1 is represented as
case(boeing,[f4,f6,f12,f14,f21,f1,f10]).
giving output:
1The Boeing Company v. Sierracin Corporation, 108 Wash.2d 38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987).
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1 ?- go(boeing).
accepted that defendant is not owner of secret
efforts made vis a vis outsiders
efforts made vis a vis defendant
there was a confidentiality agreement
defendant was on notice of confidentiality
there was a confidential relationship
accepted that the information was used
questionable means were used
accepted that the information
was not available elsewhere
accepted that information is not known
accepted that the information
was neither known nor available
accepted that the information was valuable
not accepted that the information
was legitimately obtained
improper means were used
efforts were taken to maintain secrecy
information was a trade secret
a trade secret was misappropriated
find for plaintiff
boeing[f200, f201, f203, f102,f110,f104,f111,
f112,f114,f115,f121,f122,f123,
f4,f6,f12,f14,f21,f1,f10]
decision is correct in accordance with the actual decision
The initial program correctly classified 25 out of the 32 cases (78.1%) of the cases. While all
ten of the cases won by the defendant were correctly classified, seven of the 22 cases won by
the plaintiff were not. The figure for correct answers is remarkably close to the 77.8% reported
for the version of CATO used in [55], which, of course, used exactly the same analysis of the
domain and cases that has been adopted here. Thus the first conclusion suggests that executing
the analysis in [10] as an ADF produces very similar results to those obtained using the original
CATO program (albeit a smaller set of cases is used here). Further investigation was conducted
to find how the initial program might be improved. The wrongly predicted cases were:
case(spaceAero,[f8,f15,f18,f1,f19]).
case(televation,[f6,f12,f15,f18,f21,f10,f16]).
case(goldberg,[f1,f10,f21,f27]).
case(kg,[f6,f14,f15,f18,f21,f16,f25]).
case(mason,[f6,f15,f21,f1,f16]).
case(mineralDeposits,[f18,f1,f16,f25]).
case(technicon,[f6,f12,f14,f21,f10,f16,f25]).
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Examination of the cases showed that five of the seven had F16 (ReverseEngineerable)
present and that these cases were the only cases found for the plaintiff with F16 present. The
problem in these five cases is that the program finds for the defendant because the information is
available elsewhere (F108). This is established by the presence of ReverseEngineerable and is
unchallengeable. Examination of the ADF shows that F16 is immediately decisive: if that factor
is present, there is no way the plaintiff can demonstrate that the information is a trade secret.
Goldberg2 also fails through F105 (InformationKnownOrAvailable), since disclosure in a pub-
lic forum (F27) is sufficient to deny the information trade secret status. It would appear that the
performance could be significantly improved by refining this branch to allow the plaintiff some
way to defend against F16 in particular.
Refinement
At this point it should be noted that CATO is likely to be more robust in the face of imperfect
analysis than an approach based on a logical model. Because CATO generates arguments based
on considering all the available factors taken together, it is less likely to have an outcome deter-
mined by a single factor than a logical model. For example, the presence of F16 or F24 can be
seen to immediately determine a decision for the defendant in a logical model, whereas in CATO
other factors might outweigh them. Moreover, CATO was designed to assist law students, not to
predict outcomes. Similar problems should be expected to arise in IBP, which also uses a logical
model, albeit one that is applied at a later stage of the process. In [55] it is stated
We found that some Factors, called KO-Factors (or Knockout Factors), almost al-
ways dominate the outcome of a case. For instance, as an empirical matter, the
plaintiff will not win a case with Factor F20, Info-Known.
Such factors are given special treatment in IBP, and so it does not seem unreasonable to
use the initial results to suggest possible refinements to the original analysis. First consider
Goldberg v Medtronic; in that decision it is explicitly stated that
The district court found that Medtronic could not avoid its obligation of confidence
due to the availability of lawful means of obtaining the concept when those means
were not employed. We affirm.
Thus the factor which was decisive3 for the program, F27, was in fact explicitly held to be
insufficient in the actual decision. It is not within the remit of the knowledge-base designer to
say whether this decision was correct or not, but it does explain why the program misclassifies
the case. Assuming the decision to be correct, F27 should either be redefined to include the
defendant’s actual use of this public domain knowledge, so that it is not present in Goldberg,
allow F21 (KnewInformationConfidential) as an exception to F27 in determining the acceptance
of F106, on the grounds that if the defendant believed the information to be confidential, he could
2Goldberg v. Medtronic, 686 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1982).
3Running a version of Goldberg without F27 finds for the plaintiff.
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not have been aware that the information was publicly available. Since there are no other cases
with F21 and F27 both present, these two solutions cannot be chosen based on the precedents
available.
Now turning to the problem created by F16, ReverseEngineerable, in [10] the note on the
applicability of this factor states:
The factor applies if: Plaintiff’s information could be ascertained by reverse engi-
neering, that is, by inspecting or analyzing plaintiff’s product (regardless of whether
defendant actually obtained the information in this way).
Thus it is clear that the defence of Goldberg cannot be used; that the defendant did not in
fact reverse engineer the information. Nonetheless, the ease with which the product could be
reverse engineered does (among other things) need to be considered. In Mason4 it is stated:
In this regard, we note that courts have protected information as a trade secret de-
spite evidence that such information could be easily duplicated by others competent
in the given field.
citing KFC v Marion Kay5 and Sperry Rand v Rothlein6. The KFC decision cited in Mason7
states
Marion-Kay maintains that the recipes and formulas for the making of KFC season-
ing are not unique and that Marion-Kay is capable, both financially and technically,
of producing KFC seasoning.
This suggests that the uniqueness of the product (F15) might be a factor capable of attacking
the acceptability of F108 as well as F106 (as identified in CATO). Adding F15 as an exception to
F16 would give the correct decision in Televation8, KG9 and Mason. In Technicon10 the phrase
“readily ascertainable” is used:
Curtis claimed that Technicon’s trade secrets were “readily ascertainable” and that
the company had not made reasonable attempts to ensure its trade secrets. The
Court reasoned that Bridgmon’s “wiretap” process had required over two-thousand
hours, and still had not yielded a fully functional product. The Court held that this
amount of time indicated that a trade secret was not readily ascertainable.
In fact in two of the cases (KG and Technicon) restricted material was used by the defen-
dants, strongly implying that the information was not, in fact, readily ascertainable. In Mineral
Deposits11, it was found that
4Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)
5KFC Corp. v. MarionKay Co., Inc., 620 F.Supp 1160 (D.C.Ind 1985)
6Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F.Supp. 549 (D.Conn.1964)
7Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So.2d 130 (Ala.Civ.App.1987)
8Televation Telecommunication Systems, Inc. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1988)
9K & G Oil Tool & Service Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782
10Technicon Data Systems Corp. v. Curtis 1000, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 286
11Mineral Deposits Ltd. v. Zigan, 773 P.2d 606 (Colo.App.1988)
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After Zigan received the spiral, he removed the label which indicated that patent
applications were pending and gave the spiral to defendant Zbikowski. Zbikowski
then cut the spiral into pieces, made molds of the components, and proceeded to
manufacture copies of the spiral. If a trade secret is divulged under an express or
implied restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse, a party who engages in unauthorized
use of the information will be liable in damages to the owner of the trade secret.
This strongly suggests that F14 was also in fact present in this case. Moreover in Televation,
whether the secret counted as reverse-engineerable was contested:
The mere fact, however, that a competitor could, through reverse engineering, du-
plicate plaintiff’s product does not preclude a finding that plaintiff’s techniques or
schematics were trade secrets, particularly where, as here, the evidence demon-
strated that the reverse engineering process would be time-consuming.
There is a strong suggestion that the court believed that copies of the plaintiff’s drawings
had, in fact, been used by the defendant, which would mean that F14 would apply. Finally
Sperry Rand, another decision cited in Mason, states
The defendants claim that there is no trade secret if it is disclosed by prior art or if
it is readily discernible by others skilled in the field. It is no defense in an action
of this kind that the process in question could have been developed independently,
without resort to information gleaned from the confidential relationship. As stated
in the landmark case of Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 35, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889):
“Even if resort to the patterns of the plaintiff was more of a convenience than a
necessity, still if there was a secret, it belonged to him, and the defendant had no
right to obtain it by unfair means, or to use it after it was thus obtained.”
suggesting that the use of any kind of questionable means (rather than just F14) could be
used to block a defence relying on reverse engineerability. The decisions thus give a number of
suggestions for exceptions to F16 as a support for F108; especially uniqueness of the product
and use of restricted materials. Incorporating those exceptions would raise the success of the
program to 29 out of 32 (90.6%), and removing F27 from Goldberg (or allowing F21 as an
exception) and adding F14 to Mineral Deposits, both of which seem eminently justifiable on the
facts of the cases concerned as stated in the decision texts, would give correct decisions in these
cases also (96.8%). This leaves only Space Aero12 as an unexplained failure. The output for this
case is:
?- go(spaceAero).
accepted that defendant is not owner of secret
accepted that efforts made vis a vis outsiders
no efforts made vis a vis defendant
12Space Aero Products Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965)
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accepted that there was no confidentiality agreement
accepted that defendant was not on notice of confidentiality
accepted that there was no confidential relationship
the information was used questionable means were not used
accepted that the information was not available elsewhere
accepted that information is not known
accepted that the information was neither known nor available
the information was valuable
not accepted that the information was legitimately obtained
accepted that improper means were not used
no efforts were taken to maintain secrecy
information was not accepted as a trade secret
no trade secret was misappropriated
find for defendant
spaceAero[f104,f112,f123,
f8,f15,f18,f1,f19]
decision is wrong
This case fails on two branches: the information is not a trade secret because no security
measures were taken, and because it appears that no confidential relationship existed. A key
feature of this case is that the defendants were former employees of the plaintiff, and had been
provided with the disputed information when employed by the plaintiff because they needed it
to carry out their duties. The decision itself states
The testimony, taken as a whole, convinces that Darling took precautions to guard
the secrecy of its process which, under the circumstances, were reasonably suffi-
cient.
This suggests that F19 (No Security Measures) was not, in fact, accepted as present, and
removing this factor from the case is enough to establish that there was a trade secret. Turning
to the issue of confidentiality, it is mentioned that
While none of the former employees had signed a contract with Darling in which
they formally agreed not to use the information acquired by them, and while they
were free to leave their employment at will, Judge Pugh found that they owed the
duty of fidelity to their employer while they were employed. We agree. ... The
court below found as a fact that some of the former employees had in their pos-
session, after leaving Darling’s employment, certain sketches of oxygen breathing
hoses which they had taken while they were employed by Darling, without Dar-
ling’s knowledge. ... the former employees knew that they were acting wrongfully
in violation of their confidential relationship and their duty of loyalty. We agree
with the court below that the former employees violated the duty of fidelity and
trust which they owed to Darling in respect of the trade secret and that their con-
duct was such as to entitle Darling to the protection of a court of equity.
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Again, whether this decision was correctly made or not cannot be determined. However, it
does seem that at least F21 (KnewInformationConfidential) should be included. If this is added,
a confidential relationship can be established and the case found for the plaintiff.
6.1.2 Wild Animals Domain
The approach so far has been considered with respect to one single domain. If the approach is to
be of general significance, however, it needs to be applicable to other domains. This subsection
describes a further exercise designed to show that the approach is more generally applicable. The
method is applied to another domain, which has often been used as an illustration of factor-based
reasoning and as such analyses are available: the Wild Animals cases and Popov v Hayashi. The
Wild Animals cases were introduced into AI and Law in [40] and extended to the baseball case
of Popov in [144]. The factor-based analysis of [30] has been used as a starting point. Briefly the
Wild Animals cases concern plaintiffs chasing Wild Animals when their pursuit was interrupted
by the defendant. Post was chasing a fox for sport. Keeble was hunting ducks, Young was
hunting fish and Ghen a whale, all in pursuit of their livelihoods. Popov v Hayashi concerned
disputed ownership of a baseball (valuable because it had been hit by Barry Bonds to break a
home run record). Popov had almost completed his catch when he was assaulted by a mob of
fellow spectators and Hayashi (who had not taken part in the assault) ended up with the baseball
when it came free. The Wild Animals cases were cited when considering whether Popov’s had
given him possession of the ball.
Thirteen base-level factors are identified in [30]. The first task is to form them (together with
appropriate abstract factors) into a factor hierarchy, and to use this as the node and link structure
to form an ADF. This factor hierarchy is shown in Figure 6.1: some adaptations to [30] have
been made: for example a factor Res (Residence Status) is included to indicate the attachment
of the animals to the land, since it appears to make a difference whether they are on that land
permanently, seasonally, habitually, or occasionally. The nodes and links are given in Table 6.1.
Acceptance conditions are supplied for the nine non-leaf nodes.
Possession for Plaintiff if (NOT) NoBlame
AND ((Ownership
OR (RightToPursue AND IllegalAct))
Ownership if (OwnsLand AND Resident)
OR Convention OR Capture
Capture if (NOT) NotCaught OR (Vermin AND HotPursuit)
RightToPursue if OwnsLand OR
((HotPursuit AND PMotive
AND (NOT) (better) DMotive)
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PMotive if PLiving OR
((PSport OR PGain)
AND (NOT) DLiving)
DMotive if NOT Malice AND
(DLiving OR DSport OR DGain)
IllegalAct if Trespass OR Assault
Trespass if LegalOwner AND AntiSocial
AntiSocial if (Nuisance OR Impolite)
AND (NOT) DLiving
S L+ L-
Possession for Plaintiff Ownership,RightToPursue,IllegalAct NoBlame
Capture HotPursuit, Vermin NotCaught
Ownership Convention, Capture, OwnsLand, Res
PMotive Pliving, PSport, PGain DLiving
DMotive DLiving, DSport, DGain Malice
OwnsLand LegalOwner
RightToPursue OwnsLand, Pmotive, HotPursuit DMotive
AntiSocial Nuisance, Impolite DMotive
Trespass LegalOwner, AntiSocial
IllegalAct Assault, Trespass
TABLE 6.1: Wild Animals as ADF
The only real controversy here is over the determination of Right to Pursue when both the
plaintiff and the defendant have good motives. Essentially, the choice is that if the land is not
owned by one of them, the right to pursue is given to the party with the better motive. The
remainder seem fairly uncontroversial.
ANGELIC Animals Program
The acceptance conditions can easily be expressed as Prolog procedures and then embedded
in code as was done for CATO (Appendix G shows the Wild Animals domain program and
results). The program can then be executed. For example, running the program for Young v
Hitchens produces the following output (note that the program abbreviates factor names):
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FIGURE 6.1: ADF for Wild Animals Domain
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?- go(young).
the plaintiff had not captured the quarry
the plaintiff did not own the quarry
plaintiff has good motive
defendant has good motive
plaintiff did not own the land
plaintiff had a right to pursue the quarry
defendant committed no antisocial acts
defendant committed no trespass
no illegal act was committed
do not find for the plaintiff
find for the defendant
young[rtToPursue,dMotive,pMotive,
nc,hp,imp,pliv,dliv]
decision is correct in accordance with the actual decision
Results
The program produces correct results for all five cases discussed in [30]. This indicates that the
ADF representation can be used to encapsulate the knowledge of the domain as represented in
[30], suggesting that the method can be applied straightforwardly to a second domain. In general
the method can be applied to any domain for which factor-based reasoning in the CATO (or
HYPO or IBP) style is appropriate. This has encouraged application of the method to a larger-
scale problem in the domain of the US Automobile Exception, for which there is no accepted
analysis into factors available, and which therefore requires starting from the case decision texts,
as shown in the next section.
6.1.3 US Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment Domain
Here the approach has been applied to ten freshly analysed cases in the domain of the Fourth
Amendment, specifically in relating to the Automobile Exception. The Fourth Amendment pro-
tects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” A search is considered reasonable if a warrant has been
obtained. However, when there is a high probability of losing the evidence so that there is an
urgent reason to search, obtaining a warrant may become impossible. One such situation is a
moving automobile. This domain thus considers the interaction of two competing considera-
tions: the enforceability of the law, which makes the exigency issue important, and citizens’
rights, which include the right to privacy [29].
This exception was first established by the United States Supreme Court in 1925, in the
Carroll v. US.13 decision which states:
13Carroll v United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
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Various acts of Congress are cited to show that, practically since the beginning
of the Government, the Fourth Amendment has been construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search for contraband in a store, dwelling-house,
or other structure for the search of which a warrant may readily be obtained, and a
search of a ship, wagon, automobile, or other vehicle which may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
The Automobile Exception was developed further as more cases were decided (Table 6.4
shows ten landmark cases in the domain and their representation in terms of the factors identi-
fied in Table 6.2) with further conditions taken from cases subsequent to Carroll needing to be
taken into consideration. For example, the type of the vehicle or movable container, the status of
the vehicle, which influences whether there was an urgent need to search it (e.g. was the vehicle
traveling on the highway (as in Carroll) or it was parked in a parking lot but capable of mov-
ing? California v. Carney14). Was it parked in a private place that is used for accommodation
(Coolidge v. New Hampshire15) and so not subject to inspection without warrant or was it in a
public location? Whatever the conditions, there must be a probable cause to search, but is it legal
to search the whole vehicle if the probable cause applies only to a container inside the vehicle?
What if an authorized warrant was easy to obtain? Such conditions and more are stated in the
ADF table (Table 6.3). The aim of the court opinion in this domain is to determine whether there
is enough exigency with respect to a possibly lowered expectation of privacy given the partic-
ular case facts. This is illustrated by the ADF factor hierarchy in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, based
on the base-level factors given in Table 6.2. The definitions of the base and abstract factors are
explained in Appendix E.
From the case decisions and representations shown in Table 6.4, acceptance conditions can
now be generated for the fifteen non-leaf nodes, using the base-level factors in Table 6.2 the
ADF is given in table form in Table 6.3. For each of the acceptance tests, a default value is
defined when none of the conditions is satisfied. The default value is determined with respect to
the nature of the factor: for example, the content is not considered private if none of the (AF131-
PrivateContentsCarriage) acceptance conditions are satisfied. For some factors, it is explicitly
stated that the factor is not clearly attributable on the basis of the facts as in UrgentReason-
ToSearch (AF122), and thus is considered unsatisfied.
AutomobileException IF Exigency
AND (LOW)ExpectationOfPrivacy.
Privacy IF EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse
AND ( (NO InspectionRegulation)
OR (NO VisibilityofItem) )
OR (PrivateLocation AND (NOT AuthorizedWarrant) ).
14 California v. Carney, 471 US 386 (1985).
15 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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Exigency IF (Mobile AND ExigencyWhenApproached
AND ProbableCauseToSearch)
OR (NOT EaseToGetWarrant).
EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse IF
(Residence AND Accommodation)
OR PrivateContentsCarriage.
Residence IF ConnectedMainLivingServices.
PrivateContentsCarriage IF GoodsCarried
AND ProtectionLevel AND ContainerType.
Accommodation IF AccommodationSpaces OR RoomsFunctions.
SubjectToInspectionRegulation IF License
AND (NOT RestrictedArea).
VisibilityofItem IF OnPublicView OR CanBeSeen
OR (NOT CannotBeSeen).
ExigencyWhenApproached IF (UrgentStatus AND PublicLocation)
OR (CapableToMove AND
(PublicLocation OR PublicParking
OR PermittedParkingTime)).
Mobile IF Automobile OR Vessel
OR TowableVehicle OR LargeContainer
OR MovableContainer.
EaseOfObtainingWarrant IF (NOT RiskofLosingEvidence)
OR (Magistrate availability
AND AuthorityOfMagistrate).
ProbableCausetoSearchVehicle IF OriginPurpose
AND LegalUrgentReasonToSearch
AND LegalSearchScope.
OriginPurpose IF Information OR Observation
OR Procedure.
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UrgentReasonToSearch IF PublicSafety OR Crime.
LegalSearchScope IF (WholeVehicle OR VehicleContainer)
AND LegalSearchPlace.
ID Base Factor
bf011 Automobile
bf012 Vessel
bf013 Towable
bf014 LargeContainer
bf015 MovableContainer
bf021 AuthorityOfAvailableMagistrate
bf022 RiskOfLosingEvidence
bf023 AvailabilityOfMagistrate
bf031 Licence
bf032 RestrictedArea
bf041 OnPublicView
bf042 CanBeSeen
bf043 CannotBeSeen
bf051 UrgentStatus
bf052 CapableToMove
bf053 Public Parking
bf054 PublicLocation
bf055 PermittedDuration
bf211 Information
bf212 Observation
bf213 Procedure
bf221 PublicSafety
bf222 Crime
bf231 WholeVehicle
bf232 OnlyVehicleContainer
bf233 SearchPlace
bf311 GoodsCarried
bf312 ProtectionType
bf321 ConnectedServices
bf331 AccommodationSpaces
bf332 RoomsFunction
TABLE 6.2: Base-Level Factors in The Automobile Exception as an ADF
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FIGURE 6.2: ADF for Automobile Exception, part 1
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FIGURE 6.3: ADF for Automobile Exception, part 2
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ID S L+ L-
I1 Exigency AF202,AF101,
AF103,AF104,
AF105 AF102
I2 Privacy AF203
AF202 ProbableCauseToSearchVehicle AF121
AF122
AF123
AF203 ExpectationOfPrivacyInUse AF131
AF132, AF133
AF101 Mobile bf011,bf012,bf013,
bf014, bf015
AF102 EaseWarrant bf022 bf021,
bf023
AF103 SubjectToInspectionRegulation bf031 bf032
AF104 VisibilityOfItem bf041,bf042 bf043
AF105 ExigencyWhenApproached bf051,bf052,
bf053,bf054,bf055
AF121 AuthorizedOrigionOfProbableCause bf211,bf212,bf213
AF122 UrgentReasonToSearch bf221,bf222
AF123 LegalSearchScope bf231 bf232,bf233
AF131 PrivateContentsCarriage bf311,bf312
AF132 Residence bf321
AF133 Accommodation bf331,bf332
TABLE 6.3: Automobile Exception as an ADF
ANGELIC Automobile Program
The acceptance conditions are implemented using Prolog procedures as in the previous domains,
and ordered to ensure that a report is provided giving the status of every non-leaf factor in the
domain. The following procedure shows the code for the two acceptance conditions and the
default clause for AF202-ProbableCauseSearchVehicle.
getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Factors):-
member(af123,Factors),
member(af122,Factors),
member(af121,Factors), !,
write([there, is, a ,probable, cause, to , search,
vehicle ]),nl,getSubjectToInspection(C,[af202|Factors]).
getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Factors):-
member(af122,Factors), member(af121,Factors), !,
write([there, is, a ,probable, cause, to , search,
vehicle , but, the , search, scope, was , illegal ]),
nl,getSubjectToInspection(C,Factors).
Chapter 6. Applying ADFs to Predict the Outcome of Legal Cases 146
Case Base-Level Factors Favour
Carroll v. United States bf011,bf051,bf211,bf231,bf233 P
Chambers v. Maroneys bf011,bf015,bf051,bf054,bf213,bf222,
bf231 P
Coolidge v. New Hampshire bf011,bf021,bf024,bf051,bf213,bf222,
bf231 D
Cady v. Dombrowski bf011,bf042,bf043,bf051,bf053,bf053,bf213,
bf222,bf231,bf233 P
South Dakota v. Opperman bf011,bf015,bf043,bf051,bf053,bf213,bf221,
bf231,bf233,bf233 P
United States v. Chadwick bf011,bf014 ,bf043,bf051,bf053,bf211,bf221,
bf232,bf233,bf312 D
Arkansas v. Sanders bf011,bf014,bf015,bf032,bf043,bf051,bf211,
bf221,bf232 D
United States v. Ross bf011,bf015,bf032,bf051,bf053,bf211,bf221,
bf231,bf232,bf233,bf233,bf311 P
California v. Carney bf011,bf015,bf022,bf031,bf032,bf051,bf052,
bf053,bf054,bf211,bf212,bf221,bf231,bf233,bf233, P
bf331,bf332
California v. Acevedo bf011,bf015,bf032,bf043,bf051,bf054,bf211,
bf221,bf232,bf233 P
TABLE 6.4: Automobile Exception Cases
getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Factors):-
!,write([default,there, is, no, probable, cause, to ,
search, vehicle ]),nl,getSubjectToInspection(C,Factors).
The output below is for California v Carney (abbreviated in the code to“cvc”). Carney is
concerned with whether the exception for automobiles to the protection against unreasonable
search provided by the Fourth Amendment applies to mobile homes, in particular motor homes
in which the living area is an integral part of the vehicle. The decision held that the exception
does apply:
When a vehicle is being used on the highways or is capable of such use and is found
stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, the two justifica-
tions for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle is readily mobile,
and, second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from the pervasive
regulation of vehicles capable of travelling on highways. Here, while respondent’s
vehicle possessed some attributes of a home it clearly falls within the vehicle ex-
ception.
Thus the case decision indicates that although the mobile home is an automobile with an
accommodation space, it was not parked in residential parking and not connected to any services,
and so was currently being used as a vehicle not a home. There was a probable cause to search
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the mobile home to protect the public after police agents observed suspicious activity, and it was
not possible to obtain a warrant since the vehicle was capable of moving.
case(cvc,[bf011,bf015,bf022,bf031,bf032,bf051,
bf052,bf053,bf054,bf211,bf212,bf221,
bf231,bf233,bf233 ,bf331,bf332]).
?- go(cvc).
it,is,mobile
there,was,exigency,when,approached
there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause
the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent
the,search,scope,is,legal
there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle
subject,to,regular,inspection,but,
the,search,was,directed,at,restricted,area
accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public
accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private
accepted,that,it,is,not,connected,to,one,
or,more,main,living,services
the,place,could,be,used,for,accommodation
accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use
it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant
justified,under,automobile,exception
reduced,expectation,of,privacy
warantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment
find for the plaintiff
decision is correct in accordance with the actual decision
Another earlier case, US. v Chadwick 16, provides further details for the Automobile Ex-
ception in terms of the part of the vehicle that was searched. Chadwick found for the defendant
so that the exception did not apply. Here, the agents searched a double-locked footlocker placed
in the car trunk of a parked automobile without obtaining a warrant. The decision states that
even if there was an urgent need to search the vehicle, the probable cause arises only from the
footlocker, which should have been seized but not searched until a warrant had been obtained.
The case output indicates that the warrantless search here violates the Fourth Amendment rule.
case(usvc,[bf011,bf014 ,bf043,bf051,bf053,bf211,bf221,
bf232,bf233,bf312).
?-go(usvc).
it,is,mobile
there,was,exigency,when,approached]
16United States v Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977)
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there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause
the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent
the,search,scope,is,illegal
there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle,
but,the,search,scope,was,illegal
subject,to,regular,inspection
accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public
accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private
accepted,that,it,is,not,connected,to,
one,or,more,main,living,services
accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation
accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use
it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant
reduced,expectation,of,exigency
intrusion,on,privacy,is,not,justified,
under,automobile,exception
warantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment
find for the defendant
decision is correct in accordance with the actual decision
Results and Refinements
The program output shows that 9 of the 10 cases in this domain had been decided correctly. Only
the most recent case in the set (California v Acevedo17) was decided wrongly. The Justices saw
Acevedo as clarifying some doubtful findings in earlier decisions (in particular Chadwick and
Sanders). In Acevedo, searching the vehicle at the police station, when the probable cause arose
only from a container in the trunk, without obtaining a warrant, was held to be legal under the
Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment rule. This is despite the apparent precedents
of Chadwick and Sanders.
Separate doctrines have permitted the warrantless search of an automobile to in-
clude a search of closed containers found inside the car when there is probable
cause to search the vehicle, United States v. Ross,456 U. S. 798, but prohibited the
warrantless search of a closed container located in a moving vehicle when there is
probable cause to search only the container, Arkansas v. Sanders,442 U. S. 753. Pp.
500 U. S. 569-572.
This illustrates an example where citing over-ruled case decisions produces a wrong result.
The previously accepted rule was explicitly rejected by the court in the Acevedo decision:
The Chadwick-Sanders rule also is the antithesis of a clear and unequivocal guide-
line and, thus, has confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law
enforcement
17California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)
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The program cannot, of course, detect that an existing understanding of the precedents is
about to be changed, and so the output of Acevedo follows the Chadwick decision and indicates,
wrongly, that the search is not justified under the Automobile Exception.
case(cva,[bf011,bf015,bf032,bf043,bf051,bf054,bf211,
bf221,bf232,bf233]).
?- go(cva).
it,is,mobile
there,was,exigency,when,approached
there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause
the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent
the,search,scope,is,illegal
there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle,but,the,search,
scope,was,illegal
subject,to,regular,inspection,but,the,search,was,directed,
at,restricted,area
accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public
accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private
accepted,that,it,is,not,connected,to,
one,or,more,main,living,services
accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation
accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use
it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant
reduced,expectation,of,exigency
intrusion, on,privacy,is,not,justified,
under,automobile,exception
warantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment
find for the defendant
decision is wrong
The program here produces a wrong decision, giving priority to the Chadwick-Sanders rule,
whereas the actual decision is that the case should fall under the Automobile Exception rule if
there is a probable cause to search a container inside a vehicle and the circumstances mean that
no warrant is required.
Police, in a search extending only to a container within an automobile, may search
the container without a warrant where they have probable cause to believe that it
holds contraband or evidence. Carroll v. United States.
A number of possible refinements can be applied to resolve such a problem. The program
can be adjusted by adding new facts to represent the degree of acceptance of the base-level
factor, or by using a portion of precedent cases as will be discussed in Chapter 7. Essentially
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this decision is intended to initiate a new period of settled laws, in which Chadwick and Sanders
do not have force, whereas the program represents the pre-Avecedo situation. Of course a factor-
based program such as the one presented here cannot get both Chadwick and Avecedo correct,
since they follow different understandings of the law. To decide both cases correctly would
require the inclusion of a temporal context. This has been quite widely discussed with respect
to statutes, e.g.[102], but there is very little discussion with respect to cases, although the issue
was raised in [41] and the effect of cases appearing in different sequences explored in [81].
6.2 Reasoning with Facts
The interpretation of cases cannot be disputed without descending to the level of facts as advo-
cated by [24] in order to increase transparency in the ascription of base factors to cases. Each
legal case should be represented as a set of facts that determine the base factors applicable to the
case and thus allow the explanation of the attribution of factors, which in turn provides the basis
for deciding the case using a set of abstract factors to resolve the conflict in the issues.
For example, consider Carney, from the domain of Automobile Exception. Here Carney has
been redefined using the facts mentioned in the decision of the case rather than the base-level
factors, and the program has been extended to provide acceptance conditions for the base factors
using a number of possible facts. These facts can be seen as filling slots determined from the
main Automobile Exception rule such as the type of vehicle (e.g. car, ship, wagon), personal
effects (e.g. paper bag, suitcase), private place (e.g. store, dwelling-home). Additional facts
are added to provide similarity and/or differences from precedent cases, or to show the effect of
inserting new facts, such as the mobile home in Carney’s on the decision of the case.
The output below reports Carney’s decision after incorporating the case facts:
case(cvc,[ft011mh,ft015pb,ft022nc,ft031mh,ft032ps,
ft051p,ft052dr,ft053pl,ft054d,ft211pi,
ft212po,ft221is,ft231all,ft233ps,ft233al,
ft311is,ft312c,ft331c,ft331as,ft332bd,ft332k]).
?- go(cvc).
it,is,a,mobileHome,vehicle
accepted,that,no,largeContainers
paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer
it,is,mobile
there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,parked
accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move
the,vehicle,was,in,public,location
the,vehicle,was,parked,in,public,parking
accepted,that,the,vehicle,was,parked,for,unknown,period
there,was,exigency,when,approached
received,information,from,public,informant
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there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause
main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public
the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent
all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched
the,vehicle,was,searched,twice,at,the,original,
automobile,location,
and,at,police,station
the,search,scope,is,legal
there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle
has,a,special,motorhome,licence
police,station,is,a,restricted,area
subject,to,regular,inspection,but,the,search,was,directed,at,
restricted,area
accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,
not,provided
accepted,that,item,can,not,be,seen,by,public,
or,details,are,not,provided
accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,that,items,can,not,be,seen
accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public
illegal,goods
just,closed,but,not,protected
accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private
accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,
specified,or,connected
accepted,that,not,connected,to,
one,or,more,main,living,services
consists,of,a,cab,and,suitable,accommodation,space
the,place,could,be,used,for,accommodation
accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use
accepted,that,there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence
accepted,that,magistrate,is,not,available
accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,is,not,available
it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant
justified,under,automobile,exception
reduced,expectation,of,privacy
warantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment
find for the plaintiff
decision is correct in accordance with the actual decision
Appendix H illustrates the Automobile Exception domain program and results using reason-
ing with facts.
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6.3 Including The Dissenting Opinion
The domain ADF so far is implemented to produce the case decision giving the justification
of the case opinion. In addition to the majority opinion, the domain ADF can be modified to
provide justifications for other opinions, such as dissenting or Justices’ concurring opinions. In
this case, new acceptance conditions that support other opinions can be defined straightforwardly
using the same ADF statements and links. Using the Automobile Exception ADF in Table
6.3, further analysis of the dissenting opinions in the ten cases has been completed to define
the acceptance conditions required to capture the dissenting opinions. However, not all the
dissenting opinions are related to the Automobile Exception: some Justices argued that the case
should be justified under different exceptions. In Chadwick, for example, Blackmun’s dissent
argues that the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest:
The overbroad nature of the Government’s principal argument, however, has served
to distract the Court from the more important task of defining the proper scope
of a search incident to an arrest. The Court fails to accept the opportunity this
case presents to apply the rationale of recent decisions and develop a clear doctrine
concerning the proper consequences of custodial arrest. Accordingly, I dissent from
the judgment.
The program is thus modified to capture the dissenting opinion for five cases which did
relate to the Automobile Exception: Cady v. Dombrowski, South Dakota v. Opperman, United
States v. Ross, California v. Carney and California v. Acevedo. New acceptance conditions for
the conflict issues, Privacy and Exigency, have been added to the domain ADF, in addition to
new report messages for some components to provide justification for the dissent opinion in the
program without modifying the existing components or acceptance conditions. The modified
rules are shown below. The exigency in warrantless search is considered only if the vehicle is
not suitable for accommodation. Otherwise, the priority should be given to the expectation of
privacy.
AutomobileException IF Exigency
AND (LOW)ExpectationOfPrivacy.
Privacy IF Mobile AND EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse
OR ( (NO InspectionRegulation) OR (NO VisibilityofItem) )
OR ( (NOT PublicLocation) AND (NO AuthorizedWarrant) )
OR EaseToGetWarrant.
Exigency IF (Mobile AND ExigencyWhenApproached
AND ProbableCauseToSearch) AND (NOT AccommodationUse)
OR (NOT EaseToGetWarrant).
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Using the same case representation in Table 6.4, after producing the majority opinion, the
program is directed to check the satisfied factors according to the new acceptance conditions
to provide the dissenting opinion. To continue with Carney as an example, the dissent opinion
states:
In this case, police officers searched a Dodge/Midas Mini Motor Home. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court correctly characterized this vehicle as a “hybrid” which com-
bines “the mobility attribute of an automobile . . . with most of the privacy char-
acteristics of a house.... By choosing to follow the latter route, the Court errs in
three respects: it has entered new territory prematurely, it has accorded priority to
an exception, rather than to the general rule, and it has abandoned the limits on the
exception imposed by prior cases.
Following Carney’s majority justification shown in the previous section, the dissent opinion
produced from the ANGELIC Automobile program is given as:
dissenting,argument
it,is,a,mobileHome,vehicle
accepted,no,largeContainers
paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer
it,is,a,hybrid,with,mobility,features
accepted,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move
there,was,exigency,when,approached
there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence
it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant
reduce,expectation,of,exigency
hybrid,with,mobility,and,home,features,shows
,enough,expectation,of,privacy
warantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment
true.
Another interesting case is California v. Acevedo. As explained above, the ANGELIC Au-
tomobile program in Acevedo produces the wrong decision by giving priority to the Chadwick-
Sanders rule, which is what the Justices in the dissent opinion argued:
Relying on arguments that conservative judges have repeatedly rejected in past
cases, the Court today – despite its disclaimer to the contrary, ibid. – enlarges the
scope of the Automobile Exception to this “cardinal principle,” which undergirded
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prior to the retirement of the author of the
landmark opinion in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1(1977).
dissenting,argument
it,is,a,vehicle
accepted,no,largeContainers
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paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer
it,is,a,mobile
accepted,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move
there,was,exigency,when,approached
there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence
it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant
accepted,reduce,expectation,of,exigency
enlarge,scope,of,fourth,amendment,exception
any,container,inside,automobile,shows,enough,privacy,interest
warantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment
true .
The ANGELIC Automobile program showing the dissent rules and the output of the five
cases are given in Appendix H. Furthermore, concurring opinions related to some Justices’ jus-
tification of either the majority or the dissent opinions can also be captured and considered.
Acceptance conditions for each concurring opinion can be defined and the program can be con-
trolled to consider different opinions.
6.4 Correspondence Between Oral Hearings and Opinion Case ADFs
Chapter 5 demonstrated how a Case ADF can be instantiated from the merged Justices ACTs
in the Oral Hearings. Now, to investigate the relationship between the Opinion and the Oral
Hearings, a comparison is conducted between the Opinion Case ADF and the Case ADF instan-
tiated from the Oral Hearing of California v. Carney to determine how the statements, links and
acceptance conditions are related and modified. Table 6.5 shows the accepted components in
the California v. Carney ADF based on the example in Section 6.2.
Giving this, Table 6.6 provides a number of findings that can be detected by examining the
relationship between the statements and relations in both the Oral Hearing and the Opinion Case
ADFs (CADFs) in Carney:
• The same Automobile Exception domain conflict issues, Exigency and Privacy, and Mo-
bile abstract factors continue to appear in the opinion Case ADF.
• PermittedDuration, ConnectedServices and AccommodationSpace are three new hypo-
thetical base factors in the domain ADF that had been introduced by the Justices earlier
in the Oral Hearing of the Plaintiff Dialogue as ParkingTime, HomeFacilities, and Home-
Configuration respectively. These base factors are used to update the domain ADF but
only AccommodationSpace is considered in the opinion Case ADF.
• A number of base factors in the Oral Hearings are related directly to existing factors
from precedent cases in the domain ADF such as: PublicLocation, PublicParking and
ResidentialUse. However, the parents of these base factors are abstract factors in the
domain ADF.
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S L+ L-
Exigency Mobile,
ExigencyWhenApproached,
SubjectToInspectionRegulation,
ProbableCauseToSearchVehicle
Privacy SubjectTo
Inspection
Regulation
Mobile Automobile,
MovableContainer
ExigencyWhenApproached CapableToMove,
PublicParking,
PublicLocation.
SubjectToInspectionRegulation Licence
ProbableCauseToSearchVehicle AuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause,
UrgentReasonToSearch,
LegalSearchScope
AuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause Information
UrgentReasonToSearch PublicSafety
LegalSearchScope WholeVehicle,SearchPlace
Accommodation AccommodationSpaces
EaseWarrant RiskOfLosing
Evidence
TABLE 6.5: California v. Carney Opinion Case ADF
• MobileType and VehicleConfiguration base factors are related to multiple base factors
Automobile, Vessel, Towable and MovableContainer in the domain ADF.
• The parents of some base factors in the Oral Hearings have been changed in the domain
ADF, e.g. The parent of VehicleStatus is now ExigencyWhenApproached instead of Mo-
bile in the Oral Hearing Case ADF and SubjectToInspectionRegulation is the parent of Ve-
hicleRegistration. These changes modify the acceptance of the components as discussed
below.
• The Oral Hearing Case ADF has enriched the domain ADF with a number of new facts
for both existing and new base factors, e.g. MobileHome (Automobile), MobileHomePark
(PublicParking) and DowntownLocation (PublicLocation).
• A number of factors previously existed in the domain ADF from precedent cases, such as
the base factors of ProbableCauseToSearchVehicle; however, these were not mentioned
in the Oral Hearing Case ADF.
The acceptance conditions have also been modified as a result of the component mapping,
as shown here:
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Level O.H. CADF Opinion CADF Parent Accepted
I Exigency Exigency - Y
I Privacy Privacy - Y
AF Mobile Mobile Exigency Y
BF MobileType, Automobile, Towable, Mobile Y
VehicleConfiguration Vessel, Movabler
Container LargeContainer
BF VehicleStatus UrgentStatus ExigencyWhen N
Approached
BF VehicleRegistration Licence SubjectTo Y
InspectionRegulation
BF PublicLocation PublicLocation ExigencyWhen Y
Approached
BF PublicParking PublicParking ExigencyWhen Y
Approached
BF ParkingTime PermittedDuration (NEW) ExigencyWhen N
Approached
BF HomeFacilities ConnectedServices (NEW) Residence N
BF HomeConfiguration AccomodationSpaces (NEW) Accomodation Y
BF HomeFeatures RoomsFunction Accomodation N
BF ResidentialUse Residence ExpectationOf N
PrivacyInUse
TABLE 6.6: Mapping Oral Hearing and Opinion Case ADFs
• The case is represented by all the facts from the Oral Hearing Case ADF, which in turn
have modified the definition of the existing base factors such as MobileHome and Mobile-
HomeParking.
• New acceptance conditions have been defined for the new base factors PermittedDura-
tion, Connected Services and AccommodationSpace, which in turn have modified the ac-
ceptance conditions of the existing abstract factors ExigencyWhenApproached, Residence,
Accommodation and ExpectationOfPrivacyInUse.
• The case is accepted as an Automobile Exception, giving priority to high exigency from
the acceptance condition
Exigency IF Mobile AND ExigencyWhenApproached
AND ProbableCauseToSearch
AND SubjectToInspectionRegulation
This is equivalent to the acceptance condition of Exigency in the Oral Hearing Case ADF,
where ParkingType and Location determine the acceptance of ExigencyWhenApproached.
However, ParkingDuration is not taken into consideration in increasing the exigency. Also
Accommodation only was not enough to determine ExpectationOfPrivacyInUse because
the vehicle was not parked in a private parking place.
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• On the other hand, the Oral Hearing Case ADF considered the dissenting opinion in the
acceptance condition of the Privacy issue, i.e. regardless of the parking type, having
features of accommodation space should raise the privacy expectation.
Privacy IF Mobile AND EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse
EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse IF Accommodation
OR Residence
OR PrivateContentsCarriage
These findings indicate that the Oral Hearing stage plays a role in deciding the opinion
of a case; the different components from the Oral Hearings feed the domain ADF, which in
turn provides more justification for the majority and dissent opinions in the cases. Moreover,
the sources of these components can be easily followed by tracking the Oral Hearing ACTs to
determine the relationship between the opinion arguments.
6.5 Summary
This chapter has shown, for several legal domains, how ADFs can be used to encapsulate a
theory of knowledge of the domains case law, in order to form the basis of the design of a
program to decide cases in those domains. The theories are constructed by the domain analyst by
expressing the cases in terms of factors and are implemented taking advantage of the closeness
of the representation to an executable form by translating the acceptance conditions of the ADF
into Prolog procedures. The results obtained for each domain have clearly shown the good
performance of the ADF approach over three different domains, and demonstrated how the
representation can be easily refined, giving a transparent output, to identify whether a factor was
omitted, wrongly attributed, or acceptance conditions were wrongly identified. The discussion
suggested ways in which factor-based systems, which are limited by taking as their starting point
the representation of cases as sets of factors and so abstracting away the particular facts, can be
extended to address open issues in AI and Law by incorporating the case facts to improve the
decision, by considering justification and reasoning using precedents and allowing explanation
of why factors were held to be present. The evaluation of the approach will be explored further
in the next chapter.

Chapter 7
Evaluation
“Who judges the judge who judges wrong?” Gail Carson Levine, Fairest
——————————————–
This chapter provides a number of evaluations of the ADF approach as a design tool to predict
the outcome of legal cases in several domains. Section 7.1 provides an evaluation to compare the
performance of ANGELIC in the three legal domains discussed in previous chapters. Another
comparative evaluation is conducted in section 7.2 to see how ANGELIC performs compared
to other legal reasoning systems. In Section 7.3, the ADF approach is evaluated to compare
the transparency in reasoning at different reasoning levels. Finally, the chapter concludes with
a summary in Section 7.4 that evaluates the role of the ADF as a design tool for developing a
knowledge base to represent case law.
7.1 Evaluation Over Legal Domains
This section evaluates the use of ADFs to design and implement a program to decide legal cases
based on knowledge derived from a number of precedents in a particular case law domain. As
shown by the examples in the previous chapter, firstly a number of decided cases are analysed.
After that, the ADF is constructed from the factors and issues, showing the support and attack
relationships between parents and their children and having the base-level factors as the leaves
of the ADF. The acceptance conditions are defined for each node, and translated to Prolog pro-
cedures. The ANGELIC program is then run against a set of test cases and the decisions from
the program output are compared to the actual outcomes. Table 7.1 summarises the specification
of the three legal domains, showing the number of cases, the knowledge base size in the ADF,
results obtained and the possible refinements.
As a result of evaluating the approach in these three domains, a number of findings are stated
below:
• Applying the approach in three domains shows the effectiveness of the method for encap-
sulating the theory developed in the analysis.
• The success of the approach depends to a large extent on the quality of the analysis. It
is important that the domain modelled be in a stable state (the second stage of Levi’s
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Domain No.of Cases No. of Factors Results
US Trade Secrets 32 (26 BFs, 18 AFs) Direct CATO: 78.1% (25 cases)
Refinements 1: 90.6%(29 cases)
Refinements 2: 96.8%(31 cases)
Wild Animals 5 (16 BFs, 10 AFs) 100% -
Automobile Exception 10 (31 BFs, 15 AFs) 90% (9 cases)
TABLE 7.1: ADF for Three Legal Domains
life cycle as explained in [88]). However, the ADF design facilitates refinement of the
ANGELIC program in the light of its performance on test cases, to remedy any defects in
the initial analysis.
• The method can be applied to various domains where factor-based representation is con-
sidered an appropriate approach to capture the knowledge of the domain. Normally, the
results are affected by the purpose of the analysis; US Trade Secrets, for example, re-
quired more refinements as that had been translated from the analysis of CATO which
indeed was not to predict outcomes, while the cases in the Automobile Exception domain
were analysed mainly to construct a domain ADF to provide justification for the case
decisions.
• Results are also affected by the size of the available knowledge. The small number of
cases and ADF representations found in the Wild Animals domain partly explains the
correct results obtained, although here the intention was only to encapsulate the theory
governing those cases.
• When using a set of factors identified for the case, programs based on the ADF design
provide very transparent output that identifies precisely where the outcomes suggested by
the implementation diverge from the actual case decision. After running the program, and
noting any divergences from the actual outcomes, reading the original decision texts may
suggest one or more of four solutions to refine the behaviour of the program. These are,
in ascending order of divergence from the original analysis:
– Removing a factor wrongly attributed to the case
– Adding a factor wrongly omitted from the case
– Modifying an acceptance condition: e.g. changing the priorities
– Modifying the ADF: e.g. adding a supporting or attacking node for the problem
node.
In some cases, such as those encountered in the US Trade Secrets domain, the problem
seems to lie with the attribution of the factors. Should Goldberg really have F27? Should
Mineral Deposits have F14? Should Space Aero include F14 or F21 and exclude F19?
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Such matters were contested in the actual case, and ascribing the presence or absence of
particular factors requires interpretation of the case by the analyst.
As well as disputed factors, a decision like Goldberg suggests modifying the description of
factors intended to guide the analyst. In that decision it was suggested that to count for the
defendant, the information not only had to be publicly available but also the public source
needed to be known and used by the defendant, which would narrow the applicability of
F27 from that described in [10].
• In general, adding or removing a factor to or from a particular case provides a local so-
lution, which will often solve a problem with a particular case. The results, however,
indicated a general problem that was applicable to several cases: in the Trade Secrets do-
main, F16, reverse engineerable, had a dominant effect, which led to an incorrect decision
in several cases. It seemed clear that the presence of F16 should not by itself be suffi-
cient for a finding for the defendant. Again, the decisions themselves suggested several
possible ways of arguing against F16: in particular the use of restricted materials and the
uniqueness of the product. Either or both of these exceptions could be incorporated into
the ADF without adversely affecting the other cases.
• Moreover, it should be remembered that the decisions themselves may be erroneous. As-
suming that there are least some poor decisions, which should not serve as precedents, a
certain number of divergences from the results should be tolerated. Moreover, a landmark
case like Avecedo may significantly change the interpretation of some previous decisions,
revising the applicable case law and necessitating revision of the program.
To summarise:
• Analysing a legal domain by simply translating the analysis of [10] into an ADF and
executing the resulting program gave results almost identical to those found for CATO in
the IBP experiments reported in [55] and shown in Table 7.2. Note that this is achieved
without the need for balancing pro and con factors, which is central to existing case-based
reasoning systems.
• The reasons for the “incorrect” decisions can be readily identified from the output and
the ADF, as seen in the discussion of the wrongly decided cases in US Trade Secrets and
Automobile Exception domains.
• Examination of the texts of the decisions readily explained why the results diverged, and
suggested ways in which the analysis could be improved, either at the case level by chang-
ing the factors attributed, or at the domain level by including additional supporting or
attacking links.
All this indicates that the use of ADFs leads to a system which provides good performance,
and has a number of positive features from a software engineering (and domain analysis) stand-
point, which enable instantiations of ADFs to be refined where needed and their performance
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improved. For a practical system there are often several ways to fix a problem, and thus a rea-
sonably large set of test cases is needed in order to choose between the different solutions and
to guard against over-fitting.
7.2 Comparative Evaluation Over Legal Reasoning Systems
The evaluations so far have been conducted to ensure the applicability of the approach in differ-
ent legal domains, but how does the performance of the ADF in legal domains compare to other
legal reasoning systems?
To investigate this, a quantitative evaluation was used to compare the empirical results ob-
tained in different legal reasoning systems. Although the goal in developing each legal system
was different, they all use case-based reasoning in legal domains. In [55] a number of systems
were evaluated, including several machine learning systems: one using Naive Bayes; programs
representing HYPO, which is considered the first system that used case-based reasoning in legal
domains; CATO, which was designed to identify arguments rather than to predict outcomes,
though prediction is the goal of the logical model of IBP without the case-based reasoning com-
ponent; and IBP itself. Results taken from [55] are shown in Table 7.21. Some other systems are
included in the table, including AGATHA [57]. A number of different heuristics were investi-
gated in AGATHA [57], and so two lines are included, both a high figure (for brute force search
with the largest number of seed cases, labelled AGATHA 8) and a low figure (for the version
which used A* for heuristic searches).
Another two lines are added for ADF representation in the US Trade Secrets domain, one
representing an ADF encoding of the CATO hierarchies (ANGELIC CATO) and another an ADF
refined (ANGELIC Trade Secrets) in the light of re-examination of matters wrongly decided by
the original version. The result shows that the ADF constructed directly from CATO performed
as well as CATO (78.1%), which, as would be expected, takes into consideration the similarity
in the factor hierarchy structure and the case representation in factors. However, applying a few
refinements to seven wrong cases considerably improved the performance, making it the best of
all the legal reasoning systems. Although these findings are promising, the approach still needs
to be applied further on a large number of test cases.
In order to show the effect of abstention, an additional column is included showing the per-
centage of correct answers for which an opinion was given (akin to precision in an Information
Retrieval system). Finally, two hypothetical programs are included: CATO-coin and HYPO-
coin, in which the abstentions are decided arbitrarily and it is assumed that half these decisions
will be right and half wrong.
What Table 7.2 shows is that simply guessing the outcome can improve the percentage of
correct answers of most systems, although it greatly reduces of the precision of, for example,
HYPO, which abstains on a very large number of cases, but is correct in an excellent percentage
of those for which it does yield an answer. Anything that can be done to reduce abstentions, even
1The numbers appear to contain some discrepancies, but these are present in the source, [55]
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correct error abstain accuracy no-abst
ANGELIC Trade Secrets 31 1 0 96.8 96.8
AGATHA 8 30 2 0 93.7 93.7
IBP 170 15 1 91.4 91.9
AGATHA A* 29 4 0 90.6 90.6
CATO-coin 163 30 0 89.0 89.0
Naive Bayes 161 25 0 86.5 86.5
HYPO-coin 152 34 0 81.7 81.7
ANGELIC CATO 25 7 0 78.1 78.1
CATO 152 19 22 77.8 88.8
HYPO 127 9 50 68.3 93.4
IBP-model 99 15 38 72.6 86.8
TABLE 7.2: ANGELIC and Legal CBR Systems Results From [55] and [57]
if the success rate is only 50%2, is thus going to be beneficial in terms of successfully predicted
outcomes.
7.2.1 Relation to Structured Argumentation
ASPIC+ is a structured framework for specifying systems [105]. It defines the notion of an
abstract argumentation system as a structure consisting of a logical language, and two subsets of
strict and defeasible inference rules. In addition to a knowledge base that consists of two disjoint
subsets, the axioms and the ordinary premises. Three types of attacks are defined in ASPIC+:
rebuttal (a conclusion attack); undermining (a premise attack); and undercutting (an inference
attack).
Argumentation systems in ASPIC+ are applied to knowledge bases to generate arguments.
Arguments in ASPIC+ are defined as inference trees formed by applying strict or defeasible
inference rules to premises formulated in some logical language. Two main ideas can be seen
about ASPIC+ [101]:
• conflicts between arguments are sometimes resolved with explicit preferences, having
that arguments are built with two kinds of inference rules: strict, which logically entail
their conclusion, and defeasible rules, which only create a presumption in favour of their
conclusion.
• conflicts between arguments may arise from the inconsistency of a knowledge base or the
defeasibility of the reasoning steps in an argument.
ASPIC+ has been used as a tool for reconstructing natural legal argument about legislative
proposals in [106] where defeasible inference rules are modelled using argumentation schemes,
and argument ordering provides a suitable way to evaluate debates. Examining the overall output
2Note, however, that the unrefined ADF seems to get the cases on which CATO abstained uniformly wrong.
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of the ANGELIC program, it bears a strong resemblance to the kind of structured argumentation
found in ASPIC+ [105].
From a formal perspective, acceptance conditions are supplied for each node in ANGELIC.
These take the form of tests: sufficient conditions for accepting or rejecting the parent node, in
terms of the status of its children. These tests are arranged in a priority order and a default is
given to cover cases where none of the tests are satisfied. The union of the acceptance conditions
in ANGELIC can be seen as comparing to the underlying ASPIC+ knowledge base. Determin-
ing the acceptance or rejection of the various nodes produces sub-arguments, and these can be
linked to produce the argument for finding for the plaintiff (or defendant) which follows the
argument and (or-) sub-argument structure of ASPIC+ arguments.
From an implementation perspective, there are also differences: because the ordering of
clauses expresses priority between arguments, only the winning arguments are generated. Thus
the output does not include all arguments, but only the winning line of argument. Where, how-
ever, potential attackers are children rather than siblings, but are not acceptable, this is reported.
Thus, although there are correspondences, especially through the argument - sub-argument
structure, the control regime employed by the program means that there are also important dif-
ferences.
These relate mainly to conflicts: the output shows only the winning side of the case, and
does not provide a good record of the rejected arguments available to the losing side. Although
Section 6.3 in the previous chapter extended the ANGELIC automobile program to generate the
dissent argument, that was by redefining the nodes with additional acceptance conditions related
to the dissent opinion, rather than examining different opinions in the same node.
Moreover, there are also resemblances between the argument graph constructed from Carneades
and ANGELIC. Both graphs provide explanations and justifications. However, the argument
graphs in Carneades have two kinds of nodes; statement nodes and argument nodes. Arguments
are designed to model instantiations of argumentation schemes linking a set of premises to a con-
clusion, multiple forms of reasoning can be integrated in Carneades architecture, which allows
a number of computational models of argumentation to be used together to search and construct
argument. Whereas in ANGELIC all the nodes are statements of argument components, the
statement acceptance or rejection based strongly on the acceptance or rejection of its children
through a set of defined acceptance conditions. On the other side, the evaluation of arguments
in Carneades depends on whether statements have been questioned or decided, the allocation of
the burden of proof, and the proof standard applicable to questioned statements. Carneades has
been reconstructed as an ADF in [52]. which allows the generalisation of argument evaluation
structures on ADF nodes, and helps put Carneades on a solid formal foundation.
Although there are similarities between ANGELIC and structured argumentation, the strength
of ANGELIC relies on the ability of applying ADF as a knowledge engineering tool to provide
a simple methodology for instantiating ADF to construct a domain theory by partitioning the
problem into set of acceptance conditions, which limits the number of precedents required to
determine the outcome of cases. In addition to the ease of implementation by translating the
acceptance conditions to Prolog clauses. Although examples of implementations are provided
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in the thesis, the main role of ANGELIC is to provide the knowledge in which systems can be
realised. ANGELIC program performed very well comparing to previous systems, giving that
the diverges in the program output can be easily be refined taking in advantage the transparency
of the output produced. There are also straightforward paths from ANGELIC to both ASPIC+
and Carneades.
7.3 Evaluation Over Reasoning Levels
As the ANGELIC program proceeds, it reports on the acceptability or otherwise of the various
abstract factors and the resolution of issues. As shown in the outcome from the previous chapter,
this provides a good diagnostic for divergent decisions, but how does it measure up to the actual
opinions found in cases?
In this section a qualitative evaluation is conducted to compare the quality of explanation be-
tween the program outcome derived from ADF with base factors as leaf nodes and the outcome
after considering the integration of facts as leaf nodes in addition to the citation of precedents,
which are such an important feature of real decisions. Moreover, further evaluation of reasoning
types using portions of precedents and values are discussed to improve the explanation produced
using the ADF approach in legal reasoning.
7.3.1 Quality of Explanations Using Factors and Issues
As stated earlier in Chapter 3, the court opinion provides the case verdict and an explanation
that justifies the case verdict. Sometimes, in some landmark cases, this justification provides
a test that gives a means of deciding in future cases: a typical case opinion document in the
US Supreme Court begins with a syllabus that summarises the case, followed by the majority
opinion that has been written by one of the Justices, which supports the justification for the
majority opinion. The main opinion involves the case decision and explanation for the decision,
giving the issues that the Justices relied upon in their justification. However, often, the opinion
document involves multiple opinions. Justices might agree with the decision but have different
justifications (concurring opinions); likewise, Justices might disagree with the decision and thus
have dissenting opinions. At the end of the main opinion, the document clarifies the court action,
which might be affirming or reversing the lower court decision, or returning the case to the lower
court (remanding).
Now consider a re-ordering of the elements found in the ANGELIC program outcome from
the previous chapter for a case, say Boeing from the US Trade Secrets domain (Section 6.1.1),
by omitting some elements such as some default statements reported from some factors, and
adding a little linking text to the explanation. Recall too that the ANGELIC program is written
and used thus far to “decide” the cases: in a version to supply explanations, the text reports could
be customised to indicate the particular clause being used for a node by giving the base level
factors used. Below is what such an explanation might look like: the current program output is
shown in boldface, possible clause-specific customisations in italics and linking text in ordinary
font.
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We find for plaintiff. The information was a trade secret: efforts were taken to
maintain secrecy, since disclosures to outsiders were restricted and the defendant
entered into a non-disclosure agreement and other security measures were applied.
The information was unique. It is accepted that the information was valuable
and it is accepted that the information was neither known nor available. A
trade secret was misappropriated: there was a confidential relationship since
the defendant entered into a non-disclosure agreement and it is accepted that the
information was used. Moreover improper means were used since the defendant
used restricted materials.
This explanation matches the following questions found in Boeing claims in the actual Boeing
v. Sierracin opinion:
QUESTION 1: Did Sierracin breach a confidential relationship with Boeing?
QUESTION 2: Did Sierracin breach a contract with Boeing?
QUESTION 3: Did Sierracin misappropriate Boeing trade secrets?
This seems to have the makings of a reasonable summary compared to the Boeing decision.
There are three problems: it does not indicate what the defendant contended, since the clauses
of the ANGELIC program which were not reached do not feature in the report, no precedents
are cited, and the facts on which the finding is based are not present. Nonetheless, the output
found is a distinct improvement on previous work such as [57]. Also, the output from the current
program could be readily used to drive a program of the sort envisaged by Branting [49], where
an issue-oriented approach to judicial document assembly has been used to provide an explicit
representation of legal rules, to construct a justification from these rules and create a judicial
document. This will be even further improved if a fact layer, to allow the explanation of the
attribution of factors, is added.
7.3.2 Quality of Explanations Using Facts
Of course, without facts, the decision will not be followed very closely: all the decisions begin
with a summary of facts. Thus, the next technical step is to supply the fact layer. Further analysis
of the original decisions and oral transcripts is required to extract facts, so as to permit argument
about the ascription of factors, and to enable grounding of the explanations in the particular facts
of a case. One possible way is to revive the idea of dimensions to provide a way of tackling this
issue, as indicated by [24], [13] and [32]. Descent to the fact layer will result in a considerable
improvement in the transparency of the output by enabling consideration of important features
from the actual case decisions. In comparison to the output of the case presented above, there
is a clear improvement in the quality of the explanation which provides the justification for
the acceptance of the base-level factors. The order of the output states the status of the base-
level factors first (children) and then indicates whether the abstract factor (parent of base-level
factors) is satisfied or not. Following the approach discussed previously, the explanation of the
Automobile Exception case, Carney, is produced from the program report:
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The warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment rule. The vehicle
was capable to move but found parked in a public location.The two justifications
for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle is readily mobile and
there is a reduced expectation of privacy.
It is subject to inspection under vehicle regulation. Also, there was a probable
cause to search the vehicle.
Now by considering the facts from the example in Section 6.2, the following output provides
more transparency in the reasoning as shown here, where the facts have been highlighted:
The warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment rule. The respon-
dent’s mobile home was capable to move but found parked in a public location.
The two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle
is readily mobile and there is a reduced expectation of privacy.
While the mobile home here consists of cab and accommodation space, it is
subject to inspection under vehicle regulation. Also, there was a probable cause
to search the vehicle based on the fact that the respondent was using the mobile
home to sell illegal contraband
This decision now is very close to the actual decision, which states:
When a vehicle is being used on the highways or is capable of such use and is found
stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, the two justifica-
tions for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle is readily mobile,
and, second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from the pervasive
regulation of vehicles capable of travelling on highways. Here, while the respon-
dent’s vehicle possessed some attributes of a home it clearly falls within the vehicle
exception.
It clearly justifies what base-level factors have been accepted (or rejected). Moreover, the
case facts can provide further advantage in specifying to what level the base factor is satisfied;
this has been included as part of the future work discussed in Chapter 8.
7.3.3 Reasoning with Portion of Precedents
Using the ADF approach, there are no confrontations between large sets of pro and con factors
covering the whole case. Instead, factors are opposed to one another in the context of accepting
or rejecting particular nodes, and so represent a specific point in the debate. Thus two cases
may be identical with respect to a subset of factors, which may be used to establish a particular
abstract factor, even though the eventual outcome may differ.
Two points are significant here: first that some apparent distinctions are insignificant, since
they relate to different issues; this was partly what the factor hierarchy was introduced in CATO
to address. More importantly, however, a precedent might be citable to establish the existence of
a certain plaintiff factor, even though the case as a whole was found for the defendant, because
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of some other issue. For this reason it is sometimes desirable to be able to reason with portions
of precedents, as urged by Branting in [48]:
This paper argues that the task of matching in case-based reasoning can often be
improved by comparing new cases to portions of precedents. An example is pre-
sented that illustrates how combining portions of multiple precedents can permit
new cases to be resolved that would be indeterminate if new cases could only be
compared to entire precedents.
This is borne out by a reading of the decisions in a range of cases: rarely do they begin with
a precedent and then discuss similarities and differences; rather, they use precedents at particular
points of the decisions to identify questions and issues to be addressed, and to justify answers
and consequences. This is effectively what is done in the ADF approach: competing factors are
considered in the context of accepting or rejecting a particular node. Part of the output of the
program is, for each case, the set of nodes satisfied. This information could be used to find the
precedents needed to make particular points.
For example, in US Trade Secrets, all cases where the defendant had agreed not to disclose
(F4) and yet efforts to maintain secrecy (F102) were not established could be retrieved. This
query would return CMI where the information was known to competitor (F20), and so can
cite CMI as a precedent when arguing (in the context of a case containing F4 and F20) that the
efforts taken to maintain secrecy were insufficient to establish the information as a trade secret.
In addition, the decision in California v. Acevedo, from the Automobile Exception domain,
cites some precedents that support the defendant, but does not follow these citations due to the
perceived lack of clarity of the decision in the precedents. Thus, it is important to clarify these
citations in the output of the program in order to provide more transparency and closeness to the
actual decision.
Matching at this level of granularity will help in specifying the precedents most relevant to
the specific point needing to be argued. Moreover, such precedents can then be incorporated in
the explanations to justify the acceptance or rejection of particular nodes, which is close to the
way they are used in practice, and corresponds to the downplaying and emphasis of distinctions,
which are such an important feature of CATO. To do this it would be helpful to be able to argue
about preferences (perhaps using some form of meta-level argumentation as in [35]).
Another reason to consider portions of precedents is provided by [83]. In that paper a fortiori
reasoning was explained in terms of identifying a rule using only a subset of factors available
for the winning side being preferable to the rule using all the factors available to the losing side.
That paper gave, however, no indication of how this subset should be chosen. The output from
the ADF, in contrast, does show which factors were instrumental and active in winning the case.
7.3.4 Quality of Explanations Using Precedents Citation
In addition to the facts determining the presence of factors, further improvement to the trans-
parency of the reasoning by justifying the preferences between portions of precedents is re-
quired, which better corresponds to legal practice as manifest in real decisions and may express
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social values and judicial preferences. Ideally each test in the acceptance condition should be
related to a portion of a precedent case; this will require annotating the acceptance conditions
with citations to precedent cases, which will in turn improve the program output. This is shown
in the output of some factors as below:
[it,is,a,mobileHome,vehicle,cite,carney,v,california]
[main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public,cite,carrol,v,us]
[all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched,cite,carrol,v,us,and,us,v,ross]
[only,vehicle,containers,have,been,searched,cite,us,v,chadwick,and,arkansas,v,sanders]
[justified,under,automobile,exception,cite,carroll,v,us]
Citation of some precedents can be found in the program output of the Automobile Ex-
ception domain in Appendix H. Now returning to the example of Carney’s opinion, adding the
citation of the main precedents improves the transparency and the reality of the case decision:
The warantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment rule. The re-
spondent’s mobile home was capable to move but found parked in a public lo-
cation.The two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the
vehicle is readily mobile Carroll v. US and there is a reduced expectation of
privacy South Dakota v. Opperman.
While the mobile home here consists of cab and accommodation space US v.
Chadwick, it is subject to inspection under vehicle regulation. Also, there was
a probable cause to search the vehicle Carroll v. US based on the fact that the
respondent was using the mobile home to sell illegal contraband
Moreover, citing precedents could also provide a potential database to support conceptual re-
trieval of cases, which has been an important issue in AI and Law since its very beginnings (see,
e.g. [78]).
7.3.5 Reasoning with Values
Note that the ADF structure, like CATO and IBP, does not include any reference to values. Since
[40] it has become usual to resolve conflicts not definitively decided in the precedent base by
appealing to the purposes of the law, commonly represented as values in the sense of [28], and
as in [38] and other related work. In [38] values appear at the top of the hierarchy, occupying
the place taken up by issues in the ADF representation.
The idea in [38] is that factors are associated with values, and that the precedents, by showing
preferences between sets of factors, will reveal preferences over values. Since there are more
factors than values, and several factors relate to the same value, these value preferences can
be used to determine preferences between sets of factors which do not themselves appear in the
precedents, allowing the system to draw conclusions that go beyond a fortiori reasoning. The use
of values has been criticised and does not appear in any of HYPO, CATO or IBP. In AGATHA
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[58], which was intended as an empirical evaluation of the approach of [38], the issues of IBP
were used in the role of values. The idea in the ADF is that values should not form part of the
structure: their role is to justify components of the structure and choices made. They should
thus form part of the documentation of the design rather than part of the design itself. A value
might therefore, for example, appear as comments on the acceptance conditions explaining why
the tests are ordered as they are. As observed in [146], values do not play a single role: they
can, for example, justify either the inclusion of a rule, or of an antecedent in the rule. In ADF
terms, this means that they can justify the inclusion of a test within an acceptance condition, or a
node representing a factor to be used in such tests. Moreover, playing the role assigned to them
in [40] and [38], they can explain why the various tests in acceptance conditions are ordered in
a particular way. Thus the knowledge engineer will need to identify a set of applicable values,
and an ordering of them, to guide the design choices, but they will not form an explicit part of
the ADF, just as their appearance in actual decision texts is very limited.
Since the value preferences are now effectively local to particular nodes, it is possible to
express different preferences in different contexts, which may add a desirable flexibility. If it is
considered undesirable, the knowledge engineer must ensure, as part of the verification activity,
that the preferences are in fact consistent.
A means of extracting values from an ADF, from associations between values and factors,
was given in [6]. In the current methodology, however, values inform the design but do not form
part of it.
7.4 Summary
Evaluating the performance of ADFs in the different legal domains has addressed a number of
advantages of applying a knowledge engineering approach that uses ADFs to design and develop
a knowledge-base to represent case law, summarised as follows:
• The ADF instantiated from all the domains provides a visual representation (frame-based)
and defines one or more acceptance conditions for every non-leaf factor; this ensures the
completeness of the rule base and shows how the ADF mediates between frame- and
rule-based representations of the domain knowledge.
• The encapsulated knowledge in all the domain ADFs was able to determine the outcome
of the case from only portions of precedents (effective partitioning of the problem space),
while at the same time supporting the verification by considering all the nodes in the
ANGELIC program.
• Once the method had been extended to include the facts of particular cases at the lowest
level of the ADF, new nodes were added straightforwardly, along with their acceptance
conditions, with no problems or ramifications in the knowledge base. New nodes can be
added independently from the rest of the nodes, defining the conditions from the children
of the node.
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• The evaluation of the ADF refinement process has shown that some factor rules can be
removed or modified without affecting the rest of knowledge base.
• Further, comparing the performance of ADFs with previous legal reasoning systems shows
that the refined ADF (ANGELIC Trade Secrets) performed the best, taking into consid-
eration the differences between the purposes of these systems. The ready visualisation of
the possible paths through the ANGELIC program allows detection of where the decision
diverges from the actual decision and enables the application of possible refinements to
improve the outcome.
• The modularisation achieved by using the ADF approach for design not only helps to
drive the analysis, but also provides a number of software engineering benefits, such as
ease of following the flow of control through the knowledge bases, limitation of the effects
of modifications, and assistance with quality assurance, verification and validation of the
ANGELIC program built upon the design.
The method has also provided advantages by demonstrating the improvement of explana-
tions by ordering the output and considering facts and precedent citations. It might in future
prove useful to provide links to values to improve explanations, but this will affect only presen-
tation, not the decision making, since the effect of values and preferences is already present in
the representation, in the form of the components included, the tests in the acceptance conditions
and the order of these tests.
These findings are all encouraging and offer further pointers as to how to address important
issues in future work, as presented in the next chapter.

Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
“A story has no beginning or end:
arbitrarily one chooses that moment of experience from which to look back or from
which to look ahead.” Graham Greene, The End of the Affair
——————————————–
This chapter provides a summary for the overall research story, presenting the contributions
of this research in the field of argumentation in AI and Law and discussing some potential areas
for future work. The summary is presented in Section 8.1, the contributions from the research
are given in Section 8.2, while potential research future extensions are discussed in Section 8.3.
8.1 Thesis Story
The aim of this thesis, as stated in the introductory chapter, was to attempt to fulfill the following:
To provide a method to encapsulate analyses of a variety of case law domains,
potentially performed by different people, for different purposes, using different
techniques, in a common format that can be readily realised in a computational
form.
Throughout the previous chapters, a number of issues have been addressed that all contribute
toward fulfilling the aim above and answering the research questions and objectives set out
in Chapter 1. This section summarises the story of the research, showing how the following
research objectives (reproduced from Chapter 1) have been addressed.
Objective 1 Provide an approach to analyse and represent a legal procedure dialogue in a real
context to provide an argument structure from the argument components.
Objective 2 Employ a knowledge engineering approach to capture knowledge in a legal do-
main, and to reason with this representation, to provide justification and transparency of
legal decisions.
Objective 3 Develop a justification model that can be applied over different legal case domains
using abstract argumentation, and compare the outcome to the actual legal decisions.
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Objective 4 Conduct a comparative evaluation to compare the performance of the defined ap-
proach between the different domains, and other legal reasoning systems.
Objective 5 Discover various methods to improve the explanation of legal decisions in the pro-
gram output.
As indicated by these research aims, this is interdisciplinary research integrating artificial
intelligence, argumentation, and legal reasoning. After exploring the previous work related to
the topic of this research in Chapter 2, this thesis presented a background to the US Supreme
Court and its particular legal decision process, and examined selected legal domains in Chapter
3. The method presented in this thesis was applied to three legal domains from the US Courts,
often used in the literature of AI and Law, which have been used as examples throughout this
research. All the selected cases from these domains are taken from a period where the theory
was relatively stable, although the Automobile Exception domain also includes the Carroll case,
which ended the first stage and Acevedo case which extended the third stage.
1. The Automobile Exception domain (10 cases), which has been discussed previously in the
literature [115], [76] and [29], and has been analysed in terms of argument components
by the author in this research;
2. The Wild Animals domain (5 cases), where the factor-based analysis of [30] has been
adapted;
3. And the US Trade Secrets domain using the factor hierarchy of CATO [10], IBP logical
model [17, 18], and tested on 32 cases from AGATHA [57, 58].
Thus one domain is newly analysed (Automobile Exception), one adapts an existing repre-
sentation (US Trade Secret), and the third rewrites a detailed existing analysis (Wild Animals)
taking account of other analyses of this domain.
Starting with the Automobile Exception domain, Chapter 4 showed how the legal dialogues
in Oral Hearings can be analysed and modelled in a legal dialogue representation model, giving
the specification of the Oral Hearing and the legal opinion in Chapter 3. The transcripts of
the Oral Hearing of two landmark case studies in the domain, US v. Chadwick and Carney v.
California, were analysed so that each utterance was marked with the appropriate speech act. A
limited set of speech acts make the process more objective: four moves control the beginning
and end of each dialogue and the Oral Hearing of the legal case, while the rest of the moves are
assertions that result in adding new components, combining components or emphasising certain
components. These are identified either from existing components recorded in a legal ontology
from precedent cases or introduced as a new component from the current case. The sequence of
speech acts and their contents can be input to a program, to effectively reproduce the dialogues
using the restricted vocabulary. The program processes the sequence of speech acts to build
the various component trees (ACTs) corresponding to petitioner’s, respondent’s and Justices’
perspectives. This legal analysis workflow addresses Objective 1 in this thesis.
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To find the relationship between the opinion arguments and the represented issues, factors,
and facts in ACTs, Chapter 5 investigated how these ACTs can be merged and expressed in
terms of ADFs [54] where the nodes represent the components from the ACTs of the Oral
Hearing, the links between the children and their parent reflect the relationship type between the
components, and the acceptance conditions are used to determine the accepted nodes (argument
components). A Case ADF was instantiated from the merged petitioner and respondent Justices’
ACTs, showing all the possible acceptance conditions. This was revisited in Chapter 6 to
compare the Case ADF instantiated from the Oral Hearing with the one produced from the
opinion and to determine the accepted components that support the opinion argument.
Moreover, the legal decisions of ten cases from the Automobile Exception domain were
analysed in Chapter 6 to encapsulate a theory of the domain and instantiate a domain ADF
of issues, factors and facts. The acceptance conditions were then implemented using Prolog
procedures. Each test in the acceptance conditions is applied in a separate clause, using the
set of factors currently identified as present in the case, before proceeding to the next factor.
Accepted factors are added to a list of applicable factors, and ordered to ensure that a report
is provided giving the status of every factor in the domain giving the case base-level factors or
facts. The inclusion of facts in the case representation increased transparency in the ascription
of base factors to cases. The program showed that 9 out of the 10 cases were decided correctly,
the exception being for the most recent case where certain decisions in precedent cases were
overruled or reinterpreted. In addition, the domain ADF was modified to provide justifications
for dissenting opinions by defining additional acceptance conditions’ priorities differently to
support other opinions using the same ADF statements and links. The exploration of further
opinions will be considered in future work, as discussed in Section 8.3.4.
The ADF definition shows a clear correspondence between the structure of the ADF and
the factor hierarchy in CATO. This motivates the demonstration of the suitability of ADFs in
expressing the design of legal case-based systems, and instantiating an ADF for the domain of
US Trade Secrets (CATO, IBP). Chapter 5 defined the acceptance conditions for the domain
using the factor hierarchy of CATO [10], the logical model of IBP [17] and [18], in terms
of the base factors, and the subset of case representations used in AGATHA [57, 58]. These
acceptance conditions were then executed in Prolog, in the same way as in the Automobile
Exception domain, by posing a query which gets the first factor to be decided with the case and
its base-level factors as arguments. The initial results showed that 25 out of the 32 cases (78.1%)
were decided correctly. This is very close to CATO’s results (77.8%) reported in [55], which
is to be expected given the same analysis of the cases in the domain. Further investigations
were conducted to consider possible refinements by adding missing factors, removing wrongly
attributed factors or changing the default. The results following these refinements improved
performance to 96.8% correct.
The approach performed well on the third domain, Wild Animals, producing correct results
for all five cases expressed in terms of the factors in [30]. Following the same approach, the
ADF was instantiated from the domain factors and the acceptance conditions, from which an
executable program was implemented. This shows how the methodology has been applied and
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refined in different legal domains to produce the outcomes of legal cases described as sets of
factors, according to a theory of a particular domain, based on a set of precedent cases relating
to that domain (Objective 3). In all three domains, ADFs were applied to play a role akin to that
played by Entity-Relationship models in the design of database systems, providing the ability to
record the design of the knowledge derived from a number of precedents in a particular case law
domain (Objective 2). In general the method can be applied to any domain for which factor-
based reasoning is appropriate. This knowledge engineering approach ensures the quality of the
modularisation of the knowledge base achieved by using an ADF, in that the rules are concerned
only with the acceptance of a single statement (tightly coherent), and the acceptability of a node
is determined only by the children of that node (loosely coupled).
To address Objective 4 a number of evaluations were conducted in Chapter 7 to compare
the performance of the ADF approach in the three legal domains. This concluded that the success
of the approach depends highly on:
• The quality of the analysis, i.e. examination of the texts of the decisions explained why
the results diverged, and suggested ways in which the analysis could be improved, either
at the case level by changing the factors attributed, or at the domain level by including
additional supporting or attacking links; and
• The domain model being in a stable state (the second stage of Levi’s life cycle explained
in [88] as summarised in Chapter 3). This can be seen in the wrong decision results from
the reinterpretation and overruling of precedents in the law in the Automobile Exception
domain.
Comparison with other legal case-based reasoning systems in [55] showed that applying a
few refinements in the seven wrong cases, readily identified using the methodology, consider-
ably improved the performance to make the ANGELIC Trade Secrets the best of all the legal
reasoning systems. Although these findings are promising, Chapter 7 introduced additional
aspects that need to be considered to improve the performance and the output from the program
(Objective 5). These include comparison of the transparency of the outputs and explanation of
the reasoning at different reasoning levels (factors and facts), in addition to explanation using
portions of precedents, which could specify the precedents most relevant to the specific point to
justify the acceptance or rejection of particular nodes, and also reasoning with values. All these
aspects set the foundations for future work as discussed in Section 8.3.
8.2 Main Findings and Contributions
By providing a summary of the research, this section revisits the research questions mentioned
in Chapter 1 to determine how they have been addressed in the thesis and how they are related
to the thesis contributions, as follows:
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8.2.1 RQ1-Does abstract argumentation provide a format capable of capturing a
variety of case law domains?
This thesis proposed ANGELIC, a new knowledge engineering methodology for legal reason-
ing using a powerful generalisation of Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks [61], Ab-
stract Dialectical Frameworks [53, 54]. ADFs generalise abstract argumentation frameworks
by replacing Dung’s single acceptance condition (that all attackers be defeated) with acceptance
conditions local to each particular node. The nodes in ADFs are statements, not necessarily
arguments, and can be related by a variety of types of links, not just attackers. Legal decisions
are typically not truth functional, but require both a context (e.g. a set of cases) and a procedure
(e.g. stare decisis). Both of these can be represented in the acceptance conditions of ADFs.
ANGELIC is then applied over various case law legal domains: Automobile Exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment, Wild Animals and US Trade Secrets using analyses produced by different
people for different purposes as presented in the previous section to encapsulate and apply the-
ories of case law represented as ADFs. The statements of an ADF are the set of all the issues,
intermediate concerns and base-level factors. The links forms the supporting and attacking links,
and the acceptance conditions are defined for each abstract factor (non-leaf node) in terms of
their supporting and attacking children. Each acceptance condition is a propositional function
constructed from the factors in the legal domain potentially based on the decisions in precedent
cases. This work has been published in [3], [5], and [8], and is relevant to the following research
contributions:
• The application of ADFs as powerful, general, abstract frameworks for argumentation to
drive and record the design of a knowledge base to encapsulate a body of case law.
• A solid formal basis for factor-based reasoning using ADFs that was lacking from existing
systems used for reasoning about cases.
8.2.2 RQ2-How can computational dialogue be used to identify relevant compo-
nents to instantiate the abstract argumentation format used?
A semi-automated dialogue model (published in [2, 4]) was implemented in Chapter 4 to provide
a visual representation for the analysis of the Oral Hearing dialogues. The role of these hearings
is to identify the components used to construct an appropriate test that can form the basis of an
argument which will resolve the case. The specification of the computational dialogue covers
the dialogue moves used by participants to assert and modify argument components in term
of issues, factors and facts; an Argument Components Tree (ACT) structure showing how these
components relate to one another; and an ontology to capture the relevant concepts of the domain
that are used in the dialogue and ACTs. The dialogue model has been applied to some widely
discussed Supreme Court cases. The program constructs the ACTs of the participants as the
dialogue proceeds and the final resulting trees can be then used as input to the next stage of
the judicial process, which will organise these components by merging the Justices’ ACTs and
a Case ADF that is used to decide the case as in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The contributions
related to this research question are stated below:
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• Examination of the legal procedure in the US Supreme court and characterisation of the
three sub-dialogues of the Oral Hearing in terms of their initial state, and individual and
collective goals as required by Walton and Krabbe in [133].
• Provision of a dialogue representation model, which provides a structured analysis of US
Supreme Court Oral Hearings that enables the construction of argument component trees
in which the issues, facts and factors are proposed and refined through the use of a set of
defined speech acts. This involved a manual mark-up for the argument components of the
Oral Hearing transcripts of two legal cases and a workflow for analysing the legal cases
and relate the produced argument components to the legal opinion. This mark-up can
then be input to a program to provide a visual representation by executing the dialogue.
• Demonstration of the correspondence between the components of the arguments in the
dialogue representation and the legal opinion.
8.2.3 RQ3-How can we produce an executable program from this argumentation
format in a standard manner such that cases are decided by the program
to an acceptable degree of accuracy?
This was achieved by defining the ANGELIC methodology described in Chapter 5, and applied
in Chapter 6 to three legal domains. After the analysis and representation of three legal domains
discussed in the summary (Section 8.1) was completed, the approach was applied to the existing
knowledge of US Trade Secrets as represented in CATO and IBP, exploiting the similarity be-
tween the ADF definition and the factor hierarchy. Next, ADFs in the domain of Wild Animals
cases were constructed (Popov v Hayashi and related cases were used as modelled in [30]) which
contain different representations. Finally, a set of cases were used from the Automobile Excep-
tion to The Fourth Amendment, which had been discussed in the literature in [29, 76, 115], but
had been represented only partially to illustrate particular points in those papers, so an analy-
sis had to be specifically developed for this thesis. After that, a move from the analysis to an
executable program was conducted in a direct and immediate way using Prolog, translating the
acceptance conditions into Prolog procedures, adding some control and reporting information,
and then executing the resulting program. Comparison of the program results with the actual
outcomes of the cases allowed the theory to be refined, exploiting the software engineering ben-
efits afforded by the ADF representation. Moreover, ANGELIC was shown to be performing
very well compared to other legal reasoning systems.
The contributions relating to RQ3 are:
• ANGELIC, a methodology for developing a decision justification model using Abstract
Dialectical Frameworks that is able to encapsulate and apply theories of case law repre-
sented as ADFs. The method has been tested by producing programs for three domains:
US Trade Secrets from the factor hierarchy of CATO [10] and IBP [55] (ANGELIC Trade
Secrets), the Wild Animals domain from [30] (ANGELIC Animals), and a set of cases in
the Automobile Exception to The Fourth Amendment domain (ANGELIC Automobile), as
proposed in [3, 5, 7, 8].
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• A comparative evaluation between the methodology applied in this thesis and previous
legal case-based reasoning systems.
8.2.4 RQ4-How can this executable representation be used to evaluate and refine
the analysis?
This question was addressed by identifying ways in which the ADF can be modified with respect
to misclessified test cases as presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and published in [5, 7, 8].
The ADF design facilitates refinement of the program in light of its performance on test cases, to
solve defects in the initial analysis. When using a set of factors identified for the case, programs
based on the ADF design provide very transparent output that identifies precisely where the
outcomes suggested by the implementation diverge from the actual case decision. After running
the program, and noting any divergences from the actual outcomes, reading the original decision
texts can suggest up to four solutions to refine the behaviour of the program. These are as stated
in Chapter 7:
• Removing a factor wrongly attributed to the case
• Adding a factor wrongly omitted from the case
• Modifying an acceptance condition: e.g. changing the priorities
• Modifying the ADF: e.g. adding a supporting or attacking node for the problem node.
The contribution for this question is a comparative evaluation between the domains that
tests the ease of implementation, the performance and efficacy of the resulting program, the
ease of refinement and the transparency of the reasoning.
8.2.5 RQ5-What additional information needs to be provided to support the par-
ticular aspects of applications such as explanation?
These different aspects were explored in Chapter 7, mainly to examine the quality of explanation
in the reports produced from the program output, and the actual opinions found in cases at dif-
ferent reasoning levels; by re-ordering the elements and adding a little linking text as explained
below:
1. The reasoning of the first level used the base factors as leaf nodes: this yielded output
that provided a general explanation, with a lack of specific reference to the case and no
summary of case facts.
2. The next step was to consider the integration of facts, one level down, which yielded
a clear improvement in the quality of the explanation by providing justification for the
acceptance of the base-level factors. The order of the output states the status of the base-
level factors first (children) and then indicates whether the abstract factor (parent of base-
level factors) is satisfied or not.
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3. To produce an output that is very closely related to the real decision requires the consider-
ation of precedent citations: that is, when an acceptance condition is related to a portion
of a precedent case. This will require annotating the acceptance conditions with citations
to the precedent cases they are taken from.
4. In addition to the majority opinion, rules for producing the dissenting opinion were also
considered in Chapter 6 to improve the output of the program.
Normally, legal decisions use precedents at particular points to identify questions and issues
to be addressed, and to justify answers and suggest consequences. In addition, evaluation of
reasoning types is conducted using portions of precedents rather than whole cases. This is
effectively what is done in the ADF approach: competing factors are considered in the context of
accepting or rejecting a particular node. Furthermore, although values are rarely stated explicitly
in the decision texts, they might be considered as comments within the acceptance conditions
to explain why the tests are ordered as they are. The priority reflects an ordering of the values
they promote, based on a set of applicable values, and an ordering of them. In ADF terms, this
means that values can justify the inclusion of a test within an acceptance condition, or a node
representing a factor to be used in such tests. Since the value preferences are effectively local
to particular nodes, it is possible to express different preferences in different contexts, which
may add a desirable flexibility. A means of extracting values from an ADF, from associations
between values and factors, was given in [6]. In the current methodology, however, values
inform the design but do not form part of it. This discussion has also been reported in [8],
covering the following related contributions:
• A means of improving the justification of the program by incorporating the case facts, to
provide closeness to the reported opinion.
• Identification of ways to improve the explanation of the output from the decision justifica-
tion model using portions of precedents and the generation of multiple opinions.
The implications of this research work are that the proposed method opens up new possibilities
for developing more realistic and better, more objectively engineered models to simulate legal
decision procedures. The work contributes to the long tradition of reasoning with cases in AI
and Law by reporting results on the role of using a formal, well-defined theory of argumentation,
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks, to encapsulate the analyses of a variety of case law domains,
from different resources, in a common format.
8.3 Future Directions
Future work can extend the functionality of the provided method and enhance the application of
the proposed models. This thesis lays the foundations for some potential directions for future
work, as discussed below.
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8.3.1 Evaluation of Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
This research proposed that ADFs play a role in encapsulating the knowledge of a legal domain
and defining acceptance conditions for the ADF nodes to provide reasoning and produce justi-
fication for the legal decision. Although [54], [51] and [53] have shown ADFs to be formally
sound and their formal properties have been investigated, the ADFs explained here have not
explicitly used these properties. The ADFs used here are rather uncomplicated, since for these
domains the ADFs are cycle-free, so that the grounded, preferred and stable semantics coincide.
Nevertheless, the implemented programs based on a design in the form of a cycle-free ADF are
important to show that ADFs themselves are tractably computable.
However, it is important to consider the output in terms of the ADF semantics in order to take
advantage of the theoretical developments of ADFs and apply them directly in the legal domain.
Therefore, tools for evaluating the specifications of the ADF, such as the Diamond system [63],
can be used as a starting point. Diamond directly implements ADFs and produces extensions
corresponding to a variety of semantics for a given ADF. The first step will be to compare the
grounded extension produced from Diamond with the result from the Prolog program. When
considering multiple opinions, it will be interesting to produce the preferred semantics to capture
variant opinions in a case.
An initial investigation has been done on Diamond using the Wild Animals domain in col-
laboration with the founders of the Diamond system from Leipzig University. The ADF for this
domain has been translated into the defined ADF code in Diamond, and the various semantics
models have been produced. However, since Diamond is not yet fully mature, another attempt
will be made with the latest version of Diamond once it is fully operational.
8.3.2 Considering Values and Dimensions
One potential development from the research presented in this thesis is to discuss the possibility
of going beyond what is already present in the precedents, so that not all legislations need to be
a fortiori. Three main approaches were presented in [6] to reduce the number of comparisons
of factors and issues, including partitioning so that the problem is decomposed into smaller
problems, each with fewer factors, although the total number of factors remains the same. A
representation using 2-regular ADFs was adopted, where pairs of factors are compared. For a
concrete illustration, the approach has been tested in the CATO system [10] where every parent
has exactly two children. Following this example, it is possible to assign factors to cases in a
Boolean manner, without varying degrees of presence. Further, the role of values in determining
the acceptance of the node is considered. Values are attached to the leaf nodes (base-level
factors), where the parents’ values are determined from their children’s values, as explained in
[6].
This returns the discussion to reasoning with values in Chapter 7. It might be useful in
future to provide links to values to improve explanations of the program output, but this will
affect only presentation, not the decision making, since the effect of values and preferences for
them is already cached out in the representation, in the form of the components included, the
tests of the acceptance conditions and the priority of these tests.
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The work in this thesis and [6] assigns factors to cases in a Boolean manner, present or ab-
sent, while in practice there are compelling reasons to see the presence of factors as a matter of
degree. The ascription of factors is not always a Boolean, black and white, affair, but rather may
sometimes be a matter of degree. Another potential development of this research is to consider
the strength of reasons in legal arguments. This has been introduced in [6] and an initial inves-
tigation is described in [9], reviving the use of dimensions, from which factors were originally
developed, as a bridge between facts and factors to achieve a more precise representation of the
legal significance of factors, in terms of the extent to which they contribute to a finding for the
plaintiff (or defendant). Dimension points were also used as representations of the facts of a
case to provide a way of allowing for different degrees of presence of factors [24]. Factors are
seen as ranges on dimensions, and rules are used to establish how far along the dimension the
case is, on the basis of its facts. The decision will then require consideration of whether the
plaintiff is sufficiently favoured to decide in his favour. Further illustration using Wild Animals
cases is provided to explain this approach. Future work may involve investigation of the role of
dimensions in bridging between facts and factors, a long-standing issue in AI and law.
8.3.3 Statement Types in Legal Argument
Also worthy of exploration is revisiting the reasoning stages. As proposed in Chapter 2, the rea-
soning process begins with evidence and ends with the decision of the court, and passes through
several stages in between. Following the idea of considering the dimension presented in [9], in
the future, further attempts will be considered to provide the whole picture of reasoning with
legal cases from evidence to verdict, focusing in particular on the transitions between stages,
and the different types of statement used at the various stages. This involves consideration of
the following:
• The different types of statements used in legal reasoning. Conflating these different types
can lead to problems in deciding how their acceptability should be established.
• The transition between reasoning about facts to reasoning about law. The importance of
this transition was noted in [50], but the vast majority of work has been on one side or the
other, and how this barrier is crossed remains an open question;
• How and where uncertainty is dealt with. Although many legal concepts are characterised
by open texture [130] and so have a penumbra of uncertainty [80], the verdict itself can
permit no qualification. How and where the doubts are resolved remains an open question.
Most approaches (e.g. [114]) represent legal concepts only as Booleans. For example
factors are considered present or absent and values are promoted or demoted, whereas
differing degrees of presence and absence (e.g. [6, 37, 58]) need to be recognised.
This will help in investigating why sometimes Bayesian reasoning can be used fruitfully
when reasoning from evidence to legal facts, but not when reasoning from factors to issues.
Also when should the reasoning be seen as Boolean and when should varying degrees of un-
certainty and degree be introduced and eliminated? How could dimensions play a pivotal role
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in bridging the gap between the realm of the world and the realm of law? Given the different
types of statements, ADFs can be applied to provide a very natural tool for differentiating be-
tween statement types, by characterising statements not as a homogeneous type, but as types
appropriate to the stage of reasoning, and which will form distinct levels in the ADF.
8.3.4 Beyond Majority Opinion
The Prolog program presented in this research directly implements the acceptance conditions
for each node in the ADF, and, for a given set of facts, the program always produces a single
outcome relevant to the grounded semantics of ADFs. This is to be expected given the absence of
cycles in the domain ADF, which captures the tree-based structure of CATO’s factor hierarchy.
The program has been extended to consider dissenting opinions by defining new acceptance
conditions to produce the Justices’ justification of the disagreement. However, the long-term
goal is to go beyond that, by producing a variant program to generate all the possible arguments
for the majority, dissenting or concurring arguments required to resolve conflicts explicitly, so
as to facilitate comparison with ASPIC+ and give a complete picture of the potential arguments
and their attacks. Such a program would effectively represents the Justice Conference stage of
the US Supreme Court.
8.3.5 Multi-agent Deliberation Dialogue
The presented dialogue model provides insight into deliberation dialogues by a close study of
one extensive source of well-documented examples: US Supreme Court Oral Hearings. Look-
ing at these rich, varied, real world examples of deliberation improves understanding of what
deliberation really involves. Deliberation dialogues are as yet less thoroughly understood than
the closely related class of persuasion dialogues [25]. The process of the US Supreme Court
breaks the deliberation into several stages. First, in Oral Hearings the components that might be
used to form the rule are proposed. After that, the Justices form, apply and justify a particular
rule, or test, from these components. Mutually acceptable rules emerge to form the legal deci-
sion. This process of coming to agreement on a new, jointly acceptable rule stands in need of
exploration and clarification.
One possible topic for future work is to consider this model as an example for further stud-
ies in deliberation dialogues. For example, this dialogue model could represent a multi-agent
deliberation dialogue, where there are a number of agents participating in the dialogue. Each
agent has a different role, and while some agents participate in all the dialogues, others have a
role in only some of the dialogues, as in e.g. [137]. Examples include a chair agent who takes
control over the procedure of the dialogues; one or more Justice agent(s) participating in all
the nested dialogues; and the counsel agent (plaintiff agent or defendant agent) participating in
some of the dialogues. The ACT in the dialogue system plays the role of the commitment store
commonly used in agent dialogue systems. Each agent will have its own ACT, so that for each
nested dialogue one ACT is formed for each participant for the counsel agent (petitioner agent
or respondent agent) and one for the Justice agent. This can be generalised and exploited for a
range of less formal deliberation dialogues.
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8.3.6 Legal Text Processing
Another potential area for future work could be the development of a fully automated dialogue
model using approaches in legal text processing for legal documents such as legal transcripts.
One possible approach is by using GATE, a General Architecture for Text Engineering 1, to
automatically extract the argument components from the legal text. Preliminary investigation
on this topic have been conducted in two projects by final year undergraduate students ([60],
[69]) at the University of Liverpool, using the marked-up legal transcripts for the two case
studies presented in Appendix B and Appendix C. The next step is to consider different NLP
approaches in collaboration with legal experts and NLP researchers in the legal domain to help
in capturing the dialogue moves directly from the free text, e.g. [140, 141].
Moreover, post-processing for the decision justification in the program output can be re-
considered to resemble the texts of actual decisions as presented in the explanations in Chapter
7.
8.3.7 Other Jurisdictions, Other Domains and New (Undecided) Cases
Would the methodology presented in this thesis be applicable in different jurisdictions? Could it
be extended to more legal domains? And could it be tested on more recent or undecided cases?
This is one research direction that is worth exploring to evaluate the functionality of the provided
method and consider the requirements for possible refinements and improvements in the future.
The examples presented in this thesis have all been taken from the AI and Law literature,
including what is probably the most substantial analysis to date (CATO/IBP). Even so, the ex-
amples are still relatively small and limited to one jurisdiction. Ideally this research will be
generalised, by first testing the ADF of the legal domains discussed in this thesis (e.g. US Trade
Secret or Automobile Exception) over recent cases or undecided cases and applying the required
refinements. Considering this improvement will in turn help in extending the application of this
model to encapsulate the knowledge of freshly analysed legal domains. Conducting these further
tests on the model would motivate studying the requirements for generalising the application to
cover a range of legal jurisdictions.
The true test of a methodology and its supporting tools comes from its use in practice, and
so it is hoped that the proposal will be adopted by people wishing to build substantial systems
to perform factor-based reasoning in a legal domain. Such a tool cannot be the subject of a
research project carried out by only academic computer scientists: it requires the motivation and
personnel that only a practical project can provide. Practical applications appear to be moving
closer2, which increases the hope and expectation that the methodology will be used and proven
in practice.
1https://gate.ac.uk/
2As evidenced by a spate of articles such as the Role of AI in Law, published in The Times newspaper in the UK
and available at http://raconteur.net/business/time-for-technology-to-take-over, and the many discussion threads on
LinkedIn for the group for the International Association for AI and Law.
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8.3.8 Generalisation to Non Legal Context
Another potential area for future work would be to explore whether techniques for modelling
legal reasoning can be transferred to other open texture domains. The research findings raise the
belief that factor-based reasoning has implications much wider than law.
This style of reasoning is appropriate to the sorts of concept well recognised in philosophy
as having a “family resemblance” [138] or “open texture” [130]. Many concepts are not suscep-
tible to definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, so another way of expressing
the conditions for their acceptance is required. An understanding of the concept requires an
understanding of the context and the arguments on which this consensus is based, and a deep
understanding of the concept and its liability to change requires an understanding of the consid-
erations (factors) on which these arguments are based. As such, the following steps have been
identified to generalise the model and evaluate its effectiveness.
• Apply the representation model over dialogues found in broadcast media.
• Select a suitable dataset from a non-legal context using, for example, the UCI Machine
Learning Repository3. This could then be compared with the experiments reported in
[136] and [137].
• Describe the new context, and interpret the classification used in the selected dataset into
a factor hierarchy tree.
• Map the factor hierarchy tree into the defined representation model.
• Apply the selected dataset in the developed system and record the results, which are the
accepted factors.
• Compare the results obtained with the classification results in the dataset, and analyse the
findings.
8.4 Summary
At this point, the story of this thesis is complete, showing how the proposed research questions
have been addressed and outlining the contributions of this research to the domain of argumen-
tation in AI and Law. However, this is not the end: further extensions and new versions can
be explored to shape the future of the work and demonstrate the real advantages of the method
advocated in this thesis.
3UCI Machine Learning Repository URL: https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets.html

Appendix A
Design Documentation for the Java
Implementation of the Legal Dialogue
Representation
This appendix provides the design documentation for the Java program that was implemented
to produce a visual representation for the legal dialogues in the form of ACTs (as described in
Chapter 4), using Graphviz Java API. Section A.1 illustrates the class diagram for the model,
showing the members and methods for each class separately.
A.1 The Design of the Legal Dialogue Representation
The class diagram for the dialogue representation model is shown in Figure A.1. As stated in
Chapter 4, the program was implemented in Java to form the analysis of the moves in the Oral
Hearing dialogues, and produce an ACT for each player in each dialogue. Main is the control
class, Figure A.2, where all the dialogue moves are created. The main specifications/roles of the
moves methods are explained below:
• OpenCase: instantiate a new case object, which in turn instantiates a new Oral Hearing
(OH) and three nested dialogues objects implicitly. Figures A.3 and A.4 illustrate the
members and methods for the case and Oral Hearing classes.
• OpenDialogue: Open a certain dialogue and specify the dialogue players. The method
also instantiates a player ACT (PACT) objects for each player in the dialogue implicitly.
The specifications for ACT and PACT classes are presented in Figures A.5 and A.6.
• AddIssue, CombineIssue, AddIssueRel: are three methods related to the AssertIssue and
CombineIssues moves respectively. AddIssue instantiates a new issue object in the case, if
the issue has not been added before, and adds the issue to the player’s ACT (PlayerIssue
class). To combine issues, a new object, IssueRel, is instantiated for the related issues.
The issue is added implicitly if it was not in the player’s ACT or not in the case. Figure
A.7 shows the Issue, PlayerIssue and IssueRel classes.
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• AddFactor, CombineFactor, AddFactorRel, EmphFactor: A new factor object is instanti-
ated in the “AddFactor” method, which is related to the AssertFactor move. Every factor
has a parent. Once a factor object is added to a case, a new “Player Factor” object is
instantiated and the factor’s parent object is assigned to the new factor. The parent can
be an Issue (Player Issue object), a combination of issues (IssueRel object), an abstract
factor (Player Factor Object) or a combination of abstract factors (Factor Rel object).
If the parent does not exist, the program implicitly instantiates a new object based on the
object type. Figure A.8 illustrates the factor classes. Moreover, Factors can also be com-
bined by instantiating a new object from the “FactorRel’‘ class or emphasised by using
the “EmphFactor’‘ method, applying CombineFactors and EmphasiseFactor moves.
• AddFact, CombineFact, AddFactRel, EmphFact Figure A.9 shows all the related fact
classes. Similar to the factor methods, “AddFactor” instantiates a new fact object from the
“Player Fact” class, if an object for the same fact already exists in the case. Otherwise,
the method instantiates a new “Fact” object. Facts can also be combined (CombineFact
move) using the Fact Rel class, or emphasised (EmphasiseFact move). The fact’s par-
ent can be either a base factor (Player Factor object) or a combination of base factors
(Factor Rel object).
• DisplayGraphACT This method is called after each move to produce an updated ACT for
the current move. The ACTs are presented using a GraphViz Java API1: an object from
the “GraphViz” class (Figure A.10) is instantiated for each player in a dialogue by simply
writing the GraphViz dot code, and saving the code in a source file under a specific type
image format.
1GraphViz URL: http://www.graphviz.org. GraphViz Java API: https://github.com/jabbalaci/graphviz-java-api.
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FIGURE A.2: Main Class
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FIGURE A.3: Case Class
FIGURE A.4: Oral Hearing and Dialogue Classes
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FIGURE A.5: ACT Class
FIGURE A.6: Player ACT Class
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FIGURE A.7: Issue, PlayerIssue and IssueRelation Classes
FIGURE A.8: Factor, PlayerFactor, FactorRelation Classes
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FIGURE A.9: Fact, PlayerFact, FactRelation Classes
FIGURE A.10: Graphviz Class
Appendix B
Case Study: US v. Chadwick Dialogue
Moves and ACTs
This appendix provides the dialogue moves for the marked-up Oral Hearing transcript of the
case study US v. Chadwick. Three dialogues are analysed in this transcript: Petitioner dialogue
(Section B.1); Respondent dialogue (Section B.2) and Petitioner rebuttal (Section B.3). Each
dialogue is divided into a number of contexts, and an ACT for each player is produced after the
petitioner and respondent dialogues, and updated after the petitioner rebuttal dialogue.
B.1 Petitioner Dialogue
Context 1: Introducing the Case
1 OpenCase(ChiefJustice, USvCh)
2 OpenDialogue(ChiefJustice,PD,Raymond Randolph,USvCh)
3 AssertIssue(USvCh,PD,P, WarrantRequired)
4 AssertIssue(USvCh,PD,P, WarrantLessSearch)
5 AssertCombIssues(USvChPD,P, +, {WarrantLessSearch, WarrantRequired})
6 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, container, WarrantLessSearch, I,PC )
7 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, footlocker, Container, F, T)
8 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, lockStatus, WarrantLessSearch, I,T )
9 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, locked, lockStatus, F, T)
10 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, lawfulSeized, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
11 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {container, lockStatus},
12 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, T, N )
13 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {lawfulSeized ,
14 {container, lockStatus}}, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, N )
15 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, probableCause, WarrantLessSearch, I, PC)
16 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, contraband, probableCause, F, PC)
17 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, heavyWeight, contraband, F, T)
18 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, leaking, contraband, F, T)
19 AssertCombFacts(USvCh,PD,P, and, {heavyWeight, leaking, smell},
20 contraband, F, T )
Context 2: Shipping Status
1 AssertIssue(USvCh,PD,J, WarrantRequired)
2 AssertIssue(USvCh,PD,J, WarrantLessSearch)
3 AssertCombIssues(USvCh PD, J, +, {WarrantLessSearch, WarrantRequired})
4 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, container, {WarrantLessSearch+ WarrantRequired}, IR, PC )
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5 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, shippingStatus, {WarrantLessSearch+ WarrantRequired},
6 IR, N)
7 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {container, shippingStatus},
8 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, T, N )
9 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, shippingStatus, WarrantLessSearch, I, N)
10 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {container, shippingStatus},
11 WarrantLessSearch, I, T, N )
12 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, onTrain, shippingStatus, F, N)
13 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, doublelocked, lockStatus, F, T)
14 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,J, baggageAccompanying, shippingStatus, F, T)
15 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,J,checkedBaggage, container, F, T)
16 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, smallContainer, WarrantRequired, I, N)
17 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, suitcase, smallContainer, F, T)
18 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, notCheckedbaggage, smallContainer, F, T)
19 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, onTrain(baggageCompartment),
20 shippingStatus, F, N)
21 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, baggageAccompanying, shippingStatus, F, T)
22 Emphasise Fact(USvCh,PD,P, doublelocked, lockStatus)
23 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {shippingStatus, container,
24 probableCause, lockStatus}, WarrantLessSearch, I, T, N )
Context 3: Probable Cause Evidences and Searching Place
1 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, dogSmell, contraband, F, T)
2 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, automobile, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
3 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, car, automobile, F, T)
4 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, placeinAutomobile, WarrantLessSearch, I, PC)
5 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, carTrunk, placeinAutomobile, F, T)
6 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {automobile, placeinAutomobile},
7 WarrantLessSearch, I, T, N )
8 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, searchLocation, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
9 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, agentOffice, searchLocation, F, T)
10 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {lawfulSeized, searchLocation,
11 ProbableCause}, WarrantLessSearch, I, T, N )
12 AssertCombIssues(USvCh PD, P, or, {WarrantLessSearch, WarrantRequired})
Context 4: Seizure and Search
1 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, searchLocation, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired},
2 IR, N)
3 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, searchTime, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired},
4 IR, N)
5 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {searchTime, searchLocation},
6 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, T, N )
7 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, searchTime, WarrantLessSearch, I, N)
8 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {searchTime,
9 searchLocation}, WarrantLessSearch, I, T, N )
10 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, shortTime, searchTime, F, T)
11 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, IncidentArrest , WarrantLessSearch, I, N)
12 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, mobile , WarrantLessSearch, I, N)
13 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, automobile , mobile, I, N)
14 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, container , mobile, I, N)
15 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, privatePlace, WarrantRequired, I, L)
16 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, home, privatePlace, F, H)
17 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, probableCause, WarrantLessSearch, I, H)
18 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, lawfulSeized, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired},
19 IR, H)
20 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, container, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired},
21 IR, N)
22 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {lawfulSeized, probableCause,
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23 container}, WarrantLessSearch, I, N )
24 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {lawfulSeized, probableCause,
25 container}, WarrantLessSearch, I, N )
26 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {lawfulSeized, searchLocation},
27 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR,N )
Context 5: Open Locker and Comparison to Automobile Search
1 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, footlocker, container, F, T)
2 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, glove compartment, placeinAutomobile, F, PC)
3 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, trunk, placeinAutomobile, PC, PC)
4 AssertCombFacts(USvCh,PD,P, or, {glove compartment, trunk},
5 placeinAutomobile, F, PC)
6 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, or, {container, automobile},
7 WarrantLessSearch, I, N )
8 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, ILA, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
9 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {footlocker, ILA, automobile},
10 WarrantLessSearch, I, T, N)
11 AssertIssue(USvCh,PD,J, WarrantRequired)
12 AssertCombIssues(USvCh,PD,J, +, {WarrantLessSearch, WarrantRequired})
13 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, searchLocation, {WarrantLessSearch +
14 WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
15 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, searchLocation, WarrantLessSearch, I, PC)
16 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, policeOffice, searchLocation, F, PC)
17 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {search location, automobile},
18 WarrantLessSearch, I, H)
19 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {search location, container},
20 WarrantLessSearch, I, Cooper v. California)
21 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, lock status, WarrantLessSearch, I, PC)
22 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, locked, lock status, F, PC)
23 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {lock status, automobile},
24 WarrantLessSearch, I, H)
25 AssertCombFacts(USvCh,PD,P, and, {locked, trunk}, {lock status and automobile},
26 FR, Cady v. Dombrowski )
27 AssertCombFacts(USvCh,PD,P, and, {locked, footlocker}, {lock status and
28 automobile}, FR, T)
29 AssertCombFacts(USvCh,PD,P, or, {locked and trunk, locked and footlocker},
30 ,FR, T,N )
31 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, bedroom, privacy, I, L)
Context 6: Search Incident to Arrest
1 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, lockStatus, {WarrantLessSearch+
2 WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
3 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,J, locked, lockStatus, F, N)
4 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, seizedIncidentArrest, {WarrantLessSearch+
5 WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
6 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, smallPersonalContainer, WarrantRequired, I, N)
7 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {smallPersonalContainer, arrestted},
8 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, H)
9 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,J, smallbox, smallPersonalContainer, F, H)
10 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,J, sealedEnvelope, smallPersonalContainer, F, H)
11 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, closedCigarratePack, smallContainer, F, Robinson)
12 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {smallPersonalContainer, arrestted},
13 WarrantLessSearch, I, Robinson)
14 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {lockStatus,container, arrestted},
15 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, H)
16 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, zipperClosed, lockStatus, F, Daper)
17 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {lockStatus, container, arrestted},
18 WarrantLessSearch, I, Daper)
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19 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {smallPersonalContainer, arrestted},
20 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, H)
21 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, papers, Container, F, Opperman)
22 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {smallContainer, arrestted},
23 WarrantLessSearch, I, Opperman )
24 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, easyWarrant, WarrantLessSearch, I, Cooper v. California,
25 Texas v. White , Chambers v.Maroney, Edwards)
26 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {easyWarrant, arrestted}, WarrantLessSearch,
27 I, Cooper v. California, Texas v. White , Chambers v.Maroney, Edwards)
28 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, jail, searchLocation, F, Edward)
29 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, stationHouse, searchLocation, F, Edward)
30 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, or, {easyWarrant, probableCause},
31 WarrantLessSearch, I, Cooper v. California, Opperman, Edwards)
Context 7: No Precedent Cases(no exception)
1 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, mobile, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
2 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, automobile, mobile, F, N)
3 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, container, mobile, F, N)
4 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, or, {container, automobile}, mobile, F, H)
5 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {probableCause, automobile},
6 WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
7 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, or, {Container, automobile}, WarrantLessSearch,
8 I, Opperman )
9 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,J, wheels, automobile, F, L)
10 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,J, engine, automobile, F, L)
11 AssertCombFacts(USvCh,PD,J, and, {wheels, engine}, automobile F,
12 PC and L )
13 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, or, {Container, automobile}, mobile, I,
14 Coolidge v Newhampshire)
15 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {Container, automobile}, WarrantLessSearch, I,
16 Coolidge v Newhampshire)
17 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, or, {Container, automobile},{WarrantLessSearch+
18 WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
19 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,P, automobileStatus, WarrantLessSearch, I, N)
20 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,P, stopped, automobileStatus, F, H)
21 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {automobileStatus, mobile},
22 WarrantLessSearch, I, H )
23 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, and, {automobileStatus, mobile,
24 searchLocation}, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
25 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {searchLocation, automobile},
26 WarrantLessSearch, I, Maroney and White and Dombrowski)
Context 8: WarrantRequired Expectation
1 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, or, {smallPersonalContainer, Container},
2 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
3 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,P, and, {probableCause, Container},
4 WarrantLessSearch, I, N)
5 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PD,J, or, {{probableCause and arrested},{probableCause and
6 Container}}, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
7 CloseDialogue(ChiefJustice,PD,Raymond Randolph,USvCh)
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FIGURE B.1: US v. Chadwick Petitioner Dialogue - Petitioner ACT
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FIGURE B.2: US v. Chadwick Petitioner Dialogue - Justices’ ACT
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B.2 Respondent Dialogue
Context 1: Rebutting Petitioner Conflict Issues
1 OpenDialogue(ChiefJustice,RD, Martin G. Weinberg,USvCh)
2 AssertIssue(USvCh, PD, R, WarrantSearch(WarrantRequired Expectation) )
3 AssertIssue(USvCh, PD, R, WarrantlessSearch)
4 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, Search and Seize, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
5 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, automobile Exception, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
6 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {Search and Seize, automobile
7 Exception}, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
8 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, privateProperty, WarrantSearch
9 (WarrantRequired Expectation), I, L)
10 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, container, privateProperty , F, N)
11 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, footlocker, container, F, T)
12 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, automobile, automobile Exception, F, L)
13 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container, Search and Seize},
14 WarrantSearch, I, L)
15 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, briefcase, container, F, H)
16 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, trunk, container, F, H)
17 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,R, or, {briefcase, trunk,footlocker}, container,
18 F, H)
19 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, inspectionRegulation, automobile Exception,
20 F, L)
21 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {Search and Seize, automobile
22 Exception}, WarrantLessSearch, I, Opperman and Cady)
23 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {inspectionRegulation, automobile},
24 automobile Exception,F, Opperman and Cady)
25 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, not container, automobile , F, N)
26 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, automobile, automobile Exception, F, L)
27 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, container, privateProperty , F, N)
28 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, car, automobile, F, PC)
Context 2: Expectation of WarrantRequired from Previous Cases
1 AssertIssue(USvCh,PD,J, WarrantRequired(WarrantRequired Expectation) )
2 AssertIssue(USvCh,PD,J, WarrantlessSearch )
3 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, automobile Exception, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
4 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, automobile, automobile Exception, F, L)
5 AssertCombIssues(USvCh PD, J, +, {WarrantlessSearch, WarrantRequired})
6 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, probableCause , WarrantlessSearch+
7 WarrantRequired, IR, L)
8 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {probableCause, automobile},
9 WarrantLessSearch, I, Opperman and Cady)
10 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, luggage, container, F, H)
11 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,R, or, {briefcase, trunk,footlocker,luggage},
12 container, F, H)
13 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {probableCause, automobile},
14 WarrantRequired, I, Opperman and Cady)
15 AssertCombIssues(USvCh PD, J, +, {WarrantlessSearch, WarrantRequired})
16 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, home, privateProperty , F, L(fourth amendment) )
17 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, or, {home, container},
18 privateProperty,F, Lee and Jackson)
19 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, sealed package(mail,letters), container, F, Lee and
20 Jackson)
21 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,R, or, {briefcase, trunk,footlocker,luggage,
22 sealed package(mail,letters)}, container , F, H)
Context 3: Arrested Man with Close Container
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1 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, search incident arrest, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
2 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, container, WarrantLessSearch+warrantRequired,
3 IR, L)
4 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, lockStatus, {WarrantLessSearch+
5 WarrantRequired}, IR, N)
6 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, closed, lockStatus, F, N)
7 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, arrestedPerson, search incident arrest, F, L)
8 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, briefcase, container, F, H)
9 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {container, lockStatus,
10 search incident arrest}, {WarrantRequired+ WarrantLessSearch}, IR, N)
11 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, AccessibilityEvidence, search incident arrest, F, H)
12 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, immediateControl, AccessibilityEvidence, F, Chimel)
13 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, arrestedPerson, search incident arrest, F, L)
14 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, lockStatus, privateProperty, F, N)
15 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, closed, lockStatus, F, N)
16 AssertCombIssues(USvCh PD, J, +, {WarrantlessSearch, WarrantRequired})
17 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container, lockStatus,search
18 incident arrest}, {WarrantLessSearch and WarrentRequired}, IR, N)
19 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, sealedEnvelope, container, F, H)
20 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,J, or, {briefcase, sealedEnvelope}, container, F, H)
21 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, car, automobile, F, PC)
22 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, seizable Material, ProbableCause, F, H)
23 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {automobile, ProbableCause,search
24 incident arrest},{WarrantLessSearch + WarrentRequired}, IR, N)
25 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {{automobile, ProbableCause,search
26 incident arrest}, {container and lockStatus}}, {WarrantLessSearch +
27 WarrentRequired}, IR, N)
28 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, ProbableCause, {WarrantLessSearch and
29 WarrentRequired},IR, N)
30 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {automobile, probableCause,
31 search incident arrest}, automobileException , F, N)
32 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, doublelocked, lockStatus, F, N)
33 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container, probableCause,
34 search incident arrest,lockStatus},Warrantrequired , I, N)
35 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, zipperbag, container, F, Daper)
36 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {search incident arrest,container,
37 lockStatus}, WarrantLessSearch, I, Daper)
38 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, zipperbag, container, F, Daper)
39 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container, lockStatus}
40 search incident arrest, F, Daper)
41 EmphasizeFact(USvCh,RD,R,doublelocked, lockStatus)
42 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, containerWeight, privateproperty, F, N)
43 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container, containerWeight}
44 privateproperty, F, N)
45 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, heavy, containerWeight, F, N)
46 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container,lockStatus, containerweight},
47 privateProperty , F, N)
Context 4: Searching Location and Time
1 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, searchPlace, Warrantrequired, I, N)
2 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, agentOffice, searchPlace, F, T)
3 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {privateproperty,searchPlace},
4 Warrantrequired , I, N)
5 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, contraband, probableCause, F, T)
6 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, dogSmell, contraband, F, T)
7 AssertFactor(USvCh,PD,J, searchPlace, {WarrantLessSearch+
8 WarrentRequired},IR, T)
9 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {container,probableCause,searchPlace},
10 WarrantLessSearch+ WarrentRequired, IR, N)
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11 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container, searchPlace, lockStatus,
12 probableCause}, Warrantrequired , I, N)
13 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {automobile,searchPlace,probableCause},
14 automobileException , F, N)
15 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, agentOffice, searchPlace, F, T)
16 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, depot, searchPlace, F, T)
17 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,J, or, {agentOffice, depot}, searchPlace, F, H)
18 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, notaccessible, AccessibilityEvidence, F, T)
19 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {no accessibilityEvidence,lockStatus,
20 searchPlace,container},WarrantRequired , I, N)
21 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {accessibilityEvidence, lockStatus,
22 searchPlace,container},WarantlessSearch +WarrantRequired, I, N)
Context 5: Search Time (warrant Time)
1 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, ownersLand, searchPlace, F, collidge)
2 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,J, or, {agentOffice, depot, ownersLand},
3 searchPlace, F, collidge)
4 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {searchPlace,automobile},
5 WarrantRequired , I, collidge)
6 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {container,automobile},
7 WarrantLessSearch , I, H)
8 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, privateProperty, WarrantRequired,I, L)
9 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, home, privateProperty, F, collidge)
10 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {container,home},
11 WarrantRequired , I, H)
12 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container,probableCause},
13 WarrantRequired , I, L)
14 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {automobile,probableCause},
15 WarrantLess , I, L)
16 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {container,probableCause,
17 search and seize}, WarrantlessSearch , I, H)
18 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container,probableCause,
19 search and seize}, WarrantRequired , I, H)
20 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, seizeDuration, {WarrantRequired+
21 WarantlessSearch},IR, H)
22 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J,indefinitely, seizeDuration, F, N)
23 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {container,probableCause, seizeDuration},
24 {WarrantRequired+WarrantlessSearch}, IR, N)
25 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, seizeDuration, WarrantRequired,I, H)
26 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R,reasonableTime, seizeDuration, F, Lee)
27 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J,suffecientPeriod, seizeDuration, F, N)
28 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,J, or, {suffecientPeriod, not indefinitely},
29 SeizeDuration, F, H)
30 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, riskLoseEvidence, {WarrantRequired+
31 WarantlessSearch},IR, H)
32 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {riskLoseEvidence,seizeDuration},
33 WarrantRequired+warantlessSearch , IR, H)
34 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container,seizeDuration},
35 WarrantRequired, I, N)
36 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, or, {container,home},
37 PrivateProperty, F, N)
38 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, mobile, WarantlessSearch,I, H)
39 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container,mobile,searchPlace},
40 WarantlessSearch, I, N)
41 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {home,searchPlace},
42 WarantlessRequired, I, N)
43 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, or,{{container and mobile and searchPlace}
44 {home and searchPlace}}, WarantlessRequired, I, N)
45 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {container,mobile,searchPlace},
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46 WarantlessSearch, I, N)
47 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J,heroin, contraband, F, H)
48 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J,bomb, contraband, F, H)
49 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J,smallTactical, contraband, F, H)
50 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,J, or, {heroin, bomb,smallTactical}, contraband,
51 F, H)
52 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {container,probableCause},
53 WarantlessSearch+WarrantRequired, IR, N)
54 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R,heroin, contraband, F, H)
55 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R,bomb, contraband, F, H)
56 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R,smallTactical, contraband, F, H)
57 AssertCombFacts(USvCh,RD,R, or, {heroin, bomb,smallTactical}, contraband,
58 F, H)
59 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R,personalContent,privateproperty ,F, H)
60 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R,books and Diaries, personalContent, F, H)
61 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {container,personalContent},
62 WarrantRequired, I, Jackson and Lee and Kartz)
63 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R,not footlocker,automobile ,F, N)
64 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R,EasyWarrant,warrantRequired ,F, N)
65 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R,courtDistance,EasyWarrant ,F, N)
66 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J,EasyWarrant,warrantRequired+warantlessSearch,
67 IR, N)
68 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J,unavaiableMagistrate,EasyWarrant ,F, N)
69 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {avaiableMagistrate,courtDistance},
70 EasyWarrant, F, N)
Context 6: Not Automobile
1 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, caretakingFunction, WarrantLessSearch, I, PC)
2 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {caretakingFunction, automobile},
3 WarrantLessSearch, I, Cooper)
4 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,J, probableCause, WarrantLessSearch, I, L)
5 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, transportContraband, probableCause, F, PC, cooper)
6 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, car, automobile, F, PC, Cooper)
7 Assert CombFactor(USvCh,RD,J, and, probableCause and autombile, WarrantLessSearch,
8 I, Cooper)
9 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,J, and, {transportContraband, car}, {probableCause
10 and autombile}, FR, PC, Cooper)
11 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, container, WarrantRequired, I, PC)
12 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, footlocker, container,F, T)
13 AssertFactor(USvCh,RD,R, forfeitureStatute, WarrantLessSearch, I, Cooper)
14 Assert CombFactor(USvCh,RD,R, and, {probableCause, automobile, forfeitureStatute},
15 WarrantLessSearch, I, Cooper)
16 Assert CombFactor(USvCh,RD,J, and, {probableCause, footlocker, forfeitureStatute},
17 {WarrantLessSearch+warrantRequired}, IR, Cooper)
18 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, luggage, container, F, H)
19 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,R, or, {luggage, footlocker}, container, F, H, H)
20 Assert CombFactor(USvCh,RD,R, and, {probableCause, container, forfeitureStatute},
21 WarrantRequired, I, Cooper)
Context 7: Search by Police v Search by Court
1 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,J, courtSearch, searchPlace, F, H)
2 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,J, or, {agentOffice, depot, ownersLand,courtSearch},
3 searchPlace, F, H)
4 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {searchPlace,container,probableCause},
5 WarantlessSearch , I, N)
6 AssertFact(USvCh,RD,R, courtSearch, searchPlace, F, H)
7 Assert CombFact(USvCh,RD,R, or, {agentOffice, depot, not courtSearch},
8 searchPlace, F, H)
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9 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {legalsearchPlace,container,
10 probableCause},WarantlessSearch , I, N)
11 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,J, and, {searchPlace,container,probableCause},
12 forfeitureStatute , I, N)
13 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,RD,R, and, {searchPlace,container,probableCause},
14 Warantrequired , I, N)
15 CloseDialogue(ChiefJustice,RD, Martin G. Weinberg ,USvCh)
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FIGURE B.3: US v. Chadwick Respondent Dialogue - Respondent ACT
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FIGURE B.4: US v. Chadwick Respondent Dialogue - Justices’ ACT
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B.3 Petitioner Rebuttal Dialogue
1 OpenDialogue(ChiefJustice,PRD,Raymond Randolph,USvCh)
2 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PRD,P, and, {container, arrested},
3 searchIncidenttoArrest, F, Hanz and Sariano and Schelis and Zaicek)
4 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PRD,J, and, {container, arrested,searchLocation},
5 {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR,N)
6 AssertFact(USvCh,PRD,J, breifcase, container, F, H)
7 AssertFact(USvCh,PRD,J, Hotel, searchLocation, F, H)
8 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PRD,J, and, {container, probableCause,
9 searchLocation}, {WarrantLessSearch+WarrantRequired}, IR,N)
10 AssertFact(USvCh,PD,J, ontheWay, automobileStatus, F, L)
11 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PRD,J, and, {ProbableCause, automobile,
12 automobileStatus}, WarrantLessSearch, I,L)
13 AssertFact(USvCh,PRD,J, baggage, container, F, USvJohnston)
14 AssertFact(USvCh,PRD,J, baggageCar, automobile, F, USvJohnston)
15 AssertFact(USvCh,PRD,J, dogsmelledContraband, contaband, F, USvJohnston)
16 AssertCombFactors(USvCh,PRD,P, and, {container, ProbableCause,lawfulSeize},
17 WarrantLessSearch, I, USvJohnston)
18 CloseDialogue(ChiefJustice,PRD,Raymond Randolph, USvCh)
19 CloseCase(ChiefJustice, USvCh)
Appendix C
Case Study: California v. Carney
Dialogue Moves and ACTs
This appendix provides the dialogue moves for the marked-up Oral Hearing transcript of the case
study California v. Carney. Three dialogues are analysed in this transcript: Petitioner dialogue
(Section C.1); Respondent dialogue (Section C.2) and Petitioner rebuttal (Section C.3). Each
dialogue is divided into a number of contexts, and an ACT for each player is produced after the
petitioner and respondent dialogues, and updated after the petitioner rebuttal dialogue.
C.1 Petitioner Dialogue
Context 1: Introducing the Case
1 OpenCase (ChiefJustic, CvC)
2 OpenDialogue(ChiefJustic,PD, Louis Hanoian,CvC)
3 AssertIssue (CvC,PD,P, Exigency)
4 AssertIssue (CvC,PD,P, Privacy)
5 AssertCombIssues (CvC PD, P, or, {Exigency, Privacy})
6 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, mobility, Exigency, I, Carroll and Marony and Ross)
7 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, Parking, Exigency, I, N)
8 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, downtown, parking, F, T)
9 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, origin, Exigency, I, N)
10 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, agenrOfficerObserve, origin, F, T)
11 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, agenrOfficerInform, origin, F, T)
12 AssertCombFacts (CvC,PD,P, and, {agenrOfficerInform, agenrOfficerObserve },
13 origin, F, T )
14 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, contraband, Exigency, I, N)
15 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, marijuana, contraband, F, T)
Context 2: Parking
1 AssertIssue (CvC,PD,J,Exigency)
2 AssertIssue (CvC,PD,J,Privacy)
3 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,ParkingTime, Exigency+Privacy, IR, N)
4 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, ParkingTime, Exigency, I, N)
5 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, unknown, ParkingTime, F, T)
6 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,ParkingType, Exigency+Privacy, IR, N)
7 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, ParkingType, Exigency, I, N)
8 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, public, ParkingType, F, T)
9 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, privatelyowned, ParkingType, F, T)
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10 AssertCombFacts (CvC,PD,P, and ,{Public, privatelyowned, downtown },
11 ParkingType, F, T )
12 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,not trailerPark, ParkingType, F, T)
13 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, not trailerPark, ParkingType, F, T)
14 AssertCombFacts (CvC,PD,P, and ,{Public, privatelyowned, downtown,
15 not trailerPark}, ParkingType, F, T )
Context 3: Vehicle Configuration and Circumstances
1 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,mobileConfiguration, Exigency+Privacy,IR, N)
2 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,tractorDrawn, mobileConfiguration, F, H)
3 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, mobileConfiguration, mobility, F, N)
4 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, notTractorDrawn, mobileConfiguration, F, H)
5 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, integral vehicle, mobileConfiguration, F, T )
6 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, wheels, integral vehicle, F,T)
7 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, engine, integral vehicle, F,T)
8 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, backPortion, integral vehicle, F,T)
9 Assert CombFacts (CvC,PD,P, and, {wheels, engine,backPortion}, integral
10 vehicle, F,T)
11 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,homeFacilities, Privacy, I, H)
12 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {homeFacilities,mobileConfiguration},
13 Exigency+Privacy,IR, H)
14 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,waterElect, homeFacilities, F, H )
15 AssertFactor(CvC, PD, P, homeFacilities, Privacy, I,H)
16 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, noWaterElect, homeFacilities, F, H)
17 AssertCombIssues (CvC PD, P, or, {Exigency, Privacy})
18 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,mobileConfiguration, Exigency, I, H)
19 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,wheels, mobileConfiguration, F, L)
20 Emphasise Fact (CvC,PD,J,wheels, mobileConfiguration )
21 Emphasise Factor (CvC,PD,P, mobility, Exigency)
22 Emphasise Fact(CvC, PD, P, wheels, mobileConfiguration)
23 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, self-Propelled, mobileConfiguration, F,H)
24 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, self-locomotion, mobileConfiguration, F,H)
25 Assert Comb Fact (CvC,PD,P, or, {self-locomotion, self-Propelled}, F, H)
Context 4: License Type
1 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,VehicleRegisteration, Exigency, IR, N)
2 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, VehicleRegisteration, Exigency, IR, N)
3 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, SpecialLicence, VehicleRegisteration, F, T)
4 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {VehicleRegisteration,mobile},
5 Exigency,I, N)
6 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,TruckLicence, VehicleRegisteration, F, H)
7 AssertCombFacts (CvC,PD,J,or ,{TruckLicence, VehicleLicence},
8 VehicleRegisteration, F, T )
9 AssertCombFacts (CvC,PD,J,or ,{SpecialLicence, VehicleLicence},
10 VehicleRegisteration, F, T )
Context 5: Compare to Solicitor opinion
1 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,mobilehome, Privacy, I, T)
2 AssertCombFacts (CvC,PD,P, or ,{vehicle, mobileHome}, automobile, F, T )
3 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,mobilehomePark, ParkingType, F, H)
4 AssertCombFacts (CvC,PD,J,or ,{trailerPark, mobilehomePark}, ParkingType, F,T)
5 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,homeFacilities, Privacy, I, H)
6 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J, WaterElect, homeFacilities,F, H)
7 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {homeFacilities,mobile,
8 MobilehomeparkingType}, Exigency+Privacy,IR, H)
9 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,Public, ParkingType, F, H)
10 AssertCombFacts (CvC,PD,J,or ,{trailerPark, mobilehomePark,PublicPark},
11 ParkingType, F, T )
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12 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, capabletoMove, Exigency, I, L)
13 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {capabletoMove,automobile} ,Exigency,I, L)
14 Assert CombFacts (CvC,PD,P, and, {wheels, engine},automobile,F,T)
Context 6: Compare to Self Propelled (trailer-tractor)
1 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,ResidentialUse, Privacy, I, H)
2 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,PeopleLivingin, ResidentialUse,F, H)
3 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,ResidentialUse, Privacy, I, H)
4 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,trailer(wheels), mobileConfiguration ,F, H)
5 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,trailer(wheels), PeopleLivein ,F, H)
6 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,home, PeopleLivein ,F, H)
7 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,or, {trailer,home} ,PeopleLivein,F, H)
8 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, trailer(wheels), mobileConfiguration ,F, H)
9 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {mobileConfiguration,parkingType},
10 Privacy,I, H)
11 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {automobile,parkingType,homeFacilities},
12 Privacy+Exigency,IR, H)
13 AssertCombIssues (CvC PD, P, or, {Exigency, Privacy})
14 AssertCombIssues (CvC PD, J, +, {Exigency, Privacy})
15 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {automobile,publicparkingType},
16 Exigency,I, H)
17 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {automobile,not publicparkingType},
18 Privacy,I, H)
19 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {automobile,publicparkingType},
20 Exigency,I, H)
21 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {automobile,not publicparkingType},
22 Privacy,I, H)
23 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {automobile,publicparkingType},
24 Exigency,I, H)
25 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,shortTime, ParkingTime ,F, H)
26 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {ParkingTime,automobile,homeFacilities,
27 ProbableCause}, Exigency,I, H)
28 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, longTime, ParkingTime ,F, H)
29 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {ParkingTime,automobile,ParkingType,
30 ProbableCause},Exigency,I, H)
31 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, not individualExpectation, probableCause ,F, H)
32 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {mobileConfiguration,ParkingType},
33 Exigency,I, H)
34 EmphasiseFact (CvC,PD,J,wheels)
35 Assert CombFacts (CvC,PD,P, or, {TrailernoTractor,suitcase},MobileObject,F, H)
36 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {trailer,trailerParkingType},
37 Exigency+Privacy,IR, H)
38 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {trailer,trailerParkingType}, Exigency,I, H)
39 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,SelfPropelled,mobile ,F, H)
40 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J,and, {SelfPropelled,homeFacilities},
41 Exigency+Privacy, IR, H)
42 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {SelfPropelled, homeFacilities, capabletoMove},
43 Exigency,I, H)
Context 7: Compare to Tent
1 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,mobility, {Exigency+privacy}, I, L)
2 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,camperTent, mobility, F, H )
3 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J,motor home, mobility, F, H )
4 Assert CombFacts (CvC,PD,P, and, {camperTent, motor home},mobile, H )
5 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, mobileHome, mobile, F, T )
6 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, notTent, mobile, F, H )
7 Assert CombFacts (CvC,PD,P, and, {notTent, mobileHome},mobile, H )
8 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J,movable, mobile, IR, H )
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9 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J, camperTent, movable, F, H )
10 AssertFactor ( CvC, PD, P, movable, Exigency, I, H)
11 AssertFact ( CvC, PD, P, tent, movable, F, H)\\
12 AssertFactor ( CvC, PD, P, movable, Privacy, I, Chadwick)
13 AssertFact ( CvC, PD, P, suitcase, movable, F, Chadwick)
14 Assert CombFacts ( CvC, PD, P, or, {tent, suitcase}, movable,F, H)
15 AssertFact ( CvC, PD, P, cartrunk, mobileConfiguration, F, PC)
16 AssertFactor ( CvC, PD, P, probableCause, Exigency, I, H)
17 AssertCombFactors ( CvC, PD, P, and, {mobile and movable,probableCause},
18 Exigency, I, PC)
Context 8: Bright Line for the Test
1 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, publicSafety, probableCause, F, L)
2 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, mobility, Exigency, I, carroll)
3 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {mobile,capabletomove,residentialUse},
4 Exigency,I, N)
5 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {mobile,probableCause,no mobileConfiguration,
6 no peopleExpectation}, Exigency,I, Carroll,Chambers,Ross)
Context 9: Compare to House-Boat
1 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,J, mobile, Exigency+Privacy, IR,N)
2 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J, houseboat, mobile, F, H)
3 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, houseboat, mobile, F, L)
4 Assert CombFacts (CvC,PD,J,or, {houseboat,automobile}, mobile,F, N)
5 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, vessel,mobile, F, carroll)
6 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, houseboat, vessel, F, L)
7 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, ship, vessel, F, L)
8 AssertFact (CvC,PD,J, besidehouse, parkingLocation, F, H)
9 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,J, and, {houseboat,parked,besidehouse,homeFacilities},
10 Exigency+Privacy,IR, H)
11 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, besidehouse, parkingLocation, F, H)
12 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {houseboat,parked,besidehouse,homeFacilities},
13 Exigency,I, H)
14 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, driveway, parkingLocation, F, H)
15 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {automobile,parked,driveway,homeFacilities},
16 Exigency,I, H)
17 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, glassHouse, residentialUse, Privacy, H)
18 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {residentialUse,mobile,ProbableCause},
19 Exigency,I, H)
20 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, warrantrequirement, Privacy, I,N)
21 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, unauthoirzedWarrant, warrantrequirement, Privacy, Coolidge)
22 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, priorKnoweldge, warrantrequirement, Privacy, Coolidge)
23 CloseDialogue(ChiefJustic,PD, Louis Hanoian,CvC)
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FIGURE C.1: California v. Carney Petitioner Dialogue - Petitioner ACT
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FIGURE C.2: California v. Carney Petitioner Dialogue - Justices’ ACT
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C.2 Respondent Dialogue
Context 1: Privacy facts-rebut petitioner
1 OpenDialogue(ChiefJustic,RD, Thomas Homann,CvC)
2 AssertIssue (CvC, RD, R, Privacy)
3 AssertIssue (CvC, RD, R Exigency)
4 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, residentialArea, Privacy, I, T)
5 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, livingCompartment, residentialArea, F, T)
6 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, parked, Privacy, I, T)
7 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, parkingTime, Privacy, I, T)
8 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, mobileHome, Exigency, I, T)
9 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, extended, parkingTime, F, T)
10 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {parked, parkingTime,mobileHome },
11 Privacy, I, T )
12 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, parked, Privacy, I, T)
13 AssertIssue (CvC, RD, R, Privacy)
14 AssertIssue (CvC, RD, R Exigency)
15 AssertCombIssues (CvC RD, J, +, {Exigency, Privacy})
16 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, J, parkingLocation,Exigency, I, T)
17 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, mobileHome,Exigency, I, T)
18 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, Public, parkingLocation, F, T)
19 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, J, parkingTime, Exigency, I, T)
20 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, shortTime, parkingTime, F, T)
21 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and, {parkingLocation, parkingTime },
22 Privacy+Exigency, I, T )
23 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, visibility, Privacy, I, T)
24 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, curtainsDown, visibility, F, T)
25 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, homeproperities, Privacy, I, T)
26 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, furniture, homeproperities, F, T)
27 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, table, homeproperities, F, T)
28 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, refrigerator, homeproperities, F, T)
29 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, kitchen, homeproperities, F, T)
30 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, or, {furniture, refrigerator,kitchen },
31 homeproperities, F, T )
32 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {homeproperities,parked, noVisbility,
33 mobileHome}, Privacy, I, T )
34 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, easyWarrant, Privacy, I, T)
35 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, availableMagistrate, easyWarrant, F, T)
36 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, closetoCourt, easyWarrant, F, T)
37 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, or, {availableMagistrate, closetoCourt },
38 EasyWarrant, F, T )
39 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, probableCause, Exigency, I, T)
40 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, mobile, Exigency, I, T)
41 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, vehicle/automobile, mobile, I, T)
42 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, mobilestatus, Exigency, I, T)
43 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, highway, mobileStatus, F, {Carroll,Ross})
44 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {mobile,probableCause,mobileStatus },
45 Exigency, I, {Carroll,Ross} )
46 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {mobileHome,probableCause,parked },
47 Privacy, I,T )
48 AssertCombIssues (CvC RD, R, and, {Exigency, Privacy})
Context 2: Mobile vs inoperable mobile
1 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, J, CapableToMove, Exigency, I, PC)
2 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, CapableToMove, Exigency, I, PC)
3 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, inOperable, Privacy, I, H)
4 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, no driver, inOperable, F, T)
5 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, curtainsDown, inOperable, F, T)
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6 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, and, {no driver, closeCurtains }, inOperable, F, T)
7 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, CloseCurtains, CapableToMove, F, T)
8 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {parked,inOperable}, Privacy, I,T )
9 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, curtainsDown (FrontWindshield), inOperable, F, T)
10 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, probableCause, Exigency, I, T)
11 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, contraband(marijuana), ProbableCause, F, T)
12 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, accommodationSpace, Privacy, I, N)
13 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, livingCompartment, AccommodationSpace, F, T)
14 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, automobile, Mobile, F, L)
15 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, residentialPlace, Privacy, I, L)
16 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, tempHome, residentialPlace, F, L)
17 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, personalHome, residentialPlace, F, L)
18 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, or, {tempHome, personalHome }, residentialPlace, F, T)
19 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, tent, residentialPlace, F, H)
20 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, motelRoom, residentialPlace, F, H)
21 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, or, {tempHome, personalHome,tent,motelRoom},
22 residentialPlace, F, T )
23 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, J, Mobility, Exigency, I, L)
24 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, vehicle, Mobility, F, {PC,L})
25 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, crashed, inOperable, F, Cady v Dombrowski)
26 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {mobile,inOperable}, Privacy, I,
27 Cady v Dombrowski )
28 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {mobile,ProbableCause, Highway},
29 Exigency, I,L)
30 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, Container, Privacy, I, Chadwick)
31 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, trunk, Container, F, Chadwick)
Context 3: Automobile or Chadwick Trunk
1 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, mobileHome, mobile, F, T)
2 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, J, or, {automobile, mobileHome},mobile, F, L )
3 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, J, or, {trunk, mobileHome},container, F, Chadwick)
4 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, or, {container, mobile},{Exigency+Privacy},
5 IR, Chadwick )
6 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, dresserDrawers, Container, F, T)
7 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, cabinet, Container, F, T)
8 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, suitcase, Container, F, T)
9 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, storageCompartment, Container, F, T)
10 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, J, or, {trunk, dresserDrawers,cabinet,storage
11 Compartment, suitcase},Container, I, H )
12 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, container, mobile, F, Chadwick)
13 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, or, {container, automobile},Privacy, I,Chadwick )
14 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and, {mobile, not capableMove},{Privacy+Exigency},
15 IR,Chadwick )
Context 4: Compare MobileHome to a Big Stretch Cadillac
1 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, BigStretchCadilac, automobile, F, H)
2 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and, {mobile, not capableMove,parked},{Privacy+
3 Exigency},IR,H )
4 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, home, Privacy, I, L)
5 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, BigStretchCadilac, automobile, F, H)
6 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, J, homeProperties, Privacy, F, T)
7 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {mobile, homeProperties,parked,not capableMove},
8 Privacy, I,H )
9 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, bed, homeProperties, F, H)
10 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {residentialUse, mobile, homeProperties,parked,
11 not capableMove},Privacy, I,H )
Context 5: Motor Home attributes
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1 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, trailer, accommodationSpace, F, H)
2 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, self contained unit, accommodationSpace, F, H)
3 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, or, {trailer, self contained unit},accommodationSpace,
4 F, H )
5 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, cab, accommodationSpace, F, H)
6 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, and, {self contained unit,cab},accommodationSpace,
7 F, H )
8 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, { homeProperties,accommodationSpace},
9 Privacy, I,H )
10 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, J, visibility, Privacy, I, PC)
11 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, J, cannotbeSeen, Visibility, F, H)
12 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, visibility, Privacy, I, PC)
13 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, { residentialUse,mobile},Privacy, I,H )
14 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, sleepingBag, homeProperties, F, H)
15 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and, { residentialUse,mobile,homeProperties},
16 {Privacy+Exigency}, IR,H )
17 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, not sleepingBag, homeProperties, F, H)
18 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, personalItems, Containers, F, H)
19 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, kitchen, homeProperties, F, H)
20 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, bed, homeProperties, F, H)
21 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, closeCurtains, not visible, F, H)
22 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, or, {kitchen bed},homeProperties, F, H )
23 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, { container, mobile, not visible,
24 homeProperties}, Privacy, I,H )
Context 6: Compare to Covered Wagon
1 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, wagon, mobile, F, H)
2 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, wagon, mobile, F, H)
3 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, wagon, residentialUse, F, H)
4 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, wagon, container, F, H)
5 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {residentialUse, mobile, container},
6 Privacy, I H )
Context 7: Privacy of vehicle v. vehicle function
1 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, Visibility, Privacy, I, PC)
2 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, Mobile(transportation), Exigency, I, L)
3 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, Mobile(storageCompartment)), Privacy, I, H)
Context 8: Moving van v. parked van
1 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, van, mobile, F, H)
2 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, van, mobile, F, H)
3 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, or, {van, mobileHome},mobile, F, H )
4 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, J, mobileStatus, Exigency, I H)
5 AssertFact (CvC, RD,J, highway, mobileStatus, F, PC)
6 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and, {mobile,mobileStatus},{Exigency+Privacy},
7 IR, H )
8 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, mobileStatus, Exigency, I H)
9 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, highway, mobileStatus, F, PC)
10 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {residentialUse, mobile,mobileStatus},
11 Exigency, I, H )
12 AssertFactor (CvC, RD, R, riskLosingEvidence, not EasyWarrant, F, H)
13 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {not easyWarrant, mobile,mobileStatus,
14 probableCause},Exigency, I, H )
15 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, parked, not urgentMobileStatus, F, PC)
16 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, R, or, {parked, highway},mobileStatus, F, H )
17 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {easyWarrant, mobile,no urgentMobileStatus,
18 ProbableCause},Privacy, I, H )
19 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and, {mobile,no urgentmobileStatus, notcapableMove},
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20 {Privacy+Exigency}, IR, H )
Context 9: Car and Mobile Home Parked in the Same Parking Lot
1 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, J, or, {mobileHome, car},automobile, F, H )
2 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and, {publicParking,automobile,probableCause},
3 {Exigency+Privacy},IR, H )
4 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {mobile, container, publicParking,
5 ProbableCause},Privacy, F, H )
6 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and, {publicParking,automobile,probableCause,
7 container, capabletoMove }, {Exigency+Privacy}, IR, H )
8 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and, {mobile, container, urgentMobileStatus,
9 ProbableCause },Exigency, F, H )
Context 10: Tractor Pulls Trailer
1 AssertFact (CvC, RD, J, TractorpullTailer, Mobile, F, H)
2 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, J, and, {mobile, mobileStatus}, Exigency+Privacy,
3 IR, H )
4 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, TractorpullTailer, Mobile, F, H)
5 Assert CombFacts (CvC, RD, J, or,{TractorpullTailer, motorhome}, container, F, H)
6 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, J, and,{mobile, mobileStatus}, Exigency, I, H)
7 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, tractorpullTailer, residentialUse, F, H)
8 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, tractorpullTailer, container, F, H)
9 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, trailer, not visible, F, H)
10 AssertCombFactors (CvC, RD, R, and,{mobile, residentialUse,container,not visible},
11 Privacy, I, H)
12 AssertFact (CvC, RD, R, houseCar, residentialUse, F, H)
13 CloseDialogue(ChiefJustic,RD, Thomas Homann,CvC)
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FIGURE C.3: California v. Carney Respondent Dialogue - Respondent ACT
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FIGURE C.4: California v. Carney Respondent Dialogue - Justices’ ACT
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C.3 Petitioner Rebuttal Dialogue
1 OpenDialogue(ChiefJustic,PDR, Louis Hanoian,CvC)
2 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, LivingCompartment, ResidentialUse, F, T)
3 AssertFactor (CvC,PD,P, Homeproperties, Privacy, I, N)
4 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, PersonalEffects, Homeproperties, F, T)
5 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, Food, Homeproperties, F, T)
6 Assert CombFacts (CvC,PD,P, and, {PersonalEffects,Food}, Homeproperties,
7 F, H)
8 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {ResidentialUse,Homeproperties},
9 Privacy,I, H)
10 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {noResidentialUse,no Homeproperties,
11 mobile}, Exigency,I, H)
12 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, stretchcadillac, automobile, F, H)
13 AssertFact (CvC,PD,P, pickuptrucks, automobile, F, H)
14 AssertCombFactors (CvC,PD,P, and, {ResidentialUse,mobile}, Exigency,
15 I, H)
16 CloseDialogue(ChiefJustic,PDR, Louis Hanoian,CvC)
17 OpenCase (ChiefJustic, CvC)

Appendix D
U.S. Trade Secrets Factors Definitions
This appendix presents the definitions for CATO’s Factor Hierarchy for the domain of US Trade
Secrets law from [10, 239-247]. The domain contains 5 Legal Issues, 11 Intermediate Legal
Concerns and 26 base-level factors listed below, together with their associated plaintiff and
defendant conclusions as indicated by (p) or (d).
D.1 Legal Issues
F101 InfoTradeSecret (p)
P:Plaintiff’s information is a trade secret.
D:Plaintiff’s information is not a trade secret.
F110 ImproperMeansConclusion (p)
P: Defendant acquired plaintiff’s information through improper means.
D: Defendant did not acquire plaintiff’s information through improper means.
F112 InfoUsed (p)
P: Defendant may have used plaintiff’s information and usurped a competitive advantage.
D: Defendant’s information was the result of independent development efforts and invest-
ment.
F114 ConfidentialRelationship (p)
P: A confidential relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant.
D:There was no confidential relationship between the parties.
F124 DefendantOwnershipRights (d)
P: Defendant does not have ownership rights in the information.
D: Defendant may have ownership rights in the information.
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D.2 Intermediate Legal Concerns
F102 EffortsToMaintainSecrecy (p)
P: Plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy of its information.
D: Plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining the secrecy of its information.
F104 InfoValuable (p)
P:Plaintiff’s information was valuable for plaintiff’s business.
D:It was not the case that plaintiff’s information was valuable for plaintiff’s business.
F105 InfoKnownOrAvailable (d)
P: The information apparently was not known or available outside plaintiff’s business.
D: Plaintiff’s information was known in the industry or available from sources outside
plaintiff’s business.
F106 InfoKnown (d)
P: The information apparently was not known outside plaintiff’s business.
D: Plaintiff’s information was known outside plaintiff’s business.
F108 InfoAvailableElsewhere (d)
P: It was not the case that plaintiff’s information was available from sources outside plain-
tiff’s business.
D: Plaintiff’s information was available from sources outside plaintiff’s business.
F111 QuestionableMeans (p)
P: Defendant may have acquired plaintiff’s information through questionable means.
D: Defendant apparently obtained its information by fair means.
F115 NoticeOfConfidentiality (p)
P: Defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the information would be a breach of
confidentiality.
D: It was not the case that defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the information
would be a breach of confidentiality.
F120 InfoLegitimatelyObtainedOrObtainable (d)
P: Defendant may have acquired plaintiff’s information through improper means.
D: Defendant obtained or could have obtained its information by legitimate means.
F121 ExpressConfidentialityAgreement (p)
P: There was an express agreement to keep the information confidential.
D: There was an explicit disclaimer of confidentiality.
F122 EffortsToMaintainSecrecyVisAVisDefendant (p)
P: Plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy of its information in its dealings with
defendant.
D: Plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its information
in its dealings with defendant.
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F123 EffortsToMaintainSecrecyVisAVisOutsiders (p)
P: Plaintiff took efforts to maintain the confidentiality of its information in its dealings
with outsiders.
D: Plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its information
in its dealings with outsiders.
D.3 Base-Level Factors
F1 DisclosureInNegotiations (d)
Description: Plaintiff disclosed its product information in negotiations with defendant.
This factor shows that defendant apparently obtained its information by fair means. Also,
it shows that plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining the secrecy of its informa-
tion.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff disclosed the information to defendant in the context of
(negotiations about) a joint venture, licensing agreement, sale of a business, etc.
The factor does not apply if: Defendant acquired knowledge of plaintiff’s information
in the course of employment by plaintiff.
F2 BribeEmployee (p)
Description: Defendant paid plaintiff’s former employee to switch employment, appar-
ently in an attempt to induce the employee to bring plaintiff’s information.
This factor shows that defendant may have acquired plaintiff’s information through ques-
tionable means.
The factor applies if: Defendant offered plaintiff’s employee or former employee a sub-
stantial bonus or salary increase in order to work for defendant.
F3 EmployeeSoleDeveloper (d)
Description: Employee defendant was the sole developer of plaintiff’s product.
This factor shows that defendant may have ownership rights in the information.
The factor does not apply if: Defendant contributed to the development or improvement
of plaintiff’s product, but was not the sole developer.
F4 AgreedNotToDisclose (p)
Description: Defendant entered into a nondisclosure agreement with plaintiff.
This factor shows that defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the information
would be a breach of confidentiality. Also, it shows that there was an express agreement to
keep the information confidential. Also, that plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy
of its information.
The factor does not apply if: Plaintiff obtained nondisclosure agreements from other
employees but not from the defendant.
F5 AgreementNotSpecific (d)
Description: The nondisclosure agreement did not specify which information was to be
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treated as confidential.
This factor shows that it was not the case that defendant was on notice that using or dis-
closing the information would be a breach of confidentiality.
The factor does not apply if: There is no information about the contents of the nondis-
closure agreement.
F6 SecurityMeasures (p)
Description: Plaintiff adopted security measures.
This factor shows that plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy of its information.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff took active measures to limit access to and distribution
of its information, for example through employee nondisclosure agreements, notifying
employees that information is confidential and not to be divulged to outsiders, keeping
important documents under lock and key, document distribution systems, stamping doc-
uments confidential, computer passwords, plant security, requiring outsiders to whom
information is disclosed to sign nondisclosure agreements, keeping sensitive information
hidden when plant tours are conducted, etc.
F7 BroughtTools (p)
Description: Plaintiff’s former employee brought product development information to
defendant. This factor shows that defendant may have used plaintiff’s information and
usurped a competitive advantage. Also, it shows that defendant may have acquired plain-
tiff’s information through questionable means.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff’s (former) employee, took product development informa-
tion such as copies of blueprints, documents, customer lists, computer printouts, disks,
tapes, actual specimen of plaintiff’s product, parts, tools, etc.
The factor does not apply if: Defendant had somehow come into possession of plain-
tiff’s documents, blueprints, etc., but there was no evidence that an employee of plaintiff’s
was involved.
F8 CompetitiveAdvantage (p)
Description: Defendant’s access to plaintiff’s product information saved it time or ex-
pense.
This factor shows that defendant may have used plaintiff’s information and usurped a
competitive advantage. Also, it shows that plaintiff’s information was valuable for plain-
tiff’s business.
The factor applies if: It was documented that defendant developed its product at lower
cost or in less time than it took plaintiff.
The factor does not apply if: All we know is that the information afforded plaintiff a
competitive advantage (e.g., by enabling it to manufacture a product that was superior to
the products made by competitors). Or if all we know is that plaintiff spent considerable
time and money in developing the information.
F10 SecretsDisclosedOutsiders (d)
Description: Plaintiff disclosed its product information to outsiders.
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This factor shows that plaintiff’s information was known in the industry or available from
sources outside plaintiff’s business. Also, it shows that plaintiff showed a lack of interest
in maintaining the secrecy of its information.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff disclosed its product information for example to licensees,
customers, suppliers, subcontractors, etc.
The factor does not apply if: Plaintiff published the information in a public forum. (In
that situation, F27 applies.) All we know is that plaintiff marketed a product from which
the information could be ascertained by reverse engineering.
F11 VerticalKnowledge (d)
Description: Plaintiff’s information is about customers and suppliers (which means that
it may be available independently from customers or even in directories).
This factor shows that defendant obtained or could have obtained its information by legit-
imate means.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff’s information consists of customer information such as
customer lists or information about customer business methods.
F12 OutsiderDisclosuresRestricted (p)
Description: Plaintiff’s disclosures to outsiders were subject to confidentiality restric-
tions.
This factor shows that the information apparently was not known or available outside
plaintiff’s business. Also, it shows that plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy of its
information.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff required that outsiders who received the information keep
it confidential or do not use it for any purpose other than for which it was given.
The factor does not apply if: All we know is that plaintiff restricted the number of
disclosees or the extent of the information that was disclosed.
F13 NoncompetitionAgreement (p)
Description: Plaintiff and defendant entered into a noncompetition agreement.
This factor shows that defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the information
would be a breach of confidentiality.
The factor applies if: Defendant entered into an agreement, promising not to compete
with plaintiff or work for a competitor after termination of his or her employment by
plaintiff.
F14 RestrictedMaterialsUsed (p)
Description: Defendant used materials that were subject to confidentiality restrictions.
This factor shows that defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the information
would be a breach of confidentiality. Also, it shows that defendant may have acquired
plaintiff’s information through questionable means.
The factor applies if: Defendant used documents or materials that plaintiff had marked
as confidential or that were subject to a confidentiality agreement between plaintiff and
defendant.
Appendix D. U.S. Trade Secrets Factors Definitions 228
F15 UniqueProduct (p)
Description: Plaintiff was the only manufacturer making the product.
This factor shows that the information apparently was not known or available outside
plaintiff’s business. Also, it shows that plaintiff’s information was valuable for plaintiff’s
business.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff’s product or process was unique on the market or industry,
or had marketable features not found in competitors’ products.
F16 InfoReverseEngineerable (d)
Description: Plaintiff’s product information could be learned by reverseengineering.
This factor shows that plaintiff’s information was known in the industry or available from
sources outside plaintiff’s business.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff’s information could be ascertained by reverse engineering,
that is, by inspecting or analyzing plaintiff’s product (regardless of whether defendant
actually obtained the information in this way).
F17 InfoIndependentlyGenerated (d)
Description: Defendant developed its product by independent research.
This factor shows that defendant’s information was the result of independent development
efforts and investment. Also, it shows that defendant apparently obtained its information
by fair means.
The factor applies if: Defendant developed its product or information independently,
without recourse to plaintiff’s information.
F18 IdenticalProducts (p)
Description: Defendant’s product was identical to plaintiff’s.
This factor shows that defendant may have used plaintiff’s information and usurped a
competitive advantage.
F19 NoSecurityMeasures (d)
Description: Plaintiff did not adopt any security measures.
This factor shows that plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining the secrecy of its
information.
The factor does not apply if: Plaintiff took at least some security measures, even if other
security measures were not taken, or if there is no information about security measures.
Or if all we know is that plaintiff disclosed its information to defendant or to outsiders.
(In those situations, F1 and F10 apply, respectively.)
F20 InfoKnownToCompetitors (d)
Description: Plaintiff’s information was known to competitors.
This factor shows that plaintiff’s information was known in the industry or available from
sources outside plaintiff’s business.
The factor applies if: The information plaintiff claims as its trade secret is general knowl-
edge in the industry or trade.
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The factor does not apply if: Competitors’ knowledge of plaintiff’s information results
solely from disclosures made by plaintiff. (In this situation, F10 applies.) Or if the infor-
mation could be compiled from publicly available sources, but there was no evidence that
competitors had actually done so. (In this situation, F24 applies.)
F21 KnewInfoConfidential (p)
Description: Defendant knew that plaintiff’s information was confidential.
This factor shows that defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the information
would be a breach of confidentiality.
The factor applies if: Defendant knew that plaintiff intended its information to be treated
as confidential (regardless of how defendant had come to know this).
The factor does not apply if: Defendant entered into a nondisclosure agreement with
plaintiff, but there is no evidence that defendant knew specifically which information was
to be treated as confidential. (In that situation, F4 applies.)
F22 InvasiveTechniques (p)
Description: Defendant used invasive techniques to gain access to plaintiff’s information.
This factor shows that defendant may have acquired plaintiff’s information through ques-
tionable means.
The factor applies if: Defendant used invasive methods in a deliberate attempt to ob-
tain plaintiff’s information. These may be illegal methods, such as theft, surreptitious
methods, such as rifling through trash or eavesdropping, methods devised specifically to
circumvent security measures, methods against which it would be very difficult to guard,
such as aerial photography, etc.
The factor does not apply if: Defendant tried to bribe plaintiff’s employees to disclose
confidential information. (In this situation, F2 applies.) Defendant obtained copies of
documents, blueprints, tools, etc. via a (former) employee of plaintiff’s. (In this situation,
F7 applies.)
F23 WaiverOfConfidentiality (d)
Description: Plaintiff entered into an agreement waiving confidentiality.
This factor shows that there was an explicit disclaimer of confidentiality. Also, it shows
that it was not the case that defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the informa-
tion would be a breach of confidentiality. Also, that plaintiff showed a lack of interest in
maintaining the secrecy of its information.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff acknowledged that defendant did not receive any infor-
mation in confidence.
F24 InfoObtainableElsewhere (d)
Description: The information could be obtained from publicly available sources.
This factor shows that plaintiff’s information was known in the industry or available from
sources outside plaintiff’s business.
The factor does not apply if: Plaintiff’s information was general knowledge in the
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industry. (In that situation, F20 applies.) Or if plaintiff’s information could be discovered
by reverse engineering plaintiff’s product. (In that situation, F16 applies.)
F25 InfoReverseEngineered (d)
Description: Defendant discovered plaintiff’s information through reverse engineering.
This factor shows that defendant apparently obtained its information by fair means.
The factor applies if: Defendant reverse engineered plaintiff’s product (i.e., examined or
analyzed the product to find out its constituent parts or the process by which it was made).
F26 Deception (p)
Description: Defendant obtained plaintiff’s information through deception.
This factor shows that defendant may have acquired plaintiff’s information through ques-
tionable means.
The factor applies if: Defendant deceived plaintiff so as to gain access to its information,
or was otherwise dishonest in its dealings with plaintiff.
F27 DisclosureInPublicForum (d)
Description: Plaintiff disclosed its information in a public forum.
This factor shows that plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining the secrecy of
its information. Also, it shows that plaintiff’s information was known in the industry or
available from sources outside plaintiff’s business.
The factor applies if: Plaintiff made presentations about its information during meetings
that were open to the general public, for example, scientific seminars, trade shows, etc.
Also if plaintiff published its information in magazine articles, trade publications, public-
ity material, patents, etc.
The factor does not apply if: Plaintiff disclosed its information to specific outsiders.
(In that situation, F10 applies.)
Appendix E
Automobile Exception Factors
Definitions
This appendix presents the identification and definitions of 2 issues (Section E.1), 13 abstract
factors (Section E.2) and 31 base-level factors (Section E.3) for the Automobile Exception to the
Fourth Amendment domain listed below, together with their associated plaintiff and defendant
conclusions as indicated by (p) or (d).
E.1 Legal Issues
I1:Exigency (p)
There is sufficient urgency to allow the plaintiff to search the automobile without obtain-
ing a warrant under the automobile exception to the fourth amendment.
I2:Privacy (d)
There is enough expectation of privacy to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile.
E.2 Abstract Factors
AF2-0-2:ProbableCauseSearchVehicle (p)
The factor is applied when a notification has been received from an authorized origin
source about a crime or any other urgent situation that requires immediate search without
first obtaining a warrant.
AF2-0-3:ExpectationOfPrivacyInUseRequired(PrivacyRights) (d)
The factor is applied when the searching place or object have a high expectation of privacy
that prohibits searching without first obtaining a warrant. That involves any residential
area, a place that has some accommodation properties and is not under any exception to
the fourth amendment rule, or personal effects in a private container.
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AF1-0-1:Mobile (p)
This factor involves any object that is able to move quickly because it has an engine or
wheels (such as automobiles and vessels, including towable wagons or vehicles), or that
is able to be moved by a person (for example,large containers or small, easily moved
containers).
AF1-0-2:EaseWarrant (d)
This factor tests the possibility of obtaining a warrant under the current circumstances.
This involves the distance to the closest court and the availability of the magistrate as well
as the authority of the available magistrate.
AF1-0-3:SubjectToInspectionRegulation (p)
The mobile object is under inspection regulation and thus it can be searched without first
obtaining a warrant giving a certain procedure.
AF1-0-4:VisibilityOfItem (p)
The defendants object is placed in a visible area that makes it possible for anyone to see
what is inside the automobile.
AF1-0-5:ExigencyWhenApproached (p)
This factor determines the level of urgency when reaching the automobile by checking if
the automobile is moving quickly on the highway, or is parked in a private parking lot or
in the middle of the town but is capable of moving at any time.
AF1-2-1:AuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause (p)
The notification of the probable cause to search was received from an authorized per-
son through a proper method: either receiving information, observing the defendant, or
through the normal regulations.
AF1-2-2:UrgentReasonToSearch (p)
This factor specifies the reason for the search, e.g. when there is a crime, a robbery,
or transportation and distribution of illegal substances that requires immediate action to
protect the public.
AF1-2-3:LegalSearchScope (p)
This factor determines the allowed searching areas and places that agent officers can
search without obtaining a warrant.
AF1-3-1:PrivateContentsCarriage (d)
The defendant is carrying private materials (e.g. papers or personal effects) in the con-
tainer placed in the automobile.
AF1-3-2:Residence (d)
The searched area has the main requirements for a residential dwelling, e.g. connected to
water, gas or electricity.
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AF1-3-3:Accommodation (d)
The searched area shows some home properties and is not capable of moving quickly,
which indicates that the defendant is using it for accommodation purposes.
E.3 Base-Level Factors
BF-01-1:Automobile (p)
The defendant’s automobile refers to any type of vehicle that has an engine and wheels,
making it capable of moving quickly.
The factor applies if: car, truck, tractor, lorry, limo, van, motorhome etc.
BF-01-2:Vessel (p)
The defendant’s mobile vehicle is a vessel, which can be any sail-powered or motor-driven
boat or ship.
The factor applies if: motorboat, sailboat, rowboat, ship, jet skis.
BF-01-3:Towable (p)
The defendant’s vehicle is other than a motor vehicle, designed for habitation, industrial,
professional, or commercial purposes, for carrying property on its own structure, and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle.
The factor applies if: box trailers, horse trailers, wagon, cart etc.
BF-01-4:LargeContainer (p)
This defendant’s mobile object is a large, sometimes heavy, container that is not easy to
hold.
The factor applies if: large goods container, footlocker, large baggage etc.
BF-01-5:MovableContainer (p)
This refers to small and easy-to-hold containers that can be found inside the defendant’s
automobile.
The factor applies if: wallet, pouch, paper bag, briefcase, suitcase etc.
BF-02-1:AuthorityOfAvailableMagistrate) (d)
The warrant is issued by a neutral, detached (unauthorized) magistrate.
The factor applies if: neutral detached magistrate.
The factor does not apply if: authorized magistrate.
BF-02-2:RiskofLosingEvidence (p)
This involves any situations where obtaining a warrant might cause loss of evidence.
Appendix E. Automobile Exception Factors Definitions 234
The factor applies if: farCourt.
The factor does not apply if: nearbyCourt.
BF-02-3:AvailabilityofMagistrate (d)
This factor refers to the searching time and court type where the plaintiffs authorized mag-
istrate is available.
The factor applies if: workingTime.
The factor does not apply if: overnight.
BF-03-1:Licence (p)
Every automobile driver should have a licence; the licence’s factor refers to the type of
licence issued for this vehicle or driver.
The factor applies if: vehicle licence , motorhome special licence, truck licence.
The factor does not apply if: if no license is required for a mobile object.
BF-03-2:RestrictedArea (d)
Automobile exception warrantless search is not allowed in some restricted areas that re-
quire high privacy or certain procedures.
The factor applies if: home, policeStation, airport.
The factor does not apply if: highways, borderCrossing.
BF-04-1:OnPublicView (p)
The defendant has not protected the object from being visible. The object is visible to the
public.
The factor applies if: the object for example is on the vehicles front seat and the window
curtains are not down.
The factor does not apply if: the object is in any other place that cannot be seen by the
public.
BF-04-2:CanBeseen (p)
The object placed inside the vehicle is not meant to be on public view but it can be seen
by the public.
The factor applies if: the object is on the floor, or in a transparent bag.
The factor does not apply if: the object is in any other place that cannot be seen by the
public.
BF-04-3:CanotBeSeen (d)
The defendant has protected the object from being visible to the public.
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The factor applies if: glove box, car boot or car trunk, living compartment, opaque con-
tainer.
The factor does not apply if: the object is placed in a visible place.
BF-05-1:UrgentStatus (p)
The factor describes any situation when the evidence might be lost.
The factor applies if: the automobile is moving, or it is parked in a public parking space
but is capable of moving quickly at any time.
The factor does not apply if: the automobile is crashed and not capable of moving
BF-05-2:CapableToMove (p)
The automobile is stopped or parked but has all the supporting properties that make it
capable of moving quickly.
The factor applies if: for example the automobile driver is inside the vehicle i.e. the
vehicle is occupied, the vehicle curtains are open, or there is a motive force.
The factor does not apply if: the vehicle is crashed, no driver inside the vehicle.
BF-05-3:PublicParking (p)
The vehicle is parked in a public parking lot, which means that no privacy measures are
expected.
The factor applies if: an automobile is on the highway, or parked in a public parking lot.
The factor does not apply if: an automobile is parked inside a dwelling area or on the
owners land, or in a private parking lot.
BF-05-4:PublicLocation (p)
In addition to the parking type, the location specifies where exactly the automobile is
parked or moving.
The factor applies if: an automobile is parked in a downtown or public parking location.
The factor does not apply if: an automobile is parked in a dwelling area, whether that
be urban residential, suburban or rural.
BF-05-5:PermittedDuration (p)
The factor expresses the allowed parking time for the automobile to determine whether it
is used as a private dwelling or as a vehicle.
The factor applies if: an automobile is parked for short time.
The factor does not apply if: an automobile is parked overnight, for a long stay or an
unknown time.
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BF-21-1:Information (p)
The factor specifies the origin of notification of any suspicious automobile driver.
The factor applies if: information is received from the public or another agent officer.
The factor does not apply if: there is no notified information.
BF-21-2:Observation (p)
Suspicious behavior is observed before being notified.
The factor applies if: the behaviour is witnessed by observers from the public or an agent
officer.
The factor does not apply if: a description of the behaviour was obtained from informa-
tion or by following a specific procedure.
BF-21-3:Procedure (p)
A warrantless search is applied by following a certain automobile procedure.
The factor applies if: an automobile is parked in a multiple parking lot, normal inspec-
tion regulation, incident arrest.
The factor does not apply if: the origin of purpose was from information received or
observation.
BF-22-1:PublicSafety (p)
The factor refers to the cause that required urgent search action without obtaining a war-
rant.
The factor applies if: there is a weapon inside the automobile, or the driver is transport-
ing or selling illegal substances.
The factor does not apply if: normal procedural checking.
BF-22-1:Crime (p)
The factor describes that the cause of the immediate search is a certain crime situation.
The factor applies if: for example, knowing that there is smuggling, dealing, a murder
has occurred inside the car, or the driver is involved in a robbery.
The factor does not apply if: another reason that is not a crime.
BF-23-1:wholeVehicle (p)
A warrantless search is applied to all parts of the automobile.
The factor applies if: all automobile parts.
The factor does not apply if: there is only a specific container within the automobile.
BF-23-2:OnlyVehicleContainer (p)
A warrantless search is applied only to part(s) of the vehicle but not the entire vehicle.
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The factor applies if: car trunk, glove compartment only are searched.
The factor does not apply if: the whole automobile is searched.
BF-23-3:SearchPlace (p)
The factor refers to the legal place or location area to search the automobile.
The factor applies if: police station, a garage, automobile public location.
The factor does not apply if: any other private areas.
BF-31-1:GoodsCarried (d)
The factor specifies the type of private contents inside a container.
The factor applies if: personal effects, papers, commercial items, money.
The factor does not apply if: weapons, illegal substances.
BF-31-2:ProtectionType (d)
Efforts to protect the mobile container from begin opened by someone else.
The factor applies if: locked, double locked.
The factor does not apply if: no effort is required because the container is open, or
closed normally.
BF-32-1:ConnectedServices (d)
The defendant’s automobile is connected to certain living services.
The factor applies if: gas, electricity, water.
The factor does not apply if: the automobile is not connected to any services.
BF-33-1:AccommodationSpaces (d)
The defendant’s automobile has a specific space that is suitable for accommodation.
The factor applies if: the automobile has a suitable accommodation space.
The factor does not apply if: the automobile has a cab area only.
BF-33-2:RoomsFunction (d)
The factor specifies whether there are any room features inside the automobile.
The factor applies if: bed, bathroom, kitchen, living room
The factor does not apply if: there are no room features.

Appendix F
ANGELIC Secrets Prolog Program
and Results
This appendix demonstrates the Prolog program for the US Trade Secrets domain, showing the
output from 32 cases. Some further brief details about the program are provided in Section F.1,
while the results are shown in Section F.2.
F.1 Program
The Prolog program starts with the knowledge base of the case representation. Each case con-
sists of two parameters: the case name; and a list of the base level factors representing the case.
The procedure go(C):-case(C,Factors) holds the case C and the factors of Factors and starts
navigating between the abstract factors. The existence of an abstract factor is determined by
the existence of one or more of its children (base factors) in the list Factors according to the
defined acceptance conditions in Chapter 5. If the abstract factor is satisfied, a report describ-
ing the factor is written, and the abstract factor is added to the list Factors. Every factor ends
with a default procedure that reports the default status of the abstract factor in the running case.
After examining all the abstract factors and issues, the final case decision is determined by the
root (Trade Secrets Misappropriation) in getf100(C,Factors) and the results are validated in the
finish procedure by comparing the obtained result with the case actual result in the result fact
determined at the beginning of the program.
%Cases knowledge base
1 case(arco,[f10, f16,f20]).
2 case(boeing,[f4,f6,f12,f14,f21,f1,f10]).
3 case(bryce,[f4,f6,f18,f21,f1]).
4 case(collegeWatercolour,[f15,f26,f1]).
5 case(denTalEz,[f4,f6,f21,f26,f1]).
6 case(ecolgix,[f21,f1,f19,f23]).
7 case(emery,[f18,f21,f10]).
8 case(ferranti,[f2,f17,f19,f20,f27]).
9 case(robinson,[f18,f26,f1,f10,f19]).
10 case(sandlin,[f1,f10,f16,f19,f27]).
11 case(sheets,[f18,f19,f27]).
12 case(spaceAero,[f8,f15,f18,f1,f19]).
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13 case(televation, [f6,f12,f15,f18,f21,f10,f16]).
14 case(yokana,[f7,f10,f16,f27]).
15 case(cm1,[f4,f6,f20,f17,f16,f10,f27]).
16 case(digitalDevelopment,[f6,f8,f15,f18,f21,f1]).
17 case(fmc,[f4,f6,f7,f12,f10,f11]).
18 case(forrest,[f6,f15,f21,f1]).
19 case(goldberg,[f21,f1,f10,f27]).
20 case(kg,[f6,f14,f15,f18,f21,f16,f25]).
21 case(laser,[f6,f12,f21,f1,f10]).
22 case(lewis,[f8,f21,f1]).
23 case(mbl,[f4,f6,f13,f5,f10,f20]).
24 case(mason,[f6,f15,f21,f1,f16]).
25 case(mineralDeposits,[f18,f14,f1,f16,f25]).
26 case(nationalInstruments, [f18,f21,f1]).
27 case(nationalRejectors,[f7,f15,f18,f10,f16,f19,f27]).
28 case(reinforced,[f4,f6,f8,f15,f21,f1]).
29 case(scientology,[f4,f6,f12,f10,f11,f20]).
30 case(technicon,[f6,f12,f14,f21,f10,f16,f25]).
31 case(trandes,[f4,f6,f12,f1,f10]).
32 case(valcoCincinnati,[f6,f12,f15,f21,f1,f10]).
% “result” procedure is called by “finish” procedure at the end of the program to compare
between the program output and the actual case decision
1 result(arco,d).
2 result(boeing,p).
3 result(bryce,p).
4 result(collegeWatercolour,p).
5 result(denTalEz,p).
6 result(ecolgix,d).
7 result(emery,p).
8 result(ferranti,d).
9 result(robinson,d).
10 result(sandlin,d).
11 result(sheets,d).
12 result(spaceAero,p).
13 result(televation,p).
14 result(yokana,d).
15 result(cm1,d).
16 result(digitalDevelopment,p).
17 result(fmc,p).
18 result(forrest,p).
19 result(goldberg,p).
20 result(kg,p).
21 result(laser,p).
22 result(lewis,p).
23 result(mbl,d).
24 result(mason,p).
25 result(mineralDeposits,p).
26 result(nationalInstruments,p).
27 result(nationalRejectors,d).
28 result(reinforced,p).
29 result(scientology,d).
30 result(technicon,p).
31 result(trandes,p).
32 result(valcoCincinnati,p).
% Retrieve the case factors and navigate between factors
1 go(C):-case(C,Factors),
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2 getf124(C,Factors).
3
4 getf124(C,Factors):-member(f3,Factors),
5 write([defendant,is,owner,of,secret]),nl,
6 getf123(C,[f124|Factors]).
7 getf124(C,Factors):- write([defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]),nl,
8 getf123(C,Factors).
9
10
11 getf123(C,Factors):-member(f12,Factors),
12 write([efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]),nl,
13 getf122(C,[f123|Factors]).
14 getf123(C,Factors):-write([no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]),nl,
15 getf122(C,Factors).
16
17 getf122(C,Factors):-member(f4,Factors),
18 write([efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]),nl,
19 getf121(C,[f122|Factors]).
20 getf122(C,Factors):-write([no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]),nl,
21 getf121(C,Factors).
22
23 getf121(C,Factors):-member(f4,Factors), not(member(f23,Factors)),
24 write([there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]),nl,
25 getf115(C,[f121|Factors]).
26 getf121(C,Factors):-write([there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]),nl,
27 getf115(C,Factors).
28
29
30 getf120(C,Factors):-member(f105,Factors),
31 write([the,information,was,legitimately,obtained]),nl,
32 getf110(C,[f120|Factors]).
33 getf120(C,Factors):-write([the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]),nl,
34 getf110(C,Factors).
35
36
37 getf115(C,Factors):-member(f21,Factors),
38 write([defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]),nl,
39 getf114(C,[f115|Factors]).
40 getf115(C,Factors):-member(f21,Factors),
41 write([defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]),nl,
42 getf114(C,[f115|Factors]).
43 getf115(C,Factors):-member(f4,Factors),
44 write([defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]),nl,
45 getf114(C,[f115|Factors]).
46 getf115(C,Factors):-member(f14,Factors),
47 write([defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]),nl,
48 getf114(C,[f115|Factors]).
49 getf115(C,Factors):-member(f13,Factors),
50 write([defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]),nl,
51 getf114(C,[f115|Factors]).
52 getf115(C,Factors):-write([defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]),nl,
53 getf114(C,Factors).
54
55 getf114(C,Factors):-member(f115,Factors),
56 write([there,was,a,confidential,relationship]),nl,
57 getf112(C,[f114|Factors]).
58 getf114(C,Factors):-member(f121,Factors),
59 write([there,was,a,confidential,relationship]),nl,
60 getf112(C,[f114|Factors]).
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61 getf114(C,Factors):-write([there,was,no,confidential,relationship]),nl,
62 getf112(C,Factors).
63
64
65 getf112(C,Factors):-member(f7,Factors),
66 write([the,information,was,used]),nl,
67 getf111(C,[f112|Factors]).
68 getf112(C,Factors):-member(f18,Factors),
69 write([the,information,was,used]),nl,
70 getf111(C,[f112|Factors]).
71 getf112(C,Factors):-member(f8,Factors),
72 write([the,information,was,used]),nl,
73 getf111(C,[f112|Factors]).
74 getf112(C,Factors):-member(f17,Factors),
75 write([the,information,was,not,used]),nl,
76 getf111(C,Factors).
77 getf112(C,Factors):-write([the,information,was,used]),nl,
78 getf111(C,[f112|Factors]).
79
80
81 getf111(C,Factors):-member(f25,Factors),
82 write([questionable,means,were,not,used]),nl,
83 getf120(C,Factors).
84 getf111(C,Factors):-member(f17,Factors),
85 write([questionable,means,were,not,used]),nl,
86 getf120(C,Factors).
87 getf111(C,Factors):-member(f22,Factors),
88 write([questionable,means,were,used]),nl,
89 getf120(C,[f111|Factors]).
90 getf111(C,Factors):-member(f2,Factors),
91 write([questionable,means,were,used]),nl,
92 getf120(C,[f111|Factors]).
93 getf111(C,Factors):-member(f26,Factors),
94 write([questionable,means,were,used]),nl,
95 getf120(C,[f111|Factors]).
96 getf111(C,Factors):-member(f14,Factors),
97 write([questionable,means,were,used]),nl,
98 getf120(C,[f111|Factors]).
99 getf111(C,Factors):-not(member(f1,Factors)),
100 write([questionable,means,were,not,used]),nl,
101 getf120(C,Factors).
102 getf111(C,Factors):-write([questionable,means,were,not,used]),nl,
103 getf120(C,Factors).
104
105
106 getf110(C,Factors):-member(f120,Factors),
107 write([improper,means,were,not,used]),nl,
108 getf108(C,Factors).
109 getf110(C,Factors):-member(f111,Factors),
110 write([improper,means,were,used]),nl,
111 getf108(C,[f110|Factors]).
112 getf110(C,Factors):-write([improper,means,were,not,used]),nl,
113 getf108(C,Factors).
114
115
116 % exclude when restricted materials used
117 getf108(C,Factors):-member(f16,Factors),member(f14,Factors),
118 write([the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]),nl,
119 getf106(C,Factors).
Appendix F. U.S. Trade Secrets Prolog Program and Results 243
120 % exclude when identical products
121 getf108(C,Factors):-member(f16,Factors),member(f18,Factors),
122 write([the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]),nl,
123 getf106(C,Factors).
124 getf108(C,Factors):-member(f16,Factors),
125 write([the,information,was,available,elsewhere]),nl,
126 getf106(C,[f108|Factors]).
127 getf108(C,Factors):-member(f24,Factors),
128 write([the,information,was,available,elsewhere]),nl,
129 getf106(C,[f108|Factors]).
130 getf108(C,Factors):-write([the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]),nl,
131 getf106(C,Factors).
132
133
134 getf106(C,Factors):-member(f15,Factors),
135 write([information,is,not,known]),nl,
136 getf105(C,Factors).
137 getf106(C,Factors):-member(f20,Factors),
138 write([information,is,known]),nl,
139 getf105(C,[f106|Factors]).
140 getf106(C,Factors):-write([information,is,not,known]),nl,
141 getf105(C,Factors).
142
143
144 getf105(C,Factors):-member(f108,Factors),
145 write([the,information,was,known,or,available]),nl,
146 getf104(C,[f105|Factors]).
147 getf105(C,Factors):-member(f106,Factors),
148 write([the,information,was,known,or,available]),nl,
149 getf104(C,[f105|Factors]).
150 getf105(C,Factors):-
151 write([the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]),nl,
152 getf104(C,Factors).
153
154 getf104(C,Factors):-member(f15,Factors),
155 write([the,information,was,valuable]),nl,
156 getf102(C,[f104|Factors]).
157 getf104(C,Factors):-member(f8,Factors),
158 write([the,information,was,valuable]),nl,
159 getf102(C,[f104|Factors]).
160 getf104(C,Factors):-member(f105,Factors),
161 write([the,information,was,not,valuable]),nl,
162 getf102(C,Factors).
163 getf104(C,Factors):-write([the,information,was,valuable]),nl,
164 getf102(C,[f104|Factors]).
165
166 getf102(C,Factors):-member(f6,Factors),
167 write([efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]),nl,
168 getf101(C,[f102|Factors]).
169 getf102(C,Factors):-member(f122,Factors),
170 write([efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]),nl,
171 getf101(C,[f102|Factors]).
172 getf102(C,Factors):-member(f123,Factors),
173 write([efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]),nl,
174 getf101(C,[f102|Factors]).
175 getf102(C,Factors):-member(f19,Factors),
176 write([no,efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]),nl,
177 getf101(C,Factors).
178 getf102(C,Factors):-
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179 write([efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]),nl,
180 getf101(C,[f102|Factors]).
181
182 getf101(C,Factors):-member(f102,Factors),member(f104,Factors),
183 not(member(f105,Factors)),
184 write([information,was,a,trade,secret]),nl,
185 getf100(C,[f101|Factors]).
186 getf101(C,Factors):-
187 write([information,was,not,a,trade,secret]),nl,
188 getf100(C,Factors).
189
190 getf100(C,Factors):-member(f124,Factors),
191 write([no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]),nl,
192 write([find,for,defendant]),nl,
193 finish(C,Factors,d).
194 getf100(C,Factors):-member(f101,Factors),member(f110,Factors),
195 write([a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]),nl,
196 write([find,for,plaintiff]),nl,
197 finish(C,[f100|Factors],p).
198 getf100(C,Factors):-member(f101,Factors),member(f114,Factors),
199 member(f112,Factors),
200 write([a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]),nl,
201 write([find,for,plaintiff]),nl,
202 finish(C,[f100|Factors],p).
203 getf100(C,Factors):-
204 write([no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]),nl,
205 write([find,for,defendant]),nl,
206 finish(C,Factors,d).
% Comparing between the decision from the program output and the case actual decision.
1 finish(C,Factors,R):-write(C),write(Factors),nl,
2 result(C,R),write(correct),nl.
3 finish(C,Factors,R):-write(C),write(Factors),nl,
4 write(wrong),nl.
F.2 Results
To obtain the case decision, the user calls the case using go(case name). The output from each
case provides the decision justification as a result from the factor reports, and the case decision:
find for plaintiff,or, find for defendant. The list below illustrates the output from the 32 cases.
As stated in Chapter 6, the output from the incorrect cases, SpaceAero and Mason, clarifies the
difference between the actual decision and the program decision.
Arco
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
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[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,known]
[the,information,was,known,or,available]
[the,information,was,not,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
arco[f102,f105,f106,f108,f112,f10,f16,f20]
correct
Boeing
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
boeing[f100,f101,f102,f104,f110,f111,f112,f114,f115,
f121,f122,f123,f4,f6,f12,f14,f21,f1,f10]
correct
Bryce
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
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[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
bryce[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f121,f122,
f4,f6,f18,f21,f1]
correct
CollegeWatercolour
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
collegeWatercolour[f100,f101,f102,f104,f110,f111,f112,
f15,f26,f1]
correct
DenTalEz
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[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
denTalEz[f100,f101,f102,f104,f110,f111,f112,f114,f115,
f121,f122,f4,f6,f21,f26,f1]
correct
Ecolgix
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[no,efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
ecolgix[f104,f112,f114,f115,f21,f1,f19,f23]
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correct
Emery
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
emery[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f18,f21,f10]
correct
Ferranti
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,not,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,known]
[the,information,was,known,or,available]
[the,information,was,not,valuable]
[no,efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
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[find,for,defendant]
ferranti[f105,f106,f2,f17,f19,f20,f27]
correct
Robinson
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[no,efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
robinson[f104,f110,f111,f112,f18,f26,f1,f10,f19]
correct
Sandlin
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,known,or,available]
[the,information,was,not,valuable]
[no,efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
Appendix F. U.S. Trade Secrets Prolog Program and Results 250
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
sandlin[f105,f108,f112,f1,f10,f16,f19,f27]
correct
Sheets
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[no,efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
sheets[f104,f112,f18,f19,f27]
correct
SpaceAero
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
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[the,information,was,valuable]
[no,efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
spaceAero[f104,f112,f8,f15,f18,f1,f19]
spaceAero[f104,f112,f8,f15,f18,f1,f19]
wrong
Televation
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
televation[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f123,f6,
f12,f15,f18,f21,f10,f16]
correct
Yokana
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
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[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,known,or,available]
[the,information,was,not,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
yokana[f102,f105,f108,f112,f7,f10,f16,f27]
correct
CM1
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,not,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,known]
[the,information,was,known,or,available]
[the,information,was,not,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
cm1[f102,f105,f106,f108,f114,f115,f121,f122,f4,f6,f20,
f17,f16,f10,f27]
correct
DigitalDevelopment
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
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[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
digitalDevelopment[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,
f6,f8,f15,f18,f21,f1]
correct
FMC
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
fmc[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f121,f122,f123,
f4,f6,f7,f12,f10,f11]
correct
Forrest
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
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[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
forrest[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f6,f15,f21,f1]
correct
Goldberg
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
goldberg[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f21,f1,f10,f27]
correct
Kg
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[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
kg[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f6,f14,f15,f18,
f21,f16,f25]
correct
Laser
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
laser[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f123,f6,f12,
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f21,f1,f10]
correct
Lewis
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
lewis[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f8,f21,f1]
correct
MBL
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,known]
[the,information,was,known,or,available]
[the,information,was,not,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
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[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
mbl[f102,f105,f106,f112,f114,f115,f121,f122,f4,f6,f13,f5,f10,f20]
correct
Mason
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,known,or,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
mason[f102,f104,f105,f108,f112,f114,f115,f6,f15,f21,f1,f16]
mason[f102,f104,f105,f108,f112,f114,f115,f6,f15,f21,f1,f16]
wrong
MineralDeposits
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
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[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
mineralDeposits[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,
f18,f14,f1,f16,f25]
correct
NationalInstruments
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
nationalInstruments[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,
f115,f18,f21,f1]
correct
NationalRejectors
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,not,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,no,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
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[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[no,efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
nationalRejectors[f104,f112,f7,f15,f18,f10,f16,f19,f27]
correct
Reinforced
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
reinforced[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f121,
f122,f4,f6,f8,f15,f21,f1]
correct
Scientology
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
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[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,known]
[the,information,was,known,or,available]
[the,information,was,not,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,not,a,trade,secret]
[no,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,defendant]
scientology[f102,f105,f106,f112,f114,f115,f121,f122,
f123,f4,f6,f12,f10,f11,f20]
correct
Technicon
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
technicon[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f123,
f6,f12,f14,f21,f10,f16,f25]
correct
Trandes
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
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[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,a,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
trandes[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,f121,f122,
f123,f4,f6,f12,f1,f10]
correct
ValcoCincinnati
[defendant,is,not,owner,of,secret]
[efforts,made,vis,a,vis,outsiders]
[no,efforts,made,vis,a,vis,defendant]
[there,was,no,confidentiality,agreement]
[defendant,was,on,notice,of,confidentiality]
[there,was,a,confidential,relationship]
[the,information,was,used]
[questionable,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,legitimately,obtained]
[improper,means,were,not,used]
[the,information,was,not,available,elsewhere]
[information,is,not,known]
[the,information,was,neither,known,nor,available]
[the,information,was,valuable]
[efforts,were,taken,to,maintain,secrecy]
[information,was,a,trade,secret]
[a,trade,secret,was,misappropriated]
[find,for,plaintiff]
valcoCincinnati[f100,f101,f102,f104,f112,f114,f115,
f123,f6,f12,f15,f21,f1,f10]
correct

Appendix G
ANGELIC Animals Prolog Program
and Results
This Appendix demonstrates the Prolog program for the second legal domain, Wild Animals,
showing the output from five cases. As described in the US Trade Secret domain (Appendix F),
the program and results are illustrated in Section G.1 and Section G.2, respectively.
G.1 Program
The Prolog program starts with the knowledge base of the case representation. Each case con-
sists of two parameters: the case name; and a list of the base level factors representing the
case. The procedure go(C):-case(C,Factors) holds the case C and the factors of Factors and
starts navigating between the abstract factors. The existence of an abstract factor is determined
upon the existence of one or more of its children (base factors) in the list Factors according to
the defined acceptance conditions in Chapter 6. If the abstract factor is satisfied, a report de-
scribing the factor is written, and the abstract factor is added to the list Factors. Every factor
ends with a default procedure that reports the default status of the abstract factor in the running
case. After examining all the abstract factors and issues, the final case decision is determined at
getdecision(C,Factors).
%Cases knowledge base
1 case(keeble,[nc,ol,mal,n,ds,pliv]).
2 case(pierson,[nc,hp,imp,ps,vermin]).
3 case(young,[nc,hp,imp,pliv,dliv]).
4 case(ghen,[nc,con,nob,pliv,dliv]).
5 case(popov,[nc,hp,ass,nob,pg,dg]).
% Retrieve the case factors and navigate between factors
1 go(Case):-case(Case,Factors),
2 getCapture(Case,Factors).
3
4 getCapture(Case,Factors):-not(member(nc,Factors)),
5 write([the,plaintiff,had,captured,the,quarry]),nl,
6 getOwnership(Case,[capture|Factors]).
7 getCapture(Case,Factors):-member(vermin,Factors),
263
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8 member(hp,Factors),
9 write([the,plaintiff,had,captured,the,quarry]),nl,
10 getOwnership(Case,[capture|Factors]).
11 getCapture(Case,Factors):-
12 write([the,plaintiff,had,not,captured,the,quarry]),nl,
13 getOwnership(Case,Factors).
14
15 getOwnership(Case,Factors):-member(con,Factors),
16 write([the,plaintiff,owned,the,quarry]),nl,
17 getPMotive(Case,[owned|Factors]).
18 getOwnership(Case,Factors):-member(capture,Factors),
19 write([the,plaintiff,owned,the,quarry]),nl,
20 getPMotive(Case,[owned|Factors]).
21 getOwnership(Case,Factors):-
22 write([the,plaintiff,did,not,own,the,quarry]),nl,
23 getPMotive(Case,Factors).
24
25
26 getPMotive(Case,Factors):-member(pliv,Factors),
27 write([plaitiff,has,good,motive]),nl,
28 getDMotive(Case,[pMotive|Factors]).
29 getPMotive(Case,Factors):-member(ps,Factors),
30 not(member(dliv,Factors)),
31 write([plaitiff,has,good,motive]),nl,
32 getDMotive(Case,[pMotive|Factors]).
33 getPMotive(Case,Factors):-member(pg,Factors),
34 not(member(dliv,Factors)),
35 write([plaitiff,has,good,motive]),nl,
36 getDMotive(Case,[pMotive|Factors]).
37 getPMotive(Case,Factors):-write([plaitiff,has,no,good,motive]),nl,
38 getDMotive(Case,Factors).
39
40 getDMotive(Case,Factors):-member(mal,Factors),
41 write([defendant,has,no,good,motive]),nl,
42 getOwnLand(Case,Factors).
43 getDMotive(Case,Factors):-member(dliv,Factors),
44 write([defendant,has,good,motive]),nl,
45 getOwnLand(Case,[dMotive|Factors]).
46 getDMotive(Case,Factors):-member(ds,Factors),not(member(pliv,Factors)),
47 write([defendant,has,good,motive]),nl,
48 getOwnLand(Case,[dMotive|Factors]).
49 getDMotive(Case,Factors):-member(dg,Factors),
50 not(member(pliv,Factors)),
51 write([defendant,has,good,motive]),nl,
52 getOwnLand(Case,[dMotive|Factors]).
53 getDMotive(Case,Factors):-
54 write([defendant,has,no,good,motive]),nl,
55 getOwnLand(Case,Factors).
56
57 getOwnLand(Case,Factors):-member(ol,Factors),
58 write([plainiff,owned,the,land]),nl,
59 getrightToPursue(Case,[ownLand|Factors]).
60 getOwnLand(Case,Factors):-
61 write([plainiff,did,not,own,the,land]),nl,
62 getrightToPursue(Case,Factors).
63
64 getrightToPursue(Case,Factors):-member(ownLand,Factors),
65 write([plainiff,had,a,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]),nl,
66 getAntiSocial(Case,[rtToPursue|Factors]).
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67 getrightToPursue(Case,Factors):-member(pMotive,Factors),member(hp,Factors),
68 write([plainiff,had,a,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]),nl,
69 getAntiSocial(Case,[rtToPursue|Factors]).
70 getrightToPursue(Case,Factors):-member(pMotive,Factors),
71 not(member(dMotive,Factors)),
72 write([plaintiff,had,a,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]),nl,
73 getAntiSocial(Case,[rtToPursue|Factors]).
74 getrightToPursue(Case,Factors):-
75 write([plaintiff,had,no,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]),nl,
76 getAntiSocial(Case,Factors).
77
78
79 getAntiSocial(Case,Factors):-member(n,Factors),
80 write([defendant,committed,an,antisocial,act]),nl,
81 getTrespass(Case,[antiSocial|Factors]).
82 getAntiSocial(Case,Factors):-member(imp,Factors),
83 not(member(dMotive,Factors)),
84 write([defendant,committed,an,antisocial,act]),nl,
85 getTrespass(Case,[antiSocial|Factors]).
86 getAntiSocial(Case,Factors):-
87 write([defendant,committed,no,antisocial,acts]),nl,
88 getTrespass(Case,Factors).
89
90 getTrespass(Case,Factors):-member(ol,Factors),
91 member(antiSocial,Factors),
92 write([defendant,committed,trespass]),nl,
93 getIllegalAct(Case,[trepass|Factors]).
94 getTrespass(Case,Factors):-
95 write([defendant,committed,no,trespass]),nl,
96 getIllegalAct(Case,Factors).
97
98
99 getIllegalAct(Case,Factors):-member(ass,Factors),
100 write([an,illegal,act,was,committed]),nl,
101 getdecision(Case,[illegal|Factors]).
102 getIllegalAct(Case,Factors):-member(trepass,Factors),
103 write([an,illegal,act,was,committed]),nl,
104 getdecision(Case,[illegal|Factors]).
105 getIllegalAct(Case,Factors):-write([no,illegal,act,was,committed]),nl,
106 getdecision(Case,Factors).
% Generate the case decision
1
2 getdecision(Case,Factors):-member(owned,Factors),
3 write([find,for,the,plaintiff]),nl,
4 write([find,against,the,defendant]),nl,
5 finish(Case,Factors).
6 getdecision(Case,Factors):-member(rtToPursue,Factors),
7 member(illegal,Factors),
8 not(member(nob,Factors)),
9 write([find,for,the,plaintiff]),nl,
10 write([find,against,the,defendant]),nl,
11 finish(Case,Factors).
12 getdecision(Case,Factors):-member(rtToPursue,Factors),
13 member(illegal,Factors),
14 write([do,not,find,for,the,plaintiff]),nl,
15 write([the,defendant,did,not,act,illegally]),nl,
16 write([do,not,find,against,the,defendant]),nl,
17 finish(Case,Factors).
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18 getdecision(Case,Factors):-write([do,not,find,for,the,plaintiff]),nl,
19 write([find,for,the,defendant]),nl,
20
21 finish(Case,Factors).
22 finish(Case,Factors):-write(Case),write(Factors).
G.2 Results
Similar to the US Trade Secret domain, the case decision is obtained by calling go(case name).
The output from each case provides justification for the decision as a result of the factor reports,
and produces a case decision. Some case decisions in Wild animals cases are not found for the
plaintiff and not found for the defendant as in Popov (see the decision procedure above). As
stated in Chapter 6, all the five cases were decided correctly. The output below illustrates the
decisions for all cases.
Keeble
[the,plaintiff,had,not,captured,the,quarry]
[the,plaintiff,did,not,own,the,quarry]
[plaintiff,has,good,motive]
[defendant,has,no,good,motive]
[plaintiff,owned,the,land]
[plaintiff,had,a,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]
[defendant,committed,an,antisocial,act]
[defendant,committed,trespass]
[an,illegal,act,was,committed]
[find,for,the,plaintiff]
[find,against,the,defendant]
keeble[illegal,trepass,antiSocial,rtToPursue,ownLand,
pMotive,nc,ol,mal,n,ds,pliv]
true
Pierson
[the,plaintiff,had,not,captured,the,quarry]
[the,plaintiff,did,not,own,the,quarry]
[plaintiff,has,good,motive]
[defendant,has,no,good,motive]
[plaintiff,did,not,own,the,land]
[plaintiff,had,a,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]
[defendant,committed,an,antisocial,act]
[defendant,committed,no,trespass]
[no,illegal,act,was,committed]
[do,not,find,for,the,plaintiff]
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[find,for,the,defendant]
pierson[antiSocial,rtToPursue,pMotive,nc,hp,imp,ps,
vermin]
true.
Young
[the,plaintiff,had,not,captured,the,quarry]
[the,plaintiff,did,not,own,the,quarry]
[plaintiff,has,good,motive]
[defendant,has,good,motive]
[plaintiff,did,not,own,the,land]
[plaintiff,had,a,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]
[defendant,committed,no,antisocial,acts]
[defendant,committed,no,trespass]
[no,illegal,act,was,committed]
[do,not,find,for,the,plaintiff]
[find,for,the,defendant]
young[rtToPursue,dMotive,pMotive,nc,hp,imp,
pliv,dliv]
true
Ghen
[the,plaintiff,had,not,captured,the,quarry]
[the,plaintiff,owned,the,quarry]
[plaintiff,has,good,motive]
[defendant,has,good,motive]
[plaintiff,did,not,own,the,land]
[plaintiff,had,no,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]
[defendant,committed,no,antisocial,acts]
[defendant,committed,no,trespass]
[no,illegal,act,was,committed]
[find,for,the,plaintiff]
[find,against,the,defendant]
ghen[dMotive,pMotive,owned,nc,con,nob,
pliv,dliv]
true
Popov
[the,plaintiff,had,not,captured,the,quarry]
[the,plaintiff,did,not,own,the,quarry]
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[plaintiff,has,good,motive]
[defendant,has,good,motive]
[plaintiff,did,not,own,the,land]
[plaintiff,had,a,right,to,pursue,the,quarry]
[defendant,committed,no,antisocial,acts]
[defendant,committed,no,trespass]
[an,illegal,act,was,committed]
[do,not,find,for,the,plaintiff]
[the,defendant,did,not,act,illegally]
[do,not,find,against,the,defendant]
popov[illegal,rtToPursue,dMotive,pMotive,nc,hp,
ass,nob,pg,dg]
true
Appendix H
ANGELIC Automobile Prolog
Program and Results
This appendix presents the Prolog program and results for the Automobile Exception domain.
The analysis and the domain ADFs for 10 cases were provided in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
The program presented in this appendix will consider the inclusion of facts and the citation of
precedent cases in the ADF as shown in Section H.1 and how the program has been updated to
include the dissenting opinion rules in Section H.2. Finally the program output for the 10 cases
is demonstrated in Section H.3.
H.1 Program
The representation of the cases in the Automobile Exception domain considers the role of facts.
Instead of base factors, the Prolog program below considers the inclusion of facts in the domain
knowledge base. Each case consists of two parameters: the case name; and a list of the Facts
representing the case. A fact is represented as (ft) followed by the base factor number and
thefact initials (e.g. ft011c refers to a car (fact)for the automobile (base factor-BF011)). The
procedure go(C):-case(C,Facts) holds the case C and the facts of Facts and starts navigating
between the base factors first and then abstract factors. The existence of a factor is determined
by the existence of one or more of its children (facts) in the list Facts, according to the defined
acceptance conditions in Chapter 6. If the factor is satisfied, a report describing the factor is
written, and the factor is added to the list Factors. If the factor is determined from a precedent,
the report will cite the precedent case. Every factor ends with a default procedure that reports
the default status of the factor in the running case. After examining all the base and abstract
factors and issues, the final case decision is determined in decide(C,Issues,Factors).
% Cases knowledge base
1 case(cva,[ft011c,ft015pb,ft032ps,ft043b,ft051m,ft054hw,ft211pi,ft211po,ft221is,
2 ft232ct,ft233al,ft311is,ft312c]).
3 case(cvc,[ft011mh,ft015pb,ft022nc,ft031mh,ft032ps,ft051p,ft052dr,
4 ft053pl,ft054d,ft211pi,ft212po,ft221is,ft231all,ft233ps,ft233al,ft311is
5 ,ft312c,ft331c,ft331as,ft332bd,ft332k]).
6 case(usvr,[ft011c,ft015pb,ft032ps,ft051p,ft053pl,ft211pi,ft221is,ft231all,ft232ct,
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7 ft233al,ft233ps,ft311is,ft311m,ft312c]).
8 case(avs,[ft011c,ft014gc,ft015sc,ft032ap,ft043b,ft051m,ft211ao,ft221is,ft232ct,
9 ft311is,ft312c]).
10 case(usvc,[ft011c,ft014fl,ft032pl,ft043b,ft051p,ft053pl,ft211pi,ft221is,ft232ct,
11 ft233ps,ft311is,ft312dl]).
12 case(sdvo,[ft011c,ft015pb,ft043gb,ft051p,ft053pl,ft213po,ft221is,ft231all,
13 ft233al,ft311is]).
14 case(cvd,[ft011c,ft042t,ft043b,ft051c,ft053hw,ft053dw,ft213ri,ft222m,
15 ft231all,ft233g]).
16 case(cvnh,[ft011c,ft021na,ft051p,ft053dw,ft054dw,ft213ri,ft222m,ft231all]).
17 case(cvm,[ft011c,ft015w,ft051m,ft054hw,ft213ri,ft222r,ft231all]).
18 case(cvus,[ft011c,ft051m,ft211pi,ft221is,ft231all,ft233al,ft311is]).
% Retrieve the case factors and navigate between factors
1 go(C):-case(C,Facts),
2 getAutomobile(C,Facts,[]).
3
4 % BFc-01-1 Automobile
5 %car(c)
6 getAutomobile(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft011c,Facts), !,
7 write([it,is,a,vehicle,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
8 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,[bf011|Factors]).
9 %mobilehome (mh)
10 getAutomobile(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft011mh,Facts), !,
11 write([it,is,a,mobileHome,vehicle,cite,carney,v,california]),nl,
12 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,[bf011|Factors]).
13 %Default-false
14 getAutomobile(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
15 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,an,automobilecite,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
16 getVessel(C,Facts,Factors).
17
18 % BF-01-2 Vessel
19 %Motorboat(mb)
20 getVessel(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft012mb,Facts), !,
21 write([motorboat,is,a,vessel,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
22 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,[bf012|Factors]).
23 %Sailboat(sb)
24 getVessel(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft012sb,Facts), !,
25 write([sailboat,is,a,vessel,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
26 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,[bf012|Factors]).
27 %Rowboat(rb)
28 getVessel(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft012rb,Facts), !,
29 write([rowboat,is,a,vessel,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
30 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,[bf012|Factors]).
31 %Default-false
32 getVessel(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
33 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,a,vessel,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
34 getTowable(C,Facts,Factors).
35
36 % BF-01-4 Towable
37 %Trailer(t)
38 getTowable(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft013t,Facts), !,
39 write([trailer,is,towable,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
40 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,[bf013|Factors]).
41 %Wagon(w)
42 getTowable(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft013w,Facts), !,
43 write([wagon,is,towable,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
44 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,[bf013|Factors]).
45 %Cart(c)
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46 getTowable(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft013c,Facts), !,
47 write([cart,is,towable,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
48 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,[bf013|Factors]).
49 %Default-false
50 getTowable(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
51 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,towable,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
52 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,Factors).
53
54 % BF-01-4 LargeContainer
55 %Footlocker
56 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft014fl,Facts), !,
57 write([footlocker,is a,large,container,
58 cite,us,v,chadwick]),nl,
59 getMovableContainer(C,Facts,[bf014|Factors]).
60 %GoodsContainer
61 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft014gc,Facts), !,
62 write([large,goodsContainer]),nl,
63 getMovableContainer(C,Facts,[bf014|Factors]).
64 %Default-false
65 getLargeContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
66 write([accepted,that,no,largeContainers]),nl,
67 getMovableContainer(C,Facts,Factors).
68
69 % BF-01-5 MovableContainer
70 %Pouch
71 getMovableContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft015p,Facts),!,
72 write([pouch,is,a,movableContainer]),nl,
73 getMobile(C,Facts,[bf015|Factors]).
74 %Paprebag
75 getMovableContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft015pb,Facts),!,
76 write([paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]),nl,
77 getMobile(C,Facts,[bf015|Factors]).
78 %Breifcase
79 getMovableContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft015bs,Facts),!,
80 write([breifCase,is,a,movableContainer]),nl,
81 getMobile(C,Facts,[bf015|Factors]).
82 %Suitcase
83 getMovableContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft015sc,Facts),!,
84 write([suitcase,is,a,movableContainer]),nl,
85 getMobile(C,Facts,[bf015|Factors]).
86 %Default-false
87 getMovableContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
88 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,a,movableContainer]),nl,
89 getMobile(C,Facts,Factors).
90
91 \%AF1-01- Mobile
92 \%Automobile
93 getMobile(C,Facts,Factors):- member(bf011,Factors),!,
94 write([it,is,a,mobile]),nl,
95 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
96 \%Vessel
97 getMobile(C,Facts,Factors):- member(bf012,Factors),!,
98 write([it,is,a,mobile]),nl,
99 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
100 \%#Towable
101 getMobile(C,Facts,Factors):- member(bf013,Factors),!,
102 write([it,is,a,mobile]),nl,
103 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
104 \%LargeContainer
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105 getMobile(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf014,Factors),!,
106 write([it,is,a,mobile]),nl,
107 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
108 \%MovableContainer
109 getMobile(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf015,Factors),!,
110 write([it,is,a,mobile]),nl,
111 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
112 \%Default-not mobile
113 getMobile(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
114 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,a,mobile]),nl,
115 getLicence(C,Facts,Factors).
116
117 % BF-05-1 UrgentStatus
118 %Moving
119 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft051m,Facts),!,
120 write([there,was,an,urgent,status,when,vehicle,is,
121 moving,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
122 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,[bf051|Factors]).
123 %Stationary
124 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft051s,Facts),!,
125 write([there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,found,stationary]),nl,
126 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors).
127 %Parked
128 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft051p,Facts),!,
129 write([there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,parked]),nl,
130 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors).
131 %Crashed
132 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft051c,Facts),!,
133 write([there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,crashed]),nl,
134 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors).
135 %Default-not urgent
136 getUrgentStatus(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
137 write([accepted,that,there,is,no,urgent,status]),nl,
138 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors).
139
140 % BF-05-2 CapableToMove
141 %DriverIn
142 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft052di,Facts),!,
143 write([the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]),nl,
144 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,[bf052|Factors]).
145 %Occupied
146 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft052oc,Facts),!,
147 write([the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]),nl,
148 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,[bf052|Factors]).
149 %CurtainsOpen
150 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft052co,Facts),!,
151 write([the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]),nl,
152 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,[bf052|Factors]).
153 %MotiveForce
154 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft052mf,Facts),!,
155 write([the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]),nl,
156 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,[bf052|Factors]).
157 %Default: True
158 getCapableToMove(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
159 write([accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]),nl,
160 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,[bf052|Factors]).
161
162 % BF-05-3 PublicParking
163 %Highway
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164 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft053hw,Facts),!,
165 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,in,public,parking]),nl,
166 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,[bf053|Factors]).
167 %Dwelling
168 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft053dw,Facts),!,
169 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,in,private,parking]),nl,
170 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors).
171 %Parkinglot
172 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft053pl,Facts),!,
173 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,in,public,parking]),nl,
174 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,[bf053|Factors]).
175 %ownland
176 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft053ol,Facts),!,
177 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,in,private,parking]),nl,
178 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors).
179 %work
180 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft053w,Facts),!,
181 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,in,private,parking]),nl,
182 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors).
183 %rentedland
184 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft053r,Facts),!,
185 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,in,private,parking]),nl,
186 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors).
187 %Default: if moving then not parked
188 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft051m,Facts),!,
189 write([accepted,that,vehicle,was,not,parked]),nl,
190 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,Factors).
191 %Default: false
192 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
193 write([accepted,that,vehicle,parking,type,is,not,specified]),nl,
194 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors).
195
196 % BF-05-4 PublicLocation
197 %Highway
198 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft054hw,Facts),!,
199 write([the,vehicle,was,in,public,location]),nl,
200 getPublicParking(C,Facts,[bf054|Factors]).
201 %Downtown
202 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft054d,Facts),!,
203 write([the,vehicle,was,in,public,location]),nl,
204 getPublicParking(C,Facts,[bf054|Factors]).
205 %Dwelling
206 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft054dw,Facts),!,
207 write([the,vehicle,was,in,private,location]),nl,
208 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors).
209 %urbanResidential
210 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft054ur,Facts),!,
211 write([the,vehicle,was,in,private,location]),nl,
212 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors).
213 %Suburban
214 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft054s,Facts),!,
215 write([the,vehicle,was,in,private,location]),nl,
216 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors).
217 %rural
218 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft054r,Facts),!,
219 write([the,vehicle,was,in,private,location]),nl,
220 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors).
221 %Default: false
222 getPublicLocation(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
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223 write([accepted,that,vehicle,location,is,not,specified]),nl,
224 getPublicParking(C,Facts,Factors).
225
226 % BF-05-5 PermittedDuration
227 %ShortStay(ss)
228 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft055ss,Facts),!,
229 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,for,short,time]),nl,
230 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,[bf055|Factors]).
231 %Overnight(on)
232 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft055ss,Facts),!,
233 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,for,one,overnight]),nl,
234 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,[bf055|Factors]).
235 %LongStay(ls)
236 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft055ss,Facts),!,
237 write([the,vehicle,was,parked,for,over,one,night,long,period]),nl,
238 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,[bf055|Factors]).
239 %Default-unknown
240 getPermittedDuration(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
241 write([accepted,that,the,vehicle,was,
242 parked,for,unknown,period]),nl,
243 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,Factors).
244
245 %AF1-05ExigencyWhenApproached
246 %UrgentStatus
247 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf051,Factors),!,
248 write([there,was,exigency,when,approached ]),nl,
249 getInformation(C,Facts,[af105|Factors]).
250 %CapableToMove and public parking
251 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf052,Factors),
252 member(bf053,Factors),!,
253 write([there,was,exigency,when,approached ]),nl,
254 getInformation(C,Facts,[af105|Factors]).
255 %CapableToMove and public location
256 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf052,Factors),
257 member(bf054,Factors),!,
258 write([there,was,exigency,when,approached ]),nl,
259 getInformation(C,Facts,[af105|Factors]).
260 %Default-false
261 getExigencyWhenApproached(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
262 write([accepted,that,there,was,no,exigency,
263 when,approached ]),nl,
264 getInformation(C,Facts,Factors).
265
266 % BF-21-1Information
267 %Public Informant
268 getInformation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft211pi,Facts),!,
269 write([recieved,information,from,public,informant]),nl,
270 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,[bf211|Factors]).
271 %agent officer
272 getInformation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft211ao,Facts),!,
273 write([recieved,information,from,agent,officer]),nl,
274 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,[bf211|Factors]).
275 %Default-false
276 getInformation(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
277 write([accepted,that,the,origin,probable,
278 cause,is,not,by,information,received]),nl,
279 getObservation(C,Facts,Factors).
280
281 % BF-21-2 Observation
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282 %Public
283 getObservation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft212po,Facts),!,
284 write([observed,from,public,observer]),nl,
285 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,[bf212|Factors]).
286 %agent officer
287 getObservation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft212ao,Facts),!,
288 write([observed,from,agent,officer]),nl,
289 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,[bf212|Factors]).
290 %Default-false
291 getObservation(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
292 write([accepted,that,the,origin,probable,
293 cause,is,not,by,observation]),nl,
294 getProcedure(C,Facts,Factors).
295
296 % BF-21-3 Procedure
297 % incident to arrest
298 getProcedure(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft213ia,Facts),!,
299 write([search,incident,to,arrest,cite,harris,v,us,
300 and,preston,v,us]),nl,
301 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,[bf213|Factors]).
302 %multipe Parking
303 getProcedure(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft213mp,Facts),!,
304 write([multiple,parking,procedure]),nl,
305 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,[bf213|Factors]).
306 %InspectionRegulation
307 getProcedure(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft213ri,Facts),!,
308 write([inspection,procedure,cite,harris,v,us,and,preston,v,us]),nl,
309 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,[bf213|Factors]).
310 %Default-false
311 getProcedure(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
312 write([accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,
313 not,a,procedure,or,procedure,is,not,clarified]),nl,
314 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,Factors).
315
316 %AF1-21AuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause
317 %information
318 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,Factors):-
319 member(bf211,Factors),!,
320 write([there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause ]),nl,
321 getPublicSafety(C,Facts,[af121|Factors]).
322 %observation
323 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,Factors):-
324 member(bf212,Factors),!,
325 write([there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause ]),nl,
326 getPublicSafety(C,Facts,[af121|Factors]).
327 %procedure
328 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,Factors):-
329 member(bf213,Factors),!,
330 write([there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause ]),nl,
331 getPublicSafety(C,Facts,[af121|Factors]).
332 %Default- not clarfiied or not authorized
333 getAuthorizedOriginOfProbableCause(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
334 write([ accepted,that,origin,of,probable,cause,is,not,authorized,or,not,
335 clarified ]),nl,
336 getPublicSafety(C,Facts,[af121|Factors]).
337
338 % BF-22-1PublicSafety
339 %Weapon(w) and IllegalSubstances(is)
340 getPublicSafety(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft221w,Facts),
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341 member(ft221is,Facts),!,
342 write([main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public]),nl,
343 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,[bf221|Factors]).
344 %Weapon(w)
345 getPublicSafety(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft221w,Facts),!,
346 write([main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public,
347 cite,harris,v,us,and,preston,v,us]),nl,
348 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,[bf221|Factors]).
349 %IllegalSubstances(is)
350 getPublicSafety(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft221is,Facts),!,
351 write([main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public,
352 cite,carrol,v,us]),nl,
353 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,[bf221|Factors]).
354 %Default-true
355 getPublicSafety(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
356 write([accepted,that,main,reason,to,
357 search,was,to,protect,the,public]),nl,
358 getCrime(C,Facts,[bf221|Factors]).
359
360 % BF-22-2Crime
361 %Smuggling
362 getCrime(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft222s,Facts),!,
363 write([main,reason,to,search,was,due,to,a,crime]),nl,
364 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,[bf222|Factors]).
365 %Dealing(d)
366 getCrime(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft222d,Facts),!,
367 write([main,reason,to,search,was,due,to,a,crime]),nl,
368 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,[bf222|Factors]).
369 %Murder(m)
370 getCrime(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft222m,Facts),!,
371 write([main,reason,to,search,was,due,to,a,crime]),nl,
372 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,[bf222|Factors]).
373 %Robbery(r)
374 getCrime(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft222r,Facts),!,
375 write([main,reason,to,search,was,due,to,a,crime,
376 cite,chambers,v,maroney]),nl,
377 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,[bf222|Factors]).
378 %Default-false
379 getCrime(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
380 write([accepted,that,main,reason,to,search,
381 was,not,due,to,a,crime]),nl,
382 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,Factors).
383
384 %AF1-22UrgentReasonToSearch
385 %PublicSafety
386 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf221,Factors),!,
387 write([the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent ]),nl,
388 getwholeVehcile(C,Facts,[af122|Factors]).
389 %Crime
390 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf222,Factors),!,
391 write([the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent ]),nl,
392 getwholeVehcile(C,Facts,[af122|Factors]).
393 %Default-false
394 getUrgentReasonToSearch(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
395 write([accepted,that,the,main,reason,to,
396 immediate,search,is,not,clarified ]),nl,
397 getwholeVehcile(C,Facts,Factors).
398
399
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400 %BF-23-1wholeVehcile
401 %allParts(all)
402 getwholeVehcile(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft231all,Facts),!,
403 write([all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched,cite,carrol,v,us,
404 and,us,v,ross]),nl,
405 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,[bf231|Factors]).
406 %Default-not clarified
407 getwholeVehcile(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
408 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,if,
409 all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched]),nl,
410 getOnlyVehicleContainer(C,Facts,Factors).
411
412
413 %BF-23-2OnlyVehicleContainer
414 %CarTrunk(ct) and GloveCompartment(gc)
415 getOnlyVehicleContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft232ct,Facts),
416 member(ft232gc,Facts),!,
417 write([only,vehicle,containers,have,been,searched]),nl,
418 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,[bf232|Factors]).
419 %CarTrunk(ct)
420 getOnlyVehicleContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft232ct,Facts),!,
421 write([only,vehicle,containers,have,been,searched,
422 cite,us,v,chadwick,and,arkansas,v,sandersl]),nl,
423 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,[bf232|Factors]).
424 %GloveCompartment(gc)
425 getOnlyVehicleContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft232gc,Facts),!,
426 write([only,vehicle,containers,have,been,searched]),nl,
427 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,[bf232|Factors]).
428 %Default-not clarified
429 getOnlyVehicleContainer(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
430 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,
431 which,part,of,vehicle,is,searched]),nl,
432 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,Factors).
433
434 %BF-23-3LegalSearchPlace
435 %PoliceStation(ps) and AutomobilepublicLocation(al)
436 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft233ps,Facts),
437 member(ft233al,Facts),!,
438 write([the,vehicle,was,searched,twice,at,the,same,automobile,location,
439 and,at,police,station]),nl,
440 getLegalSearchScope(C,Facts,[bf233|Factors]).
441 %PoliceStation(ps)
442 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft233ps,Facts),!,
443 write([the,vehicle,was,searched,at,police,station]),nl,
444 getLegalSearchScope(C,Facts,Factors).
445 % Garage(g)
446 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft233g,Facts),!,
447 write([the,vehicle,was,searched,at,a,garage]),nl,
448 getLegalSearchScope(C,Facts,Factors).
449 %AutomobilepublicLocation(al)
450 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft233al,Facts),!,
451 write([the,vehicle,was,searched,at,the,same,automobile,location]),nl,
452 getLegalSearchScope(C,Facts,[bf233|Factors]).
453 %Default- not clarified
454 getSearchPlace(C,Facts,Factors):- !,
455 write([accepted,that,the,vehicle,searching,
456 location,is,not,clarified]),nl,
457 getLegalSearchScope(C,Facts,Factors).
458
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459 %AF1-23LegalSearchScope
460 % WholeVehcile
461 getLegalSearchScope(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf231,Factors),!,
462 vwrite([the,search,scope,is,legal ]),nl,
463 getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Facts,[af123|Factors]).
464
465 % SearchPlace and OnlyVehicleContainer
466 getLegalSearchScope(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf232,Factors),
467 member(bf233,Factors),!,
468 write([the,search,scope,is,illegal]),nl,
469 getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Facts,Factors).
470 %Default-False
471 getLegalSearchScope(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
472 write([accepted,that,the,search,scope,is,illegal]),nl,
473 getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Facts,Factors).
474
475 %AF2-02ProbableCauseSearchVehicle
476 getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Facts,Factors):-member(af123,Factors),
477 member(af122,Factors),member(af121,Factors),!,
478 write([there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle ]),nl,
479 getLicence(C,Facts,[af202|Factors]).
480 %urgent reason and authorized origion to search but illegal scope
481 getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Facts,Factors):-member(af122,Factors),
482 member(af121,Factors),!,
483 write([there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle,but,the,
484 search,scope,was,illegal ]),nl,
485 getLicence(C,Facts,Factors).
486 %Default-false
487 getProbableCauseSearchVehicle(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
488 write([accepted,that,there,is,no,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle ]),nl,
489 getLicence(C,Facts,Factors).
490
491 % BF-03-1Licence
492 %Vehicle
493 getLicence(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft031vl,Facts),!,
494 write([has,a,vehicle,licence]),nl,
495 getRestrictedArea(C,Facts,[bf031|Factors]).
496 %Motorhome
497 getLicence(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft031mh,Facts),!,
498 write([has,a,special,motorhome,licence]),nl,
499 getRestrictedArea(C,Facts,[bf031|Factors]).
500 %Default-if vehicle then licence
501 getLicence(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf011,Factors),!,
502 write([accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]),nl,
503 getRestrictedArea(C,Facts,[bf031|Factors]).
504
505 % BF-03-2RestrictedArea
506 %Airport
507 getRestrictedArea(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft032ap,Facts),!,
508 write([airport,is,a,restricted,area]),nl,
509 getSubjectToInspection(C,Facts,[bf032|Factors]).
510 %Home
511 getRestrictedArea(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft032h,Facts),!,
512 write([private,home,is,a,restricted,area]),nl,
513 getSubjectToInspection(C,Facts,[bf032|Factors]).
514 %PoliceStation
515 getRestrictedArea(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft032ps,Facts),!,
516 write([police,station,is,a,restricted,area]),nl,
517 getSubjectToInspection(C,Facts,[bf032|Factors]).
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518 %Default- false
519 getRestrictedArea(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
520 write([accepted,that,not,restricted,area]),nl,
521 getSubjectToInspection(C,Facts,Factors).
522
523 %AF1-03SubjectToInspection
524 %Licence and restricted area
525 getSubjectToInspection(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf031,Factors),
526 member(bf032,Factors),!,
527 write([subject,to,regular,inspection,but,the,search,was,
528 allocated,at,restricted,area]),nl,
529 getOnPublicView(C,Facts,Factors).
530 %Licence
531 getSubjectToInspection(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf031,Factors),!,
532 write([subject,to,regular,inspection]),nl,
533 getOnPublicView(C,Facts,[af103|Factors]).
534 %Default-false
535 getSubjectToInspection(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
536 write([it,is,not,subject,to,regular,inspection]),nl,
537 getOnPublicView(C,Facts,Factors).
538
539 % BF-04-1OnPublicView
540 %OnSeat
541 getOnPublicView(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft041os,Facts),!,
542 write([items,were,on,the,seat,it,is,on,public,view]),nl,
543 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,[bf041|Factors]).
544 %Default-false
545 getOnPublicView(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
546 write([accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,
547 are,not,provided]),nl,
548 getCanBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors).
549
550 % BF-04-2CanbeSeen
551 %Transparent
552 getCanBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft042t,Facts),!,
553 write([items,can,be,seen,by,public]),nl,
554 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,[bf042|Factors]).
555 %OnFloor
556 getCanBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft042of,Facts),!,
557 write([items,were,on,floor,it,can,be,seen,by,public]),nl,
558 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,[bf042|Factors]).
559 %Default-false
560 getCanBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
561 write([accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,
562 by,public,or,details,are,not,provided]),nl,
563 getCanNotBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors).
564
565 % BF-04-3CanNotbeSeen
566 %OpaqueContainer
567 getCanNotBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft043oc,Facts),!,
568 write([items,were,in,an,opaque,container,it,can,not,be,
569 seen,by,public]),nl,
570 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,[bf043|Factors]).
571 %GloveBox
572 getCanNotBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft043bg,Facts),!,
573 write([items,were,inside,the,glove,box,it,can,not,be,
574 seen,by,public]),nl,
575 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,[bf043|Factors]).
576 %Boot
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577 getCanNotBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft043b,Facts),!,
578 write([items,were,inside,the,boot,it,can,be,not,seen,by,public]),nl,
579 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,[bf043|Factors]).
580 %Default-false
581 getCanNotBeSeen(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
582 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,
583 that,items,can,not,be,seen]),nl,
584 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,Factors).
585
586 %AF1-04VisibilityOfItem
587 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf041,Factors),!,
588 write([item,is,visible,to,public]),nl,
589 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,[af104|Factors]).
590 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf042,Factors),!,
591 write([item,is,visible,to,public]),nl,
592 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,[af104|Factors]).
593 %Default-false
594 getVisibilityOfItem(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
595 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]),nl,
596 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,Factors).
597
598 %BF-31-1GoodsCarried
599 %personalEffects(pe)
600 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft311pe,Facts),!,
601 write([private,goods]),nl,
602 getProtectionType(C,Facts,[bf311|Factors]).
603 %papers(p)
604 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft311p,Facts),!,
605 write([private,goods]),nl,
606 getProtectionType(C,Facts,[bf311|Factors]).
607 %CommercialItems(ci)
608 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft311ci,Facts),!,
609 write([private,goods]),nl,
610 getProtectionType(C,Facts,[bf311|Factors]).
611 %weapons(w)
612 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft311w,Facts),!,
613 write([illegal,goods]),nl,
614 getProtectionType(C,Facts,Factors).
615 %illegalSubstances(is)
616 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft311is,Facts),!,
617 write([illegal,goods]),nl,
618 getProtectionType(C,Facts,Factors).
619 %money(m)
620 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft311m,Facts),!,
621 write([private,goods]),nl,
622 getProtectionType(C,Facts,[bf311|Factors]).
623 %Default-unknown
624 getGoodsCarried(C,Facts,Factors):- !,
625 write([ accepted,that,goods,
626 carried,are,unknown ]),nl,
627 getProtectionType(C,Facts,Factors).
628
629 %BF-31-2ProtectionType
630 %open(o)
631 getProtectionType(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft312o,Facts),!,
632 write([not,protected]),nl,
633 getPrivateContentsCarriage(C,Facts,Factors).
634 %closed(c)
635 getProtectionType(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft312c,Facts),!,
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636 write([just,closed,but,not,protected]),nl,
637 getPrivateContentsCarriage(C,Facts,Factors).
638 %locked(l)
639 getProtectionType(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft312l,Facts),!,
640 write([locked,and,protected]),nl,
641 getPrivateContentsCarriage(C,Facts,[bf312|Factors]).
642 %doublelocked(dl)
643 getProtectionType(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft312dl,Facts),!,
644 write([double,locked,and,protected]),nl,
645 getPrivateContentsCarriage(C,Facts,[bf312|Factors]).
646 %Default- not clarified
647 getProtectionType(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
648 write([accepted,that,protection,
649 level,can,not,be,determined]),nl,
650 getPrivateContentsCarriage(C,Facts,Factors).
651
652 %AF1-3-1PrivateContentsCarriage
653 %GoodsCarried and protected
654 getPrivateContentsCarriage(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf312,Factors),
655 member(bf311,Factors),!,
656 write([private,contents]),nl,
657 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,[af131|Factors]).
658 %GoodsCarried and not protected
659 getPrivateContentsCarriage(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf311,Factors),!,
660 write([private,contents,but,not,protected]),nl,
661 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,Factors).
662 %Default-not private
663 getPrivateContentsCarriage(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
664 write([accepted,that,contents,are,not,
665 considered,private]),nl,
666 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,Factors).
667
668 %BF-32-1ConnectedServices
669 %Gas(g) and water
670 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft321g,Facts),
671 member(ft321w,Facts),!,
672 write([gas,and,water,services,were,connected]),nl,
673 getResidence(C,Facts,[bf321|Factors]).
674 %Electricity(e)and water
675 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft321e,Facts),
676 member(ft321w,Facts),!,
677 write([electtricity,and,water,services,were,connected]),nl,
678 getResidence(C,Facts,[bf321|Factors]).
679 %Gas(g)
680 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft321g,Facts),!,
681 write([gas,service,was,connected]),nl,
682 getResidence(C,Facts,[bf321|Factors]).
683 %Electricity(e)
684 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft321e,Facts),!,
685 write([electricity,service,was,connected]),nl,
686 getResidence(C,Facts,[bf321|Factors]).
687 %Water(w)
688 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft321w,Facts),!,
689 write([water,service,was,connected]),nl,
690 getResidence(C,Facts,[bf321|Factors]).
691 %default-not specified or not connected
692 getConnectedServices(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
693 write([accepted,that,none,of,
694 living,main,services,are,specified,or,connected]),nl,
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695 getResidence(C,Facts,Factors).
696
697 %AF1-3-2Residence
698 getResidence(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf321,Factors),!,
699 write([connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,services]),nl,
700 getAccommodationSpaces(C,Facts,[af132|Factors]).
701 %default-false
702 getResidence(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
703 write([accepted,that,not,connected,to,
704 one,or,more,main,living,services]),nl,
705 getAccommodationSpaces(C,Facts,Factors).
706
707 %BF-33-1AccommodationSpaces
708 %cab(c) and accommodation space
709 getAccommodationSpaces(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft331c,Facts),
710 member(ft331as,Facts),!,
711 write([consists,of,a,cab,and,suitable,
712 accommodation,space]),nl,
713 getAccommodation(C,Facts,[bf331|Factors]).
714 %cab(c)
715 getAccommodationSpaces(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft331c,Facts),!,
716 write([consists,of,a,cab,only]),nl,
717 getAccommodation(C,Facts,Factors).
718 %SuitableAccommodationSpace(as)
719 getAccommodationSpaces(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft331as,Facts),!,
720 write([consists,of,suitable,accommodation,space]),nl,
721 getAccommodation(C,Facts,[bf331|Factors]).
722 %default-not clarified
723 getAccommodationSpaces(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
724 write([accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,
725 spaces,are,not,clarified]),nl,
726 getRoomsFunction(C,Facts,Factors).
727
728 %BF-33-2RoomsFunction
729 %bedroom(bd)
730 getRoomsFunction(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft332bd,Facts),!,
731 write([essential,room,for,accommodation]),nl,
732 getAccommodation(C,Facts,[bf332|Factors]).
733 %bathroom(b)
734 getRoomsFunction(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft332b,Facts),!,
735 write([essential,room,for,accommodation]),nl,
736 getAccommodation(C,Facts,[bf332|Factors]).
737 %Kitchen(k)
738 getRoomsFunction(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft332k,Facts),!,
739 write([essential,room,for,accommodation]),nl,
740 getAccommodation(C,Facts,[bf332|Factors]).
741 %Living room(lr)
742 getRoomsFunction(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft332lv,Facts),!,
743 write([essential,room,for,accommodation]),nl,
744 getAccommodation(C,Facts,[bf332|Factors]).
745 %default-not specified or no rooms
746 getRoomsFunction(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
747 write([accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,
748 rooms,function,is,not,specified]),nl,
749 getAccommodation(C,Facts,Factors).
750
751 %AF1-3-3Accommodation
752 %Accommodation
753 getAccommodation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf331,Factors),!,
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754 write([the,place,was,used,for,accommodation]),nl,
755 getPrivacyRights(C,Facts,[af133|Factors]).
756 %RoomsFunction
757 getAccommodation(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf332,Factors),!,
758 write([the,place,was,used,for,accommodation]),nl,
759 getPrivacyRights(C,Facts,[af133|Factors]).
760 %default-false
761 getAccommodation(C,Facts,Factors):-!,write([accepted,that,the,place,is,not,
762 used,for,accommodation]),nl,
763 getPrivacyRights(C,Facts,Factors).
764
765 %AF2-0-3ExpectationOfPrivacyInUseRequired-PrivacyRights
766 %residence and accommodation
767 getPrivacyRights(C,Facts,Factors):-member(af133,Factors),
768 member(af132,Factors),!,
769 write([the,is,a,high,expectation,of,privacy,in,use ]),nl,
770 getRiskLosingEvidence(C,Facts,[af203|Factors]).
771 %privateContents
772 getPrivacyRights(C,Facts,Factors):- member(af131,Factors),!,
773 write([the,is,a,high,expectation,of,privacy,in,use ]),nl,
774 getRiskLosingEvidence(C,Facts,[af203|Factors]).
775 %default-false
776 getPrivacyRights(C,Facts,Factors):-
777 write([default,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use ]),nl,
778 getRiskLosingEvidence(C,Facts,Factors).
779
780 % BF-02-2 RiskLostingEvidence
781 %Default-if Exigency when approached
782 getRiskLosingEvidence(C,Facts,Factors):-member(af105,Factors),!,
783 write([there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]),nl,
784 getAvailabilityOfMagistrate(C,Facts,[bf022|Factors]).
785 %nearCourt
786 getRiskLosingEvidence(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft022nc,Facts),!,
787 write([there,was,no,risk,to,lose,evidence]),nl,
788 getAvailabilityOfMagistrate(C,Facts,Factors).
789 %default
790 getRiskLosingEvidence(C,Facts,Factors):-!,write([accepted,that,there,was,
791 no,risk,to,lose,evidence]),nl,
792 getAvailabilityOfMagistrate(C,Facts,Factors).
793 % BF-02-3 AvailabilityofMagistrate
794 %WorkingTime
795 getAvailabilityOfMagistrate(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft023wt,Facts),!,
796 write([magistrate,available,during,working,hours]),nl,
797 getAuthority(C,Facts,[bf023|Factors]).
798 %Overnight
799 getAvailabilityOfMagistrate(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft023on,Facts),!,
800 write([magistrate,are,not,available,overnight]),nl,
801 getEaseObtainingWarrant(C,Facts,Factors).
802 %Default-False
803 getAvailabilityOfMagistrate(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
804 write([accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]),nl,
805 getAuthority(C,Facts,Factors).
806
807 % BF-02-1AuthorityofAvailableMagistrate
808 %authorized
809 getAuthority(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft021a,Facts),!,
810 write([neutral,and,detached,authorized,magistrate,are,available,
811 cite,johnson,v,us]),nl,
812 getEaseObtainingWarrant(C,Facts,[bf021|Factors]).
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813 %notauthorized
814 getAuthority(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft021na,Facts),!,
815 write([warrant,issued,by,unauthorized,magistrate,cite,johnson,v,us]),nl,
816 getEaseObtainingWarrant(C,Facts,Factors).
817 %Default -false
818 getAuthority(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
819 write([accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]),nl,
820 getEaseObtainingWarrant(C,Facts,Factors).
821
822 %AF1-02EaseObtainingWarrant
823 %AuthorityofAvailableMagistrate
824 getEaseObtainingWarrant(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf021,Factors),
825 member(bf023,Factors),!,
826 write([it,is,easy,to,obtain,warrant]),nl,
827 getExigency(C,Facts,[af102|Factors],[]).
828 % Default-if Exigency when approached then not easy to obtain warrant
829 % (Risk of losing Evidence)
830 getEaseObtainingWarrant(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf022,Factors),!,
831 write([it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]),nl,
832 getExigency(C,Facts,Factors,[]).
% Generate the case decision after determining the Exigency and Privacy issues
1 % I1 Exigency
2 %Mobile and ExigencyWhenApproached and ProbableCauseToSearch
3 getExigency(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af101,Factors),
4 member(af105,Factors),
5 member(af202,Factors),!,
6 write([justified,under,automobile,exception,cite,carroll,v,us]),nl,
7 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,[is1|Issues]).
8 %Mobile and ExigencyWhenApproached and
9 ProbableCauseToSearch and accommodation
10 getExigency(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af101,Factors),
11 member(af133,Factors),!,
12 write([reduce,expectation,of,exigency]),nl,
13 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,Issues).
14 %Easy to obtain warrant
15 getExigency(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):- member(af102,Factors),!,
16 write([reduce,expectation,of,exigency]),nl,
17 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,Issues).
18 %Default-false
19 getExigency(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):- !,
20 write([reduce,expectation,of,exigency]),nl,
21 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,Issues).
22
23 % I2 Privacy
24 %EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse and (no InspectionRegulation)
25 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af203,Factors),
26 not(member(af103,Factors)),!,
27 write([high,expectation,of,privacy,not,justified,under,
28 automobile,exception]),nl,
29 decide(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
30 %EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse and (not itemsVisibility)
31 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af203,Factors),
32 not(member(af104,Factors)),!,
33 write([high,expectation,of,privacy,not,justified,under,
34 automobile,exception]),nl,
35 decide(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
36 %AuthorityofAvailableMagistrate:
37 %Private location and warrant not authorized
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38 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-not(member(bf053,Factors)),
39 member(ft021na,Facts),!,
40 write([high,expectation,of,privacy,obtained,warrant,was,issued,by,
41 neutral,and,detached,magistrate,and,not,authorized]),nl,
42 decide(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
43 %Searching only container and (not items Visibility)
44 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(bf232,Factors),
45 not(member(af104,Factors)),!,
46 write([praivacy,is,not,justified,under,automobile,exception]),nl,
47 decide(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
48 %Default-false
49 getPrivacy(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):- !,
50 write([reduced,expectation,of,privacy]),nl,
51 decide(C,Issues,Factors).
52
53 % Decide Majority
54 decide(C,Issues,Factors):-member(is2,Issues),!,
55 write([warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]),nl,
56 write([find,for,the,defendant]).
57 gomin(C,Factors).
58
59 decide(C,Issues,Factors):-member(is1,Issues),!,
60 write([warrantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment]),
61 nl,write([find,for,the,plaintiff]).
62 gomin(C,Factors).
63
64 decide(C,Issues,Factors):-write([wrong,decision]).
H.2 Dissenting Opinion Rules
The program presented above has been amended slightly to include dissenting opinions. New
rules have been added for some factors, mainly for the issues to consider the different acceptance
conditions for 5 cases in the domain as discussed in Chapter 6. After displaying the majority
opinion, the program continues to evaluate the factors and issues according to the new rules, and
decides the dissenting opinion in decideMin.
% Generate the case decision after determining the Exigency and Privacy issues
1 gomin(C,Factors):-case(C,Facts),
2 write([********************]),nl,
3 write([dissenting,argument]),nl,
4 getAutomobileMin(C,Facts,Factors).
5
6
7 % BF-01-1 Automobile
8 %car(c)
9 getAutomobileMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft011c,Facts),!,
10 write([it,is,a,vehicle]),nl,
11 getLargeContainerMin(C,Facts,[bf011|Factors]).
12 %mobilehome(mh)
13 getAutomobileMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft011mh,Facts),!,
14 write([it,is,a,mobileHome,vehicle]),nl,
15 getLargeContainerMin(C,Facts,[bf011|Factors]).
16 %Default-false
17 getAutomobileMin(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
18 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,an,automobile]),nl,
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19 getLargeContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors).
20
21
22 % BF-01-4 LargeContainer
23 %Footlocker
24 getLargeContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft014fl,Facts),!,
25 write([footlocker,is,a,large,container]),nl,
26 getMovableContainerMin(C,Facts,[bf014|Factors]).
27 %GoodsContainer
28 getLargeContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft014gc,Facts),!,
29 write([large,goodsContainer]),nl,
30 getMovableContainerMin(C,Facts,[bf014|Factors]).
31 %Default-false
32 getLargeContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
33 write([accepted,that,no,largeContainers]),nl,
34 getMovableContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors).
35
36
37 % BF-01-5 MovableContainer
38 %Pouch
39 getMovableContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft015p,Facts),!,
40 write([pouch,is,a,movableContainer]),nl,
41 getMobileMin(C,Facts,[bf015|Factors]).
42 %Paprebag
43 getMovableContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft015pb,Facts),!,
44 write([paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]),nl,
45 getMobileMin(C,Facts,[bf015|Factors]).
46 %Breifcase
47 getMovableContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft015bs,Facts),!,
48 write([breifCase,is,a,movableContainer]),nl,
49 getMobileMin(C,Facts,[bf015|Factors]).
50 %Suitcase
51 getMovableContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft015sc,Facts),!,
52 write([suitcase,is,a,movableContainer]),nl,
53 getMobileMin(C,Facts,[bf015|Factors]).
54 %Default-false
55 getMovableContainerMin(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
56 write([accepted,that,it,is,not,a, movableContainer]),nl,
57 getMobileMin(C,Facts,Factors).
58
59
60 %AF1-01- Mobile
61 %Mobile home ( this can be added as a base factor)
62 getMobileMin(C,Facts,Factors):- member(ft011mh,Facts),!,
63 write([it,is,a,hybrid,with,mobility,features]),nl,
64 getCapableToMoveMin(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
65 %Automobile
66 getMobileMin(C,Facts,Factors):- member(bf011,Factors),
67 write([it,is,a,mobile]),nl,
68 getCapableToMoveMin(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
69 %LargeContainer
70 getMobileMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf014,Factors),
71 write([any,large,container,is,a,mobile,but,not,like,
72 automobile]),nl,
73 getCapableToMoveMin(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
74 %MovableContainer
75 getMobileMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(bf015,Factors),!,
76 write([any,movable,container,is,a,mobile,but,not,like,
77 automobile]),nl,
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78 getCapableToMoveMin(C,Facts,[af101|Factors]).
79 %Default-not mobile
80 getMobileMin(C,Facts,Factors):-!,write([accepted,that,it,is,not,
81 a,mobile]),nl,
82 getCapableToMoveMin(C,Facts,Factors).
83
84
85 % BF-05-2 CapableToMove
86 %if crashed then not capable to move
87 getCapableToMoveMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(ft051c,Facts),!,
88 write([the,vehicle,is,crashed,and,not,capable,to,move]),nl,
89 deleteOne(Factors,bf052,DFactors),
90 getExigencyWhenApproachedMin(C,Facts,DFactors).
91 getCapableToMoveMin(C,Facts,Factors):-!,write([accepted,that,the,
92 vehicle,is,capable,to,move]),nl,
93 getExigencyWhenApproachedMin(C,Facts,Factors).
94
95
96 %AF1-05 ExigencyWhenApproached
97 %UrgentStatus
98 getExigencyWhenApproachedMin(C,Facts,Factors):-
99 member(bf051,Factors),!,
100 write([there,was,exigency,when,approached]),nl,
101 getRiskLosingEvidenceMin(C,Facts,[af105|Factors]).
102 %CapableToMove and public parking
103 getExigencyWhenApproachedMin(C,Facts,Factors):-
104 member(bf052,Factors),
105 member(bf053,Factors),!,
106 write([there,was,exigency,when,approached]),nl,
107 getRiskLosingEvidenceMin(C,Facts,[af105|Factors]).
108 %CapableToMove and public location
109 getExigencyWhenApproachedMin(C,Facts,Factors):-
110 member(bf052,Factors),
111 member(bf054,Factors),!,
112 write([there,was,exigency,when,approached]),nl,
113 getRiskLosingEvidenceMin(C,Facts,[af105|Factors]).
114 %Default-false
115 getExigencyWhenApproachedMin(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
116 write([accepted,that,there,was,no,exigency,when,approached ]),nl,
117 deleteOne(Factors,af105,DFactors),
118 getRiskLosingEvidenceMin(C,Facts,DFactors).
119
120
121 % BF-02-2 RiskLostingEvidence
122 %if Exigency when approached
123 getRiskLosingEvidenceMin(C,Facts,Factors):-member(af105,Factors),!,
124 write([there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]),nl,
125 getEaseObtainingWarrantMin(C,Facts,[bf022|Factors]).
126 %if no Exigency when approached
127 getRiskLosingEvidenceMin(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
128 write([there,is,no,risk,to,lose,evidence]),nl,
129 deleteOne(Factors,bf022,DFactors),
130 getEaseObtainingWarrantMin(C,Facts,DFactors).
131
132
133 %AF1-02 EaseObtainingWarrant
134 %AuthorityofAvailableMagistrate
135 getEaseObtainingWarrantMin(C,Facts,Factors):-
136 member(bf021,Factors),
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137 member(bf023,Factors),!,
138 write([it,is,easy,to,obtain,warrant]),nl,
139 getExigencyMin(C,Facts,[af102|Factors],[]).
140 % if Exigency when approached then not easy to obtain warrant
141 % (Risk of losing Evidence)
142 getEaseObtainingWarrantMin(C,Facts,Factors):-
143 member(bf022,Factors),!,
144 write([it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]),nl,
145 getExigencyMin(C,Facts,Factors,[]).
146 %Default
147 getEaseObtainingWarrantMin(C,Facts,Factors):-!,
148 write([it,is,easy,to,obtain,warrant]),nl,
149 getExigencyMin(C,Facts,[af102|Factors],[]).
150
151
152 % I1 ExigencyMin
153 %Mobile and ExigencyWhenApproached and ProbableCauseToSearch
154 and no accommodation
155 getExigencyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af101,Factors),
156 member(af133,Factors),!,
157 write([reduce,expectation,of,exigency]),nl,
158 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues).
159
160 %Mobile and ExigencyWhenApproached and ProbableCauseToSearch
161 getExigencyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af101,Factors),
162 member(af105,Factors),
163 member(af202,Factors),!,
164 write([justified,under,automobile,exception]),nl,
165 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,[is1|Issues]).
166
167 %easy to obtain warrant
168 getExigencyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):- member(af102,Factors),!,
169 write([reduce,expectation,of,exigency]),nl,
170 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues).
171
172 %default-false
173 getExigencyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):- !,
174 write([defaut,reduce,expectation,of,exigency]),nl,
175 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues).
176
177 % I2 Privacy
178 % Mobile(mobilehome) and Accommodation gives priority to privacy
179 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(ft011mh,Facts),
180 member(af133,Factors),!,
181 write([hybrid,with,mobility,and,home,features,shows,
182 enough,expectation,of,privacy]),nl,
183 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
184
185 % Easy to obtain warrant
186 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af102,Factors),!,
187 write([privacy,required,it,is,not,justified,under,
188 automobile,exception]),nl,
189 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
190
191 % searching large or movable container inside automobile without
192 % probable cause assessment by neutral and deatached magistrate
193 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(bf014,Factors),
194 not(member(bf021,Factors)),!,
195 write([privacy,required,probable,cause,assessment,for,container,
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196 should,be,done,by,neutral,and,detached,magistrate]),nl,
197 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
198
199 % searching large or movable container inside automobile without
200 % assessment by neutral and detached magistrate
201 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(bf015,Factors),
202 not(member(bf021,Factors)),!,
203 write([privacy,required,probable,cause,assessment,for,
204 container,should,be,done,by,neutral,and,detached,magistrate]),nl,
205 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
206
207 %large Container inside automobile adds privacy interest->not mobile
208 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-
209 member(bf011,Factors),member(bf014,Factors),!,
210 write([enlarge,scope,of,fourth,amendment,exception]),nl,
211 write([large,container,inside,automobile,shows,enough,
212 privacy,interest]),nl,
213 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
214
215 %movable Container inside automobile
216 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(bf011,Factors),
217 member(bf015,Factors),!,
218 write([enlarge,scope,of,fourth,amendment,exception]),nl,
219 write([any,container,inside,automobile,shows,enough,
220 privacy,interest]),nl,
221 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
222
223 % searching large or movable container inside automobile without
224 % probable cause assessment by neutral and detached magistrate
225 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(bf014,Factors),
226 not(member(bf021,Factors)),!,
227 write([privacy,required,probable,cause,assessment,for,container,
228 should,be,done,by,neutral,and,detached,magistrate]),nl,
229 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
230
231 %EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse and (no InspectionRegulation)
232 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af203,Factors),
233 not(member(af103,Factors)),!,
234 write([high,expectation,of,privacy,not,justified,under,automobile,
235 exception]),nl,
236 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
237
238 %EnoughExpectationOfPrivacyInUse and (not itemsVisibility)
239 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(af203,Factors),
240 not(member(af104,Factors)),!,
241 write([high,expectation,of,privacy,not,justified,under,automobile,
242 exception]),nl,
243 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
244
245 %AuthorityofAvailableMagistrate: Private location and warrant not authorised
246 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-not(member(bf053,Factors)),
247 member(ft021na,Facts),!,
248 write([high,expectation,of,privacy,obtained,warrant,was,issued,by,
249 neutral,and,detached,magistrate,and,not,authorised]),nl,
250 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
251
252 %Searching only container and (not itemsVisibility)
253 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):-member(bf232,Factors),
254 not(member(af104,Factors)),!,
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255 write([privacy,required,it,is,not,justified,under,automobile,
256 exception]),nl,
257 decideMin(C,[is2|Issues],Factors).
258 %default-false
259 getPrivacyMin(C,Facts,Factors,Issues):- !,
260 write([accepted,that,reduced,expectation,of,privacy]),nl,
261 decideMin(C,Issues,Factors).
262
263
264 % Decide Minority
265 decideMin(C,Issues,Factors):-member(is2,Issues),!,
266 write([warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]).
267
268 decideMin(C,Issues,Factors):-member(is1,Issues),!,
269 write([warrantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment]).
270
271
272 decideMin(C,Issues,Factors):-write([wrong,minority,decision]).
273
274
275 deleteOne([],_,[]).
276
277 deleteOne([H|Tail],H,Tail).
278
279 deleteOne([H|Tail],Y,[H|Z]):-
280 deleteOne(Tail,Y,Z).
281
282
H.3 Results
To obtain the case decision, the user calls the case using go(case name). The output from
each case provides the decision justification on the basis of the base factors and abstract factor
reports, in addition to the case decision: find for plaintiff,or, find for defendant. Considering a
case represented as facts clearly provides more explanation of the case opinion compared to the
output from the previous domains (see Appendix F, Appendix G) as discussed in Chapter 7. The
list below illustrates the output from the 10 cases including the majority and dissenting opinions
( five cases). As stated in Chapter 6, the output from the incorrect case, Acevedo, clarifies where
the decision diverges from the actual decision when citing the Chadwick and Sanders cases.
California v. Acevedo
go(cva).
[it,is,a,vehicle,cite,carroll,v,us]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,an,urgent,status,when,vehicle,is,moving,cite,
carroll,v,us]
[the,vehicle,was,in,public,location]
[accepted,that,vehicle,was,not,parked]
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[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[received,information,from,public,informant]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
[main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public,
cite,carrol,v,us]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,if,all,vehicle,parts,
have,been,searched]
[only,vehicle,containers,have,been,searched,cite,
us,v,chadwick,and,arkansas,v,sandersl]
[the,vehicle,was,searched,at,the,same,automobile,
location]
[the,search,scope,is,illegal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle,but,the,
search,scope,was
,illegal]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[police,station,is,a,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection,but,the,search,was,allocated,
at,restricted,area]
[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[items,were,inside,the,boot,it,can,be,not,seen,by,public]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
[illegal,goods]
[just,closed,but,not,protected]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,
or,connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,
clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,
not,specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
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[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[reduce,expectation,of,exigency]
[privacy,is,not,justified,under,automobile,exception]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,defendant]
[********************]
[dissenting,argument]
[it,is,a,vehicle]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[accepted,that,reduce,expectation,of,exigency]
[enlarge,scope,of,fourth,amendment,exception]
[any,container,inside,automobile,shows,enough,privacy,
interest]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
true .
California v. Carny
go(cvc).
[it,is,a,mobileHome,vehicle,cite,carny,v,california]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,parked]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[the,vehicle,was,in,public,location]
[the,vehicle,was,parked,in,public,parking]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,was,parked,for,unknown,period]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[received,information,from,public,informant]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
[main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public,cite,
carrol,v,us]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched,cite,carrol,v,us,
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and,us,v,ross]
[the,vehicle,was,searched,twice,at,the,same,automobile,
location,and, at,police,station]
[the,search,scope,is,legal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle]
[has,a,special,motorhome,licence]
[police,station,is,a,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection,but,the,search,was,allocated,
at,restricted,area]
[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,that,items,can,not,be,seen]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
[illegal,goods]
[just,closed,but,not,protected]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,
or,connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[consists,of,a,cab,and,suitable,accommodation,space]
[the,place,was,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[justified,under,automobile,exception,cite,carroll,v,us]
[reduced,expectation,of,privacy]
[warrantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,plaintiff]
[********************]
[dissenting,argument]
[it,is,a,mobileHome,vehicle]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,hybrid,with,mobility,features]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
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[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[reduce,expectation,of,exigency]
[hybrid,with,mobility,and,home,features,shows,enough,
expectation,of,privacy]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
true.
US v. Ross
go(usvr).
[it,is,a,vehicle,cite,carroll,v,us]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,parked]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[accepted,that,vehicle,location,is,not,specified]
[the,vehicle,was,parked,in,public,parking]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,was,parked,for,unknown,
period]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[received,information,from,public,informant]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
[main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public,cite,
carrol,v,us]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched,cite,carrol,v,us,
and,us,v,ross]
[the,vehicle,was,searched,twice,at,the,same,automobile,
location,and,at,police,station]
[the,search,scope,is,legal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[police,station,is,a,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection,but,the,search,was,allocated,
at,restricted,area]
[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,not,
provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are,not,
provided]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,that,items,can,not,be,seen]
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[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
[illegal,goods]
[just,closed,but,not,protected]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,or,
connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,
not,specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[justified,under,automobile,exception,cite,carroll,v,us]
[reduced,expectation,of,privacy]
[warrantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,plaintiff]
[********************]
[dissenting,argument]
[it,is,a,vehicle]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[justified,under,automobile,exception]
[privacy,required,probable,cause,assessment,for,container,
should,be,done,by,netural,and,detached,magistrate]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
true
Arkansas v. Sanders
go(avs).
[it,is,a,vehicle]
[large,goodsContainer]
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[suitcase,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,an,urgent,status,when,vehicle,is,moving]
[accepted,that,vehicle,location,is,not,specified]
[accepted,that,vehicle,was,not,parked]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[received,information,from,agent,officer]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
[main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,if,all,vehicle,parts,have,been,
searched]
[only,vehicle,containers,have,been,searched]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,searching,location,is,not,clarified]
[accepted,that,the,search,scope,is,illegal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle,but,the,search,
scope,was,illegal]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[airport,is,a,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection,but,the,search,was,allocated,
at,restricted,area]
[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,not,
provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are,not,
provided]
[items,were,inside,the,boot,it,can,be,not,seen,by,public]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
[illegal,goods]
[just,closed,but,not,protected]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,
or,connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,
clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,
not,specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[accepted,that,there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
Appendix H. Automobile Exception Prolog Program and Results 297
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[reduce,expectation,of,exigency]
[privacy,is,not,justified,under,automobile,exception]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,defendant]
true.
US v Chadwick
go(usvc).
[it,is,a,vehicle]
[footlocker,is,a,large,container]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,parked]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[accepted,that,vehicle,location,is,not,specified]
[the,vehicle,was,parked,in,public,parking]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,was,parked,for,unknown,period]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[received,information,from,public,informant]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
[main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,if,all,vehicle,parts,have,been,
searched]
[only,vehicle,containers,have,been,searched]
[the,vehicle,was,searched,at,police,station]
[accepted,that,the,search,scope,is,illegal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle,but,the,search,
scope,was,illegal]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[accepted,that,not,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection]
[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,not,
provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are,not,
provided]
[items,were,inside,the,boot,it,can,be,not,seen,by,public]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
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[illegal,goods]
[double,locked,and,protected]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,
or,connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,
clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,
not,specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[accepted,that,there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[reduce,expectation,of,exigency]
[privacy,is,not,justified,under,automobile,exception]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,defendant]
true.
South dakota v. Opperman
go(sdvo).
[it,is,a,vehicle,cite,carroll,v,us]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,parked]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[accepted,that,vehicle,location,is,not,specified]
[the,vehicle,was,parked,in,public,parking]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,was,parked,for,unknown,period]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,by,
information,received]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,by,observation]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,a,procedure,
or,procedure,is,not,clarified]
[accepted,that,origin,of,probable,cause,is,not,authorized,or,
not,clarified]
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[main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public,cite,
carrol,v,us]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched,cite,carrol,v,us,
and,us,v,ross]
[the,vehicle,was,searched,at,the,same,automobile,location]
[the,search,scope,is,legal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[accepted,that,not,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection]
[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are
,not,provided]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,that,items,can,not,be,seen]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
[illegal,goods]
[accepted,that,protection,level,can,not,be,determined]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,
or,connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,
clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,not,
specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[justified,under,automobile,exception,cite,carroll,v,us]
[reduced,expectation,of,privacy]
[warrantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,plaintiff]
[********************]
[dissenting,argument]
[it,is,a,vehicle]
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[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[paper,bag,is,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[justified,under,automobile,exception]
[enlarge,scope,of,fourth,amendment,exception]
[any,container,inside,automobile,shows,enough,privacy,
interest]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
true .
Cady v. Dombrowski
[it,is,a,vehicle,cite,carroll,v,us]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,crashed]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[accepted,that,vehicle,location,is,not,specified]
[the,vehicle,was,parked,in,public,parking]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,was,parked,for,unknown,period]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,by,
information,received]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,by,observation]
[inspection,procedure,cite,harris,v,us,and,preston,v,us]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
[accepted,that,main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public]
[main,reason,to,search,was,due,to,a,crime]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched,cite,carrol,v,us,
and,us,v,ross]
[the,vehicle,was,searched,at,a,garage]
[the,search,scope,is,legal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[accepted,that,not,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection]
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[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[items,can,be,seen,by,public]
[item,is,visible,to,public]
[accepted,that,goods,carried,are,unknown]
[accepted,that,protection,level,can,not,be,determined]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,
or,connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,
clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,
not,specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[justified,under,automobile,exception,cite,carroll,v,us]
[reduced,expectation,of,privacy]
[warrantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,plaintiff]
[********************]
[dissenting,argument]
[it,is,a,vehicle]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[the,vehicle,is,crashed,and,not,capable,to,move]
[accepted,that,there,was,no,exigency,when,approached]
[there,is,no,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[it,is,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[reduce,expectation,of,exigency]
[privacy,required,it,is,not,justified,under,automobile,exception]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
true .
Collidge v. New Hampshire
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| go(cvnh).
[it,is,a,vehicle]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,no,urgent,status,automobile,was,parked]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,is,capable,to,move]
[the,vehicle,was,in,private,location]
[the,vehicle,was,parked,in,private,parking]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,was,parked,for,unknown,period]
[accepted,that,there,was,no,exigency,when,approached]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,by,
information,received]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,by,observation]
[inspection,procedure]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
[accepted,that,main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,searching,location,is,not,clarified]
[the,search,scope,is,legal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[accepted,that,not,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection]
[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,that,items,can,not,be,seen]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
[accepted,that,goods,carried,are,unknown]
[accepted,that,protection,level,can,not,be,determined]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,
or,connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,
clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,
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not,specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[there,was,no,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[warrant,obtained,but,not,authorized]
[reduce,expectation,of,exigency]
[high,expectation,of,privacy,obtained,warrant,was,issued,by,
neutral,and,
detached,magistrate,and,not,authorized]
[warrantless,search,violates,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,defendant]
true.
Chambers v. Maroney
| go(cvm).
[it,is,a,vehicle]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,an,urgent,status,when,vehicle,is,moving]
[the,vehicle,was,in,public,location]
[accepted,that,vehicle,was,not,parked]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,by,
information,received]
[accepted,that,the,origin,probable,cause,is,not,by,observation]
[inspection,procedure]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
[accepted,that,main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,
the,public]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched]
[accepted,that,the,vehicle,searching,location,is,not,
clarified]
[the,search,scope,is,legal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[accepted,that,not,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection]
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[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are,
not,provided]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,that,items,can,not,be,seen]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
[accepted,that,goods,carried,are,unknown]
[accepted,that,protection,level,can,not,be,determined]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,
or,connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,
clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,not,
specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[accepted,that,there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[justified,under,automobile,exception]
[reduced,expectation,of,privacy]
[warrantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,plaintiff]
true.
Carroll v. US
go(cvus).
[it,is,a,vehicle]
[accepted,that,no,largeContainers]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,a,movableContainer]
[it,is,a,mobile]
[there,was,an,urgent,status,when,vehicle,is,moving]
[accepted,that,vehicle,location,is,not,specified]
[accepted,that,vehicle,was,not,parked]
[there,was,exigency,when,approached]
[received,information,from,public,informant]
[there,was,an,authorized,origin,of,probable,cause]
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[main,reason,to,search,was,to,protect,the,public]
[the,main,reason,to,search,was,urgent]
[all,vehicle,parts,have,been,searched]
[the,vehicle,was,searched,at,the,same,automobile,location]
[the,search,scope,is,legal]
[there,is,a,probable,cause,to,search,vehicle]
[accepted,that,all,automobiles,are,registered]
[accepted,that,not,restricted,area]
[subject,to,regular,inspection]
[accepted,that,item,is,not,on,public,view,or,details,are,not,
provided]
[accepted,that,can,not,be,seen,by,public,or,details,are,not,
provided]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,clear,that,items,can,not,be,seen]
[accepted,that,it,is,not,visible,to,public]
[illegal,goods]
[accepted,that,protection,level,can,not,be,determined]
[accepted,that,contents,are,not,considered,private]
[accepted,that,none,of,living,main,services,are,specified,or,
connected]
[accepted,that,not,connected,to,one,or,more,main,living,
services]
[accepted,that,vehicle,accommodation,spaces,are,not,
clarified]
[accepted,that,there,are,no,rooms,or,rooms,function,is,not,
specified]
[accepted,that,the,place,is,not,used,for,accommodation]
[accepted,that,low,expectation,of,privacy,in,use]
[accepted,that,there,is,risk,to,lose,evidence]
[accepted,that,magistrate,are,not,available]
[accepted,that,authorized,magistrate,are,not,available]
[it,is,not,easy,to,obtain,warrant]
[justified,under,automobile,exception]
[reduced,expectation,of,privacy]
[warrantless,search,did,not,violate,the,fourth,amendment]
[find,for,the,plaintiff]
true.

Bibliography
[1] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, Dialogues in US
Supreme Court oral hearings, Proceedings of CMNA 2013, 2013, In press, see:
http://www.cmna.info/CMNA13/paper 8.pdf.
[2] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, From oral hearing to
opinion in the US Supreme Court, Proceedings of JURIX 2013, 2013, pp. 1–10.
[3] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, Abstract Dialectical
Frameworks for legal reasoning, Proceedings of Jurix 2014, 2014, pp. 61–70.
[4] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, Support for factor-
based argumentation, Computational Models of Argument - Proceedings of COMMA
2014, Atholl Palace Hotel, Scottish Highlands, UK, September 9-12, 2014, 2014,
pp. 447–448.
[5] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, Evaluating the use of
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks to represent case law, Proceedings of the 15th Interna-
tional Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL ’15, ACM, 2015, pp. 156–
160.
[6] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, Factors, issues and
values: Revisiting reasoning with cases, Proceedings of the 15th International Conference
on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL ’15, ACM, 2015, pp. 3–12.
[7] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, Using Abstract Dialec-
tical Frameworks to argue about legal cases., D. Mohammed and M. Lewinski (eds.),
Argumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the First European Conference on
Argumentation, vol. II, College Publications, London, 2015, pp. 163–180.
[8] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, A methodology for de-
signing systems to reason with legal cases using Abstract Dialectical Frameworks, Arti-
ficial Intelligence and Law 24 (2016), no. 1, 1–49.
[9] Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon, ANGELIC secrets:
Bridging from factors to facts in US trade secrets, Legal Knowledge and Information
Systems - JURIX 2016: The Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference, 2016, pp. 113–118.
307
Bibliography 308
[10] Vincent Aleven, Teaching case-based argumentation through a model and examples,
Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1997.
[11] Vincent Aleven and Kevin Ashley, Doing things with factors, Proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL ’95, 1995, pp. 31–41.
[12] Leila Amgoud and Claudette Cayrol, On the acceptability of arguments in preference-
based argumentation, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Arti-
ficial Intelligence, 1998, pp. 1–7.
[13] Michal Araszkiewicz, Agata Lopatkiewicz, Adam Zienkiewicz, and Tomasz Zurek, Rep-
resentation of an actual divorce dispute in the parenting plan support system, Proceed-
ings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL 2015,
2015, pp. 166–170.
[14] Kevin Ashley, Modelling legal argument: Reasoning with cases and hypotheticals, Brad-
ford Books/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
[15] Kevin Ashley, Teaching a process model of legal argument with hypotheticals, Artificial
Intelligence and Law 17 (2009), no. 4, 321–370.
[16] Kevin Ashley, What a legal CBR ontology should provide, Proceedings of the Twenty-
Second International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, 2009.
[17] Kevin Ashley and Stefanie Bru¨ninghaus, A predictive role for intermediate legal concepts,
Proceedings of JURIX 2003, 2003, pp. 1–10.
[18] Kevin Ashley and Stefanie Bru¨ninghaus, Automatically classifying case texts and predict-
ing outcomes., Artificial Intelligence and Law. 17 (2009), no. 2, 125–165.
[19] Kevin Ashley, Collin Lynch, Niels Pinkwart, and Vincent Aleven, A process model of
legal argument with hypotheticals, JURIX 2008: The Twenty-First Annual Conference
on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems, 2008, pp. 1–10.
[20] Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon, Legal case-based reasoning as practical rea-
soning, Artificial Intelligence and Law 13 (2005), no. 1, 93–131.
[21] Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon, Argumentation and standards of proof,
ICAIL’07: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
and Law (Palo Alto, CA, USA), ACM Press: New York, NY, 2007, pp. 107–116.
[22] Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon, Practical reasoning as presumptive argumenta-
tion using action based alternating transition systems, Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007),
no. 10-15, 855–874.
[23] Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon, and Peter McBurney, Computational representa-
tion of practical argument, Synthese 152 (2006), no. 2, 157–206.
Bibliography 309
[24] Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon, Henry Prakken, and Adam Wyner, Argumentation
schemes for reasoning about factors with dimensions, Proceedings of 26th International
Conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems (JURIX 2013) (2013), 39–48.
[25] Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon, and Douglas Walton, Distinctive features of per-
suasion and deliberation dialogues, Argument & Computation 4 (2013), no. 2, 105–127.
[26] John Langshaw Austin, How to do things with words, Harvard University Press, 1975.
[27] Pietro Baroni, Federico Cerutti, Massimiliano Giacomin, and Giovanni Guida, Encom-
passing attacks to attacks in abstract argumentation frameworks, Symbolic and Quantita-
tive Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty, 10th European Conference, ECSQARU
2009 2009., 2009, pp. 83–94.
[28] Trevor Bench-Capon, Persuasion in practical argument using value-based argumentation
frameworks, Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (2003), no. 3, 429–448.
[29] Trevor Bench-Capon, Relating values in a series of supreme court decisions, Proceedings
of JURIX 2011, IOS Press, 2011, pp. 13–22.
[30] Trevor Bench-Capon, Representing Popov v Hayashi with dimensions and factors, Arti-
ficial Intelligence and Law 20 (2012), no. 1, 15–35.
[31] Trevor Bench-Capon, Michal Araszkiewicz, Kevin Ashley, Katie Atkinson, Floris Bex,
Filipe Borges, Danie`le Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, Jack Conrad, Enrico Francesconi,
Thomas Gordon, Guido Governatori, Jochen Leidner, David Lewis, Ronald Prescott
Loui, L. Thorne McCarty, Henry Prakken, Frank Schilder, Erich Schweighofer, Paul
Thompson, Alex Tyrrell, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton, and Adam Zachary Wyner, A
history of AI and law in 50 papers: 25 years of the international conference on AI and
law, Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2012), no. 3, 215–319.
[32] Trevor Bench-Capon and Floris Bex, Cases and stories, dimensions and scripts, Legal
Knowledge and Information Systems - JURIX 2015: The Twenty-Eighth Annual Confer-
ence, Braga, Portual, December 10-11, 2015, 2015, pp. 11–20.
[33] Trevor Bench-Capon and Paul Dunne, Argumentation in artificial intelligence, Artificial
Intelligence 171 (2007), no. 10, 619–641.
[34] Trevor Bench-Capon, T. Geldard, and Paul Leng, A method for the computational mod-
elling of dialectical argument with dialogue games, Artificial Intelligence and Law 8
(2000), no. 2/3, 233–254.
[35] Trevor Bench-Capon and Sanjay Modgil, Case law in extended argumentation frame-
works, In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and
Law, ACM Press, 2009, pp. 118–127.
[36] Trevor Bench-Capon, Henry Prakken, and Giovanni Sartor, Argumentation in legal rea-
soning, pp. 363–382, Springer US, Boston, MA, 2009.
Bibliography 310
[37] Trevor Bench-Capon and Edwina Rissland, Back to the future: dimensions revisited, Pro-
ceedings of JURIX 2001, IOS Press, 2001, pp. 41–52.
[38] Trevor Bench-Capon and Giovanni Sartor, A model of legal reasoning with cases incor-
porating theories and values, Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003), no. 1-2, 97–143.
[39] Trevor BenchCapon, Frans Coenen, and Paul Orton, Argument Based Explanation of the
British Nationality Act as a logic program, Information & Communications Technology
Law 2 (1993), no. 1, 53–66.
[40] Donald Berman and Carole Hafner, Representing teleological structure in case-based
legal reasoning: The missing link, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on
Artificial intelligence and Law, 1993, pp. 50–59.
[41] Donald Berman and Carole Hafner, Understanding precedents in a temporal context of
evolving legal doctrine, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence and Law, 1995, pp. 42–51.
[42] Floris Bex, Arguments, stories and criminal evidence: A formal hybrid theory, Springer,
2011.
[43] Floris Bex, An integrated theory of causal stories and evidential arguments, Proceedings
of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL 2015,
2015, pp. 13–22.
[44] Floris Bex, Henry Prakken, Chris Reed, and Douglas Walton, Towards a formal account
of reasoning about evidence: argumentation schemes and generalisations, Artificial In-
telligence and Law 11 (2003), no. 2, 125–165.
[45] Floris Bex and Chris Reed, Dialogue templates for automatic argument processing, Com-
putational Models of Argument - Proceedings of COMMA 2012, 2012, pp. 366–377.
[46] Floris Bex and Bart Verheij, Legal stories and the process of proof, Artif. Intell. Law 21
(2013), no. 3, 253–278.
[47] L. Karl Branting, Representing and reusing explanations of legal precedents, Proceedings
of the 2nd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL ’89, ACM,
1989, pp. 103–110.
[48] L. Karl Branting, Reasoning with portions of precedents, Proceedings of the 3rd Interna-
tional Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ACM, 1991, pp. 145–154.
[49] L. Karl Branting, An issue-oriented approach to judicial document assembly, Proceed-
ings of the 4th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ACM, 1993,
pp. 228–235.
Bibliography 311
[50] Joost Breuker and Nienke den Haan, Separating world and regulation knowledge: Where
is the logic, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
and Law, ACM Press, 1991, pp. 92–97.
[51] Gerhard Brewka, Paul Dunne, and Stefan Woltran, Relating the semantics of Abstract
Dialectical Frameworks and standard AFs, Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011, pp. 780–785.
[52] Gerhard Brewka and Thomas Gordon, Carneades and Abstract Dialectical Frameworks:
A reconstruction, Proceedings of the 2010 Conference on Computational Models of Ar-
gument: (COMMA) 2010 (Amsterdam, The Netherlands), IOS Press, 2010, pp. 3–12.
[53] Gerhard Brewka, Hannes Strass, Stefan Ellmauthaler, Johannes Peter Wallner, and Stefan
Woltran, Abstract Dialectical Frameworks Revisited, 23rd International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, 2013, pp. 803–809.
[54] Gerhard Brewka and Stefan Woltran, Abstract Dialectical Frameworks, Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Twelfth International
Conference, 2010, pp. 102–111.
[55] Stefanie Bru¨ninghaus and Kevin Ashley, Predicting outcomes of case-based legal argu-
ments, ICAIL’03: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence and Law, ACM Press, 2003, pp. 233–242.
[56] Claudette Cayrol and Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex, Bipolar abstract argumentation
systems, Guillermo Simari and Iyad Rahwan (Eds), Argumentation in Artificial Intelli-
gence, Springer US, 2009, pp. pp 65–84.
[57] Alison Chorley and Trevor Bench-Capon, AGATHA: using heuristic search to automate
the construction of case law theories, Artificial Intelligence and Law 13 (2005), no. 1,
9–51 (English).
[58] Alison Chorley and Trevor Bench-Capon, An empirical investigation of reasoning with
legal cases through theory construction and application, Artificial Intelligence and Law
13 (2005), no. 3-4, 323–371.
[59] Keith Clark, Negation as failure, Herve Gallaire and Jack Minkler (Eds), Logic and data
bases, Springer, 1978, pp. 293–322.
[60] Joe Collenette, EFACTS automating annotations of US Supreme Court oral hearings,
2015, University of Liverpool, BSc Dissertation.
[61] Phan Minh Dung, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in non-
monotonic reasoning, logic programming, and n-person games, Artificial Intelligence 77
(1995), 321–357.
Bibliography 312
[62] Paul Dunne, Sylvie Doutre, and Trevor Bench-Capon, Discovering inconsistency through
examination dialogues, IJCAI-05, Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, 2005, pp. 1680–1681.
[63] Stefan Ellmauthaler and Hannes Strass, The DIAMOND system for computing with Ab-
stract Dialectical Frameworks, Computational Models of Argument - Proceedings of
COMMA 2014, 2014, pp. 233–240.
[64] Arthur Farley and Kathleen Freeman, Burden of proof in legal argumentation, Proceed-
ings of the 5th international conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ACM, 1995,
pp. 156–164.
[65] Timothy Finin, Richard Fritzson, Donald McKay, and Robin McEntire, KQML as an
agent communication language, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on
Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM’94), 1994, pp. 456–463.
[66] TCC FIPA, FIPA Communicative Act library Specification, Available from the website
http://www.fipa.org, 2001, Technical Report XC00037H, Foundation for Intelli-
gent Physical Agents, 10th August 2001.
[67] James Fowler, Timothy Johnson, James Spriggs, Sangick Jeon, and Paul Wahlbeck, Net-
work analysis and the law: Measuring the legal importance of precedents at the u.s.
supreme court, Political Analysis 15 (2007), no. 3, 324–346.
[68] Anne von der Lieth Gardner, An artificial intelligence approach to legal reasoning, MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1984.
[69] Wilfred Glover, Automating Annotation of Legal Documents, 2016, University of Liver-
pool, BSc Dissertation.
[70] Thomas Gordon, The Pleadings Game: Formalizing procedural justice, Proceedings of
the Fourth ICAIL, 1993, pp. 10–19.
[71] Thomas Gordon, Henry Prakken, and Douglas Walton, The Carneades model of argument
and burden of proof, Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007), no. 10-15, 875–896.
[72] Thomas Gordon and Douglas Walton, Pierson vs. post revisited - A reconstruction using
the carneades argumentation framework, Computational Models of Argument: Proceed-
ings of COMMA 2006, September 11-12, 2006, Liverpool, UK, 2006, pp. 208–219.
[73] Thomas Gordon and Douglas Walton, Legal reasoning with argumentation schemes, Pro-
ceedings of the 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL
’09, ACM, 2009, pp. 137–146.
[74] Thomas Gordon and Douglas Walton, Proof burdens and standards, pp. 239–258,
Springer US, Boston, MA, 2009.
Bibliography 313
[75] Thomas Gordon and Douglas Walton, A carneades reconstruction of popov v hayashi,
Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2012), no. 1, 37–56.
[76] Matthias Grabmair and Kevin Ashley, Argumentation with value judgments - an example
of hypothetical reasoning, Legal Knowledge and Information Systems - JURIX 2010:
The Twenty-Third Annual Conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems,
2010, pp. 67–76.
[77] Thomas Gruber, The role of common ontology in achieving sharable, reusable knowledge
bases, Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Rep-
resentation and Reasoning (KR’91). Cambridge, MA, USA, April 22-25, 1991., 1991,
pp. 601–602.
[78] Carole Hafner, Conceptual organization of case law knowledge bases, Proceedings of the
First International Conference on AI and Law, 1987, pp. 35–42.
[79] Charles Leonard Hamblin, Fallacies, London: Methuen, 1970.
[80] Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press,
2012.
[81] John Henderson and Trevor Bench-Capon, Dynamic arguments in a case law domain,
Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law,
ICAIL 2001, 2001, pp. 60–69.
[82] Rinke Hoekstra, Joost Breuker, Marcello Di Bello, and Alexander Boer, The LKIF core
ontology of basic legal concepts., LOAIT 321 (2007), 43–63.
[83] John Horty and Trevor Bench-Capon, A factor-based definition of precedential constraint,
Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2012), no. 2, 181–214.
[84] Michael Bommarito II, Daniel Martin Katz, and Jon Zelner, Law as a seamless web?:
comparison of various network representations of the united states supreme court cor-
pus (1791-2005), The 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law,
Proceedings of the Conference, June 8-12, 2009, Barcelona, Spain, 2009, pp. 234–235.
[85] Peter Johnson and David Mead, Legislative knowledge base systems for public adminis-
tration: some practical issues, Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Artifi-
cial intelligence and law, ACM, 1991, pp. 108–117.
[86] Jeroen Keppens, Towards qualitative approaches to Bayesian evidential reasoning, Pro-
ceedings of the 11th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ACM,
2007, pp. 17–25.
[87] Marc Lauritsen, On balance, Artificial Intelligence and Law 23 (2015), no. 1, 23–42.
[88] Edward Levi, An introduction to legal reasoning, The University of Chicago Law Review
15 (1948), no. 3, 501–574.
Bibliography 314
[89] Lars Lindahl and Jan Odelstad, Intermediaries and intervenients in normative systems,
Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2008), no. 2, 229–250.
[90] Arno Lodder, DiaLaw. on legal justification and dialogical models of argumentation,
Kluwer, 1999.
[91] Arno Lodder, A simple model to structure the information of parties in online alterna-
tive dispute resolution, Proceedings of the Eigths International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence and Law, ICAIL 2001, 2001, p. 233.
[92] Arno Lodder and Aime´e Herczog, DiaLaw: A dialogical framework for modeling legal
reasoning, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
and Law, ICAIL ’95, 1995, pp. 146–155.
[93] Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The next step forward, Minnesota Law Review 33 (1949),
no. 5, 455 – 493.
[94] L. Lutomski, The design of an attorney’s statistical consultant, Proceedings of the Second
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL ’89, 1989, pp. 224–
233.
[95] J.D. MacKenzie, Question-begging in non-cumulative systems, Journal of Philosophical
Logic 8 (1979), 159–177.
[96] C. Marshall, Representing the structure of a legal argument, Proceedings of the Second
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL ’89, 1989, pp. 121–
127.
[97] L. Thorne McCarty, An implementation of Eisner v. Macomber, Proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL ’95, College Park,
Maryland, USA, May 21-24, 1995, 1995, pp. 276–286.
[98] Thorne McCarty, Reflections on TAXMAN: An experiment in artificial intelligence and
legal reasoning, Harvard Law Review (1977), 837–893.
[99] Sanjay Modgil and Trevor Bench-Capon, Metalevel argumentation, Journal of Logic and
Computation 21 (2011), no. 6, 959–1003.
[100] Sanjay Modgil and Henry Prakken, Reasoning about preferences in structured ex-
tended argumentation frameworks, Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of
COMMA 2010., 2010, pp. 347–358.
[101] Sanjay Modgil and Henry Prakken, The ASPIC+ framework for structured argumenta-
tion: a tutorial, Argument & Computation 5 (2014), no. 1, 31–62.
[102] Monica Palmirani, Guido Governatori, and Giuseppe Contissa, Modelling temporal le-
gal rules, The 13th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2011,
pp. 131–135.
Bibliography 315
[103] Henry Prakken, From logic to dialectics in legal argument, Proceedings of the 5th In-
ternational Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (New York, NY, USA), ACM,
1995, pp. 165–174.
[104] Henry Prakken, Formal systems for persuasion dialogue, Knowledge Engineering Re-
view 21 (2006), no. 2, 163–188.
[105] Henry Prakken, An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments,
Argument & Computation 1 (2010), no. 2, 93–124.
[106] Henry Prakken, Formalising a legal opinion on a legislative proposal in the ASPIC+
framework, Legal Knowledge and Information Systems - JURIX 2012: The Twenty-Fifth
Annual Conference, 2012, pp. 119–128.
[107] Henry Prakken and Giovanni Sartor, A dialectical model of assessing conflicting argu-
ments in legal reasoning, Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (1996), no. 3-4, 331–368.
[108] Henry Prakken and Giovanni Sartor, Modelling reasoning with precedents in a formal
dialogue game, Artificial Intelligence and Law 6 (1998), no. 2-4, 231–287.
[109] Henry Prakken and Giovanni Sartor, Formalising arguments about the burden of persua-
sion, The 11th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ACM, 2007,
pp. 97–106.
[110] Henry Prakken and Giovanni Sartor, Law andLogic: A review from an argumentation
perspective, Artificial Intelligence 227 (2015), 214–245.
[111] Henry Prakken, Adam Zachary Wyner, Trevor Bench-Capon, and Katie Atkinson, A for-
malization of argumentation schemes for legal case-based reasoning in ASPIC+, Journal
of Logic and Computation 25 (2015), no. 5, 1141–1166.
[112] Roger Pressman, Software engineering: a practitioner’s approach, Palgrave Macmillan,
2005.
[113] Chris Reed and Glenn Rowe, Araucaria: Software for argument analysis, diagramming
and representation, International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools 13 (2004), no. 4,
983–.
[114] Adam Rigoni, An improved factor based approach to precedential constraint, Artificial
Intelligence and Law 23 (2015), no. 2, 133–160.
[115] Edwina Rissland, Dimension-based analysis of hypotheticals from Supreme Court oral
argument, Proceedings of the Second ICAIL, ACM, 1989, pp. 111–120.
[116] Edwina Rissland and Kevin Ashley, A case-based system for trade secrets law, Proceed-
ings of the First International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL ’87,
1987, pp. 60–66.
Bibliography 316
[117] Edwina Rissland, David Skalak, and M. Timur Friedman, BankXX: Supporting legal ar-
guments through heuristic retrieval, Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (1996), no. 1, 1–71.
[118] Edwina Rissland, David Skalak, and M. Timur Friedman, Evaluating a legal argument
program: The bankXX experiments, Artificial Intelligence and Law 5 (1997), no. 1-2,
1–74.
[119] John Searle, Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language, Cambridge University
Press, 1969.
[120] Marek Sergot, Fariba Sadri, Robert Kowalski, Frank Kriwaczek, Peter Hammond, and
Terese Cory, The British Nationality Act as a logic program, Communications of the
ACM 29 (1986), no. 5, 370–386.
[121] David. Skalak and Edwina Rissland, Arguments and cases: An inevitable intertwining,
Artificial Intelligence and Law 1 (1992), no. 1, 3–44.
[122] J. C. Smith, Daphne Gelbart, Keith MacCrimmon, Bruce Atherton, John McClean,
Michelle Shinehoft, and Lincoln Quintana, Artificial intelligence and legal discourse:
The flexlaw legal text management system, Artificial Intelligence and Law 3 (1995), no. 1-
2, 55–95.
[123] Sjoerd Timmer, John-Jules Meyer, Henry Prakken, Silja Renooij, and Bart Verheij, A
structure-guided approach to capturing bayesian reasoning about legal evidence in ar-
gumentation, Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
and Law (New York, NY, USA), ICAIL ’15, ACM, 2015, pp. 109–118.
[124] Stephen Toulmin, The uses of argument, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
[125] Caroline Uyttendaele, Marie-Francine Moens, and Jos Dumortier, Salomon: Automatic
abstracting of legal cases for effective access to court decisions, Artificial Intelligence
and Law 6 (1998), no. 1, 59–79.
[126] A. Valente, Legal knowledge engineering: A modelling approach, Frontiers in artificial
intelligence and applications, IOS Press, 1995.
[127] Bas van Gijzel and Henry Prakken, Relating Carneades with abstract argumentation
via the ASPIC+ framework for structured argumentation, Argument & Computation 3
(2012), no. 1, 21–47.
[128] Pepijn R. S. Visser and Trevor Bench-Capon, A comparison of four ontologies for the
design of legal knowledge systems, Artificial Intelligence and Law 6 (1998), no. 1, 27–
57.
[129] P.R.S. Visser, Knowledge specification for multiple legal tasks: a case study of the in-
teraction problem in the legal domain, Computer/law series, Kluwer Law International,
1995.
Bibliography 317
[130] Friedrich Waismann, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, Macmillan, 1965.
[131] Douglas Walton, Types of dialogue and burdens of proof, Proceedings of the 2010 Con-
ference on Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2010 (Ams-
terdam, The Netherlands), IOS Press, 2010, pp. 13–24.
[132] Douglas Walton, Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning, Taylor & Francis,
2013.
[133] Douglas Walton and Eric Krabbe, Commitment in Dialogue: Basic concepts of interper-
sonal reasoning, Suny Series, Logic & Language, State University of New York Press,
1995.
[134] Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, and Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008.
[135] Maya Wardeh, Trevor Bench-Capon, and Frans Coenen, PADUA: a protocol for argu-
mentation dialogue using association rules, Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (2009),
no. 3, 183–215.
[136] Maya Wardeh, Frans Coenen, and Trevor Bench-Capon, Multi-agent based classification
using argumentation from experience, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 25
(2012), no. 3, 447–474.
[137] Maya Wardeh, Frans Coenen, and Trevor Bench-Capon, PISA: A framework for multia-
gent classification using argumentation, Data Knowledge. Engineering 75 (2012), 34–57.
[138] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. translated by anscombe, G.E.M.,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
[139] Adam Wyner and Rinke Hoekstra, A legal case OWL ontology with an instantiation of
Popov v. Hayashi, Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2012), no. 1, 83–107.
[140] Adam Wyner and Wim Peters, Lexical semantics and expert legal knowledge towards
the identification of legal case factors, Legal Knowledge and Information Systems - JU-
RIX 2010: The Twenty-Third Annual Conference on Legal Knowledge and Information
Systems,, 2010, pp. 127–136.
[141] Adam Wyner and Wim Peters, On rule extraction from regulations, Legal Knowledge
and Information Systems - JURIX 2011: The Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference, 2011,
pp. 113–122.
[142] Adam Wyner, Wim Peters, and Daniel Katz, A case study on legal case annotation, Legal
Knowledge and Information Systems - JURIX 2013: The Twenty-Sixth Annual Confer-
ence, 2013, pp. 165–174.
[143] Adam Zachary Wyner, An ontology in OWL for legal case-based reasoning, Artificial
Intelligence and Law 16 (2008), no. 4, 361–387.
Bibliography 318
[144] Adam Zachary Wyner, Trevor Bench-Capon, and Katie Atkinson, Arguments, values and
baseballs: Representation of Popov v. Hayashi, Legal Knowledge and Information Sys-
tems - JURIX 2007: The Twentieth Annual Conference on Legal Knowledge and Infor-
mation Systems, 2007, pp. 151–160.
[145] Adam Zachary Wyner, Trevor Bench-Capon, and Katie Atkinson, Towards formalising
argumentation about legal cases, The 13th International Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence and Law, Proceedings of the Conference, 2011, pp. 1–10.
[146] Tomasz Zurek and Michal Araszkiewicz, Modeling teleological interpretation, Proceed-
ings of the 14th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2013,
pp. 160–168.
